Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

This case involves child custody proceedings between Isaac William Hess and Lisa Ann Hess, who have two minor children registered as members of the Cherokee Nation. Isaac alleged that Lisa abused the children by spanking them with a PVC pipe and claimed she was a negligent mother. During the proceedings, Isaac's father was briefly granted emergency guardianship by the District Court of the Cherokee Nation, but the case was dismissed due to jurisdictional issues. The Idaho magistrate court awarded Lisa sole physical custody and joint legal custody with final decision-making authority, and ordered Isaac to pay child support backdated to January 1, 2021.Isaac appealed to the district court, arguing that the magistrate court erred by not consulting with the Cherokee Nation court regarding jurisdiction, failing to refer his child abuse allegations to the Idaho Department of Health and Welfare (DHW), focusing on only one statutory factor in awarding custody, effectively granting Lisa sole legal custody without proper findings, and backdating the child support award. The district court affirmed the magistrate court's decisions on jurisdiction, the child abuse referral, and physical custody, but Isaac appealed further.The Supreme Court of Idaho affirmed the district court's decisions on jurisdiction, the child abuse referral, and physical custody. The court held that the magistrate court correctly determined it had jurisdiction under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA) and that Isaac's allegations did not constitute child abuse under Idaho law. However, the court reversed the district court's affirmation of the magistrate court's decisions on legal custody and backdated child support. The magistrate court's legal custody decision was found to be internally contradictory, and its decision to backdate child support deviated from the Idaho Child Support Guidelines without explanation. The case was remanded for further proceedings on these issues. The court also awarded Lisa partial attorney fees for responding to Isaac's jurisdictional argument. View "Hess v. Hess" on Justia Law

An infant child, G.K., suffered grievous injuries while in the legal custody of the Louisiana Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) and under the physical care of foster parent Samantha Gafford. Brittany Howe, G.K.'s biological mother, filed a lawsuit individually and as natural tutrix of G.K. against Gafford and DCFS. The plaintiffs alleged that DCFS had a non-delegable duty of care towards G.K. and was liable for the actions of the foster parent.The trial court granted DCFS's motion for summary judgment, agreeing with DCFS's argument that the non-delegable duty was effectively overturned by the case Kunath v. Gafford and that there was no genuine issue of material fact regarding Gafford's employment status with DCFS. The Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, affirmed the trial court's decision, reasoning that Louisiana Revised Statute 42:1441.1 prohibited DCFS from being held liable for the actions of foster parents unless the foster parent was an official, officer, or employee of the state.The Supreme Court of Louisiana reviewed the case and reversed the lower courts' decisions. The court held that DCFS has a non-delegable duty of care and well-being owed to children in its legal custody, which cannot be abrogated by La. R.S. 42:1441.1. The court clarified that this duty is distinct from vicarious liability arising from a master-servant relationship and is an affirmative duty owed by the state. The court concluded that the statute does not apply to the duty of care DCFS owes to children in its custody. Consequently, the case was remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "HOWE VS. GAFFORD" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute between two former spouses, Jennifer Knapp and Timothy Dasler, who have a minor daughter together. After their divorce, Dasler engaged in extensive litigation against Knapp, including multiple appeals, motions, and lawsuits in various courts. Knapp sought an order restricting Dasler from engaging in abusive litigation, arguing that his filings were intended to harass and burden her.The Windsor Unit, Family Division of the Superior Court issued a final divorce order in August 2018, awarding Knapp primary custody of their daughter. Dasler appealed this order, but it was affirmed. He continued to file various motions and appeals, including attempts to modify custody and hold Knapp in contempt, all of which were denied. Dasler also initiated lawsuits in New Hampshire and federal courts, which were dismissed. In March 2023, Knapp moved for sanctions against Dasler, claiming his filings were abusive, but the court denied the motion.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the family division’s order restricting Dasler from engaging in abusive litigation. The court found that Dasler’s repetitive filings were made to harass and intimidate Knapp, meeting the criteria for abusive litigation under 15 V.S.A. § 1181. The court concluded that Dasler’s actions, including attempts to relitigate final orders and filing numerous motions for reconsideration, were abusive. The order restricted Dasler from filing motions or engaging in litigation against Knapp unless represented by a licensed attorney or with prefiling approval from the court. The court also dismissed Dasler’s pending motions as abusive and denied his claims that the court erred in its factual findings and procedural rulings. View "Knapp v. Dasler" on Justia Law

