Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

A minor child, Baby Girl R., was abandoned by her mother, S.R., shortly after birth. S.R. gave birth in a homeless encampment and was using methamphetamines daily. Baby Girl R. tested positive for the drug and exhibited withdrawal symptoms. S.R. was placed on an involuntary psychiatric hold due to paranoia, delusions, and aggression. After being discharged, S.R. left Baby Girl R. at the hospital and returned to the encampment. The Department of Family and Children’s Services initiated dependency proceedings, and Baby Girl R. was placed in protective custody. Despite diligent efforts, the Department could not locate S.R.The juvenile court placed Baby Girl R. in foster care and ordered reunification services for S.R., despite her unknown whereabouts. The court found that S.R.’s location was unknown despite reasonable efforts to locate her. Baby Girl R. appealed, arguing that the court should have bypassed reunification services under Welfare and Institutions Code section 361.5, subdivision (b)(1). While the appeal was pending, the juvenile court terminated reunification services for S.R. at the six-month review hearing and placed Baby Girl R. with her maternal grandparents.The California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court determined that the appeal was moot due to the termination of reunification services but exercised discretion to address the merits. The court concluded that section 361.5, subdivision (b)(1) does not mandate bypassing reunification services when a parent’s whereabouts are unknown despite a diligent search. The juvenile court has discretion to grant or deny reunification services in such cases. The appellate court found no error in the juvenile court’s decision to order reunification services for S.R. and affirmed the disposition order. View "In re Baby Girl R." on Justia Law

In September 2017, Attorney Karolyn Kovtun held a meeting with Jennifer Shenefield and her client Mark Shenefield, despite a criminal protective order prohibiting Mark from contacting Jennifer. During the meeting, Mark and Kovtun verbally and emotionally abused Jennifer, and Kovtun threatened to remove their daughter from Jennifer’s custody if she did not sign a custody agreement. Jennifer signed the agreement under duress and contacted the police. Kovtun continued to represent Mark, who was later convicted of violating the protective order. Kovtun then sued Jennifer for recording the meeting without consent, prompting Jennifer to file a cross-complaint against Kovtun.The Superior Court of San Diego County denied Kovtun’s two anti-SLAPP motions and sustained her demurrer to two of Jennifer’s six causes of action. After a bench trial, the court found Kovtun liable for negligence, intentional infliction of emotional distress, intentional misrepresentation, and negligent misrepresentation, awarding Jennifer $50,000 in damages. Mark did not appear at trial, and the court entered judgment against him, awarding Jennifer $250,000 in damages.The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, State of California, reviewed the case. Kovtun argued that Jennifer’s claims were barred by the statute of limitations under Code of Civil Procedure section 340.6 and the litigation privilege under Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b). The court concluded that Kovtun waived the statute of limitations defense by failing to timely and properly plead it. Additionally, the court determined that the litigation privilege did not apply to Kovtun’s communications. The judgment against Kovtun was affirmed. View "Shenefield v. Kovtun" on Justia Law

Michael Auer Wolf filed a request for a vocational evaluation of Patricia Mercado in a parentage action, which the Superior Court of Orange County granted. Wolf's request aimed to assess Mercado's ability to obtain employment and her earning capacity for determining child support. Mercado opposed the request, arguing that the court lacked jurisdiction to order a vocational evaluation as it was not authorized by any statute. She filed an amended petition for writ of mandate, prohibition, or other appropriate relief.The Superior Court of Orange County initially granted Wolf's request and later his motion to compel Mercado to undergo the vocational evaluation. Mercado appealed, arguing that the court's orders were void due to lack of statutory authority and that they violated her constitutional and discovery rights. The court maintained that child support was at issue and that it could order a vocational evaluation based on public policy and statutory provisions, including Evidence Code section 730.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court found that Wolf did not establish entitlement to a vocational evaluation under any relevant statutory authority, including sections 3558, 4331, and 4058 of the Family Code. The court emphasized that section 4058 requires a preliminary showing that a vocational evaluation would be in the best interests of the children, which Wolf failed to provide. The court also noted that Evidence Code section 730 did not support the vocational evaluation order as it pertains to neutral experts appointed by the court.The Court of Appeal granted Mercado's petition, ordering the Superior Court to vacate its orders requiring Mercado to undergo a vocational evaluation and to enter a new order denying Wolf's request. The stay order was dissolved, and Mercado was awarded her costs incurred in the proceeding. View "Mercado v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

