Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

This case involved three appeals after two limited remands by the North Dakota Supreme Court for additional proceedings at the district court. Kevin Johnson appealed several district court orders, a second amended judgment, and a third amended judgment. All proceedings arose from Johnson's divorce from Julie Lessard. The Supreme Court concluded Johnson’s issue, contending the district court had granted a divorce only to Lessard and thereby exceeded its authority, was frivolous and awarded Lessard $750 in attorney’s fees under N.D.R.App.P. 38. The Court further concluded the district court did not err in holding Johnson failed to establish a prima facie case requiring an evidentiary hearing to modify residential responsibility, the court did not err in granting Lessard’s motions for a protective order and for sanctions, and its decision allowing Lessard to relocate out of state with the minor children was not clearly erroneous. View "Lessard v. Johnson" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the juvenile court terminating Father's parental rights to his child, holding that the juvenile court erred when it terminated Father's parental rights because the child was not adjudicated a child in need of assistance (CINA).The juvenile court ultimately concluded that it could terminate Father's parental rights because the child was previously adjudicated CINA in a previous CINA proceeding that resulted in a guardianship. The court then terminated Father's rights under Iowa Code 232.116(1)(f) and (g). The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings, holding that a prior CINA adjudication in a closed case cannot be utilized to meet the statutory requirements of 232.116(1)(f) and (g) for a second CINA proceeding. View "In re L.B." on Justia Law

Eight-year-old Katherine was in dependency court for five years while her parents struggled with significant ongoing issues of domestic violence and substance abuse. Following multiple failed efforts at reunification, the juvenile court terminated services and the parental rights of both parents rejecting her father’s claim of a “beneficial parental relationship” (Welfare and Institutions Code 366.26(c)(1)(B)(i)). While recognizing that he had maintained regular visitation, the juvenile court concluded that these visits created only an “incidental benefit” to Katherine, while his ongoing instability had caused additional instability and trauma.The court of appeal affirmed, noting that the father had previously concealed a crash caused by driving under the influence and then refused to implement protective measures for Katherine’s benefit. He refused to move out of his parents’ home, which resulted in a series of abrupt changes in Katherine’s placement. He physically assaulted his mother, in the presence of Katherine, resulting in multiple facial injuries requiring medical assistance, which he concealed and downplayed. Katherine had confided at times she feared her father and did not want to speak to him. The negative impact of the father’s unresolved issues on Katherine was antithetical to the kind of beneficial parental relationship required by section 366.26. View "In re Katherine J." on Justia Law

K.W. was removed from his long-term placement with his relative, “Grandma B.,” after she took a one-day trip and did not notify the social worker of the trip. The consequence of this removal resulted in tremendous upheaval in K.W.’s life and violated the requirements of RCW 13.34.130. Though K.W. was legally free, the placement preferences set out in the statute still applied, and the court erred in failing to apply them and failing to place K.W. with relatives. View "In re Dependency of K.W." on Justia Law

After the juvenile court removed her from her parents at eight weeks old, Abigail lived with Heather for almost two years. The juvenile court declared Abigail a dependent child of the court and denied her parents family reunification services. Abigail had a 12-year-old half-sister, Anahi, who was also a dependent of the juvenile court. Heather let Anahi move in with her and Abigail. The relationship deteriorated. Anahi and Heather made allegations against each other. Anahi was ultimately placed with her aunt and uncle in Arizona. Heather filed a request for de facto parent status with respect to Abigail. The Department would not recommend Heather as the prospective adoptive parent of Abigail and notified Heather it intended to place Abigail with Anahi in Arizona. The court placed Abigail on an extended visit with Anahi in Arizona, denied Heather’s request for de facto parent status, and described her motion as “moot.” Abigail has been placed with Anahi’s relatives in Arizona since November 2020.The court of appeal reversed. Heather’s request was not moot and she did not receive proper notice of the hearing. She retains a limited interest in “the companionship, care, custody and management” of Abigail, which was not extinguished when the juvenile court placed Abigail with Anahi’s relatives. View "In re Abigail L." on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the divorce judgment entered by the district court in which the court adopted a referee's determination of the parties' child's primary residence and awarded Kristina Toland marital fees, holding that there was no error.The referee determined that Toland be awarded primary residence of the parties' minor child even if Toland relocates from Maine to Ohio and that Toland be awarded attorney fees. The district court adopted the referee's findings and recommendations. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) the referee's findings were not clearly erroneous, nor was the determination based on these findings that the child's best interest would be served by living in Toland in Ohio while maintaining contact with Helge Reimann; and (2) the attorney-fee waiver provision in the parties' premarital agreement was unenforceable as applied to their litigation of parental rights. View "Riemann v. Toland" on Justia Law

