Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

Michael Auer Wolf filed a request for a vocational evaluation of Patricia Mercado in a parentage action. The Superior Court of Orange County granted Wolf's request and later compelled Mercado to undergo the evaluation. Mercado filed an amended petition for writ of mandate, prohibition, or other appropriate relief, arguing the court lacked jurisdiction to order the evaluation as it was not authorized by any statute.The Superior Court of Orange County initially granted Wolf's request for a vocational evaluation and later his motion to compel Mercado to undergo the evaluation. Mercado opposed the request, arguing it was improper under the relevant statutes and that child support issues were being handled by the Department of Child Support Services (DCSS). The court maintained that child support was at issue and that it had the authority to order the evaluation.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court found that Wolf did not establish entitlement to a vocational evaluation under any relevant statutory authority, including sections 3558, 4331, and 4058 of the Family Code. The court noted that section 3558 does not authorize vocational evaluations, section 4331 applies only to marital dissolution or legal separation cases, and section 4058 requires a preliminary showing that a vocational evaluation would be in the best interests of the children, which Wolf did not provide. The court also found that Evidence Code section 730 did not support the order as it pertains to neutral experts appointed by the court, not retained experts.The Court of Appeal granted Mercado's petition, ordering the Superior Court to vacate its orders requiring Mercado to undergo a vocational evaluation and to deny Wolf's request for the evaluation. The stay order was dissolved, and Mercado was awarded her costs incurred in the proceeding. View "Mercado v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

The appellant, C.C., who had previously consented to terminate his parental rights to a child conceived through his sperm donation, petitioned the family court to establish himself as a presumed father and a third parent under California Family Code sections 7611(d) and 7612(c). He argued that his post-adoption conduct entitled him to parenting rights and that the 2013 amendments to the Family Code provided a path for him to establish a relationship with the child. C.C. claimed that there was no evidence he relinquished his right to enforce a legal parenting relationship and that the respondents, L.B. and R.B., were estopped from relying on his consent to the adoption.The family court granted the respondents' motion to quash C.C.'s amended petition, finding that the donor agreement allowed visitation privileges but not parental rights, and that C.C.'s voluntary consent to the termination of his parental rights was final and irrevocable. The court determined that C.C. lacked standing to assert parentage due to the finality of the adoption order. C.C. appealed, arguing that the trial court's order was contrary to custody and parenting law.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Six, reviewed the case and affirmed the trial court's decision. The appellate court held that section 8617 of the Family Code precludes C.C. from establishing parentage under any theory, as the termination of his parental rights was final and irrevocable. The court also found that equitable estoppel did not apply because the donor agreement explicitly stated that C.C. would have no paternal rights. Additionally, the court ruled that C.C. lacked standing to initiate an action for visitation as a nonparent under the Family Code. The judgment was affirmed, and respondents were awarded their costs on appeal. View "C.C. v. L.B." on Justia Law

K.M., the mother of minor Z.H., appealed a judgment that terminated her parental rights after the child's father, I.H., and paternal grandmother, C.L., filed a petition under Family Code section 7822. The petition alleged that K.M. had abandoned Z.H. by leaving him in the care of I.H. and C.L. without support or communication for over a year. The trial court found that K.M. had abandoned Z.H. and terminated her parental rights.The Los Angeles County Superior Court consolidated the case with a related custody case and stayed proceedings in the latter. During the trial, evidence showed that K.M. had not visited Z.H. since December 2017 and had not provided financial support since January 2020. The court found that K.M. had abandoned her parental role and focused more on her struggles than on Z.H.'s best interests.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court affirmed the judgment terminating K.M.'s parental rights, finding no error or abuse of discretion by the trial court. The appellate court noted that K.M. failed to show that the trial court was required to consider any legal impediment to the proposed adoption when terminating her parental rights.However, the appellate court identified a clerical error in the judgment regarding the termination of I.H.'s parental rights. The trial court had intended for I.H. to retain his parental rights. The appellate court remanded the case with instructions to correct the judgment to reflect that I.H. retains his parental rights. View "In re Z.H." on Justia Law

