Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

A firefighter retired and chose to participate in the Oklahoma Firefighters Pension and Retirement Plan B program years after his divorce. His former spouse sought to enforce the divorce decree, which required the firefighter to pay her a portion of his Plan B benefits. The district court ruled in favor of the former spouse, ordering the firefighter to pay her a portion of the funds in the Plan B account.The Court of Civil Appeals reversed the district court's decision, construing the former spouse's request as an impermissible modification of the divorce decree. The appellate court held that final property judgments cannot be modified absent fraud. The former spouse then sought certiorari from the Supreme Court of Oklahoma.The Supreme Court of Oklahoma reviewed the case and held that when a vested firefighter selects the Plan B option post-divorce and the divorce decree does not specify the allocation of these funds, the Plan B account is divisible marital property to the extent that any funds in the account are attributable to the marital years. The court applied the precedent set by Baggs v. Baggs, which established that retirement benefits accrued during the marriage are divisible marital property. The court vacated the Court of Civil Appeals' opinion and affirmed the district court's judgment, allowing the former spouse to collect her share of the Plan B benefits, including interest. View "CUMMINGS v. SASNETT" on Justia Law

David Morway sought review of an unpublished order by the court of appeals that dismissed his appeal as untimely. The appeal was against a May 24, 2023, circuit court order denying his motion to modify or terminate spousal maintenance. The court of appeals concluded that the order was final for purposes of appeal under WIS. STAT. § 808.03(1) and dismissed the appeal because David filed his notice of appeal outside the 90-day timeframe.In the Ozaukee County Circuit Court, David and Karen Morway were divorced in 2019, with David ordered to pay spousal maintenance. David filed a motion to modify the maintenance in May 2022 due to a change in his employment circumstances. The family court commissioner reduced David’s maintenance obligation, but Karen appealed. The circuit court held a trial and denied David’s motion to modify or terminate maintenance in an oral decision on April 19, 2023, which was later memorialized in the May 24 order. Karen’s post-trial motion for attorney fees based on overtrial was also denied at that time.The Wisconsin Supreme Court reviewed the case and determined that the May 24 order was final because it disposed of the entire matter in litigation, specifically David’s motion to modify or terminate maintenance. The court held that the order was unambiguous in its finality, despite lacking an explicit finality statement. The court affirmed the court of appeals' decision, concluding that David’s notice of appeal was not timely filed within the 90-day period, and thus, the court of appeals properly dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. View "Morway v. Morway" on Justia Law

A Montana State Representative, William W. Mercer, requested access to certain child abuse and neglect case records from the Montana Department of Public Health and Human Services (DPHHS) under a statute that allows legislators to review such records. The DPHHS provided some records but withheld others, including emails, text messages, and attorney-client privileged materials. Mercer filed a petition for a writ of mandamus and for declaratory and injunctive relief to compel the DPHHS to release the additional records.The First Judicial District Court of Lewis and Clark County granted a mandatory preliminary injunction requiring the DPHHS to provide the requested records, including those claimed to be attorney-client privileged, but imposed additional confidentiality protections. The DPHHS appealed, arguing that the District Court misinterpreted the statute and that the attorney-client privilege should exempt certain records from disclosure.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case. The court affirmed the District Court's decision, holding that the plain language of the statute required the disclosure of the records to the legislator, subject to confidentiality protections. The court found that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in granting the preliminary injunction, as Mercer demonstrated a clear likelihood of success on the merits, irreparable harm without the injunction, that the balance of equities tipped in his favor, and that the injunction was in the public interest. The court emphasized that the preliminary injunction did not resolve the ultimate merits of the case, which would be determined in further proceedings. View "Mercer v. Department of Public Health and Human Services" on Justia Law

David Weingarten and Krystal Mamer, who were never married, agreed to conceive a child via in vitro fertilization (IVF) using Weingarten’s sperm and a third party’s egg. They agreed to share the IVF costs, which totaled $55,635. Approximately one month after the child was born, Mamer filed a petition to determine parental relationship under the Uniform Parentage Act (UPA). Weingarten responded and later requested an order directing Mamer to reimburse him for half of the IVF costs. Mamer opposed, arguing that the statute did not authorize a court to order a mother to pay a father for any pregnancy expenses.The family court held a hearing and denied Weingarten’s reimbursement request, ruling it had no authority under Family Code section 7637 to order reimbursement of expenses incurred before the parentage action was filed. Weingarten appealed the order, and the family court subsequently entered a judgment declaring Mamer and Weingarten to be the parents of the child.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court held that Family Code section 7637 does authorize a court to direct a parent to pay reasonable expenses of the mother’s pregnancy, including IVF costs, even if those expenses were incurred before the parentage action was filed. The court found that the family court erred in its interpretation of the statute and that the statute does not limit the court’s authority to order reimbursement to expenses incurred after the parentage action is filed.The appellate court reversed the order denying Weingarten’s reimbursement request and remanded the matter to the family court to exercise its discretion in determining whether to direct Mamer to pay a portion of the IVF costs. The judgment was affirmed in all other respects, and Weingarten was entitled to recover costs on appeal. View "Mamer v. Weingarten" on Justia Law

Jane's three young daughters were taken into custody by the Mississippi Department of Child Protection Services (CPS) due to unsafe living conditions and neglect. Jane had left her daughters with her disabled mother in a cramped, unsupervised apartment. CPS developed a service plan for Jane to regain custody, which included obtaining stable housing, employment, and transportation. Despite completing parenting classes and getting clean from drugs, Jane failed to comply with the other requirements. She did not secure stable housing or employment and did not regularly visit her daughters. Consequently, CPS petitioned to terminate her parental rights.The Monroe County Chancery Court held a termination hearing where CPS workers testified about Jane's noncompliance with the service plan and the unsafe conditions that led to the removal of her daughters. Jane testified about her efforts to get clean and find employment but admitted to various failures. The court-appointed Guardian Ad Litem recommended terminating Jane's parental rights, citing her unwillingness to provide for her daughters' basic needs. The chancellor found clear and convincing evidence supporting the termination based on statutory grounds, including abandonment, unwillingness to provide necessary care, failure to exercise reasonable visitation, and substantial erosion of the parent-child relationship.The Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed the case and affirmed the chancellor's decision. The court held that substantial evidence supported the termination of Jane's parental rights, emphasizing that her lack of effort to care for and visit her daughters, rather than her lack of money, was the reason for the termination. The court found that the termination was in the best interest of the children to ensure a permanent and stable future. View "J.J.B. v. Monroe County Department of Child Protection Services" on Justia Law

The case involves the father of two children, L.B. and R.B., who were removed from their parents' care in December 2021 due to homelessness, domestic violence, and the father's alcoholism. The children were placed in foster care with R.D., a caregiver selected by Child Protective Services (CPS). Despite multiple efforts by CPS to assist the family, including providing basic necessities and facilitating treatment programs for the father, he was unable to maintain sobriety or stable housing.The Eleventh Judicial District Court, Flathead County, granted emergency protective services and later adjudicated the children as youths in need of care (YINC). The court granted temporary legal custody to the Department of Public Health and Human Services. After nineteen months, the Department requested a permanency plan for state-sponsored guardianship. The District Court held a hearing and, based on testimony from various experts, ordered the children to be placed with R.D. as their legal guardian.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case. The father argued that the Department failed to provide sufficient active efforts to help him overcome barriers to sobriety and housing. However, the court found that the Department made extensive efforts, including providing housing assistance, treatment referrals, and facilitating family engagement meetings. The court noted that the father's lack of participation and refusal of treatment options contributed to the failure of reunification efforts.The Supreme Court held that the Department made sufficient active efforts to reunite the father with his children and that further efforts would be unproductive and not in the children's best interests. The court affirmed the District Court's decision to grant legal guardianship to R.D. View "In re Matter of R.B." on Justia Law

Amber Standfill, the mother of a minor child, appealed the decision of the District Court of Oklahoma County, which denied her motion to terminate the guardianship of her child, G.E.M.S. The guardianship had been granted to the child's maternal grandparents, Patrick and Amy Christle, due to concerns about the mother's living situation and mental health. The mother argued that she had completed the requirements set forth in the guardianship order to regain custody of her child.The District Court of Oklahoma County held a hearing and heard testimony from various parties, including the mother, the guardians, the child's psychologist, therapist, and Guardian ad Litem (GAL). The court found that although the mother had substantially completed the agreed-upon standards of conduct, it was in the best interest of the child to continue the guardianship. The court noted that the child had experienced significant trauma and expressed a desire to avoid contact with the mother's new husband, Mr. Taff, who was involved in the circumstances that led to the guardianship.The Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the guardianship to continue, as terminating it would be detrimental to the child's welfare. The court emphasized that the best interest of the child outweighed the mother's completion of the guardianship requirements. The court also noted that the district court had set additional conditions for the mother to fulfill, including improving her stability. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's judgment, maintaining the guardianship of the minor child. View "IN THE MATTER OF THE GUARDIANSHIP OF G.E.M.S." on Justia Law