Respondent Kelly Routhier (wife) appealed a circuit court's final decree in her divorce from petitioner Matthew Routhier (husband). Wife argued the circuit court erred by: (1) concluding that it lacked jurisdiction to divide the husband’s interest in real property that he owned jointly with his parents; (2) deviating from the child support guidelines without providing adequate justification; (3) denying her request for alimony without providing adequate justification; and (4) declining to rule on her proposed findings of fact and rulings of law. Husband cross-appealed the final divorce decree as well as the circuit court’s final parenting plan, arguing the circuit court erred by: (1) ordering the parties’ child to attend public school in the district serving the wife’s residence; (2) improperly distributing the parties’ firearms; (3) preventing one of his witnesses from testifying at the final hearing; and (4) barring the court-appointed guardian ad litem from attending part of the final hearing. The New Hampshire Supreme Court determined the circuit court's written findings were insufficient to justify its downward deviation from the child support guidelines, and with regard to its alimony decision. Judgment was reversed in part and the matter remanded for further proceedings. The Court affirmed the circuit court in all other respects. View "In the Matter of Matthew & Kelly Routhier" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the trial court terminating Mother's parental rights in her minor child, holding that Mother was not entitled to her allegations of error.The Department of Social Services (DSS) filed a petition to terminate Mother's parental rights in Galena, alleging that grounds existed pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. 7B-1111(a)91), (2) and (6). The trial court concluded that grounds existed to terminate Mother's parental rights pursuant to each of the grounds DSS had alleged and concluded that it was in Galena's best interests that Mother's parental rights be terminated. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court's determination that grounds existed to terminate Mother's parental rights for neglect pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. 7B-1111(a)(1) was supported by the unchallenged findings of fact. View "In re G.D.C.C." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming in part and reversing in part the judgment of the trial court finding that the evidence presented was sufficient to support an adjudication of dependency but dismissing a claim of neglect, holding that the court of appeals' analysis showed improper deference to the trial court's conclusion of law.The Cumberland County Department of Social Services (DSS) filed a juvenile petition alleging Kelly to be a neglected and dependent juvenile. The trial court adjudicated Kelly to be dependent but, without explanation, dismissed the claim of neglect. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the claim of neglect. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded in part, holding that the court of appeals failed to conduct a proper de novo review of the issue of neglect. View "In re K.S." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court terminating Mother's parental rights to her daughter, Carrie, and the trial court's earlier permanency-planning order that eliminated reunification from Carrie's permanent plan, holding that there was no reversible error.On appeal, Mother did not challenge the trial court's conclusions that grounds existed to terminate her parental rights or that termination was in the child's best interests. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court (1) did not err by denying Mother's motion to continue the termination hearing; (2) did not reversibly err in failing to comply with the requirements of the Indian Child Welfare Act because there was no reason for the court to know that Carrier was an Indian child under 25 C.F.R. 23.107(c); and (3) did not abuse its discretion by eliminating Mother's visitation with Carrie in a permanency-planning order. View "In re C.C.G." on Justia Law