Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court vacated the written dispositional orders entered by the circuit court terminating Mother's parental rights to her two children, holding that the dispositional orders failed to include findings of fact and conclusions of law necessary to support the termination of parental rights.The Department of Health and Human Resources filed a motion alleging that the termination of Mother's parental rights was required by W. Va. Code 49-4-605(a)(1) because the children had been in foster care for more than fifteen of the most recent twenty-two months. The Supreme Court vacated the orders below and remanded the case for further proceedings, holding that the circuit court (1) erroneously entered written dispositional orders that contained none of the findings required by W. Va. Code 49-4-604(c)(6) for termination of parental rights; and (2) lacked subject matter jurisdiction to terminate Mother's parental rights. View "In re C.S." on Justia Law

Ohio’s Necessaries Statute permits creditors to collect certain debts from one spouse incurred by the other.. Seeking to recover outstanding legal defense bills owed by Snyder’s husband, who had been convicted of embezzlement, Finley filed a debt-collection lawsuit against Finley and her husband, asserting joint liability. Snyder contends that the lawsuit was “objectively baseless” and violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. 1692e.The Sixth Circuit reversed the entry of summary judgment in favor of Finley. The Ohio Supreme Court has clearly held that the Necessaries Statute does not impose joint liability on a married person for the debts of a spouse. A creditor must first seek satisfaction of its claim from the assets of the spouse who incurred the debt and must show that the debtor-spouse is “unable to pay” for a non-debtor spouse to be liable under the Necessaries Statute. Finley’s claims against the husband remain pending in the Ohio state trial court. View "Snyder v. Finley & Co., L.P.A." on Justia Law

Golan, a U.S. citizen, married Saada, an Italian citizen, in Italy, where, in 2016, they had a son, B. In 2018, Golan flew to the United States and moved into a domestic violence shelter with B. Saada sought an order returning B. to Italy under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, which requires that a child be returned to the child’s country of habitual residence upon a finding that the child has been wrongfully removed to or retained unless the authority finds that return would expose the child to a “grave risk” of “physical or psychological harm or otherwise place the child in an intolerable situation.” The district court concluded that B. would face a grave risk of harm if returned to Italy, given evidence that Saada had abused Golan but ordered B. returned to Italy, applying Second Circuit precedent obligating it to “examine the full range of options that might make possible the safe return of a child” and concluding that ameliorative measures could reduce the risk to B. Following a remand, the Second Circuit affirmed.The Supreme Court vacated. A court is not categorically required to examine all possible ameliorative measures before denying a Hague Convention petition for the return of a child to a foreign country once the court has found that return would expose the child to a grave risk of harm. The Second Circuit’s rule, imposing an atextual, categorical requirement that courts consider all possible ameliorative measures in exercising discretion under the Convention, improperly elevated return above the Convention’s other objectives. A court reasonably may decline to consider ameliorative measures that have not been raised by the parties, are unworkable, draw the court into determinations properly resolved in custodial proceedings, or risk overly prolonging return proceedings. View "Golan v. Saada" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated the decrees of the family court denying the Department of Children, Youth, and Families' (DCYF) petition to terminate the parental rights of Parents to their child, holding that the trial justice overlooked and misconceived material evidence of parental unfitness in this case.On remand, after finding the facts by clear and convincing evidence, the trial justice concluded that DCYF had failed to prove that it had made reasonable efforts to reunify Parents with their child. The Supreme Court vacated the decision below, holding (1) the record demonstrated that DCYF made reasonable efforts to reunify Parents with their child, and the trial justice was clearly wrong to conclude otherwise; and (2) contrary to the trial justice's conclusion, DCYF proved by clear and convincing evidence the statutory requirements supporting the termination of Parents' parental rights to their child. View "In re Nolan V-S" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decree of the family court terminating Mother's parental rights to her son, holding that there was no error or abuse of discretion.After a trial, the trial justice concluded that the State had proven by clear and convincing evidence that Mother was unfit to parent her son and that it was in the child's best interest that Mother's parental rights be terminated. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial justice did not err (1) in finding that the child had been placed with the Department of Children, Youth, and Families for at least twelve months and that there was not a substantial probability that the child could return to Mother’s care within a reasonable period of time; and (2) in finding that it was in the child's best interests to terminate Mother's parental rights. View "In re Donnell R-H" on Justia Law

