Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the family court denying Defendant's motion seeking visitation with his minor daughter, whom he shared with Plaintiff, holding that the family court did not err or abuse its discretion.Upon Defendant's incarceration, Plaintiff filed a complaint for divorce. The family court entered a judgment of divorce awarding Plaintiff sole legal custody and physical placement of the parties' son and daughter and denying visitation rights to Plaintiff. Plaintiff later filed a motion seeking visits with his daughter at the Adult Correctional Institutions. The trial justice denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial justice did not err in denying Defendant's motion to modify visitation. View "Brooks v. Brooks" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Oklahoma Supreme Court’s review was whether the Court of Civil Appeals properly applied the laws on parental rights in a dispute between a married couple regarding custody and visitation with a minor child who was adopted by only one of the parties prior to marriage. The Supreme Court held that it did not: the child was adopted by Respondent-Appellee Adrieanna Guzman (Adrieanna) prior to the marriage. Petitioner-Appellant Carmen Guzman (Carmen) never adopted the child. As a step-parent, Carmen had no standing to petition the court for paternity of the child. Thus, the Court of Civil Appeals' opinion was vacated, and the trial court's order granting Adrieanna's motion to dismiss was affirmed. View "Guzman v. Guzman" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the family court denying Plaintiff's motion to modify visitation and contact with the two children he shared with Defendant, holding that the family court did not err.In denying Plaintiff's motion, the trial justice found that there was "not a scintilla of evidence" in the record to show that it was in the children's best interests to see or communicate with Plaintiff while he was incarcerated. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the family court did not err or abuse his discretion in denying Plaintiff's request to restore visitation and mandate contact with the children where he found no evidence to indicate that it was in the children's best interests to have a relationship with Plaintiff while he was incarcerated. View "Murray v. Jones" on Justia Law

In January 2019, the Agency filed a dependency petition concerning Daniel, then about 42 months old, based on Mother's untreated substance abuse. The petition alleged that Father’s whereabouts and ability and willingness to care for Daniel were unknown. Mother did not have Father's contact information but believed he resided in Mexico. The Agency contacted Father’s sister, Ana, in May 2019. In September 2019, Father was designated “not present.” The Agency reported its efforts to locate him. In October, the juvenile court terminated reunification services to Mother, and set the matter for a February 2020 permanency planning hearing. In November, Ana provided a telephone number for Father and said he was living in Mexico City “with no stable address.” The Agency left telephone messages but received no response. In January 2020, the juvenile court found that the Agency had exercised due diligence in searching for Father. At a February hearing, Mother did not appear, and the Agency reported that Father had been given notice by publication. In May, 2020, after contacting Ana, the Agency made telephone contact with Father, who opposed adoption, wanted custody, and requested an attorney.Ultimately, the juvenile court terminated parental rights, and placed Daniel for adoption. The court of appeal affirmed the denial of Mother’s oral request to continue the permanency planning hearing but reversed the order denying Father’s petition to vacate the disposition order. Liberally construing Father’s petition, Father was entitled to an evidentiary hearing as to whether the Agency ignored the most likely means of finding him, denying him due process. View "In re Daniel F." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court terminating Father's parental rights to his daughter, Julie, holding that the evidence supported the trial court's finding that Father engaged in conduct that endangered Julie's physical or emotional well-being.Julie was an infant when Father reported to prison. Father emerged from prison when Julie was an adolescent and living with a foster family with her half-sisters. After a hearing, the trial court found by clear and convincing evidence that the State had met its burden of proof to terminate Father's parental rights to Julie on the ground that Father had engaged in conduct or knowingly placed Julie with persons who engaged in conduct that endangered the physical or emotional well-being of Julie. The court further found that termination of Father's parental rights was in Julie's best interest. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the evidence supported the trial court's findings and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in terminating Father's parental rights. View "In re J.F.-G." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court granting Kathryn Tierney's post-divorce motion to determine a metes and bounds description for the parties' marital home and awarding Kathryn a 5.24-acre parcel created from the original parcels of land, holding that the district court did not err.The decree dissolving the marriage of Kathryn and Lawrence Tierney also divided the martial property, including certain tracts of real property. The court of appeals modified the decree in part by awarding Lawrence certain parcels originally awarded to Kathryn and awarding the martial home to Kathryn. Because the home was located on one of the tracts of land that had been awarded to Lawrence Kathryn motioned for a metes and bounds description for the home. Kathryn sought a minimum parcel of 5.24 acres, and Lawrence argued for a one-acre tract. The district court granted Kathryn's motion and awarded her a 5.24-acre tract of land. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that there was no merit to Lawrence's assignments of error. View "Tierney v. Tierney" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the adjudication of the juvenile court adjudicating Mother's fourth child, A.W., a child in need of assistance (CINA), holding that the State failed to offer clear and convincing evidence that A.W. was at imminent risk of harm from Mother's failure to "exercise a reasonable degree of care in supervising" A.W., as required to support adjudication under Iowa Code 232.2(6)(c)(2).A.W. was born in April 2020. On April 2, 2021, the Supreme Court reversed the termination of Mother's parental rights to her three older children. The juvenile court adjudicated A.W. as a CINA based on two grounds - Iowa Code 232.2(6)(n) and section 232.2(6)(c)(2). The court of appeals reversed the adjudication based on section 232.2(6)(n) but affirmed on section 232.2(6)(c)(2) grounds. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that A.W. should not have been adjudicated CINA, and therefore, the juvenile court erred. View "In re A.W." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decree of the district court dissolving the marriage of the parties in this case, Tyron Alli and Patricia Seivert, and dividing the marital estate, holding that neither party was entitled to relief on their claims of error.Specifically, the Supreme Court held that the district court did not err by (1) including in the marital estate property that Alli obtained after the parties separated and the complaint for dissolution was filed; (2) ordering Alli to pay alimony; (3) ordering Alli to pay attorney fees; (4) ordering Alli to pay the children's educational expenses; (5) determining the value of Alli's business interests; and (6) failing to find that the parties were putatively married in June 1996. View "Seivert v. Alli" on Justia Law