Alex and Jessica McGee were married in 2011, divorced in 2014, and remarried in 2017. They have three children. After their second separation in 2022, Alex filed for divorce on grounds of adultery. The Montgomery County Chancery Court granted the divorce, divided the marital property, and awarded joint legal and physical custody of the children. Jessica appealed, challenging the division of Alex’s retirement account and the custody arrangement.The Montgomery County Chancery Court classified and divided the marital property, including Alex’s 401(k) from the date of the second marriage to the date of separation. Jessica argued that the division should have included assets accumulated since their first marriage in 2011. The court found no evidence that the parties accumulated assets together during their separation and upheld the division from the second marriage. Jessica also contended that the chancellor improperly focused on her adultery in awarding joint custody and that the other factors favored her.The Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court’s decision. The court found that the chancellor properly classified and divided the marital property and applied the Ferguson factors correctly. The court also upheld the joint custody arrangement, noting that the chancellor considered the best interest of the children and did not overly focus on Jessica’s adultery. The court emphasized that the chancellor’s findings were supported by substantial evidence and that Jessica failed to demonstrate an inability to cooperate with Alex for joint custody. The judgment of the Montgomery County Chancery Court was affirmed. View "McGee v. McGee" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute over whether the proceeds of an Individual Retirement Account (IRA) should be included in the estate of a deceased individual, Thomas Reich, for the purpose of calculating the share of his surviving spouse, Pamela Reich, as an "omitted spouse" under California law. Thomas had created a revocable trust in 2003, which was amended in 2016, to distribute his assets upon his death. He designated his daughter and granddaughter as beneficiaries of the IRA, which had a balance of approximately $1.5 million at the time of his death. Thomas married Pamela in 2020 but did not update his trust to provide for her before his death in 2021.Pamela initially filed a petition seeking an omitted spouse's share of Thomas's estate, including the IRA proceeds. The Los Angeles County Superior Court overruled a demurrer by the trust's beneficiaries, suggesting that the IRA proceeds might be included in the estate. However, a partial settlement was reached, excluding the IRA proceeds from Pamela's share. Pamela then filed two new petitions regarding her entitlement to the IRA proceeds, which were assigned to a different judge.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case and affirmed the probate court's orders dismissing Pamela's petitions. The court held that the IRA proceeds are nonprobate assets and do not pass through the decedent's testamentary trust to the separate trusts created for the beneficiaries. Therefore, the IRA proceeds are not part of Thomas's "estate" for the purpose of calculating Pamela's omitted spouse's share. The court also noted that the prior demurrer ruling was not controlling in this context. View "Reich v. Reich" on Justia Law

Jeffrey Edison appealed an amended divorce judgment that awarded primary residential responsibility of his two children to Signe Edison. He argued that the district court was biased and erred in calculating his income and finding him underemployed for child support purposes. The case had previously been remanded by the North Dakota Supreme Court due to findings of gender bias and errors in income calculation.The district court, on remand, held a status conference and received stipulated evidence, including wage data from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. The court then issued orders reaffirming the award of primary residential responsibility to Signe Edison and finding Jeffrey Edison underemployed. Jeffrey Edison appealed again, claiming the district court maintained its bias and failed to follow the Supreme Court's instructions.The North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the case and found no evidence of judicial bias or prejudgment by the district court. The court noted that adverse rulings alone do not indicate bias and that the district court had eliminated the improper findings related to breastfeeding. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's award of primary residential responsibility to Signe Edison.Regarding the income calculation, the Supreme Court found that the district court had erred in subtracting self-employment losses from Jeffrey Edison's gross income and failing to include refundable tax credits. However, these errors were deemed harmless as they did not affect the outcome. The court concluded that Jeffrey Edison was underemployed regardless of the errors in income calculation and affirmed the district court's judgment. View "Edison v. Edison" on Justia Law

The Department of Social Services (DSS) filed an abuse and neglect petition concerning two minor children, N.K., Jr. and S.K., who are Indian children under the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). The children were taken into emergency temporary custody after their father, N.K., Sr., was arrested for driving under the influence with the children in the car. The children were found to be homeless and in poor condition. The State filed a petition alleging abuse and neglect, and the father admitted to the allegations. Despite DSS providing various services, including substance abuse treatment and visitation arrangements, the father continued to struggle with substance abuse and was repeatedly incarcerated. The mother was largely absent and uncooperative.The Circuit Court of the Sixth Judicial Circuit in Gregory County, South Dakota, handled the initial proceedings. The father was served with the petition at an advisory hearing, but no summons was issued or served. The case was transferred between counties due to the father's relocation. The father admitted to the allegations, and DSS provided ongoing services. Despite some progress, the father relapsed and was arrested again, leading to a failed trial reunification. The State filed a petition for termination of parental rights, and the court held a final dispositional hearing.The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota reviewed the case. The court affirmed the lower court's decision, holding that the failure to issue or serve a summons did not deprive the court of jurisdiction because the father had actual notice of the proceedings. The court also found that termination of parental rights was the least restrictive alternative, given the father's ongoing substance abuse issues and inability to provide a stable environment. Additionally, the court determined that DSS had made active efforts to reunite the family, but these efforts were unsuccessful. The court affirmed the termination of both parents' parental rights. View "Interest Of N.K." on Justia Law

