Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

D.M. (father) appealed the termination of his parental rights to his biological daughter A.C. (child). He contended there was a failure to inquire into whether he had Indian ancestry, as required by the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) and related federal and state law. The issue arose because the mother plainly did have Indian ancestry — she was an enrolled member of a federally recognized Indian tribe; an older daughter had been removed from her custody and transferred to the jurisdiction of the tribe. Apparently no one thought it was worth asking whether the father, too, might have Indian ancestry. When the mother’s tribe surprised everyone by reporting that the child was not a member and not eligible for membership, the juvenile court found (without any further inquiry regarding the father ) that ICWA did not apply. San Bernardino County Children and Family Services (CFS) did not dispute there was a failure to inquire, however, it contended the father did not show the error was prejudicial. To this, the Court of Appeal agreed: the father did not claim he had any Indian ancestry. "Because he has not managed to clear this rather low hurdle, there is no reason to suppose that, absent the error, the outcome would have been any different. And, more to the point, there is no reason to reverse and remand for a further inquiry, which would not only entail effort and expense, but would also delay permanency for A.C." View "In re A.C." on Justia Law

In this termination of parental rights action the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals rejecting Mother's ineffective assistance of counsel claim, holding that Mother's ineffective assistance claim failed under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).The State sought termination of Mother's parental rights to her child. The trial court found that Mother was indigent and appointed counsel to represent her. After the jury found that grounds existed for termination and that termination was in the child's best interest Mother's retained counsel filed a notice of appeal. Thereafter, the retained counsel was suspended from the practice of law. The trial court then appointed Mother's appellate counsel. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that Mother could not raise an ineffective assistance of counsel challenge because her counsel was retained rather than appointed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) parents in government-initiated suits to terminate the parent-child relationship who retain counsel of their choosing may also challenge their counsel's performance by asserting an ineffective assistance claim; but (2) Mother's ineffective assistance claim failed under Strickland. View "In re Interest of D.T." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the juvenile court denying the State's petition to terminate Mother's parental rights, holding that, under the circumstances of this case, the State fell short of carrying its heavy burden for termination.In support of its petition to terminate Mother's parental rights, the State alleged four grounds for termination based on one proven instance of neglect, Mother's actions in escaping an abusive boyfriend and obtaining work to support her children, and the children's out-of-home placement following Mother's arrest. The juvenile court denied termination, concluding that the State failed clearly and convincingly to show that there was a statutory basis for termination or that termination was in the best interests of the children. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the State failed to meet its heavy burden to clearly and convincingly proving Mother's unfitness or that termination of her parental rights was in her children's best interests. View "In re Interest of Mateo L." on Justia Law

At issue in this case was whether the Department of Children, Youth, and Families (Department) met its burden under the Washington State Indian Child Welfare Act (WICWA) to provide active efforts to reunify C.A. with her children. After review, the Washington Supreme Court held the Department failed to provide active efforts when it provided untimely referrals and only passively engaged with C.A. from January through June 2019. The Supreme Court also held that the dependency court impermissibly applied the futility doctrine when it speculated that even had the Department acted more diligently, C.A. would not have been responsive. Therefore, the dependency court’s finding that the Department satisfied the active efforts requirement from January through June 2019 was reversed. The matter was remanded and the dependency court directed to order the Department to provide active efforts in accordance with the Court's opinion before the court proceeds to hear the filed termination of parental rights petitions. View "In re Dependency of G.J.A." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the circuit court denying mother's motion to prohibit the Arkansas Department of Human Services (ADHS) from immunizing her one-year-old daughter, M.S., over her objection after the circuit court adjudicated M.S. dependent-neglected, holding that Mother properly availed herself of the vaccination exemption provided for by Ark. Code. Ann. 6-18-702.On appeal, Mother argued that ADHS, as the temporary custodian of M.S., did not have the authority to immunize the child over her philosophical and religious objections. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) under the circumstances, the legal issues were sufficiently developed to allow an intelligent and useful decision, and therefore, the case was ripe for appellate review; and (2) Mother exercised her right to exempt M.S. from immunization, as was her right as a parent. View "Macklin v. Arkansas Department of Human Services" on Justia Law

