Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

Ryan Scott appealed a district court order denying his motion to modify primary residential responsibility. Scott argued the district court erred by failing to find a material change in circumstances existed and failing to analyze the best interest factors. Finding no reversible error, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed. View "Scott v. Scott" on Justia Law

Justin Fisketjon appealed a judgment determining primary residential responsibility of the parties’ minor child and awarding child support. Fisketjon claimed the district court improperly included his roommate’s share of rent as income in its child support calculation. To this, the North Dakota Supreme Court concluded the district court erred as a matter of law. Fisketjon and his roommate had an equal obligation to pay their landlord the full amount of the rent under the terms of the lease. The rental obligation was money owed to the landlord; it was not money owed to Fisketjon. Thus, the roommate’s share of the rent was not a “payment . . . owed to an obligor” as required by the N.D.C.C. 14-09-09.10(9) definition of income. Finding no error with the residential responsibility portion of the district court judgment, the Sipreme Court affirmed that portion, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Eubanks v. Fisketjon, et al." on Justia Law

In consolidated appeals, a mother challenged decisions by the family division of the superior court denying her motions for an extension of time to file a notice of appeal and to vacate the order terminating her parental rights to K.S., and concluding that K.S. was not an Indian child for purposes of the Indian Child Welfare Act. In March 2018, a relative reported that mother had “tossed” K.S. onto a bed during a family argument and that father had used excessive physical discipline on K.S.’s older brother. K.S. was later found to have a buckle fracture on her wrist, which her parents were unable to explain. The Department for Children and Families (DCF) sought and obtained emergency custody of K.S. and her brother, and filed petitions alleging that they were children in need of care or supervision (CHINS). Mother and father later stipulated to the merits of the CHINS petitions. At the October hearing, mother testified that she understood that she was permanently giving up her parental rights, that her decision was voluntary, and that she believed the decision was in K.S.’s best interests. The court accepted the parties’ stipulations and granted the termination petitions. In December 2019, mother hired a new attorney, who filed a motion for relief from the termination order pursuant to Vermont Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). Mother alleged that the attorney who represented her at the relinquishment hearing had rendered ineffective assistance, that the underlying facts did not support termination of mother’s parental rights, and that her relinquishment was involuntary because she did not understand the proceedings. The family division denied the motion, finding that mother’s relinquishment was knowing and voluntary and not the result of coercion by DCF or the foster parents. The court further concluded that it was not required to conduct a separate "best interests" analysis when mother voluntarily relinquished her rights, and she failed to establish that her counsel’s performance was ineffective. Mother untimely filed her notice of appeal, and while a decision on the untimely notice was pending, she filed a second motion to vacate the termination order, adding the argument that the court failed to give notice to the Cherokee tribes or to apply the substantive provisions of the Indian Child Welfare Act. The Vermont Supreme Court found no reversible error and affirmed the termination orders. View "In re K.S." on Justia Law

Father appealed a circuit court order terminating his parental rights over his minor child, R.H., on the ground that he failed to correct, within 12 months, the conditions that led to the circuit court’s finding under RSA chapter 169-C that R.H. was neglected by R.H.’s mother (Mother), who had sole physical custody of the child. This appeal presented a narrow question for the New Hampshire Supreme Court's review: when does the 12-month period to correct the conditions of neglect or abuse under RSA 170-C:5, III begin to run against a non-accused, non-custodial parent? On appeal, Father argued the 12-month period did not begin until a non-accused, non-custodial parent was provided actual notice of the neglect or abuse finding. The New Hampshire Division for Children, Youth and Families (DCYF) countered that the 12-month statutory period begins to run from the date of that finding, regardless of actual notice. Because the Supreme Court agreed with Father that the 12-month period begins when a non-accused, non-custodial parent receives constitutionally-adequate notice of both the abuse or neglect finding and the possible impact on parental rights of a failure to correct the conditions leading to that finding, it vacated and remanded. View "In re R.H." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court denying a guardianship petition, holding that the petition did not demonstrate that the proposed protected person was incapacitated.Appellant filed a petition for appointment of temporary guardian and to establish a general permanent guardianship over his mother, Respondent, and her estate. The district court denied the petition without prejudice, finding that, under Nev. Rev. Stat. 159.044(2)(i), a guardianship over an adult proposed protected person cannot be granted without a physician's certificate. The Supreme Court affirmed but on different grounds, holding (1) a certificate from a physician or a qualified individual demonstrating need for a guardianship is required for the district court to consider a petition for adult guardianship, but the certificate need not be based on an in-person examination of the proposed protected person; (2) whether the petition and certificate warrant the need for a guardianship or further proceedings is within the district court's discretion; and (3) the district court did not err in dismissing the guardianship petition because the petition did not demonstrate that Appellant's mother was incapacitated. View "In re Guardianship of Rubin" on Justia Law

