Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

Laura Latimer and Egan Walker divorced in 2002 after 13 years of marriage. During their marriage, Walker earned 8.54 years of PERS credits. The divorce decree included a marital settlement agreement (MSA) that awarded Latimer half of Walker's PERS retirement benefits, secured by a qualified domestic relations order (QDRO) allowing Latimer to elect Option 2. Walker later remarried, reentered public employment as a judge, and transferred his PERS credits to JRS, designating his current wife as the beneficiary. Walker sought judicial confirmation to designate both Latimer and his current wife as Option 2 beneficiaries.The Second Judicial District Court found that Walker could designate two different Option 2 beneficiaries for his PERS and JRS accounts. The court ordered that Latimer was entitled to 4.25 years of PERS credits but not to any of Walker's JRS account. Latimer filed a motion for a new trial, which was denied. She then appealed, arguing that Nevada law permits only one Option 2 beneficiary and that her community interest in Walker's retirement benefits should not be defeated by his transfer to JRS.The Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed the case and concluded that NRS 1A.450(1)(a) allows a JRS member to designate more than one Option 2 beneficiary. The court held that both Latimer and Walker's current wife could be designated as Option 2 beneficiaries, with each receiving their respective portion of the benefits if Walker predeceases them. The court affirmed the district court's decision to allow two beneficiaries but reversed and remanded the order regarding Latimer's entitlement to service credits from Walker's JRS account, ensuring her protected interest in the retirement benefits is maintained. View "WALKER VS. WALKER" on Justia Law

Grandparents, J.D. and M.D., petitioned to adopt their great-grandchild, P.J.W., who has lived with them for most of his life due to his parents' struggles with incarceration, substance abuse, and violence. They successfully obtained guardianship over the child in 2020. The child's biological father, R.W., contested the adoption, arguing that he had rehabilitated and wanted to maintain his parental rights. Despite the Grandparents' stable and supportive environment, the trial court denied the adoption petition, citing their advanced ages and the father's purported rehabilitation.The Montgomery Superior Court concluded that adoption was not in the child's best interest, emphasizing the Grandparents' ages and the father's progress in rehabilitation. The court also held that it is inherently in a child's best interest to be raised by a biological parent. The Grandparents appealed this decision.The Indiana Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision in a 2-1 opinion, deferring to the trial court's judgment under the applicable standard of review. However, Judge Crone dissented, arguing that the trial court's legal conclusion about the inherent best interest of being raised by a biological parent was improper and that the Grandparents had demonstrated their capability to provide a stable and supportive environment for the child.The Indiana Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that the trial court erred by not considering the Grandparents' ages in light of their ability to rear and support the child under Indiana Code subsection 31-19-11-1(a)(2). The Supreme Court also found that the trial court's conclusion that it is inherently in a child's best interest to be raised by a biological parent was an erroneous legal conclusion. The Supreme Court reversed the trial court's decision and remanded the case with instructions to reconsider the Grandparents' ages in light of their ability to raise the child and to conduct a new best-interest determination using the proper legal standard. View "J. D. v. R. W." on Justia Law

The case involves the dissolution of a marriage between the plaintiff and the defendant, who is a partner at a large law firm. The plaintiff sought joint custody, child support, alimony, and an equitable division of property. The trial court found that the defendant's interest in potential retirement payments from her law firm was too speculative to be considered marital property subject to equitable distribution. The court awarded the plaintiff alimony contingent on the defendant's employment status at her firm.The trial court determined that the defendant's interest in the retirement payments was a mere expectancy, as the firm could unilaterally reduce or eliminate these payments at any time. The court found that the defendant's interest involved too many variables and risks to be considered property. The court awarded the plaintiff $35,000 per month in alimony for the first twelve months, and $30,000 per month thereafter, contingent on the defendant's employment at the firm. If the defendant retired and received retirement payments, the alimony would be 25% of her net after-tax income from those payments.The Appellate Court affirmed the trial court's judgment, agreeing that the retirement payments were too speculative to be considered property and that the alimony award was within the trial court's discretion. The court noted that the trial court had considered all relevant factors, including the plaintiff's earning capacity and the defendant's financial situation, in crafting the alimony order.The Supreme Court of Connecticut affirmed the Appellate Court's judgment. The court held that the trial court correctly determined that the defendant's interest in the retirement payments was too speculative to constitute property for equitable distribution. The court also held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding alimony contingent on the defendant's employment at her firm, as the order was intended to provide the plaintiff with financial support while incentivizing him to seek employment. View "D. S. v. D. S." on Justia Law

G.R. lived with her mother and had no contact with her alleged father, R.R. In 2017, G.R. was hospitalized and diagnosed with disruptive mood dysregulation disorder. The Los Angeles Department of Child and Family Services became involved when the mother failed to secure necessary mental health services for G.R. The mother did not have contact information for R.R. The juvenile court initially found R.R. to be G.R.'s alleged father, later amending the order to reflect this accurately. R.R. was incarcerated for domestic violence and had an extensive criminal history. The court denied services to R.R. and ordered no visits until he contacted the Department.In May 2018, the juvenile court removed G.R. from her mother's custody and placed her with a maternal aunt. In November 2020, R.R. expressed a desire to have a relationship with G.R., but did not follow through with setting up visits. In January 2023, R.R. filed a deficient section 388 petition, which the juvenile court denied. By June 2023, G.R. had spoken with R.R. by phone but was not ready for in-person visits. In September 2023, the juvenile court appointed G.R.'s caregiver as her legal guardian, ordered monitored visits for R.R., and terminated its jurisdiction.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court dismissed R.R.'s appeal of the juvenile court's order requiring monitored visits, stating that as an alleged father, R.R. could not show he was aggrieved by the order. The court emphasized that an alleged father has no rights to custody, reunification services, or visits unless he establishes paternity and achieves presumed father status. R.R. did not establish paternity, and thus had no standing to appeal the visitation order. View "In re G.R." on Justia Law

Shahriyar Shayan appealed an order denying his motion to quash a writ of execution for attorney fees filed by Zohreh McIntyre Shayan. Shahriyar argued that the writ should be quashed because it was sought more than ten years after the entry of judgment, violating Code of Civil Procedure section 683.020, and was subject to the renewal requirements of Code of Civil Procedure section 683.130. He contended that judgments for attorney fees under the Family Code are not exempt from these requirements.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County denied Shahriyar's request to set aside the writ of execution. The court found that the judgment for attorney fees, entered under the Family Code, was enforceable until satisfied in full and did not require renewal under Family Code section 291, subdivision (b). Shahriyar appealed this decision.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, reviewed the case. The court held that when a judgment for attorney fees is entered under the Family Code, it is enforceable until paid in full, and failure to renew the judgment does not affect its enforceability. The court found that the plain language of Family Code section 291, its legislative history, and common sense supported this interpretation. The court affirmed the lower court's order, concluding that Family Code section 291's reference to money judgments includes those for attorney fees, exempting them from the ten-year limitation and renewal requirements of the Code of Civil Procedure. View "In re Marriage of Shayan" on Justia Law

Lois and David divorced in 1992, with David ordered to pay child and spousal support. Child support was to continue until their child, Shari, turned 19 and was a full-time high school student. Shari turned 18 in January 2001 and graduated high school in June 2001, but wage garnishments for child support continued until 2008. In 2021, David sought reimbursement for overpaid child support, claiming he overpaid $46,061.55. Lois opposed, arguing the delay was unreasonable and would cause her financial hardship.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County denied David's request, finding he did not act timely and his reasons for the delay were insufficient to overcome the prejudice to Lois. The court noted David had previously modified the spousal support order but failed to do so for child support. The court also found Lois had unclean hands, as she likely knew she was receiving overpayments. However, the court granted David $3,000 in attorney fees as sanctions against Lois.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court found that the defense of laches did not apply due to Lois's unclean hands. The court also disagreed with David's interpretation of Family Code section 4007, noting that the original support order did not require Lois to notify David of the termination of child support. The court emphasized that it was David's responsibility to terminate the wage and earnings assignment order. Given the 13-year delay and the prejudice to Lois, the court affirmed the trial court's decision to deny David's request for reimbursement. View "Marriage of Saraye" on Justia Law

Susan Diamond appealed an order denying her request to set aside the judgment in her marital dissolution proceeding with Troy Diamond. Susan argued that the family court erred in denying her motion to vacate the judgment based on duress and mental incapacity during the dissolution proceeding. She claimed she was unable to participate in the proceedings due to severe mental health issues and duress caused by Troy's alleged abusive behavior.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County initially granted Susan's attorney's request to be relieved as counsel due to Susan's lack of communication and cooperation. Susan did not appear in court or respond to discovery requests, leading to an uncontested trial in May 2015. The court awarded Troy sole custody of their daughter Sarah, child support, and significant financial awards. Susan's first request to set aside the judgment based on mistake was denied, and her appeal was dismissed as untimely.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Seven, reviewed the case. The court found that Susan did not meet her burden to show she was mentally incapacitated or under duress during the dissolution proceedings. The court concluded that Susan's mental health issues did not rise to the level of mental incapacity as defined by relevant statutes, and there was no evidence that Troy's behavior constituted duress. The court also rejected Susan's argument that the judgment should be set aside as inequitable, noting that section 2123 prohibits setting aside a judgment solely based on inequity.The court affirmed the family court's order, holding that Susan did not establish grounds for relief under Family Code section 2122. View "Marriage of Diamond" on Justia Law

