Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

Respondents B.A. and J.W., adopted S.A., a minor, and his two younger siblings. In 2020, S.A. had homicidal and suicidal ideations and allegedly acted out against his siblings. S.A. was eventually placed in foster care at the request of B.A., J.W., and A.W. (collectively, “Parents”). After initially opening a voluntary case, the Park County Department of Human Services (“Department”) filed a petition in dependency or neglect as to S.A. The district court, sitting as a juvenile court, adjudicated S.A. dependent or neglected on September 16, 2021. The juvenile court, after conducting a series of hearings, reviewing the proposed treatment plans, and considering the parties’ position statements, ordered therapeutic sibling visits between S.A. and his two younger siblings “[p]ursuant to [section] 19-7-204,” C.R.S. (2021). The court entered this order over Parents’ strenuous objection. Parents then petitioned the Colorado Supreme Court. The Court found that neither the Foster Youth Siblings Bill of Rights, nor the dependency or neglect provisions of the Colorado Children’s Code, granted the juvenile court personal jurisdiction over the siblings. Additionally, the court’s personal jurisdiction over the parents and its subject matter jurisdiction over the case did not grant the court authority over the non-dependent siblings. Accordingly, the Court vacated the juvenile court order, and remanded this case for further proceedings. View "Colorado in the int. of S.A., a Child" on Justia Law

John Moss was convicted of third-degree criminal sexual conduct (CSC-III) after he pleaded no contest to the charge. The charge stemmed from allegations made by defendant’s adoptive sister. In exchange for his plea, the trial court dismissed the other charges that had been brought against defendant, including another count of CSC-III, and a fourth-offense habitual-offender enhancement. Defendant and the complainant did not have a birth parent in common, but they were both adopted by the same woman. After sentencing, defendant moved to withdraw his plea, arguing for the first time that he was not related to the complainant by either blood or affinity. The trial court denied the motion, determining that, although the adoptive siblings were not related by blood, they were related by affinity. Defendant sought leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals; the Court denied the application in an unpublished order. Defendant then sought leave to appeal to the Michigan Supreme Court. The Supreme Court remanded the case to the Court of Appeals to address whether a family relation that arises from a legal adoption was either effectively a blood relation, or a relation by affinity, as those terms were used in MCL 750.520b through MCL 750.520e. On remand, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s denial of defendant’s motion, reasoning that defendant and the complainant were effectively related by blood. With that finding, the appeals court considered it unnecessary to address whether defendant and the complainant were related by affinity, but it did so anyway because of the remand order and concluded that they were not related by affinity. Defendant again sought leave to appeal to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court reversed, finding that defendant and the complainant, were adoptive siblings, and were not related by blood for purposes of the statute. "[T]he Court of Appeals erred by concluding otherwise." Because the order directing oral argument on the application only asked the parties to address whether defendant and the complainant were related by blood, the Court of Appeals’ conclusion that defendant and the complainant were not related by affinity was left undisturbed. Because an adequate factual basis for defendant’s plea did not exist in light of the Courts’ legal rulings, the case was remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Michigan v. Moss" on Justia Law

When a party files an action for divorce and the other spouse subsequently dies before the divorce is finalized, there is a rebuttable presumption that the surviving spouse was not willfully absent from the decedent spouse under MCL 700.2801(2)(e)(i). Carla Von Greiff petitioned under MCL 700.2801(2)(e) of the Estates and Protected Individuals Code (EPIC) seeking a declaration that Anne Jones-Von Greiff was not the surviving spouse of Carla’s father, Hermann Von Greiff. Anne filed for divorce from Hermann on June 1, 2017. Before the probate court entered the judgment of divorce, Hermann died on June 17, 2018. In her petition, Carla asserted that Anne had been willfully absent from Hermann for a year or more before his death and that, therefore, Anne was not entitled to inherit as Hermann’s surviving spouse under EPIC. The probate court ruled that Anne was not a surviving spouse because she had been intentionally, physically, and emotionally absent from Hermann for more than a year before his death. Anne appealed, and the Court of Appeals determined Anne was not willfully absent under MCL 700.2801(2)(e)(i) because she did not intend to abandon or desert Hermann but was exercising her legal right to seek a divorce and to enforce her rights as a divorcing spouse during the year preceding his death. The Michigan Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court on different grounds: if there were spousal communications, whether direct or indirect, during the divorce proceedings that were consistent and made in connection with the legal termination of the marriage, then the surviving spouse was not willfully absent and was entitled to the benefits of a surviving spouse under the statute. In this case, Carla did not sustain her burden to show that Anne was willfully absent given that Anne was pursuing the entry of a divorce judgment via communications with the decedent through her attorney. View "In Re Von Greiff Estate " on Justia Law

