Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

Julie and Gerald Ross (Grandparents) filed a petition in district court to adopt their grandchildren, R.K. and J.K., and to terminate the parental rights of the children's biological parents, Steven and Denielle Kracht (Parents). The district court terminated the parental rights of both parents, finding that they had abandoned and neglected their children, that the father had abused the children, and that both parents were unfit. The adoption petition by the Grandparents was still pending.Parents appealed the termination order to the Utah Court of Appeals before the adoption action concluded. The Court of Appeals certified the matter to the Utah Supreme Court for original appellate review. The central issue was whether the termination order issued by the district court was immediately appealable before the adoption action concluded.The Utah Supreme Court held that Utah Code subsection 78B-6-112(3) creates a statutory exception to the final judgment rule, allowing termination orders issued by district courts to be immediately appealable. The court concluded that the statutory language of subsection 78B-6-112(3) indicates that a district court may enter a final order terminating parental rights before a final decree of adoption is entered, thus making such termination orders appealable upon entry. This decision overruled the Court of Appeals' previous decision in In re Adoption of K.R.S., which had held that no exception to the final judgment rule allowed parties to appeal a district-court-issued termination order before it was final. The Utah Supreme Court retained the case for further argument on the merits of the Parents' challenges to the termination order. View "Ross v. Kracht" on Justia Law

A.K. (Mother) is the mother of four minor children, B.C., K.J.C., D.W.C., and B.C. In 2013, while living in Alaska, the children’s biological father, C.C. (Father), was charged with two counts of sexual abuse of a minor and subsequently incarcerated. That same year, Mother and the children moved to Utah. In 2015, Father was convicted, and in 2016, Mother divorced Father and married L.K. (Stepfather), who then began living with and raising the children alongside Mother.In 2020, Mother and Stepfather filed a petition in district court for Stepfather to adopt the children, which included a motion to terminate Father’s parental rights. Father intervened and opposed the termination and adoption. After an evidentiary hearing, the Second District Court in Weber County terminated Father’s parental rights.Father immediately appealed the termination order. While his appeal was pending, the Utah Court of Appeals decided In re Adoption of K.R.S., holding that a termination order issued by a district court is not immediately appealable when an underlying adoption petition remains unresolved, as it does not constitute a final judgment.The Supreme Court of the State of Utah reviewed the case and, for reasons articulated in Ross v. Kracht, 2025 UT 22, retained jurisdiction to hear further arguments on Father’s challenges to the termination order. The court issued an order requesting the parties to brief the merits of Father’s challenges to the termination order. View "In re Adoption of B.C." on Justia Law

X.K., a Chinese emigrant, and M.C., a U.S. citizen, married and had a child in California. After moving to China in 2018, M.C. returned to California in January 2022, and X.K. followed with their child in December 2022. They lived with M.C.'s parents until August 2023, when X.K. left for a domestic violence shelter. She filed for a domestic violence restraining order (DVRO) against M.C., alleging a history of physical, sexual, and emotional abuse.The Sonoma County Superior Court denied X.K.'s ex parte request for a temporary restraining order, citing the lack of recent events and insufficient reasons to restrain M.C.'s conduct. At the evidentiary hearing, X.K. represented herself, while M.C. had legal counsel. X.K. testified about M.C.'s abusive behavior, including physical assaults, sexual coercion, and emotional and financial control. M.C. did not testify but his counsel argued against the DVRO and sought increased visitation rights. The trial court denied the DVRO, stating that the issues were primarily about custody and visitation, which did not fall under the definition of domestic violence.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed the case. The court found that the trial court erred in its understanding of "abuse" under the Domestic Violence Prevention Act (DVPA) and improperly denied the DVRO based on the context of custody and visitation disputes. The appellate court noted that X.K.'s evidence, if credible, could constitute abuse under the DVPA, including physical, sexual, and emotional abuse. The court emphasized the need to consider the totality of the circumstances, including incidents in China, when assessing abuse.The appellate court reversed the trial court's order and remanded the case for a new hearing to properly evaluate the evidence and apply the correct legal standards under the DVPA. View "X.K. v. M.C." on Justia Law

