Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the district court modifying Father's child support obligation, holding that the court abused its discretion by modifying child support without first having sufficient information about Father's finances.Pursuant to an agreement incorporated into their divorce decree, Mother had primary custody of the parties' three children, and Father paid no child support. The State later petitioned to modify child support. The court entered a temporary support order on the State's petition, determining that Father's presumptive child support obligation was $832 per month. Father subsequently filed a motion seeking primary custody and an adjustment of child support. The court denied custody but modified Father's child support obligation to $134 per month. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court did not have sufficient information about Father's finances and abused its discretion by modifying child support in the absence of such information. View "Tucker v. Tucker" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the superior court in favor of Plaintiff, in her capacity as Administratrix for the Estate of Lisa Bicknell, following a grant of summary judgment, holding that there was no error.When the Defendant and the decedent were married Lisa participated in a 401(k) retirement plan. Lisa designated her then-husband, Defendant, as a contingent death beneficiary. After the couple divorced, Lisa died without a will and without having changed Defendant's designation as beneficiary of the retirement plan. Plaintiff sought a temporary restraining order to enjoin Defendant from transferring or conveying any portion of the money he had or may receive from the plan, claiming that Defendant had waived all interest in the retirement plan under the parties' property settlement agreement. The trial court ordered that the retirement funds be transferred to Plaintiff. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Defendant waived any and all interest in the retirement plan, and no genuine issue of material fact remained in dispute. View "Morgan v. Bicknell" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal reversed the juvenile court's order denying father's Welfare and Institutions Code section 388 petition and vacated the order terminating parental rights as to the child. The court concluded that the evidence before the juvenile court in this case was woefully inadequate to support a finding that the Department exercised reasonable diligence trying to find father, given the unique facts already known to the Department. The court also concluded that the juvenile court erred in relying on Mia's best interests as a basis for overcoming the lack of notice to father and denying father's section 388 petition. Furthermore, the record does not support the Department's implied argument that father was to blame for the delay. Considered against the absence of any documentary evidence showing that the Department timely provided father a copy of the petition or required notices about how to assert paternity and request appointment of counsel, the court found prejudicial error. The court remanded for a new jurisdiction and disposition hearing as to father only. View "In re Mia M." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the district court ordering equitable division of a jointly-owned retirement annuity, holding that the district court erred.The property settlement agreement that the parties entered into distributed more than $3 million in assets that were either Charles "Bo" Harms's premarital assets or primarily gifted to or inherited by Bo. At issue was whether a remainder clause in the parties' property settlement agreement providing that "all other real and personal property" would be distributed to Bo provided for distribution to him of all assets not otherwise identified. Sharon Harms argued that the parties' annuity was mistakenly omitted from the parties' settlement agreement. Bo filed a motion for contempt, claiming that Sharon was noncompliant with the final decree for failing to transfer the annuity to Bo. The district court denied Bo's motion and ordered that the annuity be equitably divided. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court erred in finding that there was a mutual mistake in omitting the annuity from the settlement agreement. View "In re Marriage of Harms" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court granting the parties in this case a divorce on the grounds of irreconcilable differences, dividing the parties' marital estate, and awarding joint custody of the parties' child, holding that there was no error.Both parties in this case - Elida Mezini and Leart Mezini - appealed the judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision pending entry of final judgment of the family court, holding (1) there was no error in the trial justice's equitable distribution of the marital property; (2) the trial justice did not abuse his discretion in setting Leart's child support obligations; and (3) as to any remaining issues, the trial court did not err. View "Mezini v. Mezini" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that marital agreements that consider fault or misconduct when dividing the marital property are not enforceable.The parties in this case entered in a postnuptial agreement that if Husband engaged in extramarital affairs or physically harmed his wife Wife