Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

Erin Carver alleged that her ex-husband, William Hornish, consented to the marriage of their 16-year-old daughter (“Daughter”) in order to legally emancipate her and circumvent custody provisions in the parties’ divorce decree. Carver learned of the alleged scheme before it was accomplished and filed a motion to prevent Hornish from exercising legal authority to consent to Daughter’s marriage. However, the magistrate court did not rule on the motion before Daughter was married. Carver argued on appeal that the motion should have been granted retroactively, effