Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the trial court terminating Father's parental rights to Alice, a minor child, holding that the issues identified by Father's counsel as arguably supporting an appeal were meritless.Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) the trial court did not err in deciding to discontinue reunification efforts; (2) the evidence and findings of fact supported the trial court's determination that grounds existed to substantiate the termination of Father's parental rights to Alice; and (3) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that it would be in Alice's best interests for Father's parental rights to be terminated. View "In re A.K." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the trial court that terminated the parental rights of Father to Ronnie, a minor child, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion.After a hearing, the trial court concluded that two grounds for termination existed under N.C. Gen. Stat. 7B-1111(a)(1) and (2) and that termination of Father's parental rights was in the child's best interests. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) at least one of the grounds found by the trial court for the termination of Father's parental rights was supported by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence; and (2) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the child's best interests would be served by the termination of Father's parental rights. View "In re J.R.F." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the trial court terminating Father's parental rights to his daughter, holding that the trial court's order terminating Father's parental rights was supported by clear, cogent and convincing evidence and was based on proper legal grounds.Respondent, the father of the child in this case, had not seen his daughter since she was a year and a half old and never pursued legal action to legitimate the child. Petitioner filed a petition alleging a ground existed to terminate Respondent's parental rights pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. 7B-1111(a)(5), failure to legitimate. The trial court concluded that a ground existed to terminate Respondent's parental rights and that termination was in the child's best interests. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that there was no error. View "In re K.M.S." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated the order of the district court, which established the paternity of Franklin M. as to the parties' two children and decided issues regarding custody and child support, holding that the district court erred as a matter of law when it applied an improper standard regarding removal.Franklin filed a complaint for paternity, custody, and support seeking to establish custody and support for two children he had with Lauren C. The district court found the Franklin and Lauren were the biological parents of the two children and decided issues regarding child support and custody. The Supreme Court remanded the cause, holding that the district court (1) applied an improper standard regarding removal; and (2) erred when it awarded shared legal and physical custody to Franklin. View "Franklin M. v. Lauren C." on Justia Law

Adria Brock (“Mother”) appealed a Family Court decision terminating her parental rights over her daughter (“K.C.” or “child”). In its decision, the Family Court found that the Department of Services for Children, Youth, and Their Families (“DSCYF”) established one of the statutory grounds for terminating the Mother’s parental rights: that the Mother’s parental rights over K.C.’s siblings were involuntarily terminated in a prior proceeding. At the time of the termination hearing, this statutory ground was found at 13 Del. C. 1103(a)(6) and provided for termination where “[t]he respondent’s parental rights over a sibling of the child who is the subject of the petition [had] been involuntarily terminated in a prior proceeding.” The Family Court also found that termination of the Mother’s parental rights was in the best interests of the child. On appeal, Mother argued Section 1103(a)(6) violated her right to due process under the federal and state constitutions because “it creates a presumption that she is unfit to parent any child presently solely because her parental rights [over] older children were previously terminated in North Carolina.” Mother also claimed that “[t]he statutory ‘best interest’ of the child factors set out under 13 Del. C. 722 do not sufficiently address a parent’s present ability to provide adequate care for the child”; that “DSCYF did not present evidence or argument during the trial to support a finding under 11 Del. C. 1103(a)(6) that the Appellant was unfit and that termination of parental rights was in the child’s best interest”; and that “[t]here is insufficient evidence under the clear and convincing standard to demonstrate that the parent is unfit under a best interest of the child analysis.” After considering each of Mother’s arguments, the Delaware Supreme Court concluded that the Family Court’s decision should have been affirmed. View "Brock v. Department of Services for Children, Youth, and their Families" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the juvenile court changing the permanency plan for Mother and Father's children, SMD and SND, from reunification to adoption, holding that the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion.Specifically, the Supreme Court held that the juvenile court (1) did not abuse its discretion when it found that it was in the children's best interests to change the permanency plan to adoption instead of guardianship; and (2) did not abuse its discretion when it determined there was no need for a concurrent plan of reunification upon determining that reunification efforts could cease. View "In re Interest of SMD" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the final order of the circuit court terminating Mother's parental rights to their minor child, holding that there was no error.The court issued a final dispositional order terminating Mother's parental rights over her child and granted the Department of Social Services (DSS) full adoptive custody of the child, finding beyond a reasonable doubt that DSS made active efforts to provide remedial services and rehabilitative programs designed to prevent the breakup of the Indian family and that those efforts were unsuccessful. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court (1) did not err in finding that DSS made active efforts to reunify L.N. with Mother; (2) did not clearly err in finding that termination of Mother's parental rights was the least restrictive alternative and in L.N.'s best interests; and (3) did not violate Mother's due process rights in denying her request to continue the final dispositional hearing. View "In re Interest of L.N." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals denying Grandparents' motion for reconsideration of the judgment of the court of appeals ruling that, under In re Adoption of B.I., 131 N.E.3d 28, Father's reliance on a no-contact order constituted justifiable cause for his having had no contact with his children, holding that there was no error.Father, the biological father of A.K. and C.K., was convicted of murdering the children's natural mother. The juvenile court gave custody of the children to their maternal grandparents, and the court's order stated that Father shall have no contact with the children. Grandparents later filed petitions to adopt the children. At issue was whether the need to obtain Father's consent was extinguished under Ohio Rev. Code 3107.07(A). The probate court determined that Father's consent was not required. The court of appeals ultimately reversed based on this Court's intervening decision in B.I. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, in order for the adoption proceedings to go forward, Father's consent was required. View "In re Adoption of A.K." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court terminating Mother's parental rights to her son, C.K., holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it failed to amend Mother's treatment plan or when it determined that Mother was unlikely to change within a reasonable time.After a termination hearing, the district court terminated Mother's parental rights pursuant to Mont. Code Ann. 41-3-609(1)(f). On appeal, Mother argued, among other things, that the district court abused its discretion when it failed to amend her treatment plan to enumerate specific parenting tasks related to raising a child with autism and to provide for related services. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion (1) in refusing to amend Mother's treatment plan on the day of the termination hearing; and (2) in finding that Mother was unlikely to change in a reasonable time. View "In re C.K." on Justia Law

Respondent, C.R. (ward) appealed a circuit court order appointing a guardian over her person, arguing that petitioner New Hampshire Hospital (NHH) failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that she was incapacitated. She also argued the trial court’s findings of incapacity exceeded the scope of the pleadings and evidence at trial, thereby depriving her of notice and an opportunity to be heard. The ward suffered from schizoaffective disorder, and, in November 2020, was involuntarily admitted to NHH for a two-year period. NHH obtained emergency treatment authorization to provide the ward with psychiatric medication without her consent, and although her condition improved, the medication caused side effects that required a reduction in dosage. The ward declined to take any medication to treat the side effects or any alternative medication that would not cause the side effects. The emergency treatment authorization expired on January 4, 2021. In the two weeks before the February 2021 guardianship proceeding, the ward started exhibiting worsening thoughts that people were trying to target her, and her mood fluctuated more, spurring concerns that the current medication was insufficient. NHH filed the guardianship petition at issue here, alleging that, the guardianship was necessary. The New Hampshire Supreme Court concluded the evidence presented at trial was sufficient for the trial court to have found the ward “is likely to suffer substantial harm due to an inability to provide for [her] personal needs for food, clothing, shelter, health care or safety or an inability to manage . . . her property or financial affairs.” Further, the Court found there was support in the record for the trial court's finding that guardianship was the least restrictive intervention for the ward. The Court found that the guardianship petition informed the ward the trial court could “impose additional orders as a result of the hearing,” but it did not inform her that NHH was asking the court to find her incapable of exercising her rights to marry or divorce, make a will or waive a will’s provisions, hold or obtain a motor vehicle operator’s license, initiate/defend/settle lawsuits, or make decisions concerning educational matters or training. Under these circumstances, the Supreme Court held that the ward did not receive the notice contemplated by RSA 464-A:5, I, as to those rights. Therefore, the Court vacated the guardianship order to the extent that it deprived her of those rights. The Court otherwise affirmed the order appointing a guardian over the person of the ward and remanded. View "In re Guardianship of C.R." on Justia Law