Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court terminating K.H.'s parental rights to her two children, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the conduct or condition rendering Mother unfit to parent was unlikely to change within a reasonable time.After a hearing, the district court granted the petitions filed by the Department of Public Health and Human Services, Child and Family Services Division to terminate K.H.'s parental rights to her children, finding that K.H. had failed the treatment plan and was unlikely to change in a reasonable amount of time. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion by terminating Mother's parental right on the basis of its finding that K.H.'s conduct or condition rendering her unfit was unlikely to change within a reasonable time. View "In re A.M.G." on Justia Law

Elouise Harber and Delores Williams filed cross-petitions to be appointed as guardians of two children. The trial court ordered them to exchange lists of the witnesses they intended to call, specifically including party witnesses; it also specifically ordered that they would not be permitted to call a witness who was not on their lists. Harber failed to exchange a witness list. When the case was called for trial, her counsel explained that her only witness was Harber herself, and that counsel mistakenly believed that the pretrial order did not require her to list party witnesses. Pursuant to its pretrial order, the trial court dismissed Harber’s petition and granted Williams’s petition. In the published portion of its opinion, the Court of Appeal held that, under the circumstances of this case, the trial court abused its discretion by imposing a terminating sanction View "Guardianship of A.H." on Justia Law

Appellant made a request for pendente lite attorney fees was made early in the marriage dissolution proceedings and had been pending for over a year when the trial started. By that time, Appellant was unemployed and representing herself. Nonetheless, her request for pendente lite attorney fees was never ruled on by the family court. Instead, the court waited until after the trial to address attorney fees in its final judgment of reserved issues.   The Fifth Appellate District explained that Appellant has demonstrated the family court’s failures to comply with its obligations under section 2030 were prejudicial. To remedy this prejudicial error, the court explained it must reverse the judgment (which places all reserved issues at large) and remand the case for further proceedings. Those proceedings shall include a hearing on Appellant’s request for pendente lite attorney fees and a decision on that request before the new trial is started. Because over four years have passed since Appellant filed her May 2018 request for an order awarding pendente lite attorney fees and costs, the court shall allow Appellant to file a new request for order and shall allow Blair to file a response before hearing the request for pendente lite attorney fees and costs. View "Marriage of Knox" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Vermont Supreme Court's review centered on whether a non-resident plaintiff could obtain a relief-from-abuse (RFA) order under Vermont’s Abuse Prevention Act. Mother and father were married in Massachusetts in 2015. Together, they had a daughter, age six, and a son, age five. The family’s relationship had been affected at times by father’s violent behavior and by mother’s substance abuse. Since 2019, father has lived in Dummerston, Vermont, while mother has maintained residency in Massachusetts. The couple remained married. After a November 2017 incident, mother reported father's abuse to police, and he was prosecuted for felony domestic violence. His contact with mother and the children was limited by a Massachusetts court. In June 2018, father sought emergency custody of the children in Massachusetts. He alleged that the Massachusetts Department of Children and Families had investigated mother for child neglect and that mother had been arraigned on a DUI, second offense, in early July 2018. A Massachusetts court held that despite father’s history of domestic violence, mother’s substance abuse impaired her ability to parent, and awarded custody to father and ordered that mother’s time with the children be restricted to supervised visits. The order also allowed father to move with the children to Vermont. Mother visited the children in Vermont, and on several occasions, father drove the children to Massachusetts to visit mother. When mother and father were getting along, mother had father’s permission to spend the night at his house. Mother’s time with the children was often unsupervised by father. They often spent time with the children together. Between January and April 2021, mother and father reconciled their relationship. By May 2021, this reconciliation had ended. Father told mother she could no longer see the children during unsupervised periods. However, mother still apparently spent considerably more time with the children than the Massachusetts court order allowed. Father subjected the children to corporal punishment and inappropriate outbursts of anger, some of which was witnessed by mother. In August 2021, she filed a complaint for an emergency RFA in Vermont; a Vermont court issued a temporary RFA order the same day. Father moved to dismiss the RFA order, contending that because mother was a resident of Massachusetts, she could not proceed under the Abuse Prevention Act. The family division concluded that mother could obtain both an emergency and final RFA order against father. The Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the family division's order. View "Bacigalupo v. Bacigalupo" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals dismissing Appellant's appeal from the denial of her request for custody of N.E., holding that the doctrine of stare decisis warranted this Court's continued adherence to In re N.A.C., 329 P.3d 458 (Kan. 2014), under which an order terminating parental rights is the last appealable order under Kan. Stat. Ann. 38-2273(a), and post-termination orders are not appealable, even if they address custody.Child-in-need-of-care proceedings began when the State took protective custody of N.E. and ended when N.E. was adopted by her foster family. Appellant, N.E.'s grandmother, sought custody of N.E. during the proceedings and appealed the district court's denial of her request. The court of appeals dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The Supreme Court affirmed and dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, holding that section 38-2273(a), as construed under In re N.A.C., barred appellate review of each of the district court orders from which Appellant appealed. View "In re N.E." on Justia Law

