Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

Shane Lance Yates and Amy Jo Yates (“Petitioners”) appealed district court orders denying their petitions for name changes and requests for reconsideration. They argued the district court erred in concluding their current names and the names requested were the same names. Petitioners sought to change their respective names from “SHANE LANCE YATES” (in all uppercase letters) to “Shane Lance Yates” and “AMY JO YATES” (in all uppercase letters) to “Amy Jo Yates.” They requested the changes to “terminate the guardian-ward relationship, and to distinguish from all other aliases, correct any mistakes, errors or identity confusion that exists in relation to the ALL CAPS STATE CREATED NAME.” The district court denied the petitions under res judicata because the Petitioners had previously filed identical name change petitions, which had been denied by the court, and they did not seek to change from one name to another and the requested change would not affect any action or legal proceeding or other right, title, or interest, as was the stated purpose. The Petitioners argue the district court erred in concluding their current names and the names requested were the same names. The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed, finding Petitioners offered no authority or reasoned argument that there was any legal significance to the capitalization of their names. The district court therefore did not abuse its discretion in denying the petitions. View "Matter of Shane Lance Yates" on Justia Law

Dean Gerving appealed a second amended judgment modifying his child support obligation. Gerving argued the district court erred in calculating his net income and erred by denying his request for a downward deviation in his child support obligation based on his payment of the child’s private school tuition. The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s denial of Gerving’s request for a downward deviation, but concluded the court erred in calculating Gerving’s net income. Therefore, that judgment was reversed and the case remanded for the trial court to properly calculate Gerving’s net income and child support obligation. View "Gerving v. Gerving, et al." on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment of the probate court denying Mother's petition to modify or terminate an order of the superior court that transferred custody and guardianship of her child to the child's paternal grandmother and step-grandfather (together, Grandparents), holding that the probate court lacked subject matter jurisdiction.A Connecticut superior court granted the motion filed by the Connecticut Department of Children and Families to transfer custody and guardianship of the child to Grandparents, who lived in New Hampshire. After Mother, the child, and Grandparents had all moved to Maine, Mother filed a petition in the Hancock County Probate Court seeking to register and modify or terminate the Connecticut order. The probate court denied Mother's petition. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the order below, holding that the probate court did not have subject matter jurisdiction to consider or adjudicate Mother's petition to modify a guardianship established in Connecticut's equivalent of a child protection matter. View "In re Guardianship by Stacey M." on Justia Law

Petitioner Reginald Swain (Grandfather) appealed the denial of a request to terminate a father's parental rights ("TPR") and to adopt the child. The family court determined Grandfather proved a statutory ground for TPR, but concluded TPR and adoption would not be in the child's best interests because the child was already in a stable custody situation with her grandparents, Father had seemingly reformed his ways while in prison, and the child might benefit in the future from having a relationship with him. The court of appeals affirmed, and the South Carolina Supreme Court granted certiorari. Grandfather contended the court of appeals erred in affirming the family court's decision to deny TPR and adoption. Specifically, Grandfather contended both courts ignored the recommendation of the guardian ad litem, conflated the status of custody of a child with the permanency of TPR and adoption, and erroneously focused on the appearance of the new birth certificate, ignoring Mother's consent to the adoption. Conversely, Father argued both courts correctly found Grandfather failed to meet his burden of demonstrating TPR and adoption were in Child's best interests. Exercising its de novo review, the South Carolina believed TPR and adoption were in Child's best interests. "Because the focus is on the child's best interests rather than the parents' interest when determining whether TPR and adoption is appropriate," the Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, terminated Father's parental rights, and granted the adoption. View "Swain v. Bollinger" on Justia Law

Petitioner James Britton appealed two circuit court orders denying his request to terminate alimony, and granting the requests of respondent Patricia Britton for contempt for nonpayment of alimony and renewal of alimony. The New Hampshire Supreme Court found: (1) an obligation to pay alimony under the applicable statute automatically expired after three years unless renewed, modified, or extended; (2) a stipulation providing for a term of alimony beyond the three-year limit does not override the statutory expiration of the alimony obligation; (3) the original alimony award was first entered in 1985, and petitioner’s alimony obligations expired in 1988; (4) a court order approving a 2016 stipulation did not serve to renew or extend the 1985 alimony award. Therefore the trial court erred in finding petitioner in contempt of the 2016 stipulation and order. Petitioner did not have an obligation to pay alimony after the alimony award expired in 1988; as a result, the amounts petitioner paid in error based on the mistaken belief that the 1985 alimony order remained in effect were not required and were, therefore, voluntary. Absent fraud, “money voluntarily paid under a mistake of law cannot be recovered.” Accordingly, the trial court did not unsustainably exercise its discretion in declining to order reimbursement or credit of sums paid between 1988 and 2018. View "In the Matter of Britton" on Justia Law

