Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

Michael Jones purchased Series EE federal savings bonds during his marriage to Jeanine Jones, designating her as the pay-on-death beneficiary. Upon their divorce, their divorce settlement agreement (DSA) did not specifically address the savings bonds but included a provision that any marital asset not listed would belong to the party currently in possession. The DSA also required Michael to pay Jeanine $200,000 in installments. After Michael's death, Jeanine redeemed the savings bonds and filed a creditor’s claim against Michael’s Estate for the remaining $100,000 owed under the DSA. The Estate argued that the redemption of the savings bonds satisfied Michael’s financial obligations to Jeanine.The trial court agreed with the Estate, ruling that the savings bonds counted towards Michael’s $200,000 obligation under the DSA and dismissed Jeanine’s claim for reimbursement. Jeanine appealed, and the Appellate Division reversed the trial court’s decision. The appellate court held that the federal regulations governing U.S. savings bonds preempted state law, and Jeanine was the sole owner of the bonds at Michael’s death. Therefore, the value of the redeemed bonds should not be credited towards the Estate’s obligations under the DSA.The Supreme Court of New Jersey reviewed the case and held that preemption was not an issue because N.J.S.A. 3B:3-14 does not conflict with federal regulations governing U.S. savings bonds. The Court found that the DSA did not direct the disposition of the savings bonds, and thus, the bonds should not be credited against Michael’s $200,000 obligation. The Court affirmed the Appellate Division’s judgment as modified, ruling that the Estate must make the remaining payments to Jeanine as required by the DSA. View "In the Matter of the Estate of Jones" on Justia Law

The case involves D.H.E., the biological father of V.S., a minor. The Cook County circuit court found V.S. neglected due to an injurious environment and dependent due to his mother's disability. Consequently, V.S. was adjudged a ward of the court, and guardianship was granted to the Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS). D.H.E. appealed, arguing that the neglect finding violated his due process rights, was against the manifest weight of the evidence, and that the court failed to provide a factual basis for its disposition.The appellate court affirmed the circuit court's adjudication and disposition orders. It found that D.H.E.'s challenges related to the neglect finding were moot because he did not also challenge the dependency finding. The appellate court also upheld the disposition order, which granted guardianship and custody to DCFS based on the finding that D.H.E. was unable to care for V.S.The Illinois Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the appellate court's judgment. The court held that D.H.E.'s appeal was moot because he failed to challenge the dependency finding, which alone was sufficient to support the wardship and disposition orders. The court also found that the collateral consequences exception to mootness did not apply, as no significant collateral consequences specifically tied to the neglect finding were identified. Therefore, the court did not address the remaining issues on appeal. View "In re V.S." on Justia Law

In this case, the appellant, X.G.C., appealed the termination of his parental rights over his child, V.I.C. The child was born in December 2019 and suffered multiple injuries while in the care of her parents, including a subdural hematoma and a fractured arm. The Jackson County Department of Child Protection Services (JCCPS) took custody of the child after determining that the injuries were consistent with abuse. Despite efforts to reunify the family, including a service plan and a ninety-day trial placement, the child sustained further injuries, leading to the termination of the father's parental rights.The Jackson County Youth Court initially placed the child in JCCPS custody and ordered efforts towards reunification. However, after the child sustained additional injuries during the trial placement with her father, the court changed the permanency plan to termination of parental rights. The court conducted multiple hearings and found that JCCPS had made reasonable efforts to assist the father in complying with the service plan, but he had failed to provide a safe environment for the child.The Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed the case and affirmed the youth court's decision. The court found that the statutory requirements for termination under Mississippi Code Section 93-15-115 were met, including the adjudication of the child as abused, the child's placement in JCCPS custody for over six months, and the father's failure to comply with the service plan. The court also determined that termination was appropriate under Section 93-15-119, as the father's conduct demonstrated a substantial risk to the child's safety and welfare. The court concluded that the youth court's findings were supported by substantial evidence and that the termination of parental rights was in the best interest of the child. View "X.G.C. v. Jackson County Department of Child Protection Services" on Justia Law