Hakan and Lauren Oksuzler married in 2010 and divorced in 2019. Hakan worked for Bank of America, receiving an annual bonus based on his performance. After their divorce, Lauren sought to have Hakan’s 2019 bonus, paid in February 2020, classified as community property. Additionally, the couple disputed the ownership of their marital home, which Hakan purchased before marriage but refinanced during the marriage, listing both as grantees. They also contested the characterization of Hakan’s 401(k) account, which included contributions made before and during the marriage.The trial court found that the 2019 bonus was Hakan’s separate property, awarded Hakan 100% ownership of the marital home, and classified the majority of the 401(k) funds as Hakan’s separate property. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth District of Texas affirmed the bonus and 401(k) classifications but reversed the home ownership decision, ruling that Hakan and Lauren each owned an undivided one-half interest in the home.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case. It held that the 2019 bonus, paid after the divorce for work performed during the marriage, is community property, reversing the Court of Appeals on this issue. The court affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision that the marital home should be owned equally by Hakan and Lauren as tenants in common, as Hakan did not rebut the presumption of a gift. Regarding the 401(k) account, the court agreed with the Court of Appeals that Hakan failed to provide sufficient evidence to trace the separate property contributions accurately. Thus, the court remanded the 401(k) issue to the trial court for reconsideration.In summary, the Supreme Court of Texas reversed the Court of Appeals' judgment on the bonus, affirmed the judgment on the marital home and 401(k), and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "IN RE J.Y.O." on Justia Law

Leon Stinson pled guilty to conspiracy to engage in bank fraud and was ordered to pay over $3.6 million in restitution. The Government sought to garnish assets, including retirement accounts solely in the name of Leon’s wife, Ellen. The district court concluded that Ellen’s accounts were marital property in which both Leon and Ellen had a “100% undivided interest” and ordered the liquidation of the accounts to satisfy the restitution order.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi denied Ellen’s motion to dismiss the writ of garnishment, asserting that Leon had no property interest in her accounts. The court held an evidentiary hearing and concluded that Ellen’s retirement accounts were marital property under Mississippi law, as defined in Hemsley v. Hemsley, and thus subject to garnishment.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that under Mississippi law, property is only classified as marital property during the equitable distribution process in a divorce. Until then, a person does not have an interest in property titled solely in their spouse’s name. The court found that the district court erred in concluding that Ellen’s accounts were marital property subject to garnishment. The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s orders and remanded with instructions to grant Ellen’s motion to dismiss the writ of garnishment as to her retirement accounts. View "USA v. Stinson" on Justia Law

A prolonged legal battle ensued between divorced paternal grandparents, each seeking to adopt their grandson, E.A. The boy lived with his grandfather for his first six years until 2019, when his grandmother and her husband took him under false pretenses and initiated an adoption proceeding. The grandfather attempted to intervene in the adoption but was denied "party in interest" status. He also filed an unsuccessful paternity case, claiming he was the boy's presumed father under the Kansas Parentage Act. The adoption court awarded the boy to the grandmother and her husband, and three years later, the court reaffirmed its decision, denying the grandfather's motion to intervene.The grandfather appealed both district court rulings. One Court of Appeals panel denied him relief in the parentage case, while another panel reversed the adoption court's decision, allowing the grandfather to present his case as an interested party. The losing sides sought review in each case.The Kansas Supreme Court reviewed the cases and reversed the parentage panel's decision while affirming the adoption panel's decision. The court held that the grandfather pled sufficient facts to advance a colorable party-in-interest claim in the adoption proceeding and to prosecute his parentage claim. The court emphasized that the grandfather should have been allowed to intervene in the adoption case to address the competing interests adequately.The Kansas Supreme Court remanded the parentage case to the district court to be consolidated with the adoption case, which was also remanded for further proceedings. The adoption decree was vacated, and the case was directed to return to its status as of May 31, 2019, with the understanding that temporary custody may be reconsidered to determine the boy's best interests. View "In re Parentage of E.A." on Justia Law

