Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

Husband’s estate, through a special administrator, appealed a family division’s order concluding that in light of husband’s death prior to entry of a final divorce order, it lacked jurisdiction to consider the enforceability of the parties’ stipulated agreement. The Vermont Supreme Court concluded the family division correctly determined that it lacked jurisdiction. "Although the parties’ agreement may be enforceable as a contract independent of the anticipated divorce, the civil division of the superior court, and not the family division, is the proper forum for litigating that issue." View "Maier v. Maier" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the juvenile court ordering that a permanency plan for minor siblings IM, NM, and AM be changed to adoption and finding that the Department of Family Services (DFS) be relieved of making further reasonable efforts to reunify, holding that there was no error.DFS recommended changing the minor siblings' permanency plan from a concurrent plan of adoption or reunification to adoption. After an evidentiary hearing, the juvenile court ordered that the permanency plan be changed to adoption and ruled that DFS could cease making reasonable efforts to reunify. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the juvenile court did not err in ruling that DFS could cease reasonable efforts following a change in the permanency plan to adoption; and (2) the admission of DFS's Exhibit A did not violate Mother's right to due process. View "RR v. State" on Justia Law

J.H. appealed a trial court's order and findings of fact denying his petition to remove T.F. as guardian of M.H., appoint himself as guardian, and remove contact restrictions T.F. placed on his contact with M.H. On appeal, J.H. argued the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion to remove T.F. as guardian and refusing to remove restrictions T.F. placed on his contact with M.H, arguing the finding that he was unable to civilly structure his contact with M.H. was clearly erroneous. Because the district court did not abuse its discretion in ordering T.F. remain M.H.’s guardian and its findings of fact are not clearly erroneous, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed. View "Guardianship of M.H." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's order granting Father's motion for modification of custody of the parties' daughter, holding that the court did not err in modifying the previous custody order after finding that Father's change in employment and move to Little Rock constituted a material change in circumstances.A previous order of the circuit court awarded joint custody of the child to the parties and provided a specific visitation schedule. Father later filed an amended complaint for contempt and for modification. The circuit court found that Mother was not in contempt of court but concluded that Father's change in employment and move to Little Rock constituted a material change in circumstances that warranted modification of child custody to grant Father equal time with the child. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court's decision to reallocate time was not an abuse of discretion. View "Nalley v. Adams" on Justia Law

A.S. appealed a juvenile court's judgment and order terminating her parental rights to her child, A.S.F. A.S. was appointed counsel when the State petitioned for involuntary termination of her parental rights. The trial court allowed A.S.’s counsel to withdraw after A.S. expressed dissatisfaction with her counsel. The termination hearing was continued and new counsel was appointed. One day before the rescheduled hearing, A.S.’s second counsel moved to withdraw. The judge heard the motion at the termination hearing. There, counsel stated a material breakdown in the attorney-client relationship had occurred. The court granted counsel’s motion on the basis of the treatment A.S. showed to her counsel and the unwillingness of A.S. to work with any attorney the court appointed. The judge found A.S.’s actions to be a voluntary waiver of her right to counsel. Counsel was allowed to leave the courtroom. The hearing proceeded with A.S. without counsel. The juvenile court entered an order terminating parental rights on June 10, 2021. A.S. appealed to the North Dakota Supreme Court 61 days after the initial June 10 order terminating her parental rights was entered. A.S. argues her right to counsel was violated after the court granted her second attorney’s motion to withdraw, leaving A.S. to represent herself at the termination hearing and without advice regarding the process and deadline for appeal. The Supreme Court determined it lacked jurisdiction even to consider a claim that a party failed to timely appeal as a result of a denial of the party’s right to counsel. "We are without jurisdiction to hear A.S.’s waiver of her right to counsel argument because her appeal was untimely." View "Interest of A.S.F." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals' decision dismissing Appellant's appeal from a circuit court order terminating her parental rights, holding that the court of appeals erred in holding that Appellant's failure to name the children in her notice of appeal was a jurisdictional defect requiring dismissal.In ordering the appeal to be dismissed, the court of appeals held that serving the children's guardian ad litem with the notice of appeal was insufficient to cure the jurisdiction defect in this case of failing to name the children in either the caption or body of the notice of appeal. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) service of the notice of appeal upon a child's guardian ad litem is sufficient to confer jurisdiction over that child to an appellate court; and (2) R.L.W. v. Cabinet for Human Resrouces, 756 S.W.2d 148 (Ky. App. 1988), is overruled insofar as it holds that the failure to name a child in a notice of appeal from a termination of parental rights is automatic grounds for dismissal. View "M.A.B. v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

