Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

The case involves Edward Wayne Reid, who was charged with two crimes against Jane Doe: assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury and willfully inflicting corporal injury upon a domestic partner resulting in a traumatic condition. Jane testified that Reid grabbed her by the throat, applied pressure, caused her difficulty in breathing and swallowing, and made her feel dizzy. A deputy corroborated Jane's account, noting she reported seeing stars and feeling faint during the incident.The magistrate at the preliminary hearing found probable cause for the assault charge but dismissed the domestic violence charge, stating there was no evidence of a "traumatic injury." The People refiled the information with both charges, and Reid moved to dismiss the domestic violence charge again. The trial court granted Reid's motion, agreeing with the magistrate's assessment.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court held that the evidence presented at the preliminary hearing provided a rational ground for assuming Reid inflicted corporal injury upon Jane through choking, which resulted in a traumatic condition as defined by the statute. The court emphasized that the statutory definition of a traumatic condition includes impeding normal breathing or circulation of blood by applying pressure on the throat or neck. The court found that Jane's difficulty in breathing and feeling dizzy or faint met this definition.The appellate court reversed the trial court's order dismissing the domestic violence charge and remanded the case with directions to allow Reid to withdraw his plea to the assault charge. The court concluded that there was sufficient evidence to support the charge of willfully inflicting corporal injury resulting in a traumatic condition. View "P. v. Reid" on Justia Law

Miriam Penado sought a temporary order of protection for herself and her two minor children in Butte-Silver Bow County Justice Court against Daniel Hunter, the children's father. The Justice Court issued a temporary ex parte order of protection and scheduled a hearing. Subsequently, Hunter filed a parenting plan petition in Gallatin County District Court and moved to remove the protection order case to that court, citing a state statute. The Justice Court transferred the case and vacated the hearing. The Gallatin County District Court then referred the case to a standing master, who set a hearing and maintained the temporary order of protection.Penado filed a motion in the Justice Court to vacate the transfer orders, which was denied. She appealed to the Gallatin County District Court, which also denied her appeal, stating that any appeal should have been made to the Butte-Silver Bow County District Court. The District Court found that Hunter had properly removed the case under the relevant statute. At the subsequent hearing, the District Court granted a one-year order of protection for Penado and allowed Hunter visitation rights.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case. The court held that the removal of the temporary order of protection case to the Gallatin County District Court was proper under § 40-15-301(3), MCA, which allows either party to remove the matter to district court before or after the hearing. The court found that the statute's language and intent were to consolidate related family law matters in the district court handling the parenting plan. The court also determined that Penado's due process rights were not violated, as she had notice and the opportunity to participate in the hearing. The Supreme Court affirmed the District Court's final order of protection. View "Penado v. Hunter" on Justia Law

The case involves the termination of parental rights of Brandi McCubbin, the adoptive mother of a child referred to as V.J.R. (also known as F.V.M.). The child disclosed to her biological mother that she had been sexually abused by her adoptive father, Charles Allen McCubbin. The biological mother reported the abuse to the police, leading to a forensic interview with the child, where she repeated her allegations and provided additional details. The child was subsequently taken into protective custody, and the State filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of both adoptive parents.The District Court of Oklahoma County adjudicated the child as deprived and terminated the parental rights of the adoptive mother, finding that she failed to protect the child from shocking and heinous abuse. The court determined that the adoptive mother had knowledge of at least one prior accusation of sexual abuse against the adoptive father and failed to take reasonable action to protect the child. The court also admitted a DVD recording of the child's forensic interview into evidence, despite the adoptive mother's later objections on appeal regarding the lack of a separate hearing to determine the reliability of the child's statements.The Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that the trial court did not err in applying the clear and convincing evidence standard rather than the heightened burden of proof under the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), as the case did not involve a Native American child or family. The court also found that the evidence was sufficient to support the termination of parental rights, as the adoptive mother had constructive knowledge of the abuse and failed to protect the child. Additionally, the court ruled that any error in admitting the DVD recording without a separate hearing was harmless, as the trial court had made sufficient findings regarding the credibility and reliability of the child's statements. View "IN THE MATTER OF V.J.R." on Justia Law

