Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and vacated in part the judgment of the intermediate court of appeals (ICA) affirming the family court's order denying Father's motion to set aside default and his motion to intervene, holding that the family court should have analyzed Father's motion to intervene under Hawai'i Family Court Rules (HFCR) 24.In this proceeding brought under the Hawai'i Child Protective Act, Haw. Rev. Stat. Chapter 587A, both Father's default and default judgment were entered while the identity of the child's natural father was unknown. On certiorari, Father argued that he was not required to set aside the default and default judgment before filing his motion to intervene pursuant to Rule 24. The Supreme Court agreed on that issue and otherwise affirmed, holding (1) Father was not required to set aside the default and default judgment before proceeding with his motion to intervene; and (2) Father's remaining arguments were without merit. View "In re AA" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court dividing marital property between Wife and Husband upon granting Husband a divorce, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion by dividing the marital property as it did.On appeal, Wife argued that the district court abused its discretion by arbitrarily awarding her an equalization payment of $200,000 and requested that the Court either modify the judgment to $334,789 or remand for further proceedings. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding the property in a division it considered fair and equitable and after applying the factors set forth in Wyo. Stat. Ann. 20-2-114. View "Innes v. Innes" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed in part and vacated in part the judgments entered by the district court establishing Dawn and James Ostrander as de facto parents of two biological children of Mark Martin and Marylou MacMahan, allocating parental rights and responsibilities and child support among the parties, and amending a divorce judgment between Martin and MacMahan, holding that the judgment amending the divorce judgment was in error.In an agreed-upon divorce judgment, the family court awarded shared parental rights of the twins of MacMahan and Martin to both parties. Later, the Ostranders, with whom the children were living, filed a complaint seeking a determination of de facto parentage, parental rights and responsibilities, and child support. The court concluded that the Ostranders were the de facto parents of the children, decided that parental rights would be shared among the Ostranders, Martin, and MacMahan, and amended some of the divorce judgment's provisions. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment amending the divorce judgment and otherwise affirmed, holding (1) the court did not err in establishing de facto parentage, parental rights and responsibilities, and child support; and (2) the judgment amending the divorce judgment was inconsistent with the judgment establishing parental rights and responsibilities. View "Martin v. MacMahan" on Justia Law

Erin McAlister appealed trial court orders awarding Wendi Clifton, McAlister’s former domestic partner, visitation rights to McAlister’s adopted daughter, Catherine, pursuant to the equitable caregiver statute, OCGA 19-7-3.1.1 McAlister contended the trial court erred in declaring the statute “constitutional, both facially and as applied to [Clifton],” as well as finding that Clifton had standing to seek visitation rights as Catherine’s equitable caregiver. The Georgia Supreme Court found that Catherine having turned 18 years old prior to the docketing of this appeal, and the parties agreed that this fact rendered moot McAlister’s challenge to the award of visitation rights. The Court therefore concluded this case was moot, and therefore vacated the trial court’s orders and remanded the case to the trial court with direction that the case be dismissed. View "McAlister v. Clifton" on Justia Law

The children, born in 2009 and 2012, were placed in the dependency system. They were placed in the care of their paternal grandmother, who formally adopted both children but had significant problems caring for them. Grandmother contacted Adoption Connection and asked that the children be re-placed for adoption, indicating that the children must remain part of the family and that the openness of the adoptions was of primary importance. The new adoptive parents signed an open adoption contract. Difficulties arose after the adoption was finalized and Grandmother learned that the agreement had not been provided to the adoption court and was not considered or made part of the original adoption order. Adoption Connection filed a request to “Amend Judgment of Adoption to Include Post Adoption Contact Agreement.”The trial court determined that it had no jurisdiction because the court which had originally granted the adoptions had not made the necessary judicial determinations as to whether the post-adoption contact agreement was executed voluntarily and in the best interests of the children. The court of appeal reversed. The trial court could have used its equitable powers to amend the judgments to include the parties’ agreement in the interests of fairness and justice. The trial court also erroneously held that evidence of fraud or an intentional or deliberate misrepresentation was necessary for the grandparents to show the adoptive parents were barred from opposing the amendment under the doctrine of equitable estoppel. View "Adoption of S.S." on Justia Law

Keith Andrews intervened in the divorce proceedings of Karen and Jarred Kinnett, asserting he was the biological father of Ms. Kinnett’s youngest child. His avowal action was filed eighteen months after the child’s birth. The Louisiana Supreme Court found the avowal action untimely and perempted under Louisiana Civil Code article 198 . The case was remanded for the court of appeal to address Andrews’ remaining constitutional challenge. View "Kinnett v. Kinnett" on Justia Law

