Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

N.G., the subject of this dependency proceeding, was born to mother M.S., in 2011. N.G.’s father had no meaningful relationship with N.G. M.S. met J.R., permissive intervenor in this case, in 2014. M.S. and J.R. had a child, N.G.’s half-brother, and married in 2015 but divorced in 2016. The children remained with M.S. and had regular visits with J.R. In August 2020, the Department of Children, Youth, and Families (the Department) received a report that M.S. was neglecting the children by locking them in their bedrooms for long periods of time, exposing them to drug paraphernalia, and failing to properly feed them. In October, a juvenile court entered an agreed shelter care order that placed N.G. and his half-sibling with J.R. M.S. agreed to this placement in the dependency order. In the same month, J.R. moved for the juvenile court to grant concurrent jurisdiction over both children in family court so J.R. could modify his son’s parenting plan and petition for nonparental custody of N.G. The juvenile court granted the motion as to J.R.’s son but denied concurrent jurisdiction for N.G. “at this time.” Despite concurrent jurisdiction over N.G. being denied, J.R. petitioned for de facto parentage in family court in December. J.R. then filed a motion to intervene in the dependency. The juvenile court granted J.R.’s motion to intervene under CR 24(b) without explaining its reasoning. M.S. filed a motion for discretionary review with the Court of Appeals, which was ultimately denied. The Washington Supreme Court found the Court of Appeals correctly denied the mother’s motion for discretionary review. "Although the trial court committed probable error when it failed to articulate why it allowed permissive intervention under CR 24(b)(2), the intervention of the dependent child’s former stepfather did not have an immediate effect outside the courtroom. Consequently, the Court of Appeals did not commit probable error in denying discretionary review." View "In re Dependency of N.G." on Justia Law

Erin McAlister appealed trial court orders awarding Wendi Clifton, McAlister’s former domestic partner, visitation rights to McAlister’s adopted daughter, Catherine, pursuant to Georgia's equitable caregiver statute. McAlister contended the trial court erred in declaring the statute “constitutional, both facially and as applied to [Clifton],” as well as finding that Clifton had standing to seek visitation rights as Catherine’s equitable caregiver. McAlister also contended the trial court erred in denying her counterclaim for breach of a settlement agreement that the parties signed when they separated. Because Catherine turned 18 years old prior to the docketing of this appeal, McAlister's challenge to the award of visitation rights was moot. Those portions of the trial court's orders addressing the constitutionality of the equitable caregiver statute and the award of visitation, were vacated, and the trial court directed to dismiss Clifton's claim for visitation. However, because the record supported the trial court’s finding that McAlister failed to carry her burden of proving any damages from Clifton’s alleged breach of the settlement agreement, the court did not err in denying McAlister’s counterclaim. Consequently, the Supreme Court affirmed that portion of the court’s judgment. View "McAlister v. Clifton" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs appealed a probate court’s order denying Plaintiffs' Petition for Recovery of Property under Probate Code section 850 and sustaining objections thereto by Defendant; denying Plaintiff’s Petition for Letters of Administration; and granting Defendant’s Petition for Probate of Will.   At issue is whether a mediation settlement agreement (“MSA”) that Defendant and his now-deceased wife entered into after separation and in anticipation of the dissolution of their marriage is a “complete property settlement” within the meaning of section 145, which operates as a statutory waiver of certain of Defendant’s rights as a surviving spouse enumerated in section 141, including the right to inherit from his deceased wife and to be appointed as the personal representative of her estate.   The Second Appellate reversed the probate court’s order and held that the MSA did effect a waiver of Defendant’s rights of a surviving spouse enumerated in section 141. The court reasoned that based on its independent review of the MSA and the undisputed record evidence, the written MSA signed by Defendant and his wife, each with the advice of counsel, constituted a “complete property settlement” within the meaning of section 145. Further, the MSA is an enforceable waiver of his rights as a surviving spouse, as Defendant failed to point to any evidence he was not provided with “[a] fair and reasonable disclosure of the property or financial obligations” of his wife prior to signing the MSA, as required by section 143, subdivision (a). View "Welch v. Welch" on Justia Law

