Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court vacated the circuit court's dispositional order terminating Mother's parental rights to her three minor children, holding that the court erred in terminating Mother's parental rights in the absence of any evidence being presented by the Department of Health and Human Resources (DHHR) at the dispositional hearing.Upon evidence that Mother was abusing methamphetamines Mother's three children were removed from her care and placed with their respective biological fathers. After stipulating to abuse and/or neglect and embarking upon post-adjudicatory and dispositional improvement periods Mother twice relapsed. Despite the prosecutor's failure to present any evidence on DHHR's behalf at the dispositional hearing, the circuit court terminated Mother's parental rights. The Supreme Court held that the circuit court’s dispositional order must be vacated due to DHHR’s failure to introduce evidence in support of termination. View "In re K.S." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the juvenile court, holding that the juvenile court committed serious errors by proceeding with a hearing to determine its jurisdiction over a child and disposition of a wardship petition without an incarcerated parent's presence and without appointing counsel for the parent, but the rule of automatic reversal was unwarranted in this case.The Los Angeles Department of Children and Family Services filed a dependency petition alleging that two children were at risk due to Mother's ongoing substance abuse and Father's criminal history. Neither Father, who was incarcerated, nor counsel for Father appeared at the ensuing combined jurisdiction and disposition hearing. The court sustained the petition as to both Father and Mother. Thereafter, the court terminated Father's parental rights. The court of appeal affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that it was not structural error for the juvenile court to proceed with the jurisdiction and disposition hearing without Father's presence and without appointing Father an attorney. View "In re Christopher L." on Justia Law

In this termination of parental rights case the Supreme Court granted in part the motion to dismiss an appeal from the reversal of a termination of parental rights decree, holding that the case was moot.N.J. gave birth when she was fifteen. Three months later, the Department of Family and Protective Services began termination proceedings against N.J. After a trial, the jury returned a verdict terminating N.J.'s parental rights. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the trial court lacked personal jurisdiction over N.J. The Department petitioned for review. After the Supreme Court granted the petition the Department moved to dismiss, explaining that N.J. had executed an affidavit of voluntary relinquishment of her parental rights more than one year earlier after she had reached the age of majority. The Supreme Court dismissed the appealed portion of the case, holding that the case was moot in light of N.J.'s decision to voluntarily relinquish her parental rights. View "Texas Department of Family & Protective Services v. N.J." on Justia Law

McDonald sought letters of administration for the estate of his deceased brother, John. An affidavit averred that John’s only heirs were his parents and his siblings. McDonald had been appointed plenary guardian over John’s person and estate; thereafter, without the prior knowledge of his guardian or the court, John participated in a purported wedding ceremony with Ellizzette. The circuit court entered orders appointing Shawn as administrator and declaring John’s heirs to be John’s parents and siblings. McDonald filed but then withdrew a petition for declaration of invalidity of marriage, and filed a petition to recover assets. The court allowed Ellizzette to file a petition seeking letters of administration based on her assertion that she is John’s surviving spouse, then held that Ellizzette failed to present a prima facie case establishing the validity of the marriage. The Appellate Court remanded, finding the circuit court erred in barring Ellizzette from testifying based on the Dead Man’s Act. 735 ILCS 5/8-201.The Illinois Supreme Court reinstated the trial court decision. Under the Probate Act, a ward who wishes to enter into a marriage may do so only with the consent of his guardian. Ellizzette was aware at the time of the marriage that John was under guardianship, so the marriage might not be valid. No best interest finding was ever sought or made. Ellizzette could not have provided any testimony that would have been sufficient to prove the validity of the marriage and could not have been prejudiced by her inability to testify regarding the marriage. View "In re Estate of McDonald" on Justia Law

J.D. and A.D. were removed from their parents’ care in July 2017. In September 2017, the court found that the children were neglected by father and abused and neglected by mother within the meaning of RSA 169-C:3, II(c) (2014) and RSA 169-C:3, XIX(b) (Supp. 2021). In dispositional orders issued in October 2017, the court specified the conditions that the parents needed to correct and the services that DCYF would provide to facilitate reunification. In July 2020, the court found that the conditions leading to the abuse and neglect findings had not been corrected and that the parents had not demonstrated that the children would not be endangered if returned. As a result, DCYF filed petitions for termination of parental rights against both parents in August 2020. The parents appealed the termination of their parental rights to the children. But finding no abuse of the trial court's discretion or other reversible error, the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed termination. View "In re J.D.; In re A.D." on Justia Law

The superior court determined that the marital estate should be divided 60/40 in the husband’s favor because of his lower earning potential. But the court then considered the husband’s sale of the marital home: remodeling expenses and financial dealings were inadequately explained, and contributed to a loss of marital equity. The court offset that loss by dividing the wife’s retirement savings plan 70/30 in her favor. And because the retirement savings plan was the most significant marital asset, this allocation resulted in a property division that highly favored the wife. The husband appealed the property division, and also in the trial court's calculation of child support order. The Alaska Supreme Court concluded the property division failed to follow the proper procedure for addressing the post-separation dissipation of marital assets: first valuing the dissipated asset at the time of separation and then crediting that amount to the responsible spouse in the property division. The Supreme Court also concluded that a figure for the amount of lost marital equity used in the property division was clearly erroneous. The Court therefore vacated the property division and remanded for further consideration. In all other respects the superior court’s judgment was affirmed. View "Rohde v. Rohde" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decree of guardianship by the district court granting guardianship of Mother's son to his maternal grandparents, holding that the district court did not err in finding that continued efforts to reunify Mother and child would likely be unproductive.After a hearing, the district court granted the Department of Public Health and Human Services' petition for guardianship of six-year-old S.S. On appeal, Mother argued that the district court erred in finding that continued efforts to reunify Mother and S.S. would likely be unproductive. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the record contained substantial evidence to support the district court's finding that additional reunification efforts would not be productive. View "In re S.S." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decree of the family court terminating Mother's parental rights to her son, Lucas D, holding that the trial justice did not err in deciding that Mother's parental rights should be terminated.After a trial, the trial justice issued a decision finding Mother to be unfit and determining that her parental rights should be terminated. Mother appealed, arguing that the Department of Children, Youth and Families failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that Mother had committed or allowed to be committed cruel and abusive conduct toward Lucas while in her care. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) there was competent evidence to support the trial justice's finding that Mother was an unfit parent; and (2) the trial justice did not abuse its discretion in concluding that termination was in the best interests of the child. View "In re Lucas D." on Justia Law

When members of the Public Employees’ Retirement Association (“PERA”) apply for retirement, they can choose between three options for benefit distribution. Generally, a retiree’s option choice is final. Pursuant to section 24-51-802(3.8), C.R.S. (2021), if a retiree chose either option 2 or 3 at retirement and the retiree’s then-spouse was named cobeneficiary, “the court shall have the jurisdiction to order or allow [the] retiree . . . to remove the spouse that was named cobeneficiary . . . in which case an option 1 benefit shall become payable.” In this case, the Colorado Supreme Court considered whether section 24-51-802(3.8) empowered a divorcing retiree to unilaterally remove a former spouse as named cobeneficiary and convert to option 1 retirement benefits. Assuming without deciding that this issue was adequately preserved for appeal, the Colorado Supreme Court answered this question in the negative. Instead, applying the statute’s plain language, the Court held that section 24-51-802(3.8) vested the trial court, not the retiree, with the authority to remove the former spouse as cobeneficiary and facilitate a conversion to option 1. Therefore, the Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals, albeit on different grounds. View "In re Marriage of Mack" on Justia Law

In 2017, Joanne Slaieh filed a divorce action against her husband, Nabeel Slaieh. A few years later, while the action was still pending, Nabeel was arrested on allegations of stalking and making criminal threats against Joanne, resulting in the opening of a criminal case against him. When Nabeel subsequently sought to depose Joanne in the divorce action, Joanne objected, citing a victim’s right under California's Marsy’s Law to refuse being interviewed or deposed by the defendant. Nabeel responded by filing a motion to compel her deposition, arguing Marsy’s Law applied to criminal proceedings only. After a hearing on the issue, the trial judge agreed with Joanne and denied Nabeel’s motion to compel. Nabeel filed a petition for writ of mandate asking the Court of Appeal to vacate the trial judge’s order and conclude the right to refuse a deposition contained in article I, section 28, subdivision (b)(5) of the California Constitution did not apply to a civil action like a marriage dissolution proceeding. He argued the text of Marsy’s Law made clear its protections applied in criminal proceedings only. To this the Court of Appeal agreed and therefore granted the petition. View "Slaieh v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law