Michael Auer Wolf filed a request for a vocational evaluation of Patricia Mercado in a parentage action. The Superior Court of Orange County granted Wolf's request and later compelled Mercado to undergo the evaluation. Mercado filed an amended petition for writ of mandate, prohibition, or other appropriate relief, arguing the court lacked jurisdiction to order the evaluation as it was not authorized by any statute.The Superior Court of Orange County initially granted Wolf's request for a vocational evaluation and later his motion to compel Mercado to undergo the evaluation. Mercado opposed the request, arguing it was improper under the relevant statutes and that child support issues were being handled by the Department of Child Support Services (DCSS). The court maintained that child support was at issue and that it had the authority to order the evaluation.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court found that Wolf did not establish entitlement to a vocational evaluation under any relevant statutory authority, including sections 3558, 4331, and 4058 of the Family Code. The court noted that section 3558 does not authorize vocational evaluations, section 4331 applies only to marital dissolution or legal separation cases, and section 4058 requires a preliminary showing that a vocational evaluation would be in the best interests of the children, which Wolf did not provide. The court also found that Evidence Code section 730 did not support the order as it pertains to neutral experts appointed by the court, not retained experts.The Court of Appeal granted Mercado's petition, ordering the Superior Court to vacate its orders requiring Mercado to undergo a vocational evaluation and to deny Wolf's request for the evaluation. The stay order was dissolved, and Mercado was awarded her costs incurred in the proceeding. View "Mercado v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

The appellant, C.C., who had previously consented to terminate his parental rights to a child conceived through his sperm donation, petitioned the family court to establish himself as a presumed father and a third parent under California Family Code sections 7611(d) and 7612(c). He argued that his post-adoption conduct entitled him to parenting rights and that the 2013 amendments to the Family Code provided a path for him to establish a relationship with the child. C.C. claimed that there was no evidence he relinquished his right to enforce a legal parenting relationship and that the respondents, L.B. and R.B., were estopped from relying on his consent to the adoption.The family court granted the respondents' motion to quash C.C.'s amended petition, finding that the donor agreement allowed visitation privileges but not parental rights, and that C.C.'s voluntary consent to the termination of his parental rights was final and irrevocable. The court determined that C.C. lacked standing to assert parentage due to the finality of the adoption order. C.C. appealed, arguing that the trial court's order was contrary to custody and parenting law.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Six, reviewed the case and affirmed the trial court's decision. The appellate court held that section 8617 of the Family Code precludes C.C. from establishing parentage under any theory, as the termination of his parental rights was final and irrevocable. The court also found that equitable estoppel did not apply because the donor agreement explicitly stated that C.C. would have no paternal rights. Additionally, the court ruled that C.C. lacked standing to initiate an action for visitation as a nonparent under the Family Code. The judgment was affirmed, and respondents were awarded their costs on appeal. View "C.C. v. L.B." on Justia Law

K.M., the mother of minor Z.H., appealed a judgment that terminated her parental rights after the child's father, I.H., and paternal grandmother, C.L., filed a petition under Family Code section 7822. The petition alleged that K.M. had abandoned Z.H. by leaving him in the care of I.H. and C.L. without support or communication for over a year. The trial court found that K.M. had abandoned Z.H. and terminated her parental rights.The Los Angeles County Superior Court consolidated the case with a related custody case and stayed proceedings in the latter. During the trial, evidence showed that K.M. had not visited Z.H. since December 2017 and had not provided financial support since January 2020. The court found that K.M. had abandoned her parental role and focused more on her struggles than on Z.H.'s best interests.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court affirmed the judgment terminating K.M.'s parental rights, finding no error or abuse of discretion by the trial court. The appellate court noted that K.M. failed to show that the trial court was required to consider any legal impediment to the proposed adoption when terminating her parental rights.However, the appellate court identified a clerical error in the judgment regarding the termination of I.H.'s parental rights. The trial court had intended for I.H. to retain his parental rights. The appellate court remanded the case with instructions to correct the judgment to reflect that I.H. retains his parental rights. View "In re Z.H." on Justia Law

Hakan and Lauren Oksuzler married in 2010 and divorced in 2019. Hakan worked for Bank of America, receiving an annual bonus based on his performance. After their divorce, Lauren sought to have Hakan’s 2019 bonus, paid in February 2020, classified as community property. Additionally, the couple disputed the ownership of their marital home, which Hakan purchased before marriage but refinanced during the marriage, listing both as grantees. They also contested the characterization of Hakan’s 401(k) account, which included contributions made before and during the marriage.The trial court found that the 2019 bonus was Hakan’s separate property, awarded Hakan 100% ownership of the marital home, and classified the majority of the 401(k) funds as Hakan’s separate property. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth District of Texas affirmed the bonus and 401(k) classifications but reversed the home ownership decision, ruling that Hakan and Lauren each owned an undivided one-half interest in the home.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case. It held that the 2019 bonus, paid after the divorce for work performed during the marriage, is community property, reversing the Court of Appeals on this issue. The court affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision that the marital home should be owned equally by Hakan and Lauren as tenants in common, as Hakan did not rebut the presumption of a gift. Regarding the 401(k) account, the court agreed with the Court of Appeals that Hakan failed to provide sufficient evidence to trace the separate property contributions accurately. Thus, the court remanded the 401(k) issue to the trial court for reconsideration.In summary, the Supreme Court of Texas reversed the Court of Appeals' judgment on the bonus, affirmed the judgment on the marital home and 401(k), and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "IN RE J.Y.O." on Justia Law