J.T. (father) appealed a juvenile court’s order terminating his parental rights to Kenneth D. (minor) and adopting the recommended findings and orders of the Placer County Department of Health and Human Services (Department). Father’s contentions on appeal were limited to the Department’s and juvenile court’s compliance with the requirements of the federal Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), complaining the juvenile court and the Department failed to make the required initial inquiries of father’s ICWA status prior to finding the ICWA inapplicable and terminating his parental rights. Father also argued the Department’s investigation into mother’s possible Native American heritage was inadequate. He contended these errors were prejudicial requiring reversal and that posttermination ICWA inquiries did not cure the alleged noncompliance. To this, the Court of Appeal disagreed: Father did not show the juvenile court’s ICWA determination premised upon information provided by mother was unsupported by substantial evidence, and in light of the augmented record filed May 5, 2022, Father could not show the juvenile court’s and Department’s failure to initially comply with their ICWA duties was prejudicial. Accordingly, judgment was affirmed. View "In re Kenneth D." on Justia Law

J.V. (Father) appealed a Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 order terminating his parental rights to his then three-year-old daughter, Y.M. His sole contention was that the San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency (the Agency) did not comply with its initial duty to inquire regarding Y.M.’s possible Indian ancestry under section 224.2 (b), which implemented in part the federal Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). The Agency conceded that it did not comply with its duty of initial inquiry, but argued its error was harmless. Applying the standard set forth in In re Benjamin M., 70 Cal.App.5th 735 (2021), the Court of Appeal concluded the Agency's section 224.2 (b) initial inquiry error was not prejudicial. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the section 366.26 order. View "In re Y.M." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court establishing child custody, visitation, and child support holding that the district court erred by exceeding the cap set forth in NAC 425.150(1)(f).Father in this case had a monthly income of approximately $38,000, and Mother's monthly income was approximately $5,000. Mother sought an upward adjustment to Father's child support obligation. The district court ordered Father to pay $3,500 per month in child support. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) section 425.150(1)(f) plainly caps the limit of any upward adjustment to Mother's monthly obligation amount; and (2) the district court did not err by basing an upward adjustment on NAC 425.150(1)(f), but the court did err by ordering an upward adjustment in excess of the other party's total obligation. View "Matkulak v. Davis" on Justia Law

Shelby Finnson appealed a judgment awarding primary residential responsibility of the parties’ minor child to Jacob Kershaw. She claimed the district court’s findings were unsupported by the record; the court’s parenting time decision was unreasoned; the court erred when it allowed Kershaw to call an undisclosed witness for purposes of rebuttal; and the presiding judge erred because he failed to certify himself as familiar with the record. Finding no reversible error, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the judgment. View "Kershaw v. Finnson, et al." on Justia Law

Petitioner Alicia Rudick (Wife) raised a single issue before the South Carolina Supreme Court: whether a former spouse who was both the primary wage earner and caretaker could be a "supported spouse" under South Carolina's statutory scheme governing alimony. The family court awarded Respondent Brian Rudick periodic alimony of $3,000 a month, and the court of appeals affirmed, reducing it by $300 monthly based on a mathematical miscalculation. Wife contended Husband was not a "supported spouse" and therefore did not meet the legal requirement to receive alimony or in the alternative, that the alimony award should have been reduced. Specifically, Wife argued that because Husband did not depress his income by seeking employment which would allow him more time to care for the children, he was not a supported spouse. Additionally, Wife argued the family court overemphasized the statutory factor addressing the parties' standard of living during the marriage. Conversely, Husband argued the court of appeals properly affirmed the family court's decision to award alimony, that Wife's argument elevates the term "supported spouse" to a contrived meaning not contemplated by the General Assembly, and that the term is descriptive only, and simply designates the person who receives alimony. Further, Husband argues the family court properly considered the parties' standard of living as one factor in awarding alimony. The Supreme Court agreed with Husband and affirmed the court of appeals. View "Rudick v. Rudick" on Justia Law