Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

Mother J.B., lived with her two young children (“Y.W.-B” and “N.W.-B”) and the children’s father (“Father”) in Philadelphia. In 2019, the Philadelphia Department of Human Services (“DHS”) allegedly received a general protective services report (“GPS report”) from an unidentified source alleging possible neglect by Mother. Although DHS referenced this GPS report several times at the evidentiary hearing and used it to refresh its sole witness’s recollection, it inexplicably never introduced it into evidence. The proceedings revealed the allegation suggested Mother was homeless and failed to feed one of her children during a single eight-hour period. DHS used this allegation as grounds to enter and inspect the family residence. The issue for the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's review was whether DHS established sufficient probable cause for the trial court to issue the order permitting entry into the home without consent. To this, the Court concluded DHS did not establish probable cause, and thus reversed the order of the Superior Court holding to the contrary. View "In the Interest of: N.W.-B." on Justia Law

This matter arose from four Child in Need of Aid (CINA) cases. In each, the superior court appointed a guardian ad litem for the child through the Office of Public Advocacy (OPA), and in each case Brenda Finley, working under contract with OPA, appeared as the GAL. Pursuant to CINA Rule 11(e), Finley disclosed to the parties that she was a foster parent in another CINA case. She stated that she did not believe that her role as a foster parent “will affect her ability to be [impartial] in this specific case, or in other cases.” A parent in each case moved for an evidentiary hearing “regarding whether Ms. Finley should be disqualified as a guardian ad litem.” Arguing that Finley’s role as a foster parent might create a conflict of interest due to her relationship with the Office of Children’s Services (OCS) as both a foster parent and a GAL, the parents sought additional details to determine whether a conflict existed, suggesting a hearing would allow them to elicit information regarding Finley’s past, present, and possible future tenure as a foster parent, the status of the cases in which she served as a foster parent, her financial arrangements with OCS, and her relationship with OCS workers. Both OCS and OPA filed qualified oppositions to the parents’ request for a hearing, arguing: that categorical disqualification of foster parents from serving as GALs was overbroad; the court should provide clarity on what framework should govern the potential conflict; and that a low bar for disqualification would fail to recognize “the difficulty of keeping positions in child welfare staffed by qualified individuals, ideally with ties to the community . . . .” The Alaska Supreme Court held that the Alaska Rules of Professional Conduct applied to determine whether the GAL has a disqualifying conflict of interest and that the superior court must permit limited discovery to ascertain the underlying facts for determining whether a disqualifying conflict exists. View "C.L. v. Office of Public Advocacy" on Justia Law

In this divorce case, the Supreme Court primarily affirmed in part the decision of the court of appeals reversing the judgment of the district court holding Ronald Rosser in contempt for deliberately deceiving Holly Rosser, holding that the district court's contempt order did not include sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law to hold Ronald in contempt.In reversing, the court of appeals held (1) Ronald's deceptive conduct did not amount to statutory contempt as a matter of law because it was directed at Holly, rather than at the court; and (2) under Utah Code 78B-6-301(4), deceitful conduct during litigation does not rise to the level of contempt unless it is directed at the court. The Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals' vacatur of most of the district court's contempt order, holding that the court of appeals (1) correctly reached the interpretation and application of the contempt statute in this case; but (2) erred in reading subsection (4) of the statute to reach only deceit directed at the court because the statute includes deceit in respect to a court's proceedings. View "Rosser v. Rosser" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the district court that denied Christina C.'s application to modify child custody of her daughter, Daphnie F., holding that the district court's order did not follow the framework set forth in State on behalf of Tina K. v. Adam B., 948 N.W.2d 182 (Neb. 2020).Pursuant to a Colorado custody order, Daphnie was placed in the permanent custody of her paternal grandparents. Christina filed a motion to modify, arguing that she was a fit biological parent who had a right to custody of her child that was superior to that of the child's grandparents standing in loco parentis. The district court denied Christina's motion for new trial. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court's findings and reasoning were not sufficient under the correct standard set forth in State on behalf of Tina K. View "State ex rel. Daphnie F. v. Christina C." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the child custody modification order entered by the district court awarding Father primary physical custody of the parties' two children, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion.When the parties divorced, a stipulated divorce decree awarded them joint legal, physical, and residential custody of their two minor children. The court later granted Mother's motion to modify, concluding that it was in the children's best interests for Mother to have primary residential custody. Father subsequently filed the custody modification issue at issue, arguing that a material change in circumstances had occurred and that it was in the children's best interests that he be awarded primary residential custody. The district court granted the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that a material change in circumstances had occurred and that it was in the children's best interests to award primary physical custody to Father. View "Gutierrez v. Bradley" on Justia Law