Plaintiff brought suit against the Estate of her ex-husband and against his widow individually and as administratrix of the Estate, claiming that her ex-husband misrepresented the value of his real estate investments during divorce proceedings. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants on the ground that the discovery rule did not apply to Plaintiff’s claims and dismissed the claims as time-barred; the district court did not consider whether Plaintiff’s claims should be tolled.   On appeal, Plaintiff invoked the discovery rule and equitable estoppel to argue that this suit, initiated more than thirteen years later, is nevertheless timely. The Second Circuit affirmed in part and vacated in part the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendants. The court further remanded for consideration the doctrine of equitable estoppel as to one of the contested investments.   The court reasoned that the discovery rule is not a tool to aid speculation or to validate a hunch. As Plaintiff has not shown that she had any “knowledge of facts” supporting the fraud within two years prior to initiating suit, she cannot invoke the discovery rule to save her claims. Further, Plaintiff failed to investigate her ex-husband’s assurances that his real estate investments were worth nothing, notwithstanding warning signs and ample opportunity to do so during the divorce proceedings. View "Koral v. Alsou Saunders, Est. of Gregg Saunders" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed after a court terminated her parental rights pertaining to three of her five children. On appeal, Defendant claimed that the Department of Children and Family Services ("DCFS") failed to comply with its duty under California law to inquire whether the children are Indian children within the meaning of the Indian Child Welfare Act.DCFA filed a motion to dismiss Defendant's appeal, claiming post-appeal evidence mooted Defendant's appeal.The Second Appellate District granted DCFS's motion to dismiss Defendant's appeal. The court found that although DCFS was not timely in interviewing Defendant's children's relatives, DCFS eventually did so, making any prior failure harmless. The court also held that DCFS is not required to interview a child's great-grandparents because they are not considered "Extended family members under 25 U.S.C. Sec. 1903(2). View "In re Allison B." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated the order of the circuit court dismissing the underlying abuse and neglect petition, holding that the circuit court's conduct during in camera interview of the children violated the West Virginia Rules of Procedure for Child Abuse and Neglect Proceedings, the West Virginia Rules of Evidence, and Supreme Court precedent.The West Virginia Department of Health and Human Resources filed an abuse of neglect petition alleging that two minor children may have been sexually abused by Father. During the adjudicatory hearing, the circuit court conducted in camera interview of the children and accused the children of lying. The guardian ad litem for the children was present and failed to object to the court's conduct. Thereafter, the circuit court dismissed the abuse and neglect petition. The Supreme Court vacated the order below and remanded the matter for further proceedings before a different circuit judge with a new guardian ad litem, holding (1) the circuit court substantially disregarded and frustrated the procedures established by the relevant rules; and (2) the guardian ad litem's representation of the children was deficient. View "In re K.B.-R" on Justia Law

Ryan Poole and Laramie Rainer had a child in June 2013. Poole and Rainer’s relationship ended in late 2013. Poole was incarcerated from March 2013 to October 2014. In December 2013, when the child was six months old and Poole was still incarcerated, Rainer sought sole legal and primary physical custody. Poole requested joint legal and physical custody and visitation every weekend until he was out of prison. While no custody order was in place, Poole asserted on several occasions that Rainer did not facilitate sufficient visitation with the child following the end of their relationship. A custody trial took place in February 2015. The court found both parties on equal footing with regard to most of the statutory best interests factors. The court ruled that Rainer should have primary physical custody but that Poole’s time with the child should be increased. It issued a custody order in March 2015 awarding joint legal custody and primary physical custody to Rainer while Poole lived outside of Anchorage. Poole was given unsupervised visitation that gradually increased from six hours per week to one week per month. In November 2017 Poole moved to enforce the court’s March 2015 order, claiming that despite attempting to contact Rainer to set up visitation, Rainer ignored his messages and calls since March 2015 and, as a result, he had seen his child only twice since the March 2015 court order. In September 2018 Poole again moved to enforce the March 2015 order, claiming again that Rainer was not responding to phone calls, and “only two visitation[]s were successful.” In June 2020 Poole moved to modify physical custody. The superior court ultimately found a substantial change due to poor communication and one parent interfering with the other’s visits. However, because the Alaska Supreme Court lacked sufficient factual findings to determine whether there was a substantial change in circumstances or whether a lesser sanction would have ensured compliance with the court’s custody order, it reversed and remanded for additional findings. View "Rainer v. Poole" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the orders entered by the district court in this divorce case, holding that there was no error in the proceedings below.On appeal, Husband argued that the district court erred by enforcing the parties' Mediated Settlement Agreement (MSA) and incorporating its terms into a decree of divorce, erred when it denied his motion for sanctions for Wife's alleged failure to disclose assets, and erred when it denied his motion to dismiss for forum non conveniens. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err by incorporating the terms for the MSA into a decree of divorce; (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied the motion for sanctions as moot; and (3) the MSA resolved any outstanding issues relating to forum non conveniens. View "Pellet v. Pellet" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decree entered in the family court terminating Father's parental rights to his daughter, holding that there sufficient evidence to support the trial justice's finding that Father was unfit and that termination of his parental rights was in his daughter's best interest.After a hearing, the trial justice found that Father was unfit because his daughter had been in the legal custody or care of the Department of Children, Youth and Families for twelve months and Father failed to pursue the services offered him to correct the issues that led to the child's removal. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court's findings were supported by the record and that there was no abuse of discretion in the proceedings below. View "In re Rachelle L-B." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming the judgment of the trial court terminating Father's parental rights to his child and remanded the case for a new trial, holding that it could not be discerned whether the jury terminated Father's rights on an invalid ground.The jury in this case ultimately found by clear and convincing evidence that both parents' rights to their child should be terminated, and the trial court rendered a final order of termination. The court of appeals affirmed as to both parents. Father appealed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the jury reasonably could have formed a firm belief or conviction that Father failed to maintain a safe and stable home environment as required by his service plan; (2) legally sufficient evidence supported the jury's best-interest finding; but (3) the trial court erred in submitting to the jury an invalid ground for termination of Father's rights, and it could not be determined whether the jury based its verdict on an improperly submitted termination ground. View "In re J.W." on Justia Law