Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

At birth, Appellants’ son tested positive for methadone and marijuana. Appellant A.S., the child’s mother, admitted to using marijuana days before giving birth. The juvenile court detained J.C. and placed him with Appellant J.C.’s mother.Based on Appellants’ criminal histories and substance abuse issues, the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (“the Department”), the couple’s son was declared a dependent of the court. At a 12-month hearing, appellants had not made substantial progress towards alleviating or mitigating the causes that led to their son’s placement. The court terminated Appellants’ parental rights. In doing so, the court relied on appellants’ statements that they had no known Indian ancestry.On appeal, appellants argued that the Department failed to conduct an adequate investigation into whether either parent was of Indian ancestry and that the trial court failed to ensure that the Indian Child Welfare Act (“ICWA”) applied. The court held that the Department did not fulfill its duty under the ICWA because it did not speak to extended family members who were available. Additionally, the trial court failed to ensure that the Department fulfilled its duties by neglecting to ask the Department what efforts it made to ensure the ICWA did not apply.The court conditionally affirmed the trial court’s order, remanding the case to the trial court to ensure that the Department conducts the necessary inquiries, including speaking with extended family members. View "In re J.C." on Justia Law

In California, the practice of “splitting” jurisdiction and/or disposition hearings, by purporting to hold them separately “as to mother” and “as to father,” was unauthorized and erroneous. The Court of Appeal concluded that jurisdiction splitting occurred in this case, and it "complicated the entire record ... caused confusion, unnecessary procedural difficulties and delays." S.J., father of minor A.J., appealed a juvenile court bypassing reunification services. He argued the juvenile court erred by denying his request for a continuance and proceeding with a disposition hearing without transporting him from his place of incarceration to the hearing. Although the Court of Appeal found error in the manner in which these proceedings were conducted, but it did not find error in denying father a continuance of the hearing. The juvenile court's orders were affirmed, but the Court reiterated that jurisdiction splitting was "unauthorized and erroneous," and in this case, " resulted in the (likely unintentional) forfeiture of appellant’s claim on appeal." View "In re A.J." on Justia Law

The Second Appellate District modified its opinion in the case dated March 3, 2022. First, the court modified references to “child support,” changing them to “spousal support.” Next, after entering a fee order on March 17, 2017, the court’s amended fee order, dated May 10, 2017, superseded that order. Further, the court rejected the respondent’s argument that the trial court’s arithmetic regarding the fee award was in error. The court reasoned that the respondent’s argument is based upon a prior and superseded version of the fee order that was later modified. Finally, the disposition is changed to remove the second full sentence beginning with the words, “The attorney fee award is corrected.” Thus, the court stated that these modifications changed the judgment, and the petitions for rehearing are denied. View "Marriage of Zucker" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court terminating Mother's parental rights, holding that Mother was not entitled to relief on any of her claims of error.The Commissioner of Children and Families filed these petitions to terminate Mother's parental rights with respect to her daughter and son after Mother admitted that she had sent explicitly sexual photographs of her daughter to several persons, including a registered sex offender. During the proceedings, Mother filed four motions for a continuance. The trial court granted the first three motions but denied the fourth. The court then rendered judgments terminating Mother's parental rights. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion or violate Mother's constitutional due process right to present a defense to the termination of her parental rights in denying the motion for a continuance. View "In re Ivory W." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court ruling that Jill and Shane Ailport (together, Grandparents), the grandparents of five children (collectively, Children), did not prove their right to visitation under the grandparent visitation statute, Wyo. Stat. Ann. 20-7-101, holding that Grandparents did not meet their burden of establishing that visitation was in the best interests of the children.Grandparents filed a petition against parents of Children (collectively, Parents) under Wyo. Stat. Ann. 20-7-101 to establish visitation rights with Children. Applying an enhanced best interest analysis, the district court concluded that Grandparents had not met their burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that they were entitled to visitation over Parents' objections. View "Ailport v. Ailport" on Justia Law

