Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

The New Hampshire Division for Children, Youth and Families (DCYF) appealed a circuit court order that dismissed a neglect petition brought against the respondent. DCYF argued the circuit court erred by: (1) relying upon criminal definitions of sexual assault and grooming; and (2) disregarding conduct that the child did not personally observe. Further, DCYF argued the evidence compelled a finding of neglect by the circuit court. After review, the New Hampshire Supreme Court concluded the circuit court committed legal error by basing its neglect determination, in part, upon whether the respondent’s conduct was criminal. Accordingly, the judgment was vacated and the case remanded. In addition, because the issue was likely to arise on remand, the Court clarified that RSA chapter 169-C did not require that a child personally observe conduct in order for a court to consider that conduct when determining neglect. View "In re C.C." on Justia Law

Karley Anderson appealed an order denying her motion to modify residential responsibility, and appealed a contempt order awarding attorney’s fees to Seth Pedie. Anderson argued the district court erred by concluding she failed to establish a prima facie case for modification entitling her to an evidentiary hearing, and awarding attorney’s fees in excess of the amount requested. Pedie requested sanctions against Anderson for violating the North Dakota Rules of Appellate Procedure. After review, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the order denying Anderson’s motion to modify residential responsibility and the contempt order awarding attorney’s fees, and denied sanctions on appeal. View "Anderson v. Pedie, et al." on Justia Law

Michael Pomarleau appealed a divorce judgment and amended divorce judgment. On appeal, Michael challenged the calculation of Tanya Pomarleau’s income for child support obligations, the allocation of child tax credits, allowing an off-set to Tanya's equity payment, and the valuation of various items of property. Tanya cross-appealed, arguing the district court erred in failing to make an adjustment to the net marital estate for expenses incurred by the parties during their separation and in calculating the royalty payments received by the parties during the separation. The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed in part, concluding the district court did not err in distribution, accounting, and valuation of the net marital estate, or in its allocation of the child tax credits. The Court reversed in part, concluding Michael's income was overstated and Tanya's income was understated, and reversed and remanded for recalculation of the parties’ income for child support purposes. View "Pomarleau v. Pomarleau, et al." on Justia Law

The children, born in 2016 and 2017, were taken into protective custody in July 2020 after their younger sibling, R., suffered non-accidental fatal head injuries while in the care of their father. Continuances, due in part to the pandemic, significantly delayed the jurisdiction and disposition hearings, which took place in February and May 2021. The juvenile court found there was a substantial risk of detriment to the children if returned to Mother’s care, ordered their removal from her physical custody, and ordered family reunification services for her. The court granted the Department of Family and Children’s Services' unopposed request to combine the six-month and 12-month review hearings. While the appeal was pending, the juvenile court held the 18-month review hearing and returned the children to Mother on a plan of family maintenance.The court of appeal affirmed. in light of the strict statutory limits set out in the dependency scheme, Mother failed to establish error with respect to combining the six-month and 12-month hearings. Mother’s claim that she faces the potential loss of a full and fair opportunity to reunify in the event the children are removed again is not ripe for review. Mother has not shown that her trial counsel’s failure to object to the setting of the combined review hearing was deficient or prejudicial. View "In re M.F." on Justia Law

Jaffal, born in Jordan, sought a declaration that he is entitled to derivative U.S. citizenship under former 8 U.S.C. 1432(a), which provides that “a child born outside the United States automatically acquires United States citizenship if, while the child is under the age of eighteen, the parent with legal custody of the child is naturalized while that child’s parents are legally separated.” Jaffal’s father was naturalized when Jaffal was 17 years old. Jaffal presented evidence that he was in the sole legal custody of his father when his father was naturalized and his parents were separated. The district court declined to accept Jaffal’s evidence of his parents’ divorce because there was no evidence that Jaffal’s mother participated in the Jordanian divorce.The Third Circuit reversed and remanded with instructions to issue a judgment declaring Jaffal to be a national of the United States. If a §section1432(a) petitioner establishes that a valid, legal separation was effectuated under the relevant state or foreign nation’s law, he has met the burden of establishing a legal separation. Jordanian courts had the authority to alter Jaffal’s parents’ marriage. The Jordanian divorce established Jaffal’s parents’ legal separation as a matter of law. View "Jaffal v. Director Newark New Jersey Field Office Immigration & Customs Enforcement" on Justia Law

