Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the district court dismissing Appellant's petition to establish grandparent visitation with her minor grandchildren for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, holding that the district court erred in determining that it lacked jurisdiction.The biological grandmother of the children at issue in this case, filed a petition to establish grandparent visitation with her minor grandchildren. The parents filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The district court granted the motion to dismiss, concluding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the petition because allowing the grandmother visitation would infringe on the parents' fundamental liberty interest in raising their children. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment, holding that the district court erred in concluding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction. View "Kane v. Kane" on Justia Law

S.P.L. appealed a judgment denying his petition to terminate M.T.’s parental rights and adopt K.M.T. He argued the district court erred in denying his request to terminate M.T.’s parental rights and failing to consider whether M.T.’s consent was required for an adoption proceeding. While the North Dakota Supreme Court did not find the district court’s findings were clearly erroneous, the district court erred in failing to make findings regarding whether M.T.’s consent was required in the adoption proceeding. Judgment was affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded for further proceedings. View "In the Matter of the Adoption of K.M.T." on Justia Law

Derek Spitzer appealed a second amended judgment entered after he moved to amend a parenting judgment. Spitzer and Kate Anderson had a child, P.T.S., born in 2009. In 2010 the district court awarded Anderson primary residential responsibility and ordered Spitzer to pay child support. In 2013 Spitzer moved to amend the judgment and requested primary residential responsibility. The court awarded joint residential responsibility, but Spitzer had slightly more than 50% of the parenting time. The parties agreed to eliminate Anderson’s child support obligation based on Spitzer’s income and their agreement to share P.T.S.’s expenses. In this appeal, Spitzer argued the district court erred in awarding Anderson primary residential responsibility, claiming there was not a material change in circumstances that adversely affected P.T.S. or resulted in a general decline of P.T.S.’s condition. To this the North Dakota Supreme Court agreed and reversed judgment. View "Anderson v. Spitzer, et al." on Justia Law

Mark Rath appealed after the district court entered a third amended judgment in this divorce action from Kayla Rath (now Jones). After review, the North Dakota Supreme Court concluded the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying his motion in limine; in conducting the hearing; and in allowing written, but not oral, closing arguments. The Supreme Court affirmed the denial of his requests for new trial and recusal, and affirmed the third amended judgment. However, the Supreme Court determined the district court erred in denying his demand for a change of judge and erred in referring Jones’s motion for a vexatious litigant determination under N.D. Sup. Ct. Admin. R. 58 to the presiding judge, who had previously been disqualified in this case. The Court therefore vacated a May 2021 order determining Mark Rath a vexatious litigant. Furthermore, the Supreme Court held that Rath did not meet his burden to show his constitutional challenge to N.D. Sup. Ct. Admin. R. 58 had merit, so the Court exercised authority under N.D. Sup. Ct. Admin. R. 58(7) to determine Mark Rath was a vexatious litigant under the rule. View "Rath v. Rath, et al." on Justia Law

C.M., mother of four minors (mother), appealed juvenile court’s orders terminating parental rights and freeing the minors for adoption. Her sole contention on appeal was that the Placer County Department of Health and Human Services and juvenile court failed to comply with the inquiry and notice requirements of the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). After review, the Court of Appeal agreed and remanded for the limited purpose of ensuring compliance with the ICWA. View "In re M.E." on Justia Law

C.O. (mother) appealed a court order terminating her parental rights to her daughter Z.O. The juvenile court appointed a guardian ad litem (GAL) for mother without providing grounds or explanation in the record, as it was required to do. The Court of Appeal agreed with mother that this error deprived her not only of the ability to participate at critical stages in the proceedings, but also the ability to effectively appeal and challenge the juvenile court’s reasoning for the appointment of the GAL (i.e., that mother lacked competence to understand the nature or consequences of the proceedings and to assist counsel regarding the underlying litigation). The Court concluded the trial court record did not give it "sufficient confidence" that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. And as a result, the Court reverse the termination and remanded for further proceedings. View "In re Z.O." on Justia Law

In 2019 a woman sued her former husband’s medical provider, alleging that from 2003 to 2010 the provider negligently prescribed the husband opioid medications, leading to his addiction, damage to the couple’s business and marital estate, the couple’s divorce in 2011, and ultimately the husband's death in 2017. The superior court ruled the claims were barred by the statute of limitations and rejected the woman’s argument that the provider should have been estopped from relying on a limitations defense. Because the undisputed evidence shows that by 2010 the woman had knowledge of her alleged injuries, the provider’s alleged role in causing those injuries, and the provider’s alleged negligence, the Alaska Supreme Court concluded that the claims accrued at that time and were no longer timely when filed in 2019. And because the record did not show that the woman’s failure to timely file her claims stemmed from reasonable reliance on fraudulent conduct by the provider, the Supreme Court concluded that equitable estoppel did not apply. View "Park v. Spayd" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and vacated in part the judgment of the court of appeals in this dissolution of marriage proceeding, holding that, contrary to the judgment of the lower court, Husband's concealment of a certain pension was intrinsic fraud.Throughout negotiation within the proceedings below, Husband failed to disclose his GE retirement pension. After Wife discovered the omission five years later she brought this action seeking to modify the dissolution decree by awarding her part of the pension, alleging extrinsic fraud. In response, Husband argued that the alleged fraud was intrinsic and that reasonable diligence on Wife's part would have led to the discovery of his pension within one year after entry of the order. The district court entered judgment for Wife. The court of appeals reversed in part, holding that the district court properly found the fraud was extrinsic but erred in determining that Wife would not have found the pension with reasonable diligence. The Supreme Court vacated in part, holding (1) Husband's concealment of the GE pension was intrinsic fraud; and (2) Wife would have discovered the pension within one year with reasonable diligence. View "In re Marriage of Hutchinson" on Justia Law

After declaring them dependents of the court, a California juvenile court removed M.V. and I.V. (together, Children) from the physical custody of their parents, J.V. (Father) and M.Z. (Mother), and placed them with a relative caregiver pending reunification efforts. Father, Mother, and the Children appealed those dispositional orders, arguing substantial evidence did not support the court’s findings, by clear and convincing evidence, that there was substantial danger to the Children if they were returned home and that there were no reasonable means to protect them without removing them from their parents’ custody. After review of the juvenile court record, the Court of Appeal agreed and reversed the dispositional orders as to both Father and Mother. View "In re M.V." on Justia Law

Appellant Raymond Dapo filed suit against his adoptive mother for sexual abuse that allegedly occurred 13 years earlier. He then agreed to release the adoptive mother from liability in exchange for her filing a third-party equitable apportionment claim against the Alaska Office of Children’s Services (OCS) and assigning the claim to him. OCS challenged the validity of this assignment. The superior court agreed with OCS that the assignment of the adoptive mother’s apportionment claim was void; it invalidated the assignment, dismissed the claim with prejudice, and awarded OCS attorney’s fees. Dapo appealed. The Alaska Supreme Court found that because a defendant prosecuting a third-party equitable apportionment claim possessed nothing in the claim itself that could be assigned, such claims are not assignable, and the Court affirmed the superior court’s invalidation of the assignment in this case. But the Supreme Court also concluded that it was error to dismiss the apportionment claim with prejudice; the Court thus vacated the order of dismissal and remanded for the court to provide the adoptive mother a reasonable time to decide whether to pursue the claim herself. View "Dapo v. Dept. of Health & Soc. Svcs" on Justia Law