The superior court terminated a mother’s parental rights to her two children. Because the children were Indian children under the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), the Office of Children’s Services (OCS) was required to make active efforts to provide remedial services and rehabilitative programs designed to prevent the breakup of the family before the mother’s rights could be terminated. The superior court found clear and convincing evidence that OCS satisfied this requirement, although OCS’s efforts were ultimately unsuccessful. The mother appealed, challenging the active efforts finding. She asked the Alaska Supreme Court to overturn precedent allowing courts to consider a parent’s noncooperation and the resulting futility of OCS’s actions when determining whether OCS satisfied the active efforts standard. In the alternative, she argued that even under existing law the superior court’s active efforts finding was erroneous. After review, the Supreme Court agreed with the mother that the court erred by stating that active efforts “are dependent on [the mother’s] willingness to engage”; the active efforts inquiry depends primarily on OCS’s efforts, not the parent’s reaction to those efforts. The Court took an opportunity to clarify the extent to which a parent’s noncooperation was relevant to the active efforts analysis. "And although we disagree in part with the superior court’s approach in this case, we independently conclude that OCS’s efforts satisfy the active efforts standard," therefore affirming the termination order. View "Mona J. v. Alaska Dept. of Health & Soc. Srvcs." on Justia Law

Mother sought sole legal and physical custody of the children, born in 2014 and 2018, plus child support and medical support. Father was properly served but failed to respond. The court held a default hearing. Father, who was in custody on a pending criminal matter, appeared but represented himself. Mother requested a “graduated” 15-month visitation schedule for Father, noting that had been in and out of jail, used drugs, and had unstable housing and employment. She asserted Father had been a roofer for approximately 10 years. A subsequent temporary order awarded Mother sole physical custody of the children, the parties shared legal custody, and Father paid no child support.Approximately 18 months later, Mother informed the court that Father had been released from prison. At a default hearing, Mother appeared with counsel. Father appeared but represented himself. The court heard no evidence, found it in the children’s best interest for the parties to have joint legal custody, Mother to have primary physical custody, and Father to have “reasonable, graduated visitation,” and ordered Father to pay $363 a month in child support. The Wyoming Supreme Court reversed. The court erred in ruling on visitation without any evidentiary basis to determine the children’s best interest and abused its discretion by calculating child support without having a sufficient evidentiary basis to determine Father’s income even though Mother failed to object. View "Hehn v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Anthony sued Theresa for a divorce. Theresa failed to answer. The court rendered a default judgment granting the divorce and dividing the marital estate. Theresa sought a new trial contending that Anthony’s attorney lied, telling her that the final hearing had not yet been scheduled. On appeal from the denial of her motion, Theresa brought a “sufficiency of the evidence” challenge, arguing that the trial court abused its discretion in the property division. The court of appeals affirmed, finding that Theresa had not preserved that argument.The Texas Supreme Court reversed, holding that failure to file a "Craddock" motion for a new trial in the trial court does not foreclose a party’s ability to raise on appeal an evidentiary challenge to a default property division. The court noted that Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 33.1(d) specifically offers a defaulting party an appellate remedy to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence in a case tried to the bench. A motion under Craddock does not attempt to show an error in the judgment; rather, it seeks to excuse the defaulting party’s failure to answer by showing the Craddock elements. View "Marriage of Williams" on Justia Law

