Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

The Court of Appeal affirmed the order granting respondent's request to move their daughter, H.P., from California to Illinois. The court concluded that the Family Code permitted counsel to determine what was in H.P.'s best interest and make that position known to the trial court; any reliance on hearsay did not prejudice petitioner; and substantial evidence supports the trial court's determination that circumstances had changed so significantly that granting the move-away request was in H.P.'s best interest. View "Ramsden v. Peterson" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the nonprecedential opinion of the court of appeals instructing the district court to consider whether Rebecca Bender presented newly discovered evidence warranting relief from a child support order, holding that the district court should have determined whether Bender's proffered evidence warranted relief.Years after marriage dissolution and child support proceedings between Bender and Peter Bernhard, Bender filed a motion to modify the child support termination order based on "newly discovered evidence" under Minn. Stat. 518.145, subd. 2(2) and Minn. R. Civ. P. 60.02. The district court denied the motion. The court of appeals reversed and remanded the case. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) as may be just, a district court has discretion under section 518.145 to consider newly discovered evidence that arises after the court's underlying decision; and (2) the district court abused its discretion in finding that Bender's newly discovered evidence was not "new." View "Bender v. Bernhard" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court accepted a certified question from the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit by answering that Texas law does not authorize certain state officials to directly or indirectly enforce the state's new abortion restriction requirements.Plaintiffs, who provided and funded abortions and support for women who obtain them in Texas, requested a declaration that Senate Bill 8, the "Texas Heartbeat Act," Tex. Health & Safety Code 171.201-.212, unconstitutionally restricted their rights and injunction prohibiting Defendants, state agency executives, from enforcing the Act's requirements. After a remand, the Fifth Circuit certified a question to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court answered answered that Texas law does not grant the state agency executives named as defendants any authority to enforce the Act's requirements, either directly or indirectly. View "Whole Woman's Health v. Jackson" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the juvenile court terminating the parental rights with respect to two Indian children under the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), 25 U.S.C. 1903(4), and Iowa Code chapter 232B (Iowa ICWA), holding that the juvenile court erred in considering the best interests of the children on the narrow question of transfer to the tribal court.In 2018, the State commenced child-in-need-of-assistance proceedings involving the older child, and in 2019, the Sate commenced CINA proceedings against the younger child. The Omaha Tribe of Nebraska & Iowa (Tribe) was granted intervention and subsequently filed a motion to transfer the case to tribal court. The juvenile court denied the motion to transfer on the ground that it would not be in the best interests of the children. The court then terminated the parental rights of both parents. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the juvenile court erred in denying the Tribe's motion to transfer jurisdiction. View "In re T.F." on Justia Law

K.P. (mother) and D.P. (father) appealed juvenile court orders denying mother’s petitions to change the court’s order terminating her reunification services and thereafter terminating both of their parental rights, freeing the minors for adoption. The petition for termination involved the parents' five children, and recounted the parents’ past abuse of the minors, the parents’ history of drug abuse, three of the children having been born with drugs in their system, the parents’ history with the San Joaquin County Human Services Agency (Agency), and the parents’ criminal history. A 2020 disposition report recommended the parents be bypassed for services under Welfare and Institutions Code section 361.5, subdivisions (b)(6) and (b)(13), due to the physical abuse of the minors and the parents’ extensive drug abuse. Later that year, father and mother filed petitions under Welfare and Institutions Code section 388 to change the court’s order denying them reunification services. The court summarily denied the parents’ section 388 petitions by written orders, finding for each: “[T]he request does not state new evidence or a change of circumstance” and “the proposed change of order . . . does not promote the best interest of the child.” After review, the Court of Appeal affirmed the juvenile court’s order denying mother’s section 388 petitions, but reversed its orders terminating parents’ parental rights. The Appellate Court found some evidentiary support for each element of the beneficial parental relationship exception, therefore the juvenile court's ruling there was inadequate evidence to support the exception was an abuse of discretion under the controlling caselaw. The case was remanded for the juvenile court to weigh the evidence presented under the applicable standard and, in its discretion, consider additional evidence. View "In re D.P." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court in this marital dissolution case, holding that a trial court need not follow a rigid, technical formula in dividing the marital estate so long as the court expressly considers all marital property and offers sufficient justification to rebut the presumptive equal division.In its final decree, the trial court granted Wife's request for spousal maintenance and awarded Wife fifty-five percent of the "net marital estate." On appeal, both Husband and Wife disputed the trial court's award of spousal maintenance and the distribution of the marital estate. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) there was no error in the trial court's award of spousal maintenance; and (2) there was no error in the court's division of marital property. View "Roetter v. Roetter" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellant Hebah Abdelqader appealed an order following a bifurcated trial wherein the superior court denied Hebah’s request for a restraining order against her ex-husband, Abdo Abraham, and granted joint physical custody of the couple’s children, A.A. and G.A. Hebah claimed the court made multiple errors when determining she had not met her burden of proving domestic violence. In addition, Hebah claimed the court erred in failing to articulate, on the record or in writing, the reasons it found the presumption under Family Code section 3044 had been rebutted. In the unpublished portion of its opinion, the Court of Appeal concluded the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Hebah’s request for a restraining order. However, in the published portion of the opinion, the Court agreed the trial court erred in failing to state the reasons, on the record or in writing, it found the presumption under section 3044 had been rebutted. As such, the judgment was reversed as to that issue only and the matter remanded for further consideration. View "Abdelqader v. Abraham" on Justia Law