would receive most of the parties' joint assets. Husband later filed a complaint for divorce. The family court held that the marital agreement at issue was unenforceable as violating statutory policy and principles of no-fault divorce and equitable distribution. The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) vacated the family court's decision, holding that the marital agreement was valid and enforceable. The Supreme Court vacated the ICA's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings, holding that the marital agreement violated public policy and was therefore unenforceable. View "Crofford v. Adachi" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the juvenile court changing the permanency plan for Mother and her three children from family reunification to termination of parental rights and adoption, holding that the juvenile court abused its discretion.On appeal, Mother argued that the juvenile court abused its discretion in determining that the Wyoming Department of Family Services had made reasonable efforts to reunify Mother with her children. The Supreme Court agreed, holding that the record demonstrated that the Department failed in its burden to show that it provided Mother appropriate services or genuine help to achieve reunification with her children. View "In re MA" on Justia Law

Mark Shenefield filed a request for order (RFO) seeking joint legal and physical custody of the child he shared with Jennifer Shenefield. In his declaration, Mark quoted from and referenced the contents of a confidential, court-ordered psychological evaluation undertaken during Jennifer’s previous marital dissolution. Mark’s attorney Karolyn Kovtun filed the paperwork. Jennifer opposed Mark’s request and sought sanctions for violations of Family Code sections 3111(d) and 3025.5, for unwarranted disclosure of the confidential custody evaluation. The trial court ordered the sanctions issue be heard at trial. Jennifer’s trial brief detailed her arguments for why the court should impose sanctions on both Mark and Kovtun. Mark did not file a trial brief. Following trial, the court issued sanctions against Mark in the amount of $10,000 and Kovtun in the amount of $15,000. Kovtun challenged the sanctions, filing a motion under Code of Civil Procedure section 473(d). A different court heard Kovtun’s request to vacate the sanctions imposed against her and denied the request. On appeal, Kovtun argued the court improperly sanctioned her because: (1) attorneys could not be sanctioned under section 3111; (2) the notice she received did not comply with due process standards; (3) the court lacked personal jurisdiction over her; (4) the court failed to enforce the safe harbor provision of Code of Civil Procedure section 128.7; and (5) the court improperly admitted and relied on a transcript of a meeting between Kovtun, Mark, and Jennifer. The Court found Kovtun’s arguments meritless, and affirmed the sanctions. View "Shenefield v. Shenefield" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed as modified the provisions of a district court order that found Mark Becher in contempt for failure to pay various expenses following his divorce from Sonia Becher, holding that the court's order is modified slightly but that Mark's remaining assignments of error were without merit.On appeal, Mark argued that the district court erred in (1) finding him in contempt for failure to pay for a portion of the children's 2016 medical expenses, real estate taxes, and a wilderness therapy program and requiring Mark to pay for his share of those expenses as part of a purge plan; (2) requiring him to pay for his share of the children's future medical expenses as part of the purge plan; (3) assessing interest; and (4) ordering him to pay Sonia's attorney fees. The Supreme Court affirmed as modified, holding (1) the portion of the order regarding contempt findings and purge provisions related to the children's 2016 medical expenses and future medical expenses must be deleted; and (2) there was no merit to Mark's remaining assignments of error. View "Becher v. Becher" on Justia Law

Mother appealed an order terminating her parental rights under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. She argued that the Department of Children and Family Services and the court failed to comply with Code section 224.2 by inquiring whether her child is or might be an Indian child within the meaning of the federal Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). Mother had “denied Native American ancestry for the family.”The court of appeal affirmed, finding any error harmless. The maternal grandmother is the only person Mother identified as a person who should have been asked about Indian ancestry; she had expressed her desire to adopt the child and to have the child placed with her. Under ICWA, when an Indian child is the subject of foster care or adoptive placement proceedings, “preference shall be given, in the absence of good cause to the contrary, to a placement with .. a member of the Indian child’s extended family,” 25 U.S.C. 1915(a), (b). Maternal grandmother, Mother’s counsel, and the child.’s counsel, each of whom requested placement with the maternal grandmother, would have had a strong incentive to bring to the court’s attention any facts that suggest that she is an Indian child. Their failure to do so implies that the maternal grandmother is unaware of such facts. View "In re S.S." on Justia Law