Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

The sole issue in this appeal of the termination of parental rights was whether San Bernardino County Children and Family Services (CFS) conducted further inquiry into whether the Indian Child Welfare Act’s (ICWA) applied if there was “reason to believe” an Indian child was involved in the dependency proceedings involving nine-year-old K.T. and his two-year-old sister, D. Early on in the case, the children’s mother and K.T.’s father (father) reported they had possible Cherokee, Choctaw, and Blackfeet ancestry and gave CFS contact information for family members who might be able to provide more detail. CFS never followed up, and the juvenile court found ICWA didn’t apply without first ensuring CFS had pursued these leads. About two years into the proceedings, after the parents failed to reunify with the children, the court determined they were likely to be adopted and terminated parental rights. On appeal, mother and father argued that despite having reason to believe K.T. and D. were Indian children, CFS failed to conduct adequate further inquiry to determine whether ICWA applies. CFS conceded their error. As a result, the record did not support the juvenile court’s finding that ICWA did not apply, and the Court of Appeal reversed the orders terminating parental rights and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "In re K.T." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the order of the district court awarding retroactive child support in a paternity action initiated after the child reached the age of majority, holding that the three-year statute of limitations to bring a paternity action after the child reaches the age of majority applies to a parent's request for retroactive child support.Mother and Father had one child together. More than one year after the child turned eighteen, Mother filed a paternity action against Father in order to seek back child support. Mother asked the district court to recognize the parties' previous agreement for $400 per month under Nev. Rev. Stat. 126.900(1) and alternatively argued that, even absent an agreement, she was entitled to retroactive child support. The district court denied relief. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) Mother's request for retroactive child support was timely; (2) because Mother was permitted to seek retroactive child support the district court abused its discretion by concluding that it did not have the authority to grant relief; and (3) because Father did not make a promise in writing to make monthly support payments, the district court correctly denied Mother's section 126.900(1) claim. View "Hargrove v. Ward" on Justia Law

Daniel Watanabe and Solveig (Watanabe) Pedersen divorced in 2016. During the marriage, Pedersen inherited a large sum of money and land after her mother passed away. At their dissolution trial, the court held that various real properties were Pedersen’s separate property, despite the fact that both Watanabe’s and Pedersen’s names were on the title for the properties. Watanabe appealed, arguing the trial court erred by failing to apply the joint title gift presumption since the property was acquired in both of their names during marriage. Watanabe also argued the trial court erred by allowing extrinsic evidence of Pedersen’s intent when she quitclaimed her separate property to the community. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the gift presumption did not apply, regardless of whether the property was acquired before or during marriage. The Court of Appeals also held that extrinsic evidence was appropriately admitted to determine whether Pedersen intended to transmute separate property, not to dispute the quitclaim deed itself. After review, the Washington Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals: the joint title gift presumption did not apply regardless of whether the property was acquired before or during marriage. In addition, the Supreme Court held that extrinsic evidence could be admitted to explain the intent of the parties when signing a quitclaim deed to determine whether a party intended to convert separate property into community property. View "In re Marriage of Watanabe" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and vacated in part the decision of the court of appeals affirming a family court order of contempt, holding that the trial court abused its discretion because the order sought to punish future contempt rather than present contempt.The family court ultimately held Appellant in contempt, found him to be $126,691 in arrears on his child support (including interest), and reduced his monthly payment. The court of appeals affirmed the order of contempt. The Supreme Court vacated in part the decision of the court of appeals, holding (1) the family court's factual findings were not erroneous; but (2) because the family court sought to coercively punish Appellant's future conduct, the order was an abuse of discretion. View "Crandell v. Commonwealth, Cabinet for Health & Family Services ex rel. Dilke" on Justia Law

Procedurally, after an initial determination of child support and custody, Appellee Kirsten Friend (Mother) sought to modify the child support order and applied to find Appellant Brian Friend (Father) in contempt, claiming he had not paid child support for several months. The district court granted Mother's motions. The trial court found Father in indirect contempt and increased the child support payment. Mother asked for attorney fees and costs, dividing the request into fees incurred for the request to modify child support and fees incurred for the contempt request. Father objected but conceded the only issue was whether Mother was legally entitled to the fees. The Oklahoma Supreme Court held that, where a prevailing party is entitled to attorney fees below, they are also entitled to appellate attorney fees; where an award of attorney fees is within the trial court's discretion, a prevailing party may be granted appellate attorney fees. View "Friend v. Friend" on Justia Law