J.B. appealed a juvenile court order terminating her parental rights. On appeal, J.B. argued that the district court erred in terminating her parental rights, because the qualified expert witness’s testimony did not satisfy the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). The North Dakota Supreme Court remanded for additional, specific findings under the ICWA: "A qualified expert witness’s expressed preference to deny termination of parental rights does not preclude the court from making findings sufficient to satisfy ICWA and ordering termination." View "Interest of K.B." on Justia Law

Amanda Johnshoy, now known as Amanda Fry, appealed a district court order denying her motion to modify primary residential responsibility. Fry and Zachary Johnshoy divorced in November 2014, and the court awarded Johnshoy with primary residential responsibility of the parties’ two minor children. Since the divorce, Johnshoy moved to a different city within North Dakota. Fry remarried following the divorce. In June 2020, Fry moved to modify primary residential responsibility and parenting time and requested an evidentiary hearing. Fry included two affidavits with the motion: her own and one from the parties’ elder child. The district court denied the motion to modify primary residential responsibility, concluding that Fry had not established a prima facie case warranting an evidentiary hearing. On appeal, Fry argued the district court erred in concluding that her affidavit and her child’s affidavit had not established a prima facie case warranting an evidentiary hearing. “[T]o establish a prima facie case that modification is necessary to serve the best interests of the children requires more than the improved circumstances of the party moving to modify primary residential responsibility.” The North Dakota Supreme Court found Fry’s affidavit did not provide facts showing how a change in circumstances affected the children. "Fry’s affidavit fails to show how a change in custody is necessary to serve the best interests of the children and thus fails to establish a prima facie case for modification of primary residential responsibility." Accordingly, judgment was affirmed. View "Johnshoy v. Johnshoy" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the intermediate court of appeals (ICA) concluding that the family court erred in dismissing count two of this complaint charging Defendant with certain offenses on the grounds that the family court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over that count, holding that the ICA did not err.Count one of the operative complaint charged Defendant with abuse of a family or household member, and count two charged him with third degree assault against a complaining witness. The family court granted Defendant's motion to dismiss count two, concluding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction. The ICA reversed, concluding that the family court had concurrent subject matter jurisdiction over the charge based on Haw. Rev. Stat. 571-14(b). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the family court erred in dismissing count two for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because section 571-14(b) provided the family court with concurrent subject matter jurisdiction over count two; and (2) the family court continued to have subject matter jurisdiction over count two despite the dismissal of count one with prejudice. View "State v. Milne" on Justia Law

Appellant Iris Stacy (Mother) sought certiorari review of an unpublished opinion by the Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals (COCA) that affirmed the trial court's judgment terminating her parental rights to I.T.S., I.M.S., and R.E.S. (Children). At issue was the trial court's sua sponte discharge of Mother's court-appointed counsel at the conclusion of the disposition hearing, which left her without representation until State filed its petition to terminate her parental rights over two years later. She argued the trial court's failure to provide her legal representation between the disposition and the filing of the petition to terminate her parental rights (a period of 798 days) was contrary to the federal Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). The Oklahoma Supreme Court granted her petition to address a question of first impression: Upon request by an Indian child's parent for counsel in a deprived child proceeding, and a finding of indigency, whether the federal Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) required court-appointed counsel for the parent at all stages of the deprived child proceeding. The Supreme Court held that section 1912(b) of ICWA required, upon request and a finding of indigency, the appointment of counsel at all stages of the deprived child proceeding. View "In the Matter of I.T.S." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals reversing the order of the circuit court concluding that it had the authority to order Paul Schwab to comply with a marital settlement agreement entered into in 1992 on the grounds that Wis. Stat. 893.40 barred Kathy Siech's action, holding that the statute posed no bar to Kathy's action.In the settlement agreement, Paul promised to pay Kathy half of his pension "when and if" that benefit became available to him. Twenty-one years later, Paul received his pension, but he refused to pay Kathy her share. Kathy sought to judicially enforce their agreement by seeking a contempt order. In response, Paul asserted that Kathy's action was barred by section 893.40's twenty-year statute of repose. The circuit court concluded that it had the authority to order Paul to comply with the settlement agreement under Johnson v. Masters, 830 N.W.2d 647. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that section 893.40 did not bar Kathy's action because it was impossible for Kathy to enforce Paul's promise until after the statutory period of repose had run. View "Schwab v. Schwab" on Justia Law