Father J.R. appealed a juvenile court order finding his child, M.R., to be deprived; removing M.R. from the care, custody, and control of the parents; and placing M.R. with North Star Human Service Zone (“North Star”). Because M.R. was no longer a minor child and the order on appeal had expired, the North Dakota Supreme Court dismissed the appeal as moot. View "Interest of M.R." on Justia Law

Donald Burris appealed a district court order denying his motion to eliminate or reduce spousal support paid to Luann Burris. Donald argued the court erred: (1) in determining there had not been a material change in circumstances; (2) as a matter of law in not applying a 2015 statutory change; (3) in not considering his future retirement; and (4) in awarding Luann Burris attorney’s fees. Finding no reversible error, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed. View "Burris v. Burris" on Justia Law

The parties are married and have three sons born between 2005 and 2013. After the parties separated, M.S. sought a domestic violence restraining order (DVRO, Fam. Code 6200) against A.S. for herself and her sons, alleging that A.S. enlisted her friends and mother to talk her into reconciling with A.S., that he threatened to kill M.S.’s male friend and followed him to his home, and that he engaged their children to spy on her.The court granted the DVRO specifying M.S. and her children as protected parties after hearing evidence of A.S. stalking and harassing M.S. and that A.S. often slapped the children “upside the head,” pushed them down, and choked them “in the name of playing,” screamed at the children, called them derogatory names, and encouraged them to engage in physical violence with each other for entertainment, in addition to the “spying.” The court also granted M.S. temporary physical and legal custody of the children with supervised visitation for A.S. The court of appeal affirmed the three-year DVRO. There was sufficient evidence of good cause for including the children in the DVRO. View "M.S. v. A.S." on Justia Law

Tescari and Salame, Venezuelan citizens, have two minor children. Tescari removed the children from their home in Venezuela and brought them with her to the U.S. Salame filed a petition seeking their return under the Hague Convention on Civil Aspects of International Abduction. Tescari and the children were granted asylum in the U.S.The parties stipulated that Salame had a prima facie of wrongful removal and retention. Tescari claimed an affirmative defense under Article 13(b) of the Convention, 22 U.S.C. 9003(e)(2). The court concluded Tescari failed to establish, by clear and convincing evidence, her affirmative defense that returning the children to Venezuela would subject them to a grave risk of physical or psychological harm or otherwise place them in an intolerable situation.The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Because the alleged abuse was relatively minor, the court had no discretion to refuse the petition nor to consider potential future harm. The determination that Salame could provide the children with shelter, food, and medication in Venezuela is not clearly erroneous. Despite Venezuela’s political schisms and civil unrest, Tescari failed to introduce sufficient evidence that it is a zone of war, famine, or disease. Any defects in the Venezuelan court system fall short of "an intolerable situation." While the factors that go into a grant of asylum may be relevant to Hague Convention determinations, the district court has a separate and exclusive responsibility to assess the applicability of an Article 13(b) affirmative defense. View "Ajami v. Solano" on Justia Law

David and Sara share joint legal custody of their five-year-old child. Initially, the child spent nearly 80 percent of his time with Sara. In 2017, David’s monthly income was $15,000; he paid $1,525 in monthly child support. Sara also received a $5,000 monthly gift from her father, which later increased to $7,500. In 2020, David moved to modify the child support order. His time with the child had increased to 42 percent; his monthly income had risen to $17,500. He also sought a seek-work order. Sara had not worked since 2013, The court reduced monthly child support to $891, retroactive to February 2020. In imposing a seek-work order, the court explained, “the policy of the State of California is that both parents should work and provide support for their minor child,” and that the order was in the “best interest of the child.”The court of appeal affirmed. Under Family Code section 4053, the trial court has the discretion to impose a seek-work order in an appropriate circumstance. Substantial evidence supports the court’s finding that such an order was in the “best interest of the child” and the order is consistent with various principles in section 4053. View "Haley v. Antunovich" on Justia Law