A minor child, Baby Girl R., was abandoned by her mother, S.R., shortly after birth. S.R. gave birth in a homeless encampment and was using methamphetamines daily. Baby Girl R. tested positive for the drug and exhibited withdrawal symptoms. S.R. was placed on an involuntary psychiatric hold due to paranoia, delusions, and aggression. After being discharged, S.R. left Baby Girl R. at the hospital and returned to the encampment. The Department of Family and Children’s Services initiated dependency proceedings, and Baby Girl R. was placed in protective custody. Despite diligent efforts, the Department could not locate S.R.The juvenile court placed Baby Girl R. in foster care and ordered reunification services for S.R., despite her unknown whereabouts. The court found that S.R.’s location was unknown despite reasonable efforts to locate her. Baby Girl R. appealed, arguing that the court should have bypassed reunification services under Welfare and Institutions Code section 361.5, subdivision (b)(1). While the appeal was pending, the juvenile court terminated reunification services for S.R. at the six-month review hearing and placed Baby Girl R. with her maternal grandparents.The California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court determined that the appeal was moot due to the termination of reunification services but exercised discretion to address the merits. The court concluded that section 361.5, subdivision (b)(1) does not mandate bypassing reunification services when a parent’s whereabouts are unknown despite a diligent search. The juvenile court has discretion to grant or deny reunification services in such cases. The appellate court found no error in the juvenile court’s decision to order reunification services for S.R. and affirmed the disposition order. View "In re Baby Girl R." on Justia Law

In September 2017, Attorney Karolyn Kovtun held a meeting with Jennifer Shenefield and her client Mark Shenefield, despite a criminal protective order prohibiting Mark from contacting Jennifer. During the meeting, Mark and Kovtun verbally and emotionally abused Jennifer, and Kovtun threatened to remove their daughter from Jennifer’s custody if she did not sign a custody agreement. Jennifer signed the agreement under duress and contacted the police. Kovtun continued to represent Mark, who was later convicted of violating the protective order. Kovtun then sued Jennifer for recording the meeting without consent, prompting Jennifer to file a cross-complaint against Kovtun.The Superior Court of San Diego County denied Kovtun’s two anti-SLAPP motions and sustained her demurrer to two of Jennifer’s six causes of action. After a bench trial, the court found Kovtun liable for negligence, intentional infliction of emotional distress, intentional misrepresentation, and negligent misrepresentation, awarding Jennifer $50,000 in damages. Mark did not appear at trial, and the court entered judgment against him, awarding Jennifer $250,000 in damages.The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, State of California, reviewed the case. Kovtun argued that Jennifer’s claims were barred by the statute of limitations under Code of Civil Procedure section 340.6 and the litigation privilege under Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b). The court concluded that Kovtun waived the statute of limitations defense by failing to timely and properly plead it. Additionally, the court determined that the litigation privilege did not apply to Kovtun’s communications. The judgment against Kovtun was affirmed. View "Shenefield v. Kovtun" on Justia Law

Michael Auer Wolf filed a request for a vocational evaluation of Patricia Mercado in a parentage action, which the Superior Court of Orange County granted. Wolf's request aimed to assess Mercado's ability to obtain employment and her earning capacity for determining child support. Mercado opposed the request, arguing that the court lacked jurisdiction to order a vocational evaluation as it was not authorized by any statute. She filed an amended petition for writ of mandate, prohibition, or other appropriate relief.The Superior Court of Orange County initially granted Wolf's request and later his motion to compel Mercado to undergo the vocational evaluation. Mercado appealed, arguing that the court's orders were void due to lack of statutory authority and that they violated her constitutional and discovery rights. The court maintained that child support was at issue and that it could order a vocational evaluation based on public policy and statutory provisions, including Evidence Code section 730.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court found that Wolf did not establish entitlement to a vocational evaluation under any relevant statutory authority, including sections 3558, 4331, and 4058 of the Family Code. The court emphasized that section 4058 requires a preliminary showing that a vocational evaluation would be in the best interests of the children, which Wolf failed to provide. The court also noted that Evidence Code section 730 did not support the vocational evaluation order as it pertains to neutral experts appointed by the court.The Court of Appeal granted Mercado's petition, ordering the Superior Court to vacate its orders requiring Mercado to undergo a vocational evaluation and to enter a new order denying Wolf's request. The stay order was dissolved, and Mercado was awarded her costs incurred in the proceeding. View "Mercado v. Superior Court" on Justia Law