Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

A child was taken from his mother after she brought him to the hospital. Hospital staff found the child had serious injuries. The father, who lived separately from the mother, asked that the child be placed with him. The Washington State Department of Children, Youth and Family recommended out-of-home placement, citing concern for the child’s safety. A court determined the child should have been placed with his godparents, based on the Department’s recommendation. The father moved for discretionary review of the shelter care order, arguing the court erred because the Department failed to make reasonable efforts to prevent removal from a parent. The Court of Appeals denied review, and a panel of the court declined to modify its ruling. The father than moved for discretionary review by the Oregon Supreme Court, which was granted. The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court became moot, as the father ultimately agreed to an order of dependency in a subsequent hearing. The Supreme Court still opined on what “reasonable efforts” the Department had to make before a child could be removed for a parent or guardian’s care. The Department argued (and the trial court agreed) that given the acute and emergent circumstances of the case, it did not violate the reasonable efforts requirement. The father argued there was no such exception for emergent circumstances. The Supreme Court provided additional guidance as to what constituted reasonable efforts, and here, held the trial court erred in excusing the Department from making reasonable efforts to place the child with the father. View "In re Dependency of L.C.S." on Justia Law

In February 2016, three-month-old A.K., daughter of respondents Michelle Desmet and Sandro Kasco, was taken into protective custody after she suffered a spiral fracture to her left femur. When the parents could not explain the injury, A.K. was placed with her paternal aunt for six months while the Department of Social Health Services (DSHS) initiated an investigation. By August, A.K. was returned to her parents and a dependency action was dismissed. In August 2018, the parents sued the DSHS (the State) for negligent investigation, negligent infliction of emotional distress (NIED), and invasion of privacy by false light (false light) based on the Department’s allegedly harmful investigation and issuance of a letter indicating that allegations of child abuse/neglect against Desmet were founded (the founded letter). The Department moved for summary judgment, arguing it was immune from suit under RCW 4.24.595(2) because its actions in A.K.’s dependency proceedings were taken pursuant to the juvenile court’s order to place A.K. with her aunt. The trial court denied summary judgment and entered a final order finding that no immunity applied. The Department appealed on the immunity issue, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court. The Department claimed on appeal to the Washington Supreme Court that the Court of Appeals’ decision rendered RCW 4.24.595(2) meaningless and that the court erroneously refused to consider the legislative history of RCW 4.24.595(2), which, in the Department’s view, was enacted to bar claims like those brought by the parents. The Supreme Court found the unambiguous text of RCW 4.24.595(2) did not grant the Department immunity for all actions in an investigation of child abuse/neglect that might coincide with a court order in related dependency proceedings. The Court of Appeals was affirmed and the matter remanded back to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Desmet v. Washington" on Justia Law

In this divorce action, the Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part orders entered by two different circuit court judges related to James Farmer's distributional interest in Lakota Lake Camp, LLC and orders related to the release of funds to James's wife, Lori Lieberman, that were previously held by the clerk of court following the execution sale of property owned by Lakota Lake, holding that the court erred in part.Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) the collection court had subject matter jurisdiction to hear and determine Lori's application for a charging order; (2) the divorce court erred in ordering the release of excess sale proceeds to Lori; and (3) the collection court's order denying Lakota Lake's motion to release to the company the excess sale proceeds from the sale of Granite Perch, the last remaining property owned by Lakota Lake, to Lori must be vacated and the case remanded for further proceedings on the issue. View "Farmer v. Farmer" on Justia Law

In this post-dissolution action, the Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment of the district court granting Appellant's motion to amend a stipulated order, holding that the motion to amend the stipulated order was untimely.After the parties divorced they filed various post-judgment motions. The parties then reached an agreement and presented their stipulations to the court. The court executed a stipulated order without holding a hearing. Appellant later filed a motion to amend the order by inserting a vehicle or serial identification number to each alleged corresponding item of personal property listed in the stipulated order. The district court granted the motion without holding an evidentiary hearing. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the order below, holding that amending the stipulated order constituted a substantive change, and therefore, Appellant's motion should have been considered pursuant to Rule 59(e) as a motion to alter or amend the judgment rather than dismissed as untimely. View "Beedle v. Beedle" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court vacated in part and remanded in part the divorce judgment entered by the district court on Husband's complaint, holding that the judgment was improper was to the property division and attorney fees.Specifically, the Supreme Judicial Court held (1) delineation of Wife's employment retirement accounts as marital or nonmarital property must be calculated pursuant to a three-step process for division of property in a divorce matter; (2) the relevant date for determining the marital and nonmarital portions of Husband's retirement accounts was the date of the entry of the divorce judgment; (3) the trial court erred by double counting Wife's Vanguard retirement accounts; and (4) because the property division portion of the judgment must be vacated, the trial court's denial of Wife's request for attorney fees also must be vacated. View "Moran v. Moran" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellee and attorney Jessica Peck represented parents and other family members in child abuse cases in Colorado juvenile courts. She brought suit against Defendant-Appellants, Colorado Executive Director of Health Services Michelle Barnes and Second Judicial District Attorney Beth McCann, to challenge the constitutionality of § 19-1-307 of the Colorado Children’s Code Records and Information Act (“Children’s Code”). Peck alleged Section 307 violated her First Amendment rights by restricting her disclosures and thereby chilling her speech on these matters. The district court agreed and struck down both of Section 307’s penalty provisions. The Tenth Circuit thought Section 307(1) and Section 307(4) had different scopes due to their distinct language and legislative histories. As a result, the Court found Peck could challenge Section 307(4)’s penalty as unconstitutional, but has not properly challenged Section 307(1). The Court thus reversed the district court’s order insofar as it invalidated Section 307(1). View "Peck v. McCann, et al." on Justia Law

In this post divorce dispute over child support and alimony, the Supreme Judicial Court held that a provision of the Alimony Reform Act, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 208, 53(c)(2), allows for the concurrent award of child support and alimony and that several of the judge's rulings relating to the divorce judgment and calculation of child support constituted error.In this dispute, both parties sought a modification of the child support order issued as part of the divorce judgment and Mother sought alimony for the first time in the proceedings. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated certain portions of the judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings, holding (1) the judge abused her discretion by not considering an award where alimony was calculated before child support and denied without consideration of the mandatory statutory factors set forth in section 53(a); (2) the judge erred in interpreting the language in the separation agreement as to the parties' obligations for the youngest son's schooling; and (3) the judge abused her discretion in excluding certain interest and capital gains on transactions other than those related to real and personal property in calculating Father's gross income for the purposes of child support. View "Cavanagh v. Cavanagh" on Justia Law

Defendant Jerry Vang was convicted by jury for multiple crimes against two different victims, including: kidnapping first degree felony murder with a special circumstance, infliction of corporal injury on a cohabitant, making criminal threats with firearm allegations, and firearms possession by a felon. Defendant had a long history of domestic violence, had an argument with his wife. After she fled in her car, defendant followed, eventually forced her to stop, and coerced her (through force or fear) into his vehicle. As defendant was driving away, his wife opened the door and jumped from the moving vehicle, resulting in her death. Defendant argued the trial court erred by permitting the prosecution to proceed on a legally inadequate theory of felony murder. He contends that under the current felony-murder rule, as amended by Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.), he could be liable for felony murder only if he was proven to be the “actual killer.” Because the evidence showed that his wife jumped from the vehicle of her own volition, defendant contends he was not the actual killer and therefore his conviction for first degree felony murder with a special circumstance rested on a legally invalid theory. To this, the Court of Appeal agreed, and reversed that conviction as to first degree felony murder. The judgment and convictions were affirmed in all other respects. View "California v. Vang" on Justia Law

Appellant made deferred cash payments to his ex-wife, Appellee, pursuant to a marriage termination agreement (MTA) that Appellee “waives any right to . . . permanent spousal maintenance.” At issue is whether those payments were nonetheless “spousal maintenance” payments under Minn. Stat. Section 518.552.The Eighth Circuit concluded that the answer is clearly no and therefore affirm the decision of the United States Tax Court denying Appellant deductions under now-repealed alimony provisions of the Internal Revenue Code for $51M in cash payments he made to Appellee during his 2012 and 2013 federal income tax years.The court concluded that that Minnesota law unambiguously establishes that the MTA was not a spousal maintenance agreement. Rather, it was a contractual division of marital property. Contractual obligations under a divorce agreement fall under the general rule that causes of action survive their personal representatives. Minn. Stat. Section 573.01. That being so, Minnesota law unambiguously provides that the payments in question were not deductible because Appellant’s liability to make the payments would survive Appellee’s death. This is consistent with the stated purpose of Section 71(b)(1)(D). View "Andrew Redleaf v. CIR" on Justia Law

In this dissolution action governed bay a premarital agreement the Supreme Court affirmed the decree in all respects with the exception of the court's itemization of a truck as part of the marital estate, which the court vacated, holding that there was largely no error in the proceedings below.The district court imposed a constructive trust over certain limited liability companies titled solely in Wife's name so that, under the agreement, they were considered additions to the marital estate. On appeal, Husband argued, among other things, the court abused its discretion in allowing Wife to amend her pleadings to include the issue of the constructive trust and that the evidence did not support the constructive trust. The Supreme Court largely affirmed, holding (1) there was no error in the court's imposition of a constructive trust; (2) the truck owned at the time of filing should not have been calculated as part of the marital estate; and (3) Husband's remaining assignments of error were without merit. View "Simons v. Simons" on Justia Law