Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the trial court terminating Father's parental rights to his daughter, holding that the trial court did not err in terminating Father's parental rights.After a termination hearing, the trial court concluded that grounds existed to terminate Father's parental rights based on neglect, willfully leaving the child outside the home without making reasonable progress, and failure to legitimate. See N.C. Gen. Stat. 7B-1111(a)(1), (2) and (5). The court also determined that terminating Father's rights was in the child's best interests. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction in this case; and (2) the trial court's findings of fact were supported by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence, and those findings supported the trial court's conclusions of law. View "In re M.S.L." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the trial court terminating Father's parental rights to his daughter, holding that the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction to terminate Father's parental rights. After a termination hearing, the trial court concluded that grounds existed to terminate Father's parental rights based on neglect and willful abandonment. See N.C. Gen. Stat. 7B-1111(a)(1), (7). On appeal, Father argued that the trial court did not have subject matter jurisdiction to terminate his parental rights because he was a nonresident and was not served with a summons. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court's subject matter jurisdiction was properly invoked and that Father waived his insufficient service argument. View "In re A.L.I." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the trial court terminating the parental rights of Mother and Father to their minor child T.B., holding that there was no error.After a termination hearing, the trial court entered an order terminating Parents' parental rights, concluding that four grounds alleged in the termination motion existed to terminate both Parents' parental rights and that it was in T.B.'s best interests to terminate Parents' rights. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) there was no error to the trial court's challenged findings of fact; (2) there was substantial evidence to support the conclusion that there was a likelihood of repetition of neglect as to Mother; and (3) the trial court's order terminating Father's parental rights in the child was supported by competent evidence and based on proper legal grounds. View "In re T.B." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court further modified a hybrid traditional and rehabilitative alimony award that the court of appeals modified in this case, holding that this Court hereby adopts transitional alimony as another tool to do equity in calculating spousal support.In this divorce action, the district court entered a decree dissolving the parties' seventeen-year marriage, ordering shared custody and physical care of the children, and diving the marital property. On appeal, the court of appeals increased the spousal support award and recalculated Husband child support obligation. On appeal, Husband argued that the increase in the spousal support award and duration was excessive and unnecessary. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision as modified, holding that the alimony is modified as to the amount and duration and that this modification required a recalculation of child support. View "In re Marriage of Pazhoor" on Justia Law

Joseph Schrodt appealed the judgment of divorce from Katie Schrodt. Joseph raised numerous issues including the district court’s denial of his request for a continuance, the court’s valuation of certain marital assets, the court’s calculation of child support, the court’s parenting plan, and the court’s award of attorney’s fees and costs to Katie. Finding no reversible error, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed. View "Schrodt v. Schrodt, et al." on Justia Law

ason Canerdy appealed a district court order denying his motion for contempt and his motion to modify primary residential responsibility without an evidentiary hearing. Jason and Samantha Canerdy were divorced in June 2020. The parties had two minor children. The judgment awarded Samantha primary residential responsibility and Jason reasonable parenting time. In April 2021, Jason filed a motion to modify the judgment to be awarded primary residential responsibility of the minor children, or in the alternative, be awarded equal residential responsibility. Jason also filed a motion for contempt for Samantha's interference with his parenting time. The district court denied Jason's motion for contempt and his motion to modify the judgment for primary residential responsibility without an evidentiary hearing. The court found that there was no evidence that Samantha disobeyed the judgment, and that she had not committed contempt of court. Further, the court found no persistent and willful denial of parenting time, no evidence that the children were in any danger, and no evidence that primary residential responsibility changed. The court stated that Jason did not take responsibility for his own inaction in regard to not spending as much time with his minor children because he did not regularly attend or participate in their dance activities. The court noted that Jason would seek to make up his parenting time when the dance activities occur on his scheduled weekend. After review, the North Dakota Supreme Court concluded Jason established a prima facie case for modification and was entitled to an evidentiary hearing. The Court affirmed the district court in all other respects, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Canerdy v. Canerdy, et al." on Justia Law

Thomas Kaspari appealed an amended judgment awarding spousal support to Jean Kaspari entered after the first appeal in this case. The district court ordered Thomas to pay $7,000 per month in spousal support to Jean until he turned 65 years old. Thomas argued the district court erred in the amount of spousal support it awarded, claiming: (1) the court failed to properly consider the distribution of the parties’ assets and debts; (2) the evidence did not support a finding of a need for support; and (3) the court improperly attempted to equalize the parties’ incomes. The North Dakota Supreme Court determined that although the district court made findings about the Ruff-Fischer factors and considered Jean's need for spousal support and Thomas' ability to pay, the court failed to adequately explain its reason for awarding spousal support of $7,000 per month when Jean did not show a need for that amount. "The court was not required to provide a detailed calculation of Jean Kaspari’s need for spousal support, but it was required to make sufficient findings to provide a discernible basis for its decision. Without further explanation from the district court, the amount appears to be arbitrary or an attempt to equalize the parties’ incomes." Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the district court’s spousal support decision and remanded for that court to make further findings explaining its decision or to reconsider the amount of support. View "Kaspari v. Kaspari" on Justia Law