Jacob Hollingsworth filed for divorce from Katie Hollingsworth after nearly five years of marriage. They had one child and stipulated to a parenting plan, leaving the division of marital property, spousal support, and attorney’s fees as the issues for trial. Katie entered the marriage with significant debt and a house, while Jacob had a house, personal assets, and business interests. They kept separate finances except for a joint account for shared expenses. Jacob paid off much of Katie’s debt during the marriage.The District Court of Morton County, South Central Judicial District, heard testimony from both parties, two valuation experts, and Jacob’s father. The court awarded Jacob 92% and Katie 8% of the marital assets, denied Katie’s requests for spousal support and attorney’s fees, and allowed Jacob’s valuation expert to testify despite a late report disclosure. Katie appealed the decisions.The North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the case. It upheld the district court’s decision to allow the expert testimony, noting that the court offered a continuance, which Katie declined. The court found no abuse of discretion in the district court’s handling of the late disclosure.The Supreme Court also affirmed the district court’s valuation and division of the marital estate, finding the valuations were within the range of evidence presented and the unequal distribution was justified by the parties’ financial contributions and spending habits. The court upheld the use of the agreed valuation date for assets and found no error in including interim order funds in the marital estate.The court found no clear error in denying spousal support, as both parties were capable of self-support. It also upheld the denial of attorney’s fees, noting Katie’s sufficient income and excessive spending habits. The district court’s judgment was affirmed in all respects. View "Hollingsworth v. Hollingsworth" on Justia Law

Laura Latimer and Egan Walker divorced in 2002 after 13 years of marriage. During their marriage, Walker earned 8.54 years of PERS credits. The divorce decree included a marital settlement agreement (MSA) that awarded Latimer half of Walker's PERS retirement benefits, secured by a qualified domestic relations order (QDRO) allowing Latimer to elect Option 2. Walker later remarried, reentered public employment as a judge, and transferred his PERS credits to JRS, designating his current wife as the beneficiary. Walker sought judicial confirmation to designate both Latimer and his current wife as Option 2 beneficiaries.The Second Judicial District Court found that Walker could designate two different Option 2 beneficiaries for his PERS and JRS accounts. The court ordered that Latimer was entitled to 4.25 years of PERS credits but not to any of Walker's JRS account. Latimer filed a motion for a new trial, which was denied. She then appealed, arguing that Nevada law permits only one Option 2 beneficiary and that her community interest in Walker's retirement benefits should not be defeated by his transfer to JRS.The Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed the case and concluded that NRS 1A.450(1)(a) allows a JRS member to designate more than one Option 2 beneficiary. The court held that both Latimer and Walker's current wife could be designated as Option 2 beneficiaries, with each receiving their respective portion of the benefits if Walker predeceases them. The court affirmed the district court's decision to allow two beneficiaries but reversed and remanded the order regarding Latimer's entitlement to service credits from Walker's JRS account, ensuring her protected interest in the retirement benefits is maintained. View "WALKER VS. WALKER" on Justia Law

Grandparents, J.D. and M.D., petitioned to adopt their great-grandchild, P.J.W., who has lived with them for most of his life due to his parents' struggles with incarceration, substance abuse, and violence. They successfully obtained guardianship over the child in 2020. The child's biological father, R.W., contested the adoption, arguing that he had rehabilitated and wanted to maintain his parental rights. Despite the Grandparents' stable and supportive environment, the trial court denied the adoption petition, citing their advanced ages and the father's purported rehabilitation.The Montgomery Superior Court concluded that adoption was not in the child's best interest, emphasizing the Grandparents' ages and the father's progress in rehabilitation. The court also held that it is inherently in a child's best interest to be raised by a biological parent. The Grandparents appealed this decision.The Indiana Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision in a 2-1 opinion, deferring to the trial court's judgment under the applicable standard of review. However, Judge Crone dissented, arguing that the trial court's legal conclusion about the inherent best interest of being raised by a biological parent was improper and that the Grandparents had demonstrated their capability to provide a stable and supportive environment for the child.The Indiana Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that the trial court erred by not considering the Grandparents' ages in light of their ability to rear and support the child under Indiana Code subsection 31-19-11-1(a)(2). The Supreme Court also found that the trial court's conclusion that it is inherently in a child's best interest to be raised by a biological parent was an erroneous legal conclusion. The Supreme Court reversed the trial court's decision and remanded the case with instructions to reconsider the Grandparents' ages in light of their ability to raise the child and to conduct a new best-interest determination using the proper legal standard. View "J. D. v. R. W." on Justia Law