Because the Louisiana Supreme Court found in its original opinion that plaintiffs had a right of action under La. C.C. arts. 2315.1 and 2315.2, their constitutional challenge was pretermitted and “that part of the district court judgment declaring [these code articles and La. C.C. art. 199 to be] unconstitutional as applied to children given in adoption” was vacated. Having found on rehearing that the codal analysis of La. C.C. arts. 2315.1, 2315.2 and 199 foreclosed a right of action to the plaintiff children, who were given in adoption, for the death of their biological parent and half-siblings, the Supreme Court was called on to address the propriety of the district court’s declaration that La. C.C. arts. 2315.1, 2315.2, and 199 are “unconstitutional as applied to children given in adoption.” The Court found a rational basis existed for limiting the categories of eligible claimants in La. C.C. arts. 2315.1 and 2315.2 to those who “are likely to be most affected by the death of the deceased.” Children given in adoption “have moved into a new parental relationship, becoming children ‘by adoption,’ who are eligible claimants in the unfortunate occurrence of the tortious death of their adoptive parents. Likewise, the transfer of children into a new parental unit as children ‘by adoption’ terminates, for purposes of wrongful death and survival actions, any connection between the ‘children given in adoption’ and any biological siblings who were not ‘given in adoption.’” For these reasons, the district court legally erred in finding that the fact that Daniel Goins and David Watts were adopted did not prevent them from bringing survival and wrongful death claims for the deaths of their biological father and biological half-siblings and in overruling the defendant’s exception raising the objection of no right of action. The Supreme Court's original decree was vacated and the district court's judgment was reversed. Judgment was entered sustaining the defendant insurance company's peremptory exception raising the objection of no right of action, and dismissing the claims that were the subject of this exception. View "Rismiller et al. v. Gemini Ins. Co." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court denying Father's petition for modification of alimony, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Father's request to modify alimony.The parties in this case had two children and were divorced in Connecticut. They entered into a separation agreement that was incorporated by reference into their decree of divorce that set terms for child support and alimony. Father later filed a petition to reduce alimony, asserting that the financial position of both parties had changed substantially since their divorce. The district court denied the petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court could reasonably find that Father failed to show a substantial change in circumstances that would warrant a modification of his alimony obligation. View "Boyce v. Jarvis" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the district court striking down sections 99 and 100 of House File 766, which added funding conditions prohibiting abortion providers from participating in two federally funded educational grant programs directed at reducing teenage pregnancy and promoting abstinence, holding that any conditions premised on providing abortions cannot be considered unconstitutional.Planned Parenthood of the Heartland (PPH) was a former grantee of both grants and, upon the passage of sections 99 and 100, became ineligible to receive funding. PPH brought a declaratory judgment action arguing that the Act violated its rights to equal protection, due process, free speech, and free association under the Iowa Constitution. The district court granted summary judgment for PPH and enjoined enforcement of the legislative enactments. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the conditions were rationally related to the classification selected by the general assembly; and (2) where abortion providers have no constitutional right to perform abortions, the unconstitutional conditions doctrine did not prohibit the State form barring abortion providers from receiving the funding at issue. View "Planned Parenthood of the Heartland, Inc. v. Reynolds" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court finding that Husband had breached a provision of the parties' settlement agreement entered into during their dissolution of marriage action, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that Husband had breached the warranty clause of the agreement.During dissolution proceedings, Wife and Husband signed a settlement agreement under which each party retained all stock accounts in their respective names and Husband received all jointly held stock accounts. The agreement contained a warranty stating that the parties would truly reveal to each other their assets and debts. Wife subsequently filed a motion for relief from judgment, alleging that the agreement should not be enforced due to the omission of a stock account from a balance sheet used in determining the division of assets. The trial court awarded Wife half of the value of the account, concluding that fraud, constructive fraud, mutual mistake, or misrepresentation had occurred. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Wife's evidence was inadmissible to avoid the agreement, and the trial court incorrectly determined that fraud, constructive fraud, mutual mistake, or misrepresentation had occurred; but (2) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that Husband had breached the warranty clause of the agreement. View "Berg v. Berg" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that capacity or willingness to accept treatment is a relevant factor to be considered on the issue of grave disability but is not a separate element that must be proven to establish a conservatorship.Under the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act, Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code 5000 et seq., those subject to a conservatorship petition are entitled to a court or jury trial to decide if they are "gravely disabled." At issue was whether the trier of fact must additionally find that the individual is unwilling or unable to accept treatment voluntarily. The jury in this case found that K.P. was gravely disabled and granted a petition to renew K.P.'s conservatorship. The court of appeal affirmed. On appeal, K.P. claimed that a finding of unwillingness or inability to accept voluntary treatment was required for a conservatorship to be established. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that inability or unwillingness to accept voluntary treatment need not be separately proven at trial. View "Conservatorship of K.P." on Justia Law