J.O. and M.B. married in 2007 and for more than 15 years also have been in what they describe as a committed, polyamorous relationship with appellant. In 2018, appellant, J.O., and M.B. decided to have a child together. They agreed J.O. and M.B. would be the child’s biological parents, appellant would adopt the child, and J.O. and M.B. would maintain their parental rights. Together, the three of them would share equally in parenting rights and responsibilities. After E.B. was born, appellant began adoption proceedings. Consistent with the requirements for an independent adoption, California’s State Department of Social Services (CDSS) conducted an investigation and concluded the adoption was in E.B.’s best interest. Accordingly, CDSS recommended the uncontested adoption be granted. Rejecting CDSS’s recommendation, the trial court denied appellant’s petition to adopt E.B. Relying on Family Code section 7612, the trial court found appellant had not yet fulfilled E.B.’s needs for a substantial period of time, and there was no likelihood that E.B. would be taken from appellant, resulting in detriment to the child. Appellant moved the court to vacate its order. The trial court denied that motion too. To the Court of Appeals, appellant and CDSS argued the trial court applied the incorrect law to appellant’s adoption petition and, under the correct law, section 8617, the petition to adopt E.B. should have been granted. The Court agreed the trial court applied the incorrect law and remanded the matter to allow the trial court to exercise its discretion under the applicable statute. View "Adoption of E.B." on Justia Law

Mother appealed the order terminating her parental rights to four-year-old Antonio R. under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26, contending that the Department and the juvenile court failed to comply with the inquiry and notice provisions of the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA).The Court of Appeal agreed with Mother that Welfare and Institutions Code section 224.2, subdivision (b), required the Department to inquire of the maternal extended family members, and the juvenile court erred in finding ICWA did not apply despite the Department's insufficient inquiry. The court also concluded that the information in the hands of the extended family members was likely to be meaningful in determining whether the child is an Indian child. In this case, the error was prejudicial because the court did not know what information the maternal relatives would have provided had the Department or court inquired. Accordingly, the court conditionally affirmed and remanded for the juvenile court and the Department to comply with the inquiry provisions of ICWA and California law. View "In re Antonio R." on Justia Law

Kristine and Jeffrey McInerney were married in 2003, and had two minor children. Kristine, who resided in Indiana with the two children, filed a complaint for divorce on May 1, 2020, in Bryan County, Georgia. At the time of the filing, the marital residence was in Bryan County, and Kristine believed Jeffrey resided there. However, Jeffrey moved to Chatham County shortly before Kristine filed for divorce. On July 2, 2020, Jeffrey sold the marital residence in Bryan County, and the sale proceeds were placed in a trust account as agreed to by the parties. In his answer and counterclaim, Jeffrey consented to venue and jurisdiction, and admitted he was a Georgia resident who resided in Bryan County within six months of the filing of the complaint for divorce. Approximately two months after she initiated the divorce action in Georgia, Kristine initiated a child custody action in Indiana. The parties agreed that Indiana had exclusive jurisdiction over the child custody action and all child custody and visitation issues. The parties later participated in mediation in Georgia in an attempt to resolve all issues relating to their divorce and the custody of their children, but were unable to come to an agreement. Jeffrey then filed a motion to dismiss the divorce case in Bryan County under the doctrine of forum non conveniens pursuant to OCGA 9-10-31.1 (a). This appeal presented the question of whether a superior court could transfer or dismiss a divorce case under the doctrine of forum non conveniens pursuant to OCGA 9-10-31.1(a) without offending Article VI, Section II, Paragraph I of the Georgia Constitution. The Georgia Supreme Court held that with respect to the question of transfer of venue, OCGA 9-10-31.1(a) was consistent with the authority vested in the General Assembly by the Georgia Constitution to enact statutes that direct the superior courts on how to exercise their power to change venue. As to the question of dismissal, OCGA § 9-10-31.1(a) was an exercise of the General Assembly’s plenary legislative power, not a matter of venue subject to the constitutional venue provisions. "The venue provisions do not limit the General Assembly’s authority to provide for the dismissal of a divorce case based on the doctrine of forum non conveniens." However, because the trial court incorrectly analyzed some of the factors set forth in OCGA § 9-10-31.1(a), the Supreme Court vacated the trial court’s judgment and remanded the case for reconsideration. View "McInerney v. McInerney" on Justia Law