Leon Stinson pled guilty to conspiracy to engage in bank fraud and was ordered to pay over $3.6 million in restitution. The Government sought to garnish assets, including retirement accounts solely in the name of Leon’s wife, Ellen. The district court concluded that Ellen’s accounts were marital property in which both Leon and Ellen had a “100% undivided interest” and ordered the liquidation of the accounts to satisfy the restitution order.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi denied Ellen’s motion to dismiss the writ of garnishment, asserting that Leon had no property interest in her accounts. The court held an evidentiary hearing and concluded that Ellen’s retirement accounts were marital property under Mississippi law, as defined in Hemsley v. Hemsley, and thus subject to garnishment.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that under Mississippi law, property is only classified as marital property during the equitable distribution process in a divorce. Until then, a person does not have an interest in property titled solely in their spouse’s name. The court found that the district court erred in concluding that Ellen’s accounts were marital property subject to garnishment. The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s orders and remanded with instructions to grant Ellen’s motion to dismiss the writ of garnishment as to her retirement accounts. View "USA v. Stinson" on Justia Law

A prolonged legal battle ensued between divorced paternal grandparents, each seeking to adopt their grandson, E.A. The boy lived with his grandfather for his first six years until 2019, when his grandmother and her husband took him under false pretenses and initiated an adoption proceeding. The grandfather attempted to intervene in the adoption but was denied "party in interest" status. He also filed an unsuccessful paternity case, claiming he was the boy's presumed father under the Kansas Parentage Act. The adoption court awarded the boy to the grandmother and her husband, and three years later, the court reaffirmed its decision, denying the grandfather's motion to intervene.The grandfather appealed both district court rulings. One Court of Appeals panel denied him relief in the parentage case, while another panel reversed the adoption court's decision, allowing the grandfather to present his case as an interested party. The losing sides sought review in each case.The Kansas Supreme Court reviewed the cases and reversed the parentage panel's decision while affirming the adoption panel's decision. The court held that the grandfather pled sufficient facts to advance a colorable party-in-interest claim in the adoption proceeding and to prosecute his parentage claim. The court emphasized that the grandfather should have been allowed to intervene in the adoption case to address the competing interests adequately.The Kansas Supreme Court remanded the parentage case to the district court to be consolidated with the adoption case, which was also remanded for further proceedings. The adoption decree was vacated, and the case was directed to return to its status as of May 31, 2019, with the understanding that temporary custody may be reconsidered to determine the boy's best interests. View "In re Parentage of E.A." on Justia Law

Lucila Magana-Magana, a Mexican citizen, entered the United States unlawfully in 1995. She faced a series of abusive relationships, including with Rafael Camacho and later Clyde Wakefield, whom she married in 2017. Wakefield's abuse led to their separation and eventual divorce. In 2007, Magana-Magana was arrested by U.S. Border Patrol, and the Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings. She applied for cancellation of removal, citing hardship to her U.S. citizen children, but her request was denied by an immigration judge (IJ) and later by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA). Her appeal to the Ninth Circuit was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.In January 2022, Magana-Magana filed a motion with the BIA to reopen her removal proceedings, citing new evidence of abuse by Wakefield and her application for benefits under the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA). The BIA denied her motion, stating it was untimely and that she had not demonstrated "extraordinary circumstances" to waive the one-year filing deadline.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court concluded it had jurisdiction to review the BIA's determination of "extraordinary circumstances" under 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(iv)(III), as it involved applying a legal standard to undisputed facts. The court found that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in determining that the abuse suffered by Magana-Magana did not constitute "extraordinary circumstances" and that there was no basis to conclude that such circumstances caused the delay in filing her motion. The court also rejected her other arguments, including her unexhausted equitable-tolling claim and the BIA's discretionary decision not to reopen the case sua sponte. The petition for review was denied in part and dismissed in part. View "MAGANA-MAGANA V. GARLAND" on Justia Law