Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

In March 2011, when husband Pedro Aviles and wife Jessica Vulovic got married, Jessica’s divorce from a former husband was not yet final. She later testified she was unaware of this; she discovered it only in May 2011, and she obtained a final judgment of divorce in March 2012. In April 2013, Pedro and Jessica went through a second marriage ceremony; in September 2013, they went through a third marriage ceremony. In 2020, Pedro filed the present divorce proceeding. The trial court found that Jessica was at least a putative spouse; on that basis, it awarded her spousal support and attorney fees. Pedro contended that, as a matter of law, Jessica did not qualify as a putative spouse. Pedro also contended the trial court erred by basing spousal support on his 2020 income rather than his 2021 income. The Court of Appeal concluded Jessica qualified as a putative spouse because she adequately showed that, at the time of the original marriage, she had a good faith belief that she was unmarried. The Court found Pedro filed a false income and expense declaration for 2020, therefore, the trial court could reasonably disregard his income and expense declaration for 2021 and rely instead on what Jessica showed was his true 2020 income. View "Marriage of Aviles & Vulovic" on Justia Law

Eleven-year-old A.F. sought a domestic violence restraining order (DVRO) against her father, Jeffrey F. (Father), who held joint legal custody with her mother, Andrea F. (Mother). The petition was filed by Mother on A.F.’s behalf. Mother sought appointment as A.F.’s guardian ad litem (GAL) in the domestic violence (DV) matter at the same time. The court granted the request for GAL appointment. A.F. was represented by attorney Edward Castro in the domestic violence matter. Castro previously represented Mother in her marital dissolution from Father. Father objected to Mother’s appointment as GAL and to Castro’s representation of A.F., contending Castro had a conflict of interest under Rule 1.7(a), (b) of the State Bar Rules of Professional Conduct. The court removed Mother as GAL and granted Father’s request to disqualify Castro. A.F. appealed, contending: (1) Father lacked standing to challenge Castro’s representation of A.F.; (2) the court incorrectly concluded Castro simultaneously represented Mother and A.F. and consequently abused its discretion by applying Rule 1.7 to disqualify Castro; and (3) the court should have considered the rules governing successive representation and denied the request for disqualification. The Court of Appeal assumed Father had standing to challenge Castro’s representation of his minor child A.F. However, the Court concluded the record lacked substantial evidence to support the trial court’s finding that Castro simultaneously represented Mother and A.F., and it was therefore an abuse of discretion to apply Rule 1.7 to disqualify Castro. Accordingly, the order disqualifying Castro as attorney was reversed, and the matter was remanded for further proceedings. View "A.F. v. Jeffrey F." on Justia Law

While Samir Elali was married to Angeles Elali and lived with her in California, Samir married Mayssa Marchoud in Lebanon. After Samir attempted to terminate the Lebanese marriage, Mayssa filed a petition in California for spousal support without dissolution against Samir. The trial court ruled the Lebanese marriage was bigamous and therefore void under Family Code section 2201(a). Mayssa appealed the judgment of nullity, contending: (1) the trial court erred in relying on section 2201(a) to declare the Lebanese marriage was void; (2) the parties’ pleading allegations admitting there was a marriage required the trial court to find the Lebanese marriage was valid; (3) there was insufficient evidence to overcome the presumption that the Lebanese marriage was valid; and (4) a ruling that the Lebanese marriage was valid precluded a different judge from subsequently ruling the marriage was void. After review, the Court of Appeal rejected Mayssa’s contentions, and found the trial court did not err in ruling the Lebanese marriage was void under California law. View "Marriage of Elali & Marchoud" on Justia Law

A.L. appealed an order terminating his parental rights over A.C. A.L. argued the juvenile court erred in finding the Cass County Human Services Zone engaged in active efforts to prevent the breakup of an Indian family as required under the Indian Child Welfare Act (“ICWA”). A.L. also argued the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that continued custody of A.C. by A.L. would likely result in serious harm to A.C. The North Dakota Supreme Court retained jurisdiction and remanded for further factual findings on the ICWA requirements and North Dakota law as codified by N.D.C.C. 27-20.3-19. View "Interest of A.C." on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the juvenile court terminating Mother's parental rights to her child and granting permanent guardianship to the child's paternal grandmother, holding that the juvenile court properly exercised its authority even where the Department of Children and Families did not have physical custody of the child when they petitioned for termination.While the child was still in his grandmother's custody the Department filed a notice of intent requesting that the juvenile court terminate Mother's parental rights pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 210, 3. The judge found Mother unfit, terminated her parental rights, and ordered conditional permanent custody to the grandmother. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the judge was warranted in terminating Mother's parental rights. View "In re Care & Protection of Zeb" on Justia Law

In this marital dissolution proceeding, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court awarding child support and failing to award retroactive child support, holding that there was no error or abuse of discretion.The district court awarded Wife permanent child support of $1,800 per month from Husband and declined Wife's request for retroactive child support. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the district court (1) did not err or abuse its discretion in categorizing Husband's income from his father as "gift income," resulting in the exclusion of that income from the court's child support calculation; and (2) did not abuse its discretion when it refused to award Wife retroactive child support. View "Miller v. Miller" on Justia Law

In the Colorado Supreme Court's original jurisdiction, the issue presented for review centered on a district court's setting aside the adjudication and termination orders entered against A.P.’s parents, S.S. and D.P. under C.R.C.P.60(b)(5). Because the Parents failed to show that former Judge Natalie Chase was actually biased in their case, and because Rule60(b)(5) was reserved only for extraordinary circumstances not present here, the district court abused its discretion by misconstruing the law concerning impropriety and bias in this case, and misapplied Rule 60(b)(5) in granting the Parents' relief. The matter was remanded for further proceedings. View "Colorado in the Interest of A.P." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the juvenile court declining to remove the Iowa Department of Human Services (DHS) as the guardian of certain children, holding that DHS acted unreasonably in failing to send relative notices as to the removal of the children and in failing to serve the children's best interests.The children at issue lived in their stepgrandmother's care for approximately eighteen months after they were adjudicated as children in need of assistance. The parental rights of the children's parents was subsequently terminated by the juvenile court. Later, acting as the children's guardian, DHS entered the children's home on the pretext of a visit and abruptly removed the children from their stepgrandmother's care to place them in foster care with strangers. The children's guardian ad litem filed motions for the immediate return of the children to their step grandmother, for a hearing on modification of placement, and to remove DHS as guardian. The juvenile court declined to remove DHS as the guardian. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the DHS acted unreasonably by making the sudden change to the children's placement. View "In re K.D." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit in federal court against his ex-wife, two state judges, and several others under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983. The district court sua sponte dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, pointing to related state court proceedings pending on appeal.   On appeal, Plaintiff argued that the district court erred in dismissing his suit under Rooker-Feldman because the relevant state-court cases were pending on appeal when he filed this lawsuit. The Fifth Circuit agreed and reversed the district court’s judgment finding. The court explained that in denying Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration, the district court relied on Hale and the court’s unpublished Houston decision.” The court concluded that Hale is no longer good law after Exxon Mobil and hold that Rooker-Feldman is inapplicable where a state appeal is pending when the federal suit is filed. The court further reasoned that the Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that Rooker-Feldman is a “narrow” jurisdictional bar. It applies only to cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments. View "Miller v. Dunn" on Justia Law

Daniel Hsu (Daniel) asked the Court of Appeal to reverse the trial court’s decision denying him need-based attorney fees under California Family Code section 2030. This case was a marriage dissolution proceeding between Daniel and Christine Nakamoto (Christine; together, the spouses). But the dispute at issue was between Daniel and his two siblings, Charleson Hsu (Chau) and Melissa Hsu See (Melissa). After their parents passed away, Daniel claimed Chau was concealing a portion of his inheritance. The siblings met to discuss Daniel’s claims and reached an agreement at the meeting, which Daniel documented on a two-page handwritten memorandum. Among other things, the Handwritten Agreement stated Daniel was to be paid $4 million. Several months later, the three siblings executed a formal Compromise Agreement for Structured Settlement. The Compromise Agreement contained many of the terms set forth in the Handwritten Agreement but did not mention the $4 million payment. The spouses claimed Daniel was never paid the $4 million, which would have been a community asset, and that it was still owed to Daniel under the Handwritten Agreement. Chau and Melissa argued the Handwritten Agreement was not a binding contract and that Daniel had already been paid $4 million through a separate transaction outside the Compromise Agreement. Chau, Melissa, and several business entities they owned (together, claimants) were involuntarily joined to this dissolution proceeding to settle this dispute. At trial, the primary question facing the lower court was whether the Handwritten Agreement or the Compromise Agreement was the enforceable contract. The court found in favor of claimants, ruling the Compromise Agreement was enforceable while the Handwritten Agreement was not. Meanwhile, over the course of Daniel’s litigation against claimants, the court awarded him $140,000 in attorney fees under section 2030. After the court issued a tentative ruling finding the Handwritten Agreement was not enforceable, Daniel requested an additional $50,000 for attorney fees incurred during trial plus another $30,000 to appeal. The court denied his request. The Court of Appeal found no error in the attorney fees ruling. View "Marriage of Nakamoto and Hsu" on Justia Law