A father appealed a Family Court order terminating his parental rights. The Department of Services for Children, Youth and their Families (DFS) took custody of the father's son shortly after birth due to the father's mental health issues, substance abuse, unstable housing, employment status, previous involvement with DFS, history of domestic violence, and failure to plan for the child. DFS moved to be excused from case planning with the father under 13 Del. C. § 1103(d), arguing that grounds for termination existed under 13 Del. C. § 1103(a)(7) because the father's parental rights to another child had been involuntarily terminated in an earlier proceeding. The Family Court granted the motion and later terminated the father's parental rights after finding clear and convincing evidence that termination was in the best interests of the child.The father argued on appeal that Section 1103(d) is unconstitutional. The Supreme Court of Delaware reviewed the case and concluded that Section 1103(d) is not unconstitutional as applied to the father. The court found that the Family Court's analysis under Sections 1103(a)(7) and 1103(d) was supported by the record and that termination of the father's parental rights was in the best interests of the child. The court also rejected the father's argument that the "least restrictive means" standard should be applied, instead following the due process framework established by the U.S. Supreme Court in Mathews v. Eldridge.The Supreme Court of Delaware affirmed the Family Court's judgment, holding that the statutory grounds for termination were met and that the termination was in the best interests of the child. The court found that the father received sufficient process before the termination of his parental rights and that the Family Court's findings were supported by clear and convincing evidence. View "Schnell v. Department of Services for Children, Youth and their Families" on Justia Law

Wesley Brinda (Father) petitioned for a custody modification to change the current arrangement from primary residential custody with Stacey Walker (Mother) to shared residential custody. Mother counterpetitioned to modify child support. After a two-day bench trial, the district court found no material change in circumstances to justify reopening the current custodial order but modified the child support order. Father appealed the district court’s custody decision.The District Court of Campbell County initially awarded joint legal custody with Mother having primary residential custody of the children, AB and KB, based on Father’s rotating work schedule at a coal mine. After being laid off in 2016, Father became self-employed, allowing him more flexibility. In 2017, Father successfully petitioned to modify child support but did not request a custody modification. In 2021, Father filed a petition to modify custody, citing his flexible work schedule and the children’s desire to spend more time with him. Mother denied sufficient grounds for modifying custody but sought a review of child support.The Wyoming Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s decision. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining no material change in circumstances had occurred. The court found that while the children expressed a desire to spend more time with Father, the district court reasonably concluded that these preferences, along with Father’s career change, did not justify reopening the custody order. The court also found that the parties generally co-parented well and that the district court properly considered all evidence presented. The Wyoming Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s decision, finding it reasonable and supported by the evidence. View "Brinda v. Walker" on Justia Law

A District Court in Caribou, Maine, issued a judgment in February 2024 regarding the parental rights and responsibilities of a child born to Andrew M. Landeen and Ashley Burch, who were former romantic partners but never married. The court granted primary physical residence to Burch and visitation rights to Landeen. Additionally, the court changed the child's last name to "Landeen" without providing specific findings or comments on the decision. Burch appealed the name change, and Landeen cross-appealed the allocation of parental rights and responsibilities.The District Court's judgment was based on the best interest of the child, considering factors such as the parents' ability to cooperate and the child's emotional and physical safety. The court found that Landeen's persistent anger towards Burch and his inability to manage frustration appropriately were detrimental to the child's best interest. Consequently, the court allocated primary parental rights to Burch while allowing Landeen visitation rights and the right to be informed of major decisions concerning the child.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case and found that the District Court's allocation of parental rights and responsibilities was supported by the record and did not constitute an abuse of discretion. However, the Supreme Judicial Court vacated the portion of the judgment changing the child's last name. The court held that the father’s desire to change the child's surname, based solely on tradition and without supporting evidence, did not meet the statutory requirement of showing "good cause" or that the change was in the child's best interest. The court emphasized that both parents have equal rights in naming their child and that any name change must be justified by the child's best interest. View "Landeen v. Burch" on Justia Law

A.K. appealed a disorderly conduct restraining order issued against her. Jennifer Gooss, on behalf of her minor daughter, filed the petition alleging A.K., also a minor, engaged in disorderly conduct. A temporary restraining order was issued, and a hearing was held. After a 30-minute hearing, the district court issued a disorderly conduct restraining order against A.K.The District Court of Mercer County, South Central Judicial District, conducted the hearing. A.K. argued on appeal that she was denied due process because the court's time limit on the hearing deprived her of a reasonable opportunity to rebut the evidence and testify on her own behalf. She also contended that the district court's findings were not supported by the evidence.The North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the case. The court noted that a district court's decision to grant a restraining order or conduct a hearing is reviewed for abuse of discretion. The court found that A.K. did not object to the 30-minute time limit at the outset of the hearing and did not request additional time. The court determined that the district court did not act arbitrarily or capriciously by setting the time limitations and that A.K. had a reasonable opportunity to cross-examine the petitioner.The Supreme Court also reviewed the district court's findings and concluded that sufficient evidence supported the finding that A.K.'s conduct affected the minor petitioner's safety, security, or privacy. The court held that the district court's findings were not clearly erroneous and that the court did not abuse its discretion in granting the restraining order. The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the disorderly conduct restraining order. View "Gooss v. A.K." on Justia Law