The parent in this case, J.C., contended that the Department of Children, Youth and Families (DCYF) did not tailor its offer of services to accommodate her intellectual disability prior to recommending termination of her parental rights. “Understandable offers of services are essential to giving a parent a meaningful opportunity to remedy their parental deficiencies and preserve their parent-child relationship. … A termination is certainly erroneous where DCYF did not fulfill its duty to understandably offer services to the parent. Absent sufficient evidence proving that DCYF fulfilled this duty, it is not possible for a court to determine why efforts to reunite the family were unsuccessful. Perhaps the parent was unwilling or unable to remedy their deficiencies. Or perhaps the parent was capable of improvement but struggling to understand precisely what they must do. Both situations are frustrating and potentially devastating for those involved, but there is a world of difference between them.” In this case, the Washington Supreme Court concluded DCYF did not prove by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence that it made sufficient efforts to ensure that its offers of services were reasonably understandable to J.C. in light of her potential intellectual disability. It therefore reversed the order terminating her parental rights. View "In re Termination of Parental Rights to M.A.S.C." on Justia Law

Diana initiated divorce proceedings from Gregory in 2007. A final judgment dissolving the marriage and allocating marital property was entered in 2009 and was affirmed in 2012. Both parties filed post-decree petitions. Diana appealed a series of orders, arguing as a threshold issue that the court erred in denying her motion for substitution of judge as of right. The appellate court (Crecos II) agreed that the trial court erred in denying Diana’s motion and that subsequent orders were “void.” In 2016, Diana filed petitions under 750 ILCS 5/508(a)(3) for attorney fees and costs incurred in both appeals. In 2018, the trial court ordered Gregory to pay Diana’s attorney fees: $32,952.50 for the Crecos I appeal and $89,465.50 for the Crecos II appeal.The appellate court found that the 2018 order was not final and appealable; the order awarded interim attorney fees under section 501(c-1), which are temporary in nature and subject to adjustment and inextricably intertwined with the property issues that remained partially unresolved. The claim for attorney fees was not a separable claim for purposes of appeal.The Illinois Supreme Court reversed. The 2018 fee award was a final order on a post-dissolution petition. In entering the order, the trial court included Rule 304(a) language. The appellate court had jurisdiction over Gregory’s appeal of that order. View "In re Marriage of Crecos" on Justia Law