In 2017 Brubaker sought dissolution of her marriage to Strum and requested a domestic violence restraining order, alleging Strum threatened to kill her and stalked her. The two entered into a stipulated temporary protective order. Brubaker alleged Strum violated the stipulated order multiple times. In 2018, the family law court issued a two-year domestic violence restraining order and subsequently found Strum had violated that order. In awarding Brubaker sole custody of their children, the court stated that Strum had not rebutted the presumption that an award of sole or joint custody to a perpetrator of domestic violence is detrimental to the best interest of the child, noting Strum’s inability to control his explosive temper and aggressive behavior.In 2019 Brubaker unsuccessfully sought to renew the two-year domestic violence restraining order. The court of appeal reversed the denial. The trial court erroneously considered only whether Strum committed acts of domestic violence during a narrow window of time when the original restraining order was in effect, and not whether Brubaker had a reasonable fear of future abuse, given all relevant facts and circumstances. A court should renew a domestic violence restraining order when the court finds the probability of future abuse is sufficient that a reasonable person in the same circumstances would have a “reasonable apprehension” that abuse will occur absent a protective order. View "Marriage of Brubaker and Strum" on Justia Law

After wife filed a petition for dissolution of her 39-year marriage to husband, the parties stipulated to the appointment of the Honorable Melinda Johnson as temporary judge. Judge Johnson subsequently entered a "non-CLETS" domestic violence restraining order (DVRO) against wife.The Court of Appeal concluded that Judge Johnson did not exceed the scope of her appointment when she heard and decided husband's request for a DVRO, but did err as a matter of law when she specified that the restraining order was a "non-CLETS" order. The court remanded the matter to permit Judge Johnson to enter an order in compliance with Family Code section 6380. The court affirmed in all other respects. View "Marriage of Reichental" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Tyson on plaintiff's interference claim under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA). The court concluded that Tyson's request for recertification was reasonable as a matter of law under 29 U.S.C. 2613(e) and did not interfere with defendant's FMLA rights. The court explained that it was reasonable as a matter of law to require recertification based on a significant change in the circumstances of plaintiff's absences. View "Whittington v. Tyson Foods, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed in part and affirmed in part two district court orders in this divorce case - a custody order and a visitation order, holding that the district court abused its discretion in requiring Father to submit to regular alcohol testing during the transition period to joint custody.On appeal, Father argued that the district court erred in awarding primary custody to Mother during the transition period, in implementing a fifteen-month transition plan, and requiring him to submit to regular alcohol testing during the transition. The Supreme Court reversed the alcohol testing requirement and otherwise affirmed, holding that the district court (1) did not abuse its discretion in awarding primary custody to Mother; (2) abused its discretion in requiring Father to film himself taking a home breath test at least once a week and undergo random tests for nearly one year; and (3) did not commit reversible error when it delayed seven months after the final hearing before entering its custody and visitation orders. View "Mecartney v. Mecartney" on Justia Law

M.A. (mother) and A.O. (father) appealed the termination of their parental rights to their three children. In January 2019, Children and Family Services (Agency) received a report that the home was filthy. It received a separate report that the maternal grandparents hit the children and the parents were methamphetamine addicts. Both parents had prior arrests for possession of a controlled substance. The parents and grandparents actively avoided detention warrants executed to the home. In June 2019, a police officer on an unrelated call found the family at the home and detained the children. The next month, two children were placed in foster care; the parents had a third child, L.A.-O (L) in May 2020, whom the the Agency detained and filed a dependency petition. In July 2020, at the jurisdictional/dispositional hearing as to L., the juvenile court found that it had jurisdiction based on failure to protect, failure to support, and abuse of a sibling, and formally removed L. from the parents’ custody and ordered reunification services. At the section 366.26 hearing, the juvenile court found that the children were adoptable and that there was no applicable exception to termination of parental rights. It therefore terminated parental rights. The Court of Appeal addressed two novel issues raised by the parents' appeal: (1) the California Supreme Court’s decision in In re Caden C., 11 Cal.5th 614 (2021) overruled lower appellate court decisions holding that a parent asserting the parental-benefit exception must show that he or she occupied a “parental role;” and (2) the juvenile court erred by “ignor[ing]” evidence in social worker’s reports filed in connection with earlier hearings and that these reports established that the parental-benefit exception applied. The trial court found that the parental-benefit exception did not apply partly because the parents “ha[d] not acted in a parental role in a long time” and partly because the prospective adoptive parents “ha[d] been acting in a parental role.” Because the trial court used this terminology, the Court of Appeal could not tell whether its ruling conformed with Caden C. Hence, judgment was remanded for reconsideration of the parental-benefit exception. With regard to the second issue, the appellate court disagreed: the reports were not introduced into evidence at the section 366.26 hearing; hence, neither the Court of Appeal nor the juvenile court could consider them. "The parents will be free to introduce them on remand." View "In re L.A.-O." on Justia Law