Samantha Davis filed a petition for a disorderly conduct restraining order against Richard Romanyshyn in April 2024. The district court granted a temporary restraining order and outlined the hearing procedure, which limited the hearing to 15 minutes unless a full evidentiary hearing was requested. The procedure required the requesting party to file a notice of witnesses and a summary of their anticipated testimony three days before the hearing. If no request was made, evidence had to be presented by affidavit, and affiants had to be available for cross-examination if notified 24 hours before the hearing.Davis did not request a full evidentiary hearing but filed a notice to cross-examine Romanyshyn. Romanyshyn argued he requested a full evidentiary hearing and filed a notice to cross-examine through his answer, but the district court found he did not follow the proper procedure. The hearing was limited to arguments from Davis’s counsel and Romanyshyn, along with Davis’s petition and Romanyshyn’s affidavit. The district court granted Davis a two-year restraining order, later amended to include the parties’ two minor children, conflicting with an existing parental responsibility order.The Supreme Court of North Dakota reviewed the case and concluded that the district court deprived Romanyshyn of a full evidentiary hearing as required by N.D.C.C. § 12.1–31.2–01(1). The court found that the district court relied solely on inadmissible hearsay in Davis’s petition and Romanyshyn’s affidavit, without allowing cross-examination or presenting admissible evidence. The Supreme Court reversed the restraining order and remanded the case for a full evidentiary hearing. The court also noted that any restraining order issued on remand must not conflict with the existing parental responsibility order. View "Davis v. Romanyshyn" on Justia Law

Ashley Navarro and Goretti Cervera were in a relationship for approximately eight years. During and after their relationship, Cervera struggled with mental health issues, including borderline personality disorder, general anxiety, and major depressive disorder. In July 2018, after their breakup, Cervera attempted to confront Navarro at her workplace, leading to a violent incident where Cervera was found with a large kitchen knife and admitted to intending to kill Navarro. Navarro obtained an emergency protective order and a five-year domestic violence restraining order (DVRO) against Cervera. Cervera violated the DVRO in 2019 by contacting Navarro via email and text, leading Navarro to obtain a three-year criminal protective order.The Alameda County Superior Court initially issued the DVRO based on the 2018 incident, finding Navarro had a reasonable apprehension of physical harm. In May 2023, Navarro sought a permanent renewal of the DVRO, citing ongoing fear of harm due to Cervera's mental health issues and past behavior. Cervera opposed the renewal, claiming her mental health had stabilized and she had not contacted Navarro in four years. The trial court denied the renewal request, finding Navarro's fear of future abuse unreasonable and noting Cervera's improved mental health and lack of recent contact.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case and found that the trial court abused its discretion. The appellate court held that the facts of the 2018 incident, combined with Cervera's violations of the DVRO, established a reasonable apprehension of future abuse. The court reversed the trial court's decision and directed it to grant the renewal request, determining whether the DVRO should be renewed for five or more years, or permanently. View "Navarro v. Cervera" on Justia Law

Thomas Steiger and Hope VanDelden have two minor children, G.L.M.S. and T.L.S. Thomas filed a Petition for Establishment of a Permanent Parenting Plan in October 2016, which was granted in May 2017 after Hope did not respond or attend the hearing. The plan allowed the children to reside primarily with Thomas and have contact with Hope on alternating weekends, holidays, and up to 14 days of vacation each year. Hope filed a motion to amend the parenting plan in October 2017, claiming Thomas had reduced her parenting time. Thomas’s mother and stepfather also petitioned to intervene, asserting their grandparenting time had been decreased.In October 2023, Hope filed a motion to proceed with mediation to address the parenting plan. After unsuccessful mediation, she filed another motion to amend the plan in January 2024, claiming Thomas did not allow the children to spend additional time with her. Thomas opposed the motion, asserting there was no change in circumstances to warrant an amendment. The District Court set an in-chambers interview with the oldest child, G.L.M.S., but did not hold an evidentiary hearing before granting Hope’s motion to amend the parenting plan in July 2024.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case. The court held that the District Court erred by not holding a hearing on the motion to amend the parenting plan, as required by Montana law unless the motion is denied for lack of adequate cause. The Supreme Court reversed the District Court’s order and remanded the case for a hearing to determine if the statutory criteria for amending the parenting plan were met and to amend the plan in the best interests of the children. View "In Re G.L.M.S. and T.L.S." on Justia Law