Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

When Angela Russ (Spouse) and Jeffery Russ (Veteran) divorced, they agreed to divide Veteran’s military retirement pay as part of the community property. Nonetheless, about eight years after their divorce, Veteran waived his retirement pay in order to receive a disability benefit from the federal government. His waiver occurred after Mansell v. Mansell, 490 U.S. 581 (1989) was issued, but before Howell v. Howell, ___ U.S. ___, 137 S. Ct. 1400 (2017) was issued. The question presented for the New Mexico Supreme Court’s review was whether the Court of Appeals correctly determined that Howell did not apply to this case. If the Howell Court’s application of the Mansell rule applied, Veteran could unilaterally change his federal benefit as he did. This change precluded Spouse from receiving any of his retirement benefit from the federal government, regardless of what he agreed to when they divorced. If the Howell Court’s application of the Mansell rule did not apply, then Veteran had to indemnify Spouse for her share of his waived retirement benefit. “Although equitable principles may suggest that we should determine that Howell does not apply in this case, the Supremacy Clause of the federal constitution, U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2, precludes that application of equity.” The New Mexico Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals’ determination that Howell was not given full retroactive effect in New Mexico, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Russ v. Russ" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal affirmed the family law court's order denying father's petition filed pursuant to the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, concluding that father did not bear his burden of establishing the existence of ameliorative measures to ensure his children's safety. In this appeal concerning an international custody dispute involving the two minor children of an American mother and a Chilean father, mother was subjected to acts of domestic violence and emotional abuse by father, which was sometimes committed in the presence of the children.The court concluded that it is a reasonable inference from the evidence that father will continue to drink to excess and drive while intoxicated, thus exposing his children to a grave risk of harm. Given father's failure to acknowledge his excessive drinking and acts of domestic violence, as well as his repeated acts of driving while intoxicated, the court explained that there are no ameliorative measures that will mitigate the grave risk of harm to his children. View "Emilie D.L.M. v. Carlos C." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the denial of Father's motion for an order to show cause based on Mother's relocation of the parties' minor child, holding that the district court abused its discretion in denying Father's motion.The decree of dissolution dissolving the parties' marriage awarded the parties joint legal and physical custody of the minor child. Two years later, Mother moved with the child from Burwell to Springfield. Father filed a motion for order to show cause and a motion for writ of assistance, requesting the court to direct law enforcement to take custody of the child and deliver the child to him. The district court denied Father's motions, finding the parties' parenting plan did not require the child to attend school in Burwell rather than Springfield. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Mother's unilateral decision to relocate the child ran contrary to the parties' custody arrangement and deprived Father of court-ordered parenting time; and (2) therefore, the district court abused its discretion by denying Father's motion for an order to show cause. View "Vyhlidal v. Vyhlidal" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the juvenile court terminating Mother's parental rights in her child, holding that the juvenile court lacked authority to appoint a master to preside over the trial in the termination of parental rights (TPR) proceeding.At issue whether having a hearing master preside over trial in a TPR proceeding satisfies the due process requirements in the Nevada Constitution. The Supreme Court held (1) due process requires the TPR trial to be heard before a district judge in the first instance; and (2) a hearing master cannot preside over a TPR trial pursuant to Nev. Rev. Stat. 432B without infringing on a parent's constitutional right to procedural due process. The Court remanded the case for a new TPR proceeding. View "In re Parental Rights as to L.L.S." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court terminating Appellant's parental rights, holding that the district court's failure to apply Nev. R. Civ. P. 16.2(e)(4)'s mandate regarding disclosure of witnesses was harmless error.The State sought to terminate Appellant's parental rights, but the State did not disclose a nonexpert witness until after the trial had commenced. The district court, however, allowed the witness to testify at trial on the grounds that the nonexpert witness disclosure requirements in Rule 16.2(e)(4) do not apply to termination of parental rights proceedings. The district court ultimately terminated Appellant's parental rights. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the nonexpert witness notice requirements in Nev. R. Civ. P. 16.2 apply to termination of parental rights proceedings; and (2) the district court erred by denying Appellant's motion in liming to exclude an unnoticed nonexpert witness during trial, but the error was harmless. View "In re Parental Rights as to T.M.R." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that the provision in Nev. Rev. Stat. 125C.006(1)(b) that a custodial parent who intends to relocate his or her residence to a place outside of the State and desires to take the child but the noncustodial parent refuses to consent to relocation must first petition the district court applies not only to relocation from Nevada to a place outside of Nevada but also from a place outside of Nevada to another place outside of Nevada.Mother was granted primary physical custody of the parties' three minor children after the parties' divorce. Mother later filed a petition under section 125C.006 for permission to relocate with the children from Nevada to Arizona. Mother subsequently moved to Arizona with the children. Mother later petitioned for permission to again relocate with the children, this time from Arizona to Ohio. The district court granted the petition, concluding that Mother did not need permission for the current relocation because the court had already granted her permission to move from Nevada. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) because Mother sought to move with the children to Ohio and Father did not consent, section 125C.006(1)(b) applied; and (2) the district court abused its discretion by failing to issue specific findings under the factors set out in Nev. Rev. Stat. 125C.007. View "Pelkola v. Pelkola" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeal reversing the judgment of the trial court that Mother had established one of a series of enumerated exceptions to avoid termination of parental rights, holding that the court of appeals erred in its analysis.The trial court in this case found that Child was likely to be adopted but that Mother had established the parental-benefit exception precluding termination of parental rights. The court therefore declined to terminate parental rights and ordered that Child remain in foster care subject to periodic review. The court of appeal reversed, concluding that because Mother continued to struggle with mental health issues and substance abuse and because the benefits of the potential adoptive home and the risks of foster care, a reasonable court could not find that Child's relationship with Mother outweighed the benefits of adoption. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the court of appeal's holding that no reasonable court could apply the parental-benefit exception given Mother's substance abuse and mental health issues was in error. View "In re Caden C." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming the judgment of the district court finding Yvonne Martin in unlawful detainer and entering a judgment that included a substantial award, holding that the court of appeals did not err.Upon her divorce from Petter Kristensen, the divorce court awarded Yvonne temporary possession of the marital home - which was owned by Petter's father, Frank - during the pendency of the divorce proceedings. After Yvonne filed for divorce Frank served her with a notice to vacate. Yvonne refused to vacate, and Frank filed an unlawful detainer action against her. A jury concluded that Frank was the rightful owner of the property and that Yvonne was guilty of unlawful detainer starting five days after Frank filed the notice to vacate. On appeal, Yvonne argued that the temporary possession order precluded Frank from seeking the remedies available in an unlawful detainer action. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the possession orders in the divorce proceeding functioned like a temporary possession order in an unlawful detainer proceeding in that they precluded Yvonne's eviction from the property but did not affect the availability of statutory remedies for unlawful detainer. View "Martin v. Kristensen" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals dismissing a petition for appeal filed by a person who was not a party in the proceeding from which the appeal was taken, holding that there was no error in the judgment of the court of appeals.Michelina Bonanno was the mother of Elizabeth Quinn. Elizabeth had a daughter from a previous relationship. Elizabeth and Bonanno were awarded joint legal custody of the child, and Elizabeth was awarded physical custody. Elizabeth subsequently married James Quinn. When Elizabeth died, James filed a petition for adoption, asserting that Bonanno's consent was unnecessary because of lack of visitation or contact. After the circuit court entered a final order of adoption Bonanno filed a motion to vacate and set aside the order and then filed a petition for appeal. James filed a motion to dismiss, noting that Bonanno had not filed a motion to intervene in the adoption proceeding. The circuit court denied Bonanno a hearing on the motions, and Bonanno appealed. The circuit court dismissed the appeals, concluding that Bonanno lacked standing. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court of appeals (1) lacked jurisdiction to hear Bonanno's petition for appeal; and (2) did not abuse its discretion by awarding James appellate attorney's fees. View "Bonanno v. Quinn" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decree of the family court terminating Mother's parental rights to her son, holding that Mother's arguments on appeal were unavailing.The trial justice found that was not in the child's best interest to be placed with Mother, that Mother was unfit, and that the child was thriving with foster parents who could offer him permanency. The trial justice then found that it was in the child's best interest that mother's parental rights be terminated. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the finding of unfitness was supported by clear and convincing, legally competent evidence; (2) the trial justice's finding that reasonable efforts were made to reunify Mother and the child was supported by legally competent evidence; and (3) the trial justice's finding that Mother's termination of parental rights was in the child's best interest was supported by legally competent evidence. View "In re Gelvin B." on Justia Law