Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

Appellant appealed the juvenile court’s order terminating her parental rights to her daughter. She did not challenge the basis of the termination of her rights. Her sole contention is that the Los Angeles Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) did not comply with its initial duty of inquiry under Welfare and Institutions Code section 224.2, subdivision (b).1 Specifically, Appellant acknowledged she denied Indian heritage, but she contends DCFS failed to ask maternal extended family members whether J.W. is an “Indian child” within the meaning of Section 1903 of the federal Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA).   The Second Appellate District affirmed the trial court’s order. The court found the juvenile court erred in determining that ICWA did not apply without evidence that DCFS questioned extended family members despite having contact with those same family members. However, the court concluded that the error was harmless because the daughter was placed for adoption with her maternal grandmother. As a second ground, the court found no prejudice because there was nothing in the record to suggest that the daughter had Indian heritage or that the mother’s denial of Indian heritage was uninformed or incorrect. View "In re J.W." on Justia Law

S.A. (mother) appealed a juvenile court’s order terminating parental rights and ordering G.A. (minor) be placed for adoption. Mother contended the San Joaquin County Human Services Agency (Agency) and the juvenile court failed to comply with the inquiry requirements of the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) because the Agency did not contact extended family members to inquire about the ICWA and the juvenile court made no findings regarding agency compliance in that regard. Mother added that no express ICWA findings were made by the juvenile court during the course of the proceedings, compounding the error, and asked the Court of Appeal to remand the case for ICWA compliance. The Court of Appeal determined that while the juvenile court failed to make an ICWA finding, the error was harmless because the Agency satisfied its duty of inquiry, and there was no reason to believe the minor was an Indian child: "the parents consistently stated they had no reason to believe they had Native American ancestry and did not object to the Agency’s reports that consistently concluded they did not. No further duty to inquire was triggered in this case, as the court and Agency had no reason to believe that an Indian child was involved." From this the Court found no prejudice flowing from the Agency's failure to interview extended family members. The case was remanded for the juvenile court to formally enter its ICWA finding on the record. View "In re G.A." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals dismissing Appellant's petition for a writ of prohibition against Geauga County Court of Common Pleas Judge Carolyn J. Paschke, holding that the court of appeals properly dismissed the petition under Civ.R. 12(B)(6).Appellant, a defendant in a divorce case pending before Judge Paschke, brought this petition alleging that Judge Paschke's procedure for issuing orders in his case violated Civ.R. 53 and seeking a writ of prohibition restraining the judge from issuing entires in violation of Civ.R. 53. The court of appeals dismissed the petition for failure to state a valid claim for relief. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because the petition was based on an alleged error in Judge Paschke's exercise of jurisdiction and not a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, prohibition was not an appropriate remedy. View "State ex rel. Jones v. Paschke" on Justia Law

A child was declared a dependent child of the juvenile court and removed from Defendants (her parents), after the court sustained an amended petition pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivisions (a) (serious physical harm), (b)(1) (failure to protect) and (j) (abuse of sibling), due to the mother’s history of violent behavior and the parent's history of substance abuse. On appeal, the mother contended the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (“Department”) violated the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA), by failing to make an adequate “further inquiry” after she advised the Department and the court, she and the child may have Cherokee ancestry through the maternal grandfather.   The Second Appellate district conditionally affirmed the disposition order. The court wrote that the Department misapplied the rationale of In re H.B. The Department argued its multiple violations of express statutory requirements should be deemed harmless because, although she advised the juvenile court she may have Cherokee ancestry through her maternal grandfather, the mother provided no additional evidence on appeal demonstrating the child is, in fact, an Indian child within the meaning of ICWA.   The court wrote that further inquiry is required in this case. On remand, the juvenile court must promptly direct the Department to make a meaningful and thorough inquiry regarding the child’s possible Indian ancestry, including interviews with extended family members and any other persons who may reasonably be expected to have information regarding the child’s tribal membership or eligibility for membership and contact with the Cherokee tribe or any other tribes that may have such information. View "In re Rylei S." on Justia Law

A divorcing couple settled their property dispute by executing a settlement agreement that included a litigation waiver. The superior court accepted the settlement five months later. The former wife subsequently sued her former husband, alleging tort claims based upon actions taken in the months between the time the agreement was executed and when it was accepted. The superior court granted the husband's motions to dismiss and for summary judgment. The wife appealed. After review, the Alaska Supreme Court agreed with the superior court that one of the torts alleged by the wife did not exist in Alaska, so the Court affirmed dismissal of that claim. However, because the settlement agreement was effective between the parties when signed, even though it was subject to court approval, the Supreme Court reversed the superior court’s grant of summary judgment regarding the other torts and remanded for further proceedings on those issues. View "Notti v. Hoffman" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the trial court terminating Mother's parental rights in her two minor children, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in the proceedings below.The Henderson County Department of Social Services filed a motion to terminate Mother's parental rights in her two children based on neglect and failure to make reasonable progress. See N.C. Gen. Stat. 7B-1111(a)(1)-(2). After the first termination hearing was continued, Mother's counsel requested a continuance at the beginning of the hearing. The trial court denied the motion and then terminated Mother's parental rights. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Mother's motion for a continuance of the termination hearing; and (2) Mother's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel was without merit. View "In re A.M.C." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court terminating Parents' parental rights to their three children, holding that Father was not entitled to relief on his allegations of error.Following four hearings, the trial court entered an order terminating Parents' parental rights to all three children, adjudicating the existence of grounds under N.C. Gen. Stat. 7B-1111(a)(1)-(3), (5), and (7) and concluding that it was in the children's best interests that Parents' parental rights be terminated. Father appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that it was in the children's best interests to terminate Parents' parental rights in their children. View "In re M.R." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and remanded in part a permanency planning order of the trial court eliminating reunification as a permanent plan, holding that remand was required.Father appealed from an order of the trial court ceasing reunification efforts with his two songs, the permanency planning order eliminating reunification as a permanent plan, and subsequent orders terminating his parental rights. The Supreme Court remanded the case in part, holding (1) because the permanency planning order lacked findings that addressed one of the four issues contemplated N.C. Gen. Stat. 7B-906.2(d) remand was necessary for entry of additional findings; (2) Father's claim of error concerning the permanency planning order was properly resolved by remand and did not necessitate vacating or reversing the order, and therefore, it was premature for the Supreme Court to consider the trial court's orders terminating Father's parental rights. View "In re C.H." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the trial court terminating Mother's parental rights to her three minor children, holding that the trial court's adjudication of neglect was supported by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence.The Robeson County Department of Social Services filed a petition to terminate Mother's parental rights to her three children under N.C. Gen. Stat. 7B-1111(a)(1)-(3). After a hearing, the trial court granted the petition and found that it was in the children's best interests that Mother's parental rights be terminated. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court properly exercised subject matter jurisdiction and did not err in determining the existence of grounds to terminate Mother's parental rights on the basis of neglect. View "In re J.D.O." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the trial court dismissing Mother's petition seeking to have the parental rights of Father to the parties' three children terminated, holding that the trial court did not err in dismissing Mother's petition.Mother filed a termination petition alleging that Father's parental rights in the children were subject to termination on the grounds of willful abandonment set forth in N.C. Gen. Stat. 7B-1111(a)(7). The trial court dismissed the petition, concluding that Mother had failed to establish that Father had willfully abandoned the children. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the evidence supported the trial court's conclusion that Father had not willfully abandoned the juveniles. View "In re N.W." on Justia Law