A minor in the custody of the Alaska Office of Children’s Services (OCS) was brought to a hospital for mental health treatment. A hospital social worker then petitioned the superior court to have the minor involuntarily hospitalized at a psychiatric facility for a mental health evaluation. The court held a brief ex parte telephonic inquiry at which it took the social worker’s sworn testimony. The court concluded that the minor was a danger to herself and granted the petition. Under the statute governing involuntary commitments, the court was required to hold an evidentiary hearing within 72 hours if the psychiatric facility intended to continue providing treatment beyond that time. Before any hearing, however, OCS informed the court that it consented to the minor’s 30-day commitment for treatment; it contended that its consent made the 30-day commitment “voluntary” and, under the statute governing parental admissions, no hearing was required. The court eventually held an evidentiary hearing nearly 30 days after the minor’s initial hospitalization for evaluation. The court decided that the standards for a 30-day commitment were met because there was clear and convincing evidence that the minor had a mental illness, that she posed a risk of harm to herself, and that there were no less restrictive means of treatment available. The court also concluded that OCS had the statutory authority to admit a child in its care under the parental admissions statute. The first 30 days of the minor’s commitment were therefore considered voluntary, and her continued hospitalization would be considered under the involuntary commitment framework only after those 30 days expired. The court further determined that, because the 30-day limit under the parental admission statute was separate from the 30-day limit before a jury trial was required under the involuntary commitment statute, the minor could be held for an additional 30 days — 60 days total — before there was any need for a trial. The minor appealed, arguing the superior court violated her due process rights by not allowing her to be heard at the initial inquiry, when the petitioner testified under oath, and by treating her initial 30-day commitment as voluntary. The Alaska Supreme Court concluded the minor’s hospitalization for evaluation complied with due process; a hearing was not required at the ex parte review stage, and a judge’s decision to hold a brief inquiry with the petitioner did not give the respondent a right to be heard. But the Supreme Court further concluded that it was error to treat the initial 30-day commitment as voluntary, because OCS was not a parent or guardian statutorily authorized to use the voluntary parental admission framework. Because the 30-day commitment should have been considered involuntary, any further hospitalization could not be ordered absent a full hearing or jury trial. The Supreme Court therefore reversed the superior court order characterizing the first 30-day commitment as voluntary and authorizing an additional 30 days of commitment. View "In the Matter of the Hospitalization of April S." on Justia Law

The superior court terminated a mother’s parental rights to her daughter after a termination trial. The mother appealed, and the Alaska Supreme Court concluded that on the facts of this case, the mother preserved her evidentiary appeal point. The Court rejected the Office of Children’s Services’s (OCS) assertion that the mother waived her evidentiary objection by not repeatedly raising it to every question asked during the relevant testimony. The Court also concluded that, because the superior court did not explain its evidentiary ruling at any point during the relevant testimony or in its termination decision, it could not determine: (1) whether the court allowed some or all of the hearsay testimony for limited purposes; (2) how the court used the hearsay evidence to reach its findings; or (3) whether the court erred or abused its discretion by allowing and relying on the hearsay testimony. The case was therefore remanded to the superior court for a full explanation of its evidentiary ruling, how the ruling related to the hearsay testimony, and how the hearsay testimony related to the trial court’s findings. View "M.B. (Mother) v. Alaska, DHSS, OCS" on Justia Law

Ilka Porter and Lina Louise Porter, through her mother and next friend, Ilka Porter, appealed a probate court order that concluded Sean Porter was married to Alexis Campbell Porter at the time of his death, and appointing Alexis Campbell Porter as administratrix of his estate. The question presented by these appeals was one of first impression in Alabama: Whether the death of a party to a marriage, after a marriage document is executed but before the marriage document is recorded, invalidates the marriage for failure to comply with the registration requirements of section 22-9A-17, Ala. Code 1975. The Alabama Supreme Court concluded that it did not, affirming the probate court's order. View "Porter v. Estate of Porter" on Justia Law

Scott and Tal were married for 17 years and had three children together. They divorced in 2014. In the stipulated dissolution judgment, Scott's gross annual income was listed as $196,440. He was ordered to pay $4,326 per month in spousal support and $3,674 per month in child support. In 2017, Scott sought to modify child and spousal support. The court found his yearly gross income had declined to $185,664 and the parties’ oldest child had aged out of child support, which constituted a change in circumstances. The court reduced spousal support to $3,800 per month.Two years later, Scott filed another request to modify spousal support. The court found that his income had not decreased, that Tal had “made efforts” to become self-sufficient, and that in addition to threatening to file several requests to modify support, Scott had unsuccessfully filed a motion for sanctions “rehashing the issues in 2017” and ordered him to pay Tal’s attorney fees ($5,000) incurred in opposing the latest request. The court of appeal affirmed the denial of the request, rejecting arguments that the trial court failed to consider required criteria under Family Code section 4320, erroneously excluded live testimony at the motion hearing, and abused its discretion in issuing attorney fee sanctions. View "Marriage of Kahan & Diamond" on Justia Law