Debtor and Creditor have three children. Their decree of dissolution was entered in 2008. Domestic support and child custody issues have continued to be litigated. In 2017, Creditor obtained primary custody of the children; he filed a Motion for Child Support and Motion for Contempt in Family Court. A monthly support amount was determined. Pre-petition, the Family Court established that the parties would split the cost of the childrens' medical care and extra-curricular activities. Creditor was seeking reimbursement for Debtor’s share of incurred expenses when Debtor’s bankruptcy petition was filed. The Family Court, post-petition, found Debtor in contempt of a prior order.Debtor filed a motion with the Bankruptcy Court requesting sanctions for violation of the automatic stay for the post-petition hearing and Creditor’s collection efforts made pursuant to Family Court orders. The Bankruptcy Court found that some actions violated the automatic stay and awarded attorneys’ fees as actual damages and punitive damages. The Sixth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel affirmed. The Family Court hearing was conducted to modify a domestic support obligation; the hearing and subsequent garnishment order were excepted from the automatic stay, 11 U.S.C. 362(b)(2)(A)(ii); 362(b)(2)(C). The Family Court Judgment finding Debtor in civil contempt violated the stay and is void. An order of payment, directly to Creditor, toward a pre-petition debt, also violated the stay. View "In re: Dougherty-Kelsay" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court denying Mother's petition filed on behalf of her minor child, SGN, for a change of surname, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying the petition.While Father and Mother were married, they had SGN. After they divorced, Mother remarried and took the surname of her husband. Mother then filed a verified petition in the district court to change SGN's surname to Lamb-Newman because Mother would be the primary custodian and wanted SGN to share her surname and that of her half sibling. Father objected. The district court denied the petition, finding that the name change was not in SGN's best interest and that it was detrimental to Father's interests. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court's decision to deny the name change was not an abuse of discretion. View "Lamb v. Newman" on Justia Law

Family Code section 30441 creates a rebuttable presumption that an award of sole or joint physical or legal custody of a child to a person who has perpetrated domestic violence against the other party seeking custody within the past five years is detrimental to the child. If the court determines the presumption has been overcome, it must state its reasons in writing or on the record. The trial court issued a restraining order protecting a mother from the father of a child (born in 2015) and, citing the statute, granted the mother sole legal and physical custody. The court left intact a visitation schedule under which the child lived with each parent approximately half of the time. There were problems with the father not returning the child after his visitation. The court of appeal reversed the visitation order, stating that the case illustrates the need for clear and specific findings to facilitate appellate review and to inform the parties and ensure consideration of the proper factors in the first instance. The schedule amounted to joint physical custody, in violation of the statute. The trial court erred in refusing her request for a statement of decision. View "City & County of San Francisco v. H.H." on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's order granting the request of paternal relatives in Arizona to place J.Y. with them, although he barely knew them and had no bond with them. The principal reason stated by the trial court for its decision to send J.Y. to Arizona was the trial court's unfounded conclusion that the Department failed in its duty under Welfare and Institutions Code section 361.3 to give preferential consideration to other relatives in California (not the Arizona relatives) who requested placement back when the parents were receiving reunification services. The court concluded that the trial court abused its discretion by deciding, without any support in the record, the Department failed in its duty to assess other relatives, and by ordering removal of the child from his de facto parents although there was no evidence that removal was necessary or in the child's best interest. View "In re J.Y." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the trial court terminating Father's parental rights to his child, holding that the trial court did not err in finding past neglect or in determining that there was a likelihood of future neglect and that termination was in the child's best interests.After a termination hearing, the trial court adjudicated that a ground existed to terminate Father's parental rights for neglect and that terminating Father's parental rights was in the child's best interests. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court (1) did not err when it adjudicated that a ground existed to terminate Father's parental rights under N.C. Gen. Stat. 7B-1111(a)(1); and (2) did not abuse its discretion when it determined that the termination of Father's parental rights was in the child's best interests. View "In re C.S." on Justia Law