Lucila Magana-Magana, a Mexican citizen, entered the United States unlawfully in 1995. She faced a series of abusive relationships, including with Rafael Camacho and later Clyde Wakefield, whom she married in 2017. Wakefield's abuse led to their separation and eventual divorce. In 2007, Magana-Magana was arrested by U.S. Border Patrol, and the Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings. She applied for cancellation of removal, citing hardship to her U.S. citizen children, but her request was denied by an immigration judge (IJ) and later by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA). Her appeal to the Ninth Circuit was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.In January 2022, Magana-Magana filed a motion with the BIA to reopen her removal proceedings, citing new evidence of abuse by Wakefield and her application for benefits under the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA). The BIA denied her motion, stating it was untimely and that she had not demonstrated "extraordinary circumstances" to waive the one-year filing deadline.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court concluded it had jurisdiction to review the BIA's determination of "extraordinary circumstances" under 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(iv)(III), as it involved applying a legal standard to undisputed facts. The court found that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in determining that the abuse suffered by Magana-Magana did not constitute "extraordinary circumstances" and that there was no basis to conclude that such circumstances caused the delay in filing her motion. The court also rejected her other arguments, including her unexhausted equitable-tolling claim and the BIA's discretionary decision not to reopen the case sua sponte. The petition for review was denied in part and dismissed in part. View "MAGANA-MAGANA V. GARLAND" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute between the Government Oversight Committee of the 131st Maine Legislature and the Maine Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) over access to confidential records related to the deaths of four children in 2021. The DHHS refused to provide the records, citing confidentiality laws. The Committee then filed an action in the Superior Court (Kennebec County) to compel the DHHS to comply with its subpoena. The Superior Court denied the Committee’s request, and the Committee appealed.The Superior Court (Kennebec County) ruled that the Committee did not have the statutory authority to access the confidential records and denied the motion to compel. The Committee then appealed the decision to the Maine Supreme Judicial Court.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the Superior Court’s judgment. The Court held that the Committee does not have the statutory authority to access confidential records under the OPEGA statute, which limits the Committee’s access to public information and records. The Court also found that the statutory exception in 22 M.R.S. § 4008(3)(D) does not apply to the Committee, as it is not considered a “legislative official with responsibility for child protection services.” Additionally, the Court rejected the Committee’s argument that it has inherent legislative power to compel the disclosure of confidential information via subpoena, as this power is limited by the Committee’s statutorily prescribed duties and the nature of the information it may receive. View "Government Oversight Committee v. Department of Health and Human Services" on Justia Law

A mother and her fiancé filed a petition to terminate the biological father's parental rights and allow the fiancé to adopt the child. The mother did not serve the father with the petition, and he did not participate in the proceedings. The magistrate court terminated the father's parental rights and granted the adoption. The father later filed two motions to set aside the judgment, arguing that his due process rights were violated due to lack of notice. The magistrate court denied the second motion, citing res judicata. The district court reversed this decision, finding that the father's due process argument warranted consideration.The Idaho Supreme Court reviewed the case. The court held that the father's Rule 60(b)(4) motion, which alleged a fundamental error violating his constitutional right to due process, was not barred by res judicata. The court applied the fundamental error doctrine, which allows for exceptions to procedural bars when a fundamental constitutional right is at stake. The court also rejected the mother's arguments that the father's motion was barred by the doctrines of claim splitting, invited error, appellate waiver, and the law of the case.The Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decision to remand the case to the magistrate court for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the father's Rule 60(b)(4) motion was timely and whether the termination and adoption judgment was void. The court also awarded the father partial attorney fees on appeal for defending against certain arguments made by the mother. View "Doe v. Doe" on Justia Law

Andrew Nisbet petitioned for the return of his two young children to Scotland under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction. The children had been taken to the United States by their mother, Spirit Bridger, in June 2022. Nisbet argued that the children were habitual residents of Scotland and that Bridger had wrongfully removed them.The United States District Court for the District of Oregon, after a bench trial, denied Nisbet's petition. The court found that Nisbet failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the children were habitual residents of Scotland. The court considered the totality of the circumstances, including the children's lack of meaningful relationships in Scotland, Bridger's credible testimony that she never intended for Scotland to be a permanent home, and her lack of ties to Scotland.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The Ninth Circuit held that the district court did not clearly err in its findings. The court emphasized that the district court properly considered the children's lack of meaningful connections in Scotland and Bridger's intentions and circumstances as the sole caregiving parent. The Ninth Circuit concluded that the children did not have a habitual residence in Scotland under the Hague Convention, and therefore, Bridger did not wrongfully remove them. View "Nisbet v. Bridger" on Justia Law