In this consolidated appeal arising from the rulings of the family court on remand from a published opinion of the intermediate court of appeals (ICA) in a divorce case, holding that the family court abused its discretion in part.The ICA affirmed in part and vacated in part the divorce decree in this case and remanded several issues, including the issue of spousal support, to the family court. After the case was remanded and judgment was made, the ICA held that the family court erred by engaging in a new just and equitable determination on remand, as it was not part of the remand order. The Supreme Court vacated in part and affirmed in part, holding (1) the ICA erred by setting aside the amended spousal support order on the basis that the family court was prohibited to do so on remand because Haw. Rev. Stat. 580-47(a) provided the court with continuing jurisdiction to address issues of spousal support; (2) the family court erred on remand by awarding more spousal support than it determined was required to satisfy Wife's needs; and (3) the family court erred by not holding a hearing on remand to determine whether the spousal support amount should have been amended. View "Jacoby v. Jacoby" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decree of the family court terminating Mother's parental rights to her son, holding that the family court did not err.The trial justice found by clear and convincing evidence that Mother was unfit to parent the child and that it was in the child's best interest that Mother's parental rights be terminated. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) there was sufficient evidence in the record to support the trial justice's finding that Mother was unfit given her failure to engage fully in the services provided by the Department of Children, Youth, and Families and lack of protective capacity; and (2) the trial justice's decision to terminate Mother's parental rights was proper. View "In re Domenic B." on Justia Law

K.L. and R.H. were the parents of Z.L.; their year-long relationship was defined by multiple acts of abuse by K.L., and the complete inability of either party to effectively communicate with the other. After their relationship ended, both filed requests for Domestic Violence Prevention Act (DVPA) orders against the other in December 2019. In February 2020, after an evidentiary hearing, the trial court found that both K.L. and R.H. had acted as a primary aggressor against the other, and that neither had acted in self-defense. The court therefore issued mutual orders against both parties, and also issued orders granting joint physical and legal custody of Z.L. to both parties. The Court of Appeal reversed that order, finding the trial court erred by issuing mutual restraining orders without considering and following the relevant statutory authority. Because there was more than sufficient evidence supporting a DVPA order protecting R.H. and her child H.H. from K.L., the Court affirmed that order. It reversed the orders regarding child custody: "If, after the trial court regains jurisdiction following the resolution of the dependency proceedings involving Z.L., either party files a request for order concerning custody, the trial court shall consider and apply the rebuttable presumption of Family Code section 3044 and the factors that may overcome that presumption." View "K.L. v. R.H." on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal reversed in part and vacated in part in a dispute over ownership of two parcels of real property between wife, her husband, and the husband's mother. The court concluded that the trial court abused its discretion when it amended husband's mother's complaint to include a cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty. Therefore, the court reversed the judgment on the third cause of action. The court also concluded that the trial court erroneously determined that conditional delivery of the deed was valid. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment on the causes of action for slander of title, quiet title, declaratory relief, and cancellation of deeds. Finally, the court concluded that the trial court's findings and orders interfered with issues under the jurisdiction of the family law court; the trial court did not err when it admitted impeachment evidence about wife's financial circumstances in 2009; and the trial court did not deprive wife of a fair trial by cutting off her trial time unexpectedly. The court remanded with instructions to the trial court to amend the language of the judgment to provide that its orders do not preclude wife from raising proper claims for community property interests, Epstein credits, Watts charges, or other similar claims in the family law court. View "McMillin v. Eare" on Justia Law