Jacob Wilde and Mickayla Taggart, formerly married, are parents to a minor child, E.W. Following their divorce in 2018, Wilde was ordered to pay $143.07 per month in child support. Wilde later filed petitions to modify the custody arrangement and child support, citing Taggart's alleged incapacity and unemployment. Taggart responded, explaining her inability to work due to an autoimmune disease and requested child support modification based on the Idaho Child Support Guidelines.The magistrate court found that Taggart's income had been minimal since the petition was filed and imputed her income at minimum wage. Wilde's income was determined to be $58,240 annually. The court retroactively modified child support to $420.34 per month starting August 2019, creating an arrearage for Wilde. Wilde's motion to reconsider was denied, and the magistrate court reaffirmed its decision, adjusting the child support amount to $485.34 from June 2021.Wilde appealed to the district court, which affirmed the magistrate court's decision. The district court found that the magistrate court had substantial evidence to support its findings and did not abuse its discretion in making the child support modification retroactive.The Idaho Supreme Court reviewed the case and upheld the district court's decision. The court found that the magistrate court acted within its discretion, supported by substantial evidence of the parties' changed incomes. The court noted that Wilde had been aware of the potential for retroactive modification and had not disputed the child support calculations. The Supreme Court awarded attorney fees and costs to Taggart, deeming Wilde's appeal frivolous and without foundation. View "Wilde v. Taggart" on Justia Law

Ryan S. and Marie S. married in 2011 and have three minor children. They separated in 2019, and Marie was awarded temporary primary physical and legal custody. Ryan participated in supervised visits, which were terminated due to policy violations. In early 2020, the district court found Ryan unfit for custody, partly due to self-diagnosed PTSD, and allowed Marie to relocate with the children to California. Ryan's virtual visits were also terminated due to financial constraints. Despite his efforts to comply with custody evaluations and provide support, Ryan had not interacted with his children since June 2020.The Eighth Judicial District Court, Family Division, Clark County, terminated Ryan's parental rights, finding him unfit and concluding that he had abandoned and neglected his children, making only token efforts to support or communicate with them. The court applied NRS 128.107 and NRS 128.109, which outline factors for terminating parental rights and create a presumption that termination is in the child's best interest when the child has been placed outside the home.The Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed the case and found that NRS 128.107 and NRS 128.109 were inapplicable because the children were in the custody of a parent, not placed outside the home under NRS Chapter 432B. The court concluded that the district court erred in applying these statutes and that the findings of abandonment, neglect, and token efforts were not supported by substantial evidence. The Supreme Court reversed the district court's order terminating Ryan's parental rights and remanded the case for further proceedings, instructing the district court to order the destruction of any amended birth certificates and restore the children's names. View "In re Parental Rights to L.R.S., J.M.S. and J.L.S." on Justia Law

Jose Cardona appealed a trial court order granting Karina Soto, the mother of his child, a domestic violence restraining order (DVRO) against him. The DVRO, which expired in November 2023, protected Soto and their daughter. The appeal was not moot despite the DVRO’s expiration because the finding of domestic violence created a five-year statutory presumption against Cardona’s custody of their daughter.The Contra Costa County Superior Court initially granted the DVRO based on an incident where Cardona, while drunk, beat his current wife in the presence of their daughter, who he also slapped. Soto claimed Cardona had verbally abused their daughter and forced her to carry his gun on multiple occasions. Cardona admitted to the incident but denied ongoing abuse and claimed Soto was lying to gain full custody. During the hearing, the court interviewed the daughter in chambers without the parties present, and the interview was not reported or documented.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division One, found that Cardona’s due process rights were violated because he was not informed of the substance of his daughter’s testimony and thus could not respond to it. The court emphasized that while in-chambers interviews of minors are permissible, there must be safeguards to ensure the parent can respond to the testimony. The failure to make any record of the daughter’s testimony left the evidentiary basis for the DVRO unreviewable on appeal. Consequently, the court reversed the DVRO due to the due process violation, though it did not preclude future reliance on other evidence of domestic violence presented. View "Cardona v Soto" on Justia Law

The parties were married in October 1996, and John A. Jewell Sr. filed for divorce in February 2018. The divorce judgment, entered in March 2019, required Jewell to pay Carol L. Brewer $2,000 per month in spousal support indefinitely. Jewell was found to have an earning capacity of $80,000, while Brewer was deemed fully disabled with no formal education or training. Jewell later moved to modify the spousal support, citing decreased earning capacity and Brewer’s cohabitation, but his motion was denied in June 2021. Jewell appealed, but the denial was upheld.In December 2022, Jewell filed another motion to modify the spousal support, again alleging Brewer’s cohabitation. The District Court (Bangor, Szylvian, J.) held a hearing in August 2023 and found that Jewell’s income had decreased to $52,000 per year and that Brewer had the capacity to work, despite her disability claims. The court terminated Jewell’s spousal support obligation but required him to pay $500 per month towards arrearages and attorney fees.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case and found that there was no evidentiary support for the District Court’s finding that Brewer had the capacity to earn income. The court vacated the judgment and remanded the case for the District Court to reevaluate whether there has been a substantial change in circumstances since the most recent judgment. If such a change is found, the court must then determine whether to modify the spousal support based on the new findings. View "Jewell v. Brewer" on Justia Law

