Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the trial court in this parental rights termination case, holding that the juvenile court applied the incorrect definition of "normal home" in Ariz. Rev. Stat. 8-533(B) in terminating the parental interest of Father to his child.The juvenile court found H.B. and her half-siblings dependent as to Mother and their respective fathers. As to Father, the court found that DCS had proved termination pursuant to the length-of-sentence ground listed 8-533(B)(4) and that termination was in H.B.'s best interests. Specifically, the court concluded that Father's incarceration had and would continue to deprive H.B. of a normal home for a period of years, thus demonstrating the legnth-of-sentence ground for termination. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the juvenile court erred by not considering whether a permanent guardianship could provide H.B. with a "normal home" while Father maintained his parental rights; and (2) remand was necessary for consideration of Father's past and ongoing efforts to parent H.B. from prison and their impact on H.B.'s interest in a stable home life in the court's best interests analysis. View "Timothy B. v. Department of Child Safety" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court in this divorce proceeding, holding that there was no error.Plaintiff brought this divorce action, and the the trial court declared a mistrial. After a second trial Plaintiff appealed, arguing that the trial court prejudiced Plaintiff's credibility and displayed judicial bias and improperly awarded Defendant $65,000 in legal fees and $5000 in sanctions. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the doctrine of plain error did not require reversal in this case; and (2) the trial court properly awarded Defendant attorney's fees and sanctions. View "Ponns Cohen v. Cohen" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal affirmed with instructions the jurisdictional and dispositional orders concerning A.C. However, the court concluded that, under the facts of this case, DCFS's failure to ask extended family members about potential Indian ancestry was prejudicial, and thus the court remanded the matter with directions for the juvenile court to order DCFS to comply with Welf. & Inst. Code, section 224.2. In this case, the record reveals readily obtainable information that was likely to bear meaningfully on whether A.C. was an Indian child. The court could not assume that the parents' mere denial of Indian ancestry on a form was sufficient to dispel prejudice from DCFS's failure to ask A.C.'s extended family members about potential Indian ancestry. View "In re A.C." on Justia Law

In the published portion of this opinion, the Court of Appeal held that in considering whether a spousal support agreement executed between 1986 and 2002 is enforceable, the court is not limited to a determination under Family Code section 1615, subdivision (a)(2) whether the agreement was unconscionable when executed. Rather, the court retains the power under Family Code section 1612, subdivision (a)(7) to shape public policy regarding premarital spousal support agreements to the extent not inconsistent with Legislative declarations of such policy, and to declare that a premarital spousal support agreement is unenforceable as against public policy solely because it is unconscionable at the time of enforcement.The court rejected all challenges to the trial court's rulings, except the court corrected an arithmetical error in the trial court's attorney fee award, and modified the order to direct husband to pay wife $870,000. The court also vacated the trial court's ruling on wife's request for order of March 14, 2014 seeking to modify the temporary spousal support order, and remanded for the trial court to determine the amount of pendente lite spousal support from the date of wife's request. The court affirmed in all other respects. View "Zucker v. Zucker" on Justia Law

A maternal aunt and uncle sought to adopt a child over the father’s objection; after finding that the father’s consent was required, the superior court dismissed the adoption petition. The aunt and uncle contended the superior court erred by finding that: (1) the father had justifiable cause for his failure to communicate with the child for one year or more; (2) the father did not abandon the child for six months or more; and (3) the father did not fail to support the child for one year or more. The Alaska Supreme Court found the superior court did not err in its decision; judgment was therefore affirmed. View "In the Matter of the Adoption of J. R. S." on Justia Law

A divorcing couple’s property settlement agreement required the husband to pay the wife $1,200 per month from the non-disability portion of the husband’s military retirement. The agreement also provided that if the husband took any action that reduced the wife’s share of this payment, the husband would directly pay the wife so as to indemnify her against the reduction. After the husband’s retirement was converted to disability pay and the wife stopped receiving her monthly payment, she moved to enforce the settlement agreement’s indemnity provision. The superior court initially concluded that the indemnity provision was unenforceable because it violated federal law. But when the wife then moved to set the settlement agreement aside, the court decided to enforce the indemnity provision and ordered the former husband to make the monthly $1,200 payment and to pay arrears. To this, the Alaska Supreme Court affirmed, holding that federal law did not preclude enforcing one spouse’s promise to pay another a sum of money each month even if the source of the money was military disability pay. View "Jones v. Jones" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court renewing a domestic abuse protection order, holding that the evidence was sufficient to support the district court's finding that renewal of the protection order was necessary to prevent future harm.The domestic abuse protection order at issue issued on March 18, 2020. The protected party was Margaret Garrison, and the order was against her former spouse, Logan Otto. On March 17, 2021 Garrison filed a petition to renew the domestic abuse and protection order. The court issued an ex parte renewal of the ex parte domestic protection order. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court did not err in ultimately determining that renewal was justified. View "Garrison v. Otto" on Justia Law

The co-trustees and a beneficiary of the trust filed petitions under Probate Code section 850 alleging that defendant misappropriated trust assets and committed elder abuse against the trustor. The litigants settled and the guardian ad litem for defendant's minor children entered into an agreement with the co-trustees and certain trust beneficiaries, but not defendant (the first GAL agreement). Defendant and the children subsequently challenge the trial court's orders (1) enforcing the oral settlement agreement; (2) granting the GAL's petition to approve the second GAL agreement; (3) appointing the GAL as the children's guardian ad litem in certain probate cases; and (4) denying defendant's motion to remove the GAL as the children's guardian ad litem.In the published portion of the opinion, the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's orders and concluded that defendant failed to establish procedural and substantive unconscionability. The court rejected the argument that the GAL lacked capacity to make a contract in Jacqueline's name. The court also concluded that the trial court did not err by determining that defendant is precluded from repudiating the agreement because her objection is inconsistent with the children's interests. Furthermore, the court rejected the children's contention that they disaffirmed the settlement agreement and the second GAL agreement when they filed their repudiations of the agreements. Finally, the court concluded that there was no conflict of interest and thus no error in denying defendant's motion to remove the GAL as guardian ad litem. View "Chui v. Chui" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the circuit court setting Appellant's support obligation above the amount indicated by the latest version of Arkansas Supreme Court Administrative Order No. 10 - Child Support Guidelines, holding that the court erred in its calculation of Appellant's child support obligation.At issue before the Supreme Court was construction of new provisions in the guidelines setting support when a child's parents earn more than $30,000 per month. In this case, the court concluded that $6500 was an appropriate monthly support obligation. Appellant appealed, arguing that the circuit court erred by ordering support that exceeded the highest chart amount. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court's ruling constituted a clear error of law and that the court's findings were not consistent with the plain language of revised Administrative Order No. 10. View "Parnell v. Arkansas Department of Finance & Administration" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court dismissed this appeal from the trial court's judgment dismissing Mother's post-termination motion to intervene in her biological daughter Riley's juvenile case to obtain an order for visitation, holding that Mother failed to establish the party status necessary to support this Court's jurisdiction to consider her appeal.After the juvenile court terminated Mother's parental rights she filed a motion for post-termination visitation with Riley, citing this Court's decision in In re Ava W., 248 A.3d 675 (Conn. 2020), as support for the trial court's authority to issue a post termination of parental rights visitation order. The trial court denied the motion. The Supreme Court dismissed Mother's appeal, holding that, post termination, biological parents lack a legally cognizable interest to support a right to intervene in the juvenile case for the purpose of seeking visitation. View "In re Riley B." on Justia Law