The case involves a custody dispute over a seven-year-old child, S.M. Initially, S.M. lived with his mother, Erica Ward, for the first eleven months of his life. He then moved in with his father, Samuel Mack, for the next two-and-a-half years. It is alleged that Mack killed Ward in S.M.’s presence. Following Ward’s death and Mack’s arrest, S.M. stayed with his maternal uncle, Gregory Bowlding, for eight days before moving in with Mack’s adult daughter and S.M.’s half-sister, Samaya. Bowlding sought third-party custody of S.M., despite not being S.M.’s parent or de facto parent.The Superior Court of the District of Columbia dismissed Bowlding’s suit for lack of statutory standing, concluding that he did not meet any of the statutory categories under which third parties are permitted to petition for custody of a minor. The court also rejected Bowlding’s argument that he had standing to seek custody through the court’s common law or equitable powers.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case. Bowlding argued that he had statutory standing under D.C. Code § 16-831.02(a)(1)(C), which allows a third party to seek custody if they are living with the child and exceptional circumstances exist to prevent harm to the child. He acknowledged that he was not living with S.M. at the time he filed his suit but argued for a broad interpretation of the statute. The court disagreed, holding that the plain text of the statute requires the third party to be living with the child at the time of filing. The court also rejected Bowlding’s argument that he had standing under the court’s common law or equitable jurisdiction, noting that the legislative history of the statute did not support such an interpretation. The court affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of Bowlding’s suit for lack of standing. View "Bowlding v. Mack" on Justia Law

A couple used marital funds to enhance the husband's Foreign Service pension by buying back credits for his pre-marriage military service. The key issue was whether the portion of the pension related to the pre-marriage military service should be considered separate or marital property.The Supreme Court initially ruled that the value of the Foreign Service pension related to the husband's pre-marriage Navy service was marital property because marital funds were used to buy back the credits. The Appellate Division reversed this decision, holding that the Navy pension credits were the husband's separate property since they were the result of his sole efforts and not due to the wife's contributions. However, the Appellate Division remitted the case to the Supreme Court to calculate the equitable distribution of the marital funds used to purchase the credits. The Supreme Court adjusted the award accordingly, and the wife appealed.The New York Court of Appeals held that the portion of the Foreign Service pension related to the pre-marriage military service is entirely marital property. The court reasoned that the use of marital funds to buy back the Navy service credits transformed them into marital property. The court emphasized that separate property commingled with marital property presumptively becomes marital property. The court reversed the Appellate Division's decision and remitted the case to the Supreme Court for further proceedings, allowing the husband to claim the value of his separate property contribution. The court also noted that marital property need not be distributed equally and that the trial court must consider various factors in making an equitable distribution. View "Szypula v Szypula" on Justia Law

Fawna and Terry Goff were married in 2015 and had one child, M.G. In late 2021, Terry left the marital home in South Dakota for work in Texas and did not return, eventually starting a new relationship. Fawna allowed M.G. to visit Terry in Texas, but Terry refused to return the child. Fawna filed for divorce, and the circuit court granted her a divorce on grounds of adultery, awarded her primary custody of M.G., set child support, divided property, and awarded partial attorney fees to Fawna. Terry appealed.The Circuit Court of the Fourth Judicial Circuit in Meade County, South Dakota, initially handled the case. Terry did not respond to the divorce complaint in a timely manner, leading Fawna to seek a default judgment. At the default hearing, Terry requested to proceed with the divorce trial, which the court allowed. The court granted Fawna a divorce, primary custody of M.G., and ordered Terry to pay child support and arrearages. Terry was also ordered to pay half of the mortgage on the marital home and awarded his camper. Terry filed for divorce in Texas, but the South Dakota court retained jurisdiction.The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota reviewed the case. The court affirmed the divorce and custody decisions but found that the circuit court abused its discretion in calculating child support arrearages without considering the time M.G. spent with Terry. The court also found that the circuit court failed to make necessary findings regarding the best interests of M.G. in limiting Terry’s visitation to South Dakota and in awarding attorney fees. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded for a new calculation of arrearages and further findings on visitation and attorney fees. View "Goff v. Goff" on Justia Law