DCFS alleged, and the juvenile court found true, three allegations that mother had physically abused, failed to protect, and medically neglected her daughter, Emily L., within the meaning of Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b). While this appeal was pending, Emily turned 18 and is no longer subject to the jurisdiction of the juvenile court.The Court of Appeal concluded that, although the appeal is moot as to Emily, the court will exercise its discretion to address the merits. In this case, substantial evidence does not support the jurisdictional finding of the juvenile court. Given the lack of substantial evidence of any risk of future harm to Emily at the time of the jurisdictional hearing, the court concluded that the juvenile court erred in assuming jurisdiction over this action. The court reversed the juvenile court's order asserting jurisdiction, vacated the juvenile court's factual findings, and directed the juvenile court upon remand to dismiss the petition. View "In re Emily L." on Justia Law

Appellants, Soncino (Celine’s brother), Celine, and Yoram (Celine’s husband) created for-profit organizations, that provided music enrichment and formed a nonprofit organization to contract with public entities. The for-profit organizations provided services, which the nonprofit paid for. The siblings sued Yoram and the businesses, alleging Yoram had misappropriated property belonging to the businesses. The complaint was joined to Celine's and Yoram's divorce proceedings. The parties filed a “Confidential Protective Order,” which prevented Celine from disclosing information and documents she obtained from Yoram’s desk and the marital residence without Yoram's knowledge.The court concluded that Soncino was a partner in the businesses and that the appellants used the business funds for personal expenses. The dissolution was finalized. The Attorney General subsequently filed a complaint against the family businesses and appellants and moved to unseal court records in the dissolution, alleging comingling of charitable funds and using those assets for personal expenses. Ultimately, the family court ordered that records from the dissolution and Soncino v. Tamir be unsealed, and the protective orders lifted.After holding that the family court had the authority to rule on the motion, that the Attorney General is entitled to seek the records on behalf of the public, and that the appellants failed to identify a privacy interest that outweighs the public right to access, the court of appeal reversed and remanded. The family court failed to assess whether the documents at issue were used at trial or submitted as a basis for adjudication, and erred in setting aside the protective orders. View "Marriage of Tamir" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the trial court terminating Respondent's parental rights, holding that the purported issues addressed by counsel in support of the appeal were meritless.After a hearing, the trial court concluded that grounds existed to terminate Father's parental rights based on willful abandonment and willful failure without justification to pay for the child's care. See N.C. Gen. Stat. 7B-1111(4) and (7). The trial court further concluded that termination was in the child's best interests. The Supreme Court affirmed after reviewing the issues identified by Father's counsel in a no merit brief, holding that the trial court's order was supported by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence and was based on proper legal grounds. View "In re J.I.T." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the trial court terminating Mother's parental rights to her juvenile child, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that termination was in the child's best interests.After a hearing, the trial court terminated Mother's parental rights on the grounds of abuse, neglect, and dependency. See N.C. Gen. Stat. 7B-1111(a)(1)-(2). The court further found that it was in the child's best interests to terminate Mother's parental rights. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Mother's challenges to the court's findings of fact were unavailing; and (2) the court did not abuse its discretion in making its best interests determination. View "In re N.B." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the trial court terminating Father's parental rights in his child, holding that there was no error.After a termination hearing, the trial court concluded that grounds existed to terminate Mother's and Father's parental rights pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. 7B-1111(a)(1) and (2) and that termination of the parents' parental rights was in the child's best interests. Father was the only party to this appeal. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Father's challenges to the trial court's findings of fact were unavailing; and (2) the trial court did not err in adjudicating neglect as a ground for termination of Father's parental rights pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. 7B-1111(a)(1). View "In re R.G.L." on Justia Law