Parents of the two children at issue in a juvenile dependency case repeatedly denied having any American Indian heritage. The social services agency spoke with several of the parents’ relatives but never asked those relatives whether the children had any American Indian heritage. Nearly 30 months into the proceedings and on appeal from the termination of her parental rights, the biological mother objected that the agency did not discharge its statutory duty to inquire whether her children might be “Indian children” within the meaning of the state’s broader version of the federal Indian Child Welfare Act (“ICWA”).   The Second Appellate District affirmed the trial court’s ruling. The court explained that there is no dispute that the agency did not properly discharge its statutory duty. However, the critical inquiry is whether the error was harmless and how harmlessness is to be assessed. The court offered a fourth rule: An agency’s failure to discharge its statutory duty of initial inquiry is harmless unless the record contains information suggesting a reason to believe that the children at issue may be “Indian child[ren],” in which case further inquiry may lead to a different ICWA finding by the juvenile court.   Here, the court held that the error was harmless, because the record contains the parents’ repeated denials of American Indian heritage, because the parents were raised by their biological relatives, and because there is nothing else in the record to suggest any reason to believe that the parents’ knowledge of their heritage is incorrect. View "In re Dezi C." on Justia Law

Santa Cruz County Human Services Department filed a juvenile dependency petition, Welfare & Institutions Code section 361(c), concerning an 11-year-old girl, then residing with her father. The whereabouts of her mother were unknown. It was alleged that father had physically abused the minor. The juvenile court ordered the minor detained, found the allegations of the petition true, and adjudged the minor a dependent of the court. Father received family reunification services for 17 months. The court found legal guardianship with the minor’s maternal grandparents to be the appropriate permanent plan, found that visitation of the minor by father would be detrimental, and ordered that father have no contact with the minor.After a contested six-month post-permanency review hearing in which the court heard testimony, it reaffirmed the detriment finding and denied visitation. Father renewed his request for visitation at the 12-month post-permanency review hearing. The juvenile court denied father’s request for a contested hearing, reaffirmed the detriment order, and denied his request for visitation. The court of appeal affirmed. Father, as the parent of a child where the permanent plan is legal guardianship, did not have an unqualified statutory right nor an unfettered due process right to a contested post-permanency review hearing. The juvenile court did not err in requiring him to make an offer of proof in support of his request for a hearing. View "In re A.B." on Justia Law

Husband filed a petition seeking appointment as guardian over his wife. The parties' daughter, Christy Hladik, objected and sought to have herself appointed. In July 2020, the trial court entered the Court's First Amended Plan for Care and Treatment of Ward and Management of Property of the Ward. A month later, the trial court appointed daughter as guardian over the person and property of Wife. Husband appealed, and on the Oklahoma Supreme Court's own motion, the matter was retained. After reviewing the record and briefs, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's rulings. View "Walterscheidt v. Hladik" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the circuit court denying Petitioners' motion to intervene in the underlying child abuse and neglect proceedings and reunifying the child with Mother, holding that there was no error.Petitioners, the foster parents of the two children in this case, moved to intervene in the underlying proceedings, but the circuit court denied intervention. The court then ordered that the child be reunified with Mother. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court properly denied Petitioners' motion to intervene in the underlying child abuse and neglect proceedings. View "In re H.W." on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the order entered by the district court dismissing Grandmother's petition for grandparent visitation for lack of standing, holding that there was no error.Grandmother petitioned against Mother and Father for visitation rights with the three children at issue in this case under the Grandparents and Great-grandparents Visitation Act, Me. Rev. Stat. 19-A, 1801-1806. The district court dismissed the petition for lack of standing, concluding that Grandmother did not prove that she had a sufficient existing relationship with the children. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the court applied the correct standard of proof and that the record did not compel the court to make factual findings in Grandmother's favor. View "Fiske v. Fiske" on Justia Law