This case was one of many "disagreements" about the control of the multi-million-dollar estate of Thomas Tedesco. Plaintiff-respondent Laura White was one of Thomas’s three biological daughters and a cotrustee of his living trust. Defendant-appellant Debra Wear (aka Debbie Basara Wear) was one of Thomas’s stepdaughters. In 2013, Thomas suffered serious health issues, which resulted in significant cognitive impairment, leaving him susceptible to being unduly influenced by anyone close to him. Gloria Tedesco, Thomas’s second wife, began denying White and her sisters access to their father, causing him to believe that they were stealing from him. Wear assisted Gloria, her mother, in unduly influencing Thomas via contacting, or facilitating access to, attorneys in order to change Thomas’s estate plan to disinherit his biological family in favor of Gloria and her family. In 2015, a permanent conservator of Thomas’s estate was appointed. Despite the existence of the conservatorship, Wear continued to assist Gloria in taking actions to unduly influence Thomas to change his 30-plus-year estate plan. Consequently, upon White’s petition, the superior court issued an elder abuse restraining order (EARO), restraining Wear for three years from, among other things, financially abusing Thomas, contacting him (either directly or indirectly), facilitating any change to his estate plan, coming within 100 yards of him, and possessing any guns, other firearms, and ammunition. Wear contended the EARO was void because: (1) the judge was disqualified; and (2) he violated due process by substantially amending the allegations in the petition and prohibiting her from possessing firearms and ammunition. She further claimed the petition failed to state a cause of action for elder financial abuse. The Court of Appeal agreed the court erred in including a firearms and ammunition restriction in the EARO and directed the trial court to strike it. Otherwise, the Court affirmed. View "White v. Wear" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Kathleen Moynihan and defendant Edward Lynch were involved in a long-term “marital-style relationship.” Anticipating the potential dissolution of that relationship, they signed and notarized a written agreement, without the assistance of counsel, that finalized the financial obligations each owed to the other. The issue this case presented for the New Jersey Supreme Court's review was the validity of that palimony agreement. In 2015, the parties parted ways, and Lynch refused to abide by their written agreement. Moynihan filed a complaint seeking enforcement of the written agreement and an alleged oral palimony agreement that she claimed the parties had entered before the Legislature in 2010 amended N.J.S.A. 25:1-5 to include subparagraph (h), which mandated that palimony agreements be reduced to writing and “made with the independent advice of counsel.” She challenged N.J.S.A. 25:1-5(h) on constitutional grounds and urged enforcement as a typical contract; alternatively, she sought enforcement of the agreement on equitable grounds. Lynch denied the existence of an oral palimony agreement and asserted that the written agreement was unenforceable because the parties did not receive the independent advice of counsel before entering it. The Supreme Court concluded the palimony agreement, as written and signed, without the attorney review requirement, was enforceable. That portion of N.J.S.A. 25:1-5(h), which imposed an attorney-review requirement to enforce a palimony agreement, contravenes Article I, Paragraph 1 of the New Jersey Constitution. The Court concluded the parties did not enter an oral palimony agreement. View "Moynihan v. Lynch" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the trial court in this parental rights termination case, holding that the juvenile court applied the incorrect definition of "normal home" in Ariz. Rev. Stat. 8-533(B) in terminating the parental interest of Father to his child.The juvenile court found H.B. and her half-siblings dependent as to Mother and their respective fathers. As to Father, the court found that DCS had proved termination pursuant to the length-of-sentence ground listed 8-533(B)(4) and that termination was in H.B.'s best interests. Specifically, the court concluded that Father's incarceration had and would continue to deprive H.B. of a normal home for a period of years, thus demonstrating the legnth-of-sentence ground for termination. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the juvenile court erred by not considering whether a permanent guardianship could provide H.B. with a "normal home" while Father maintained his parental rights; and (2) remand was necessary for consideration of Father's past and ongoing efforts to parent H.B. from prison and their impact on H.B.'s interest in a stable home life in the court's best interests analysis. View "Timothy B. v. Department of Child Safety" on Justia Law