In this case, the husband filed for an absolute divorce, and the wife counterclaimed. The parties attempted mediation but did not reach a settlement. The wife’s counsel later sent a settlement package to the husband’s counsel, which included a Voluntary Separation and Property Settlement Agreement, a promissory note, and a guaranty. The cover letter specified that the husband needed to sign the agreement and note by the end of the day on September 25, 2020. The husband signed the documents on September 28, 2020, and filed an amended complaint for divorce based on mutual consent, incorporating the agreement.The Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County found that the husband had timely accepted the wife’s offer and that a binding settlement agreement was formed. The court granted the husband’s motion to enforce the settlement agreement and entered a judgment for absolute divorce based on mutual consent, incorporating but not merging the agreement into the judgment. The wife appealed, and the Appellate Court of Maryland reversed the circuit court’s judgment, finding that the husband had not timely accepted the wife’s offer and that no contract was formed.The Supreme Court of Maryland reviewed the case and affirmed the Appellate Court’s judgment. The court held that the wife’s offer was conditioned on the husband signing the agreement and note by September 25, 2020, and that the husband’s failure to meet this deadline meant that no contract was formed. The court also found no evidence that the wife had waived the deadline. The court concluded that the husband’s signing of the documents on September 28, 2020, constituted a counteroffer, which the wife was not obligated to accept. View "Pattison v. Pattison" on Justia Law

The State filed a petition alleging that A.K., a three-year-old child, was in need of care. Both parents entered no contest statements, and the court found A.K. to be a child in need of care. The father later died, leaving the mother as the sole subject of the termination proceedings. The State filed a motion to terminate the mother's parental rights, and during a pretrial conference, the mother did not appear, but her attorney did. The court set a date for a "proffer trial" under K.S.A. 38-2248(f). At the proffer trial, the mother was absent, and her attorney objected to proceeding by proffer, leading the court to set a full trial date. The mother did not appear at the trial, and her substitute counsel did not object to proceeding by proffer. The court terminated the mother's parental rights based on the State's proffer of evidence.The Johnson District Court terminated the mother's parental rights based on the State's proffer of evidence. The mother appealed, arguing that the court had no authority to proceed by proffer because she had instructed her counsel to object. She also argued that K.S.A. 38-2248(f) violated procedural due process. The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's decision, rejecting the mother's claims.The Kansas Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that the district court misapplied K.S.A. 38-2248(f) by terminating the mother's parental rights based on a proffer alone. The court clarified that while K.S.A. 38-2248(f) permits a proffer against an absent party who has not instructed their counsel to object, it does not allow the district court to make a finding of unfitness or terminate parental rights based solely on the proffer. The court reversed the judgments of both the Court of Appeals and the district court and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "In re A.K. " on Justia Law

Stacy L. Jones and Joshua Colgrove were in a relationship and had a child, B.C. After their separation, Stacy moved to Lincoln, Nebraska, with B.C. and her other children. Joshua, who was diagnosed with Guillain-Barre syndrome, did not initially seek custody. Stacy was later convicted of felony child abuse and placed on probation, leading to juvenile court proceedings where B.C. was placed in foster care. Joshua's request for B.C.'s placement with him was denied due to his non-compliance with DHHS requests. The juvenile court eventually found Stacy rehabilitated and awarded her custody of B.C., issuing a bridge order transferring jurisdiction to the district court.The district court entered a custody decree consistent with the juvenile court's order. Joshua filed a petition for modification, and the State filed a complaint to establish child and medical support. The district court overruled Joshua's motion to dismiss the State's complaint and required him to pay child support. The court also issued an amended custody decree after the juvenile court corrected minor errors in its bridge order. Joshua's motions to reconsider and strike the amended orders were denied.The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The court found that the district court's findings, including Stacy's compliance with rehabilitative measures and her ability to protect B.C., were supported by evidence. The court also held that the State's intervention to establish child support was permissible under the relevant statutes. The court determined that the issue of the amended orders was moot and did not warrant further review. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding custody to Stacy, requiring Joshua to handle transportation for parenting time, and not awarding Joshua the child tax credit. View "Jones v. Colgrove" on Justia Law

In this case, the father and mother of B.W. had a contentious relationship, and the father was involved in a criminal incident where he shot and killed a man. Following this incident, the father was advised by his criminal defense attorney not to contact the mother or B.W. to avoid jeopardizing his defense. The father was later charged with first-degree murder and conspiracy but was acquitted in December 2021. In March 2022, the father sought to establish his parental rights, and the mother filed for termination of his parental rights based on abandonment.The Superior Court in Maricopa County found that the father had abandoned B.W. by failing to maintain a normal parental relationship for over six months without just cause. The court rejected the father's argument that he had just cause for his inaction, noting that he did not take any legal steps to assert his parental rights. The court concluded that termination of the father's parental rights was in B.W.'s best interest. The father appealed.The Court of Appeals affirmed the juvenile court's decision, agreeing that the father did not demonstrate just cause for his failure to maintain a relationship with B.W. The court held that the father's reliance on his criminal defense attorney's advice did not excuse his inaction.The Supreme Court of the State of Arizona reviewed the case to clarify the meaning of "just cause" under A.R.S. § 8-531(1). The court held that "just cause" refers to a reasonable and justifiable reason for a parent's failure to maintain a normal parental relationship, based on good faith. The court reversed the juvenile court's termination order and remanded the case for reconsideration, instructing the lower court to apply the clarified definition of "just cause" in determining whether the father's actions were justified. The Court of Appeals' decision was vacated. View "In re Termination Parental Rights as to B.W." on Justia Law