A father going through a contentious divorce was accused by his young daughter of sexual abuse. A Department of Human Services social worker observed the forensic interview, believed it was credible, obtained additional information primarily from the mother, and obtained an ex parte court order requiring the father to leave the family home. An ensuing adversary proceeding determined that the allegation was unfounded and that the mother had “wanted [the father] out of the house.” The DHS finding was set aside and, eventually, the father obtained physical care of the children. In the father's subsequent suit, the district court granted the defendants summary judgment.The Iowa Supreme Court affirmed. The claim of intentional interference with the parent-child relationship fails because that claim applies to extralegal actions— such as absconding with a child—not to judicially-approved acts. The claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress fails because the conduct here did not reach the level of an “outrage” necessary to sustain such a claim. The unreasonable search and seizure claim cannot succeed because there was no showing that the DHS social worker falsified the affidavit she submitted to the court or that the removal order would not have been granted without her questioned statements. The substantive due process claim fails because DHS’s conduct does not “shock the conscience.” A procedural due process claim cannot prevail because the father was provided with adequate process, which ultimately cleared his name. View "Lennette v. State of Iowa" on Justia Law

In March 2011, when husband Pedro Aviles and wife Jessica Vulovic got married, Jessica’s divorce from a former husband was not yet final. She later testified she was unaware of this; she discovered it only in May 2011, and she obtained a final judgment of divorce in March 2012. In April 2013, Pedro and Jessica went through a second marriage ceremony; in September 2013, they went through a third marriage ceremony. In 2020, Pedro filed the present divorce proceeding. The trial court found that Jessica was at least a putative spouse; on that basis, it awarded her spousal support and attorney fees. Pedro contended that, as a matter of law, Jessica did not qualify as a putative spouse. Pedro also contended the trial court erred by basing spousal support on his 2020 income rather than his 2021 income. The Court of Appeal concluded Jessica qualified as a putative spouse because she adequately showed that, at the time of the original marriage, she had a good faith belief that she was unmarried. The Court found Pedro filed a false income and expense declaration for 2020, therefore, the trial court could reasonably disregard his income and expense declaration for 2021 and rely instead on what Jessica showed was his true 2020 income. View "Marriage of Aviles & Vulovic" on Justia Law

Eleven-year-old A.F. sought a domestic violence restraining order (DVRO) against her father, Jeffrey F. (Father), who held joint legal custody with her mother, Andrea F. (Mother). The petition was filed by Mother on A.F.’s behalf. Mother sought appointment as A.F.’s guardian ad litem (GAL) in the domestic violence (DV) matter at the same time. The court granted the request for GAL appointment. A.F. was represented by attorney Edward Castro in the domestic violence matter. Castro previously represented Mother in her marital dissolution from Father. Father objected to Mother’s appointment as GAL and to Castro’s representation of A.F., contending Castro had a conflict of interest under Rule 1.7(a), (b) of the State Bar Rules of Professional Conduct. The court removed Mother as GAL and granted Father’s request to disqualify Castro. A.F. appealed, contending: (1) Father lacked standing to challenge Castro’s representation of A.F.; (2) the court incorrectly concluded Castro simultaneously represented Mother and A.F. and consequently abused its discretion by applying Rule 1.7 to disqualify Castro; and (3) the court should have considered the rules governing successive representation and denied the request for disqualification. The Court of Appeal assumed Father had standing to challenge Castro’s representation of his minor child A.F. However, the Court concluded the record lacked substantial evidence to support the trial court’s finding that Castro simultaneously represented Mother and A.F., and it was therefore an abuse of discretion to apply Rule 1.7 to disqualify Castro. Accordingly, the order disqualifying Castro as attorney was reversed, and the matter was remanded for further proceedings. View "A.F. v. Jeffrey F." on Justia Law

While Samir Elali was married to Angeles Elali and lived with her in California, Samir married Mayssa Marchoud in Lebanon. After Samir attempted to terminate the Lebanese marriage, Mayssa filed a petition in California for spousal support without dissolution against Samir. The trial court ruled the Lebanese marriage was bigamous and therefore void under Family Code section 2201(a). Mayssa appealed the judgment of nullity, contending: (1) the trial court erred in relying on section 2201(a) to declare the Lebanese marriage was void; (2) the parties’ pleading allegations admitting there was a marriage required the trial court to find the Lebanese marriage was valid; (3) there was insufficient evidence to overcome the presumption that the Lebanese marriage was valid; and (4) a ruling that the Lebanese marriage was valid precluded a different judge from subsequently ruling the marriage was void. After review, the Court of Appeal rejected Mayssa’s contentions, and found the trial court did not err in ruling the Lebanese marriage was void under California law. View "Marriage of Elali & Marchoud" on Justia Law