Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court vacated the decision of the court of appeals concluding that an order of partial summary judgment entered in the underlying proceeding to modify custody and child support was immediately appealable as a final order in a special proceeding under Neb. Rev. Stat. 25-1902(1)(b), holding that Neb. Rev. Stat. 25-1315(1) was implicated but was not satisfied.Plaintiff filed a complaint to modify his child support obligation and certain provisions of the parties' parenting plan. Defendant counterclaimed, alleging that the Nebraska court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the child at issue when the dissolution decree was entered. The district court granted summary judgment for Defendant and voided every provision in the decree and parenting plan related to the child. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals' decision, holding that section 25-1315(1) was implicated in this case, and there was no proper certification under that statute. View "Mann v. Mann" on Justia Law

N.G. (Mother) appealed a juvenile court’s order terminating parental rights to her children, Ricky R. and Jayden R. Mother argued the Riverside County Department of Public Social Services (DPSS) failed to discharge its duty of initial inquiry under state law implementing the federal Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA). DPSS did not dispute that it failed to discharge its duty of initial inquiry, but it argued that the error was harmless. DPSS also moved to dismiss the appeal as moot on the basis of postjudgment evidence, and it asked the Court of Appeal to consider that evidence under several theories. After review, the Court concluded DPSS prejudicially erred by failing to comply with its duty of initial inquiry under ICWA-related state law. The Court also denied DPSS’s motion to dismiss the appeal and declined to consider the postjudgment evidence of ICWA inquiries conducted while this appeal was pending. To this end, the Court held the juvenile court should consider that evidence in the first instance and determine whether DPSS discharged its duties under ICWA and related state law. View "In re Ricky R." on Justia Law

D.L. (Mother) is the biological mother of four children: E.L., Child 1, now 15 years old; E.R.O., Child 2, now 11; L.O., Child 3, now 10; and E.O.O., Child 4, now 7. E.O. (Father) is the presumed father of Child 1 and the biological father of the other children. In January 2015, Father began a two-year term in the Ventura County jail. Aida R. was appointed legal guardian of the children.   Mother contends the trial court abused its discretion in denying her request to reopen the evidence to allow her to testify. Mother contends the trial court failed to comply with the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA). Mother argues that ICWA is a substantial right, and her counsel may not waive a substantial right without her consent.   The Second Appellate District affirmed the orders and found that the ICWA does not apply. The court explained that the circumstances here, however, warrant application of Code of Civil Procedure section 909. The court wrote that remand would unnecessarily delay the likelihood of adoption of the children and would achieve the same result the court found here. View "In re E.L." on Justia Law

Father appealed the juvenile court’s order terminating his and Mother’s parental rights and finding that the child, J.R., was adoptable. The Second Appellate District conditionally reversed that order because the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS or the agency) violated Mother’s due process rights.The court explained that the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that “[n]o State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . .” (U.S. Const., 14th Amend., Section 1.) Except in emergent circumstances, this provision guarantees reasonable notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard before the state may deprive a person of a protected liberty or property interest. Because parents have a fundamental liberty interest in the companionship, care, custody, and management of their children, the due process clause requires child welfare agencies to exercise reasonable diligence in attempting to locate and notify them of dependency proceedings.   The court explained that this case presents a textbook example of a due process violation. DCFS initiated dependency proceedings concerning J.R. on the ground that his father physically abused him. Even though Father told the agency at the outset of the proceedings that Mother resided in El Salvador, the record does not show that DCFS made any attempt to ascertain Mother’s location in that country. The court concluded that Father has standing to assert DCFS’s violation of Mother’s due process rights. View "In re J.R." on Justia Law

T.T. (Mother) challenged a juvenile court’s finding that the federal Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA) did not apply to the dependency proceedings concerning her son, Dominick D. She argued the juvenile court failed to ensure that San Bernardino County Children and Family Services (CFS) discharged its duty of initial inquiry into Dominick’s possible Indian ancestry under California Welfare & Institutions Code section 224.2(b). To this, the Court of Appeal agreed, but declined to address the parties’ arguments concerning harmlessness, because ICWA inquiry and notice errors did not warrant reversal of the juvenile court’s jurisdictional or dispositional findings and orders other than the finding that ICWA did not apply. The Court accordingly vacated that finding and remanded for compliance with ICWA and related California law, but otherwise affirmed. View "In re Dominick D." on Justia Law

