Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court granting the Wyoming Department of Family Service's petition to terminate Father's and Mother's parental rights under Wyo. Stat. Ann. 14-2-309(a)(iii) and (a)(v), holding that there was sufficient evidence for the district court to terminate Mother's and Father's parental rights.After a four-day bench trial, the district court held that the Department proved, by clear and convincing evidence, that Mother's and Father's parental rights should be terminated under sections 14-2-309(a)(iii) and (v) and that it was in the child's best interest to terminate their parental rights. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court had subject matter jurisdiction; and (2) the Department presented sufficient evidence for the district court to terminate Mother's and Father's parental rights under section 14-2-309(a)(v). View "Hood v. State" on Justia Law

The trial court in this case denied a county agency’s petitions to terminate involuntarily the parental rights of a mother. The agency appealed to the Superior Court, which reversed the trial court’s order and effectively terminated the mother’s parental rights to two of her children. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted the mother’s petitions for allowance of appeal to consider two issues: (1) whether the Superior Court’s decision conflicted with the Supreme Court's decision in In re R.J.T., 9 A.3d 1179 (Pa. 2010); and (2) whether the Superior Court erred by substituting its judgment for that of the trial court. After review, the Supreme Court concluded the Superior Court exceeded its standard of review. "Rather than examining the record to determine whether it supports the trial court’s conclusion that the various conditions that led to the Children’s removal from Mother’s custody no longer continue to exist, the intermediate court focused exclusively on one condition that led to the Children’s removal, i.e., Mother’s mental health issues, and searched the record to support its view that Mother has failed to address this condition adequately. Because the Superior Court erred by substituting its judgment for that of the trial court, we vacate the Superior Court’s judgment and reinstate the trial court’s order." View "In the Interest of: S.K.L.R." on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal reversed the juvenile court's jurisdictional order, as well as related dispositional orders, declaring daughter a dependent child under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300 and removing her from mother's custody pursuant to section 361, subdivision (c)(1). The court agreed with mother that the juvenile court erred and deprived her of due process when it amended the dependency petition to conform to proof produced at the jurisdictional hearing to include allegations based on factual and legal theories not at issue in the original petition. The court concluded that a remand for further proceedings, rather than dismissal of the case, is the appropriate relief on appeal. View "In re I.S." on Justia Law

In the aftermath of her divorce from ex-Methodist minister Andrew Johnson, Kim Miller sued not only Johnson but also his employer, the Mississippi Annual Conference of the United Methodist Church (MUMC). Miller also sued fellow MUMC minister Susan Woodard. Her claims against Johnson were aimed at his risky extramarital sexual behavior, which led to Johnson contracting HIV and later infecting Miller with the virus. Miller based her claims against MUMC and Woodard on her allegation that, had the conference and the fellow minister followed United Methodist policy and procedure, they would have discovered Johnson’s behavior and remedied it or warned Miller before she contracted HIV. The question before the Mississippi Supreme Court on interlocutory appeal was whether she established a wrong for which she could legally recover. After review, the Court found "it is clear that Miller seeks to hold MUMC and Woodard legally accountable for failing to follow religious doctrine and procedure. Under the First Amendment, this Court has no authority to consider and enforce religious standards. Thus, MUMC and Woodard are entitled to summary judgment." The Court found Miller’s claims against her ex-husband, Johnson, were not barred by the First Amendment. Still, Johnson insisted he was entitled to summary judgment based on a mutual release in Miller and Johnson’s divorce settlement. The Court found Johnson did not pursue his affirmative defense based on the release for more than two and a half years. By that time, the trial court deemed this defense waived. And after review, the Court held the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Johnson summary judgment on this basis. The trial court's orders denying MUMC’s and Woodard’s motions for summary judgment were reversed; the order denying Johnson’s motion for summary judgment was affirmed and Miller’s claims against Johnson remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Woodard v. Miller" on Justia Law