Sharon and Kieran Cunningham were married in 1994 and divorced in 2021. They entered into a marital settlement agreement (MSA) that was incorporated but not merged into the final divorce decree. The MSA included provisions about the use and sale of their home in Middletown, Rhode Island, which were modified twice by mutual agreement. In January 2024, Kieran's counsel offered to purchase the home, leading to a dispute over whether the Family Court could modify the MSA to allow an appraisal of the property.Kieran filed a motion in the Family Court to have the home appraised, which Sharon opposed, arguing that the MSA did not provide for such an appraisal. Kieran amended his motion to request an inspection and appraisal, citing Rule 34 of the Family Court Rules of Domestic Relations Procedure. The Family Court held a hearing and ultimately ruled that Kieran had no right to purchase the property under the MSA and sanctioned him for filing an improper motion, awarding Sharon $6,125 in attorneys' fees.The Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the Family Court's decision. The Court held that Kieran's motion was not well-grounded in fact or law and that he sought relief not permitted by the MSA. The Court found that the Family Court did not abuse its discretion in awarding attorneys' fees, as the fees were reasonable and supported by an affidavit from a Rhode Island Bar member. The Supreme Court concluded that the sanctions and attorneys' fees were appropriate given the circumstances. View "Cunningham v. Cunningham" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute between Peter Lowes and Amy Thompson, formerly Amy Lowes, regarding a nondisparagement clause in their stipulated divorce judgment. Lowes alleged that Thompson breached this clause by describing him as her "abuser" during a political campaign interview. Thompson filed a special motion to strike the breach of contract claim under Oregon’s anti-SLAPP statute, which aims to quickly dismiss nonmeritorious claims arising from protected speech. The trial court granted Thompson’s motion, but the Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that the nondisparagement clause waived Thompson’s right to the anti-SLAPP statute’s protections.The Deschutes County Circuit Court initially granted Thompson’s special motion to strike, finding that her statements were protected under the anti-SLAPP statute and that Lowes failed to show a probability of prevailing on his claim. The Court of Appeals reversed this decision, holding that the nondisparagement clause constituted a waiver of Thompson’s anti-SLAPP protections, thus making it unnecessary to evaluate whether Lowes could prevail on his claim.The Oregon Supreme Court reviewed the case and disagreed with the Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court held that the nondisparagement clause did not clearly indicate an intention to waive the procedural protections of the anti-SLAPP statute. Therefore, the clause alone could not defeat Thompson’s special motion to strike. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals' decision in part and remanded the case back to the Court of Appeals to determine whether Lowes met his burden of establishing a probability of prevailing on his breach of contract claim. View "Lowes v. Thompson" on Justia Law

William Chalmers filed for legal separation from his wife, which was later converted to a dissolution proceeding. During the proceedings, Chalmers' attorney requested the appointment of a guardian ad litem due to concerns about Chalmers' capacity. The court appointed Brian Theut as guardian ad litem, who then requested the appointment of East Valley Fiduciary Services, Inc. (EVFS) as temporary guardian and conservator. EVFS retained Ryan Scharber and John McKindles to represent them and Chalmers, respectively. The professionals did not file the required statement under A.R.S. § 14-5109(A) explaining their compensation arrangement.The professionals filed numerous applications for fees and costs, which were initially approved by the court. However, when a new judge took over, Chalmers objected to the fee applications, including those already approved. The court denied the outstanding fee applications, citing the professionals' failure to comply with § 14-5109(A) and noting that they had already received substantial compensation. The court of appeals held that the prior fee approvals were not final and remanded the case to determine if the approvals were manifestly erroneous or unjust due to non-compliance with § 14-5109(A).The Arizona Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that failure to comply with § 14-5109(A) does not automatically preclude recovery of fees. The court found that the statute is directory, not mandatory, and that the trial court has discretion to rectify non-compliance. The court vacated the court of appeals' opinion, affirmed the denial of fees to which Chalmers timely objected, but reversed the ruling requiring the professionals to disgorge previously awarded fees. The case was remanded to reinstate the initial fee awards. View "In the matter of CHALMERS" on Justia Law