In November 2018, the Santa Clara County Department of Family and Children’s Services filed a petition (Welfare and Institutions Code section 3001) relative to three-year-old A.L. A.L. was living with her father; she was placed into protective custody after her father left A.L. with a daycare provider for several days without making arrangements for her care. Father was in custody. The Department could not locate A.L.’s mother. In March 2019, the juvenile court declared A.L. a dependent child, removed her from her father’s care, and ordered family reunification services. Father received services for 16 months. In July 2020, the court terminated those services and scheduled a selection and implementation hearing (section 366.26). Father then filed a section 388 petition. seeking the return of A.L. to his care. In January 2021, after a combined hearing on the 388 petition and selection and implementation, the court found A.L. adoptable and terminated the father’s parental rights.The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting arguments that the juvenile court abused its discretion in denying the father’s claim of the beneficial parental relationship exception to adoption and did not apply the correct legal standard by basing its determination that the exception did not apply on the finding that father did not occupy a strong parental role in A.L’s life. View "In re A.L." on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal reversed the order denying mother's Welfare and Institutions Code section 388 petition and remanded for the juvenile court to reconsider her request for additional reunification services on the merits. The court stated that, although section 361.5, subdivision (a), generally limits family reunification services to a period not exceeding 18 months after the date a child was originally removed from the physical custody of the child's parent, nearly 30 years ago in In re Marilyn H. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 295, the Supreme Court held that a parent may utilize the section 388 petition procedure to demonstrate circumstances have changed and additional reunification services would be in the child's best interest. Furthermore, section 366.3, subdivisions (e) and (f), expressly authorize the juvenile court at post-permanent plan review hearings to order a second period of reunification services if it would be in the child's best interest to do so, ample statutory authority for the relief mother requested.In this case, the juvenile court's failure to evaluate mother's actual request for reunification services, rather than for an immediate return of all seven children to her custody, was not harmless. The court remanded for the juvenile court to conduct a new section 388 hearing and evaluate under the proper standards whether mother has maintained her sobriety and whether, under the circumstances as they exist at the time of the new hearing, additional reunification services would be in the best interest of any of the children. View "In re Malik T." on Justia Law

The court of appeal affirmed an order terminating parental rights over eight-year-old Eli and his sister, seven-year-old A.B., who have been living together in foster care for nearly four years. After noting that the father has died, the court proceeded on the merits and rejected an argument that the juvenile court erred in declining to apply the beneficial relationship exception concerning either parent. In light of all of the circumstances, the juvenile court had the discretion to weigh the harms and benefits of terminating the mother’s parental rights in the manner that it did, even if the children had a significant, positive emotional bond to her. Substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s determination that the mother did not prove the existence of a significant, positive emotional attachment with either child. The juvenile court could infer from one violent incident, and the lack of judgment mother displayed on that occasion with a different child, that her anger and inability to control her aggression could potentially have a detrimental influence on Eli’s and A.B.’s mental health, if not also their physical safety were she ever to expose them to continued domestic violence. View "In re Eli B." on Justia Law

A mother no longer wished to serve as her adult daughter’s guardian due to fear of her daughter’s violence. The superior court held a hearing to determine whether to allow the mother to resign and appoint a public guardian from the Office of Public Advocacy (OPA) to serve as the daughter’s guardian instead. After a brief exchange, the superior court allowed the daughter to waive her right to counsel and consent to appointment of a public guardian. The Alaska Supreme Court reversed because the superior court did not sufficiently establish that the waiver of counsel was knowing and voluntary. View "In the Matter of the Protective Proceeding of Amy D." on Justia Law

A circuit court entered a judgment divorcing Jason Grimmett from April Grimmett on the ground of adultery by Jason, and divided the couple's marital property. The Court of Civil Appeals affirmed the judgment without an opinion, and Jason petitioned the Alabama Supreme Court for certiorari review. The Supreme Court issued the writ to examine, among other things, a potential conflict in the law regarding whether adultery committed after a party files for divorce was a ground for divorce. Because the language chosen by the Legislature, specifying adultery as a ground for divorce, did not limit this ground to prefiling conduct, and because the Supreme Court's early cases distinguishing between prefiling and postfiling adultery had to be read in light of the procedural restrictions of equity practice under which they were decided, the Court affirmed the circuit court's judgment. View "Ex parte Jason Grimmett." on Justia Law