C.C. and D.V., who share two children, had joint legal and physical custody established in 2016. In January 2022, C.C. sought a domestic violence restraining order (DVRO) against D.V., alleging persistent harassment, including sending explicit images and verbal abuse. The court issued a temporary restraining order (TRO) granting C.C. sole legal and primary physical custody. The parties later stipulated to extend the TRO and address custody separately. In April 2023, they agreed to a one-year restraining order after hearing (ROAH), which did not address custody.The Marin County Superior Court issued a joint custody order in September 2022, despite C.C.'s pending DVRO request and her invocation of Family Code section 3044, which presumes that awarding custody to a perpetrator of domestic violence is detrimental to the child's best interest. C.C. appealed the ROAH and the subsequent July 2023 custody order, arguing the court erred by not determining D.V. had overcome the section 3044 presumption.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Three, held that the presumption in section 3044 is triggered whenever an ROAH is issued, even if stipulated. The court found that the trial court did not err in issuing the ROAH without modifying custody, as custody was addressed separately. However, the court erred in its July 2023 order by not determining that D.V. had overcome the section 3044 presumption before awarding joint custody. The appellate court reversed the July 2023 order but affirmed the April 2023 ROAH. The case was deemed moot due to subsequent legal proceedings, but the appellate court retained the appeal to resolve the significant legal issue. C.C. was awarded her costs on appeal. View "C.C. v. D.V." on Justia Law

Bobby Feehan sought extraordinary writ relief from the trial court’s order denying them temporary visitation during the pendency of their petition to establish a parental relationship with minor L.S. Feehan and Lauren Seto were in a romantic relationship while Seto was pregnant with L.S., who was later adopted by Seto’s partner, Jude Guide. Feehan claimed to have acted as a parent to L.S. from birth until the relationship with Seto ended, after which Seto cut off almost all contact between Feehan and L.S. Feehan filed a petition to determine their parental relationship and requested temporary visitation, which Seto and Guide opposed.The Superior Court of Alameda County denied Feehan’s request for temporary visitation, citing a lack of authority under Family Code sections 7604 and 6436 to order pendente lite custody and visitation. The court rejected Feehan’s argument that it had equitable authority to issue such orders when a prima facie case for parentage is made. Feehan then filed a petition for writ of mandate, which led to the current appeal.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case and found that the trial court had broad equitable authority to grant pendente lite visitation in parentage cases under Family Code sections 3022 and 3100, subdivision (a). The appellate court concluded that the trial court erred in determining it lacked authority to grant Feehan’s request. The court held that trial courts have discretion to enter temporary visitation orders if the requesting party makes a preliminary showing of being a presumed parent and if the order is in the best interests of the child. The appellate court issued a peremptory writ of mandate commanding the trial court to vacate its order and reconsider Feehan’s request for pendente lite visitation. View "Feehan v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Elizabeth T. was taking her three children to see their father when she fell on a bus after consuming alcohol. An anonymous caller reported her to the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS), alleging she was intoxicated and her children were neglected. Elizabeth denied being heavily intoxicated and claimed her children were well cared for. DCFS filed a petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b), alleging Elizabeth's substance abuse posed a risk to her children.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County sustained the petition, citing a prior sustained allegation of substance abuse from 2018. The court ordered informal supervision under section 360, subdivision (b). Elizabeth appealed, arguing that one incident of alcohol abuse did not support the finding that she posed a risk to her children at the time of the jurisdiction hearing.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court found that the evidence of the bus incident, along with the four-year-old allegation, did not support the finding that Elizabeth's conduct created a substantial risk of serious physical harm or illness to her children. The court noted that Elizabeth had cooperated with DCFS, submitted to drug and alcohol testing, and her children were healthy and well cared for. The court concluded that there was no substantial evidence of a current risk to the children and reversed the juvenile court's jurisdiction findings and disposition orders. View "In re Gilberto G." on Justia Law