Kemily and Kelvin Rankin were married in July 2007 and had two children during the course of their marriage. In December 2017, Kemily filed a complaint for divorce on the ground of habitual cruel and inhuman treatment or, in the alternative, irreconcilable differences. At the conclusion of Kemily’s case-in-chief, Kelvin moved to dismiss the complaint for divorce and argued that the evidence “wholly, completely, [and] totally fail[ed] to make out a case for habitual cruel and inhuman treatment.” The chancellor entered a fifteen-page memorandum opinion and final judgment that denied Kemily’s complaint for divorce, finding “that the evidence presented [wa]s insufficient to grant [Kemily] a divorce on the ground of habitual cruel and inhuman treatment.” Kemily timely appealed. On appeal, the Court of Appeals found that “there was sufficient evidence to support granting the divorce on the ground of habitual cruel and inhuman treatment” and therefore reversed the chancellor’s judgment and remanded the case “for further findings in accordance with [its] opinion.” Kelvin filed a petition for writ of certiorari and argued that the Court of Appeals’ decision was (1) in direct conflict with well-established law regarding appellate review; and (2) in direct conflict with a prior decision of the Mississippi Supreme Court. The Supreme Court found the appellate court's decision was based on the absence of an express finding by the chancellor regarding Kemily's credibility, thus failing to recognize the required assumption “that the chancellor resolved [the credibility] issue[] in favor of [Kelvin].” The Supreme Court ultimately reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals, and affirmed the chancery court’s denial of the complaint for divorce on the ground of habitual cruel and inhuman treatment. View "Rankin v. Rankin" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgments of the district court terminating Mother's and Father's respective parental rights to their child, holding that the district court did not err.Specifically, the Supreme Court held that the district court (1) did not erroneously proceed to a youth-in-need-of-care (YINC) adjudication, temporary legal custody, and parental rights termination without a determination of the child's eligibility for enrollment in the Lakota Sioux Tribe; (2) did not erroneously re-adjudicate the child as a YINC or later erroneously find under Mont. Code Ann. 41-3-609(1)(f) that it had; and (3) did not erroneously terminate Father's parental rights under section 41-3-609(1)(f)(ii) without sufficient evidence to prove by clear and convincing evidence that his conduct or condition of unfitness was unlikely to change within a reasonable time. View "In re L.H." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals reversing the judgment of the district court finding that Mother's child was in need of protection or services, holding that the district court properly considered the allegations of the petition in this case and that Rice County proved the allegations by clear and convincing evidence.After Mother failed to appear at a pretrial hearing the County requested to proceed by default pursuant to Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P. 18. The district court granted the request and found that the child in this case was in need of protection or services. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the juvenile protection rules do not allow for relief in a default proceeding based solely on the pleadings and that the evidence was insufficient to support the adjudication. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the district court could not simply accept the allegations in the County's petition as true when Mother failed to appear for the pretrial hearing; (2) the unrequited witness testimony presented at the hearing established that the allegations of the petition were true and correct; and (3) the court did not err in finding that the child was in need of protection or services. View "In re H.G.D." on Justia Law

This case arose from a custody dispute between a natural mother and an adoptive mother. The chancellor allowed the natural mother to withdraw her surrender of parental rights and consent to adoption. The chancellor also found that the natural mother was under duress when she signed the surrender and revoked the order granting temporary custody of the child to the adoptive mother. Finding no reversible error, the Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed the chancellor’s judgment. View "In the Adoption of A.M." on Justia Law

Jane Doe (Mother) and John Doe (Father) were a married couple and the biological parents of E.W. (Child). Mother and Father were both incarcerated from 2015 until 2020. Mother gave birth to Child while incarcerated and asked her friend Jane Doe I (Guardian Mother) and her husband John Doe I (Guardian Father) to care for Child until Mother was released. Guardians raised Child since her birth and presently act as legal guardians for her. Guardians filed a petition seeking to terminate the parental rights of Mother and Father and to adopt Child. A termination trial was held by the magistrate court, after which the magistrate court terminated the parental rights of both Mother and Father. The magistrate court found that Mother had neglected Child and was unable to discharge her parental responsibilities. The magistrate court further found that Father had abandoned and neglected Child and was also unable to discharge his parental responsibilities. The magistrate court then granted Guardian’s petition for adoption. The Idaho Supreme Court reversed, finding the Guardians’ Verified Petition failed to allege any facts supporting termination of Mother’s and Father’s parental rights, thereby violating the parents' due process right to notice regarding the bases upon which termination was sought. The case was remanded to the magistrate court with instructions to dismiss the petition without prejudice. View "Doe I v. Doe" on Justia Law

Plaintiff and her late husband, Grant Tinker, signed a premarital agreement (PMA) that in relevant part governed the ownership and testamentary disposition of their marital home. Respondents, Larry Ginsberg and his law firm, represented plaintiff in connection with the PMA and approved the PMA as to form on her behalf. Non-attorney Sidney Tessler, Tinker's longtime accountant and business manager, negotiated terms and approved the PMA as to form on Tinker's behalf. Plaintiff, the estate, and Tinker's children subsequently litigated plaintiff's and the children's claims, which were ultimately resolved in a global settlement.Plaintiff then filed suit against Ginsberg for legal malpractice in connection with the preparation and execution of the PMA, alleging that the PMA was unenforceable due to Ginsberg’s failure to ensure that Tinker signed a waiver of legal representation. The trial court granted Ginsberg's motion for summary judgment on the ground that Tinker ratified the PMA.The Court of Appeal reversed, concluding that there is a triable issue of material fact as to the threshold issue of whether Tinker satisfied the requirements of Family Code section 1615 when he executed the PMA. The court explained that, if the factfinder determines that Tinker did not comply with section 1615, and the PMA was therefore not enforceable, the question becomes whether Tinker's subsequent amendments to his estate plan could ratify the PMA and thereby rectify the statutory violation. The court concluded that the trial court erred by concluding that they could and did. The court held that a premarital agreement that is not enforceable under section 1615 is void, not voidable, and accordingly cannot be ratified. Because none of the other grounds asserted in the summary judgment motion support the trial court's ruling, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings on plaintiff's malpractice claim. The court denied plaintiff's request for judicial notice as moot. View "Knapp v. Ginsberg" on Justia Law