The Georgia Division of Family and Children Services (DFCS) was the temporary custodian of Appellants John and Brittani Chandler’s three children. The Chandlers sought a determination they had constitutional and statutory rights to object on religious grounds to DFCS’s immunization of their children. Because the juvenile court applied the wrong standard in finding that the Chandlers’ religious objection was insincere, the Georgia Supreme Court vacated the trial court’s order and remanded this case for application of the correct standard. View "In the Interest of C.C. et al., children" on Justia Law

The boys were removed from the custody of their (married) parents by the Humboldt County Department of Health and Human Services in 2020, after a string of child abuse and neglect referrals stemming from repeated bouts of domestic violence between the couple, concerns over parental substance abuse and, in mother’s case, mental health concerns. The boys, then 19 months and 6 months old, were placed into foster care together, later joined by a sister who was detained in a separate case after mother tested positive for drugs at her birth. The juvenile court sustained allegations that the boys were at substantial risk of serious physical and emotional harm.Mother appealed a subsequent termination of her parental rights, arguing that the juvenile court erred in its consideration of the beneficial relationship exception (Welf. & Inst. Code 366.26(c)(1)(B)(i)), under “Caden C.,” a 2021 decision. The court of appeal affirmed the orders terminating parental rights, without reaching the merits. The record does not contain evidence that would support the application of the beneficial relationship exception. When a juvenile court applies the wrong legal standard in rejecting the beneficial relationship exception, reversal is not warranted if the parent did not introduce evidence that would permit a finding in their favor under the correct legal standard. View "In re J.R." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated the orders of the trial court terminating Mother's parental rights in her three children, holding that the trial court failed to make necessary determinations to support the adjudication of grounds for termination under N.C. Gen. Stat. 7B-1111(a)(1) and (2).After a hearing, the trial court terminated Mother's parental rights based on neglect and failure to show reasonable progress in correcting the conditions which led to the removal of the children from the home. On appeal, Mother argued that the trial court failed to make certain necessary determinations regarding both grounds for termination. The Supreme Court agreed and vacated the judgment, holding that the trial court failed to make the necessary determinations on adjudication under sections 7B-1111(a)(1) and (2). View "In re M.B." on Justia Law

Defendant A.L.A. was the legal guardian of her four grandchildren, who ranged in age from three to seventeen years old. In August 2016, the oldest grandchild reported that defendant physically abused them. After an investigation, the New Jersey Division of Child Protection & Permanency initiated an emergency removal of all four grandchildren. Defendant was tried for multiple counts of endangering the welfare of a child. The parties agreed that the court would instruct the jury on second-degree endangering, and what the parties termed a lesser included disorderly persons offense of simple assault. The issue this case presented for the New Jersey Supreme Court’s review centered on whether the jury could have understood the affirmative defense of reasonable corporal punishment applied to both the child endangerment charge and the simple assault chard, where the reasonable corporal punishment instruction was provided only in the instructions for the child endangerment charge. The Supreme Court determined after review that the jury could not have understood the language in the instruction applied to both charges. Therefore, the Supreme Court held the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury, in the context of the simple assault charge, that reasonable corporal punishment was not prohibited. Because that error in instructions could have led the jury to an unjust result, the conviction was vacated and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "New Jersey v. A.L.A." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals reversing the family court's holding that L.G. emotionally abused her son, holding that the family court was not clearly erroneous and did not abuse its discretion in finding that L.G. emotionally injured H.M., thus finding abuse and removing H.M. from L.G.'s custody.On appeal, L.G. argued that the trial court abused its discretion in finding emotional injury amounting to abuse. The court of appeals agreed and reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the court of appeals impermissibly substituted its own findings for the family court's and thus found an abuse of discretion; and (2) it was not unfair or unreasonable for the family court to conclude, based on substantial evidence, that H.M. was emotionally injured by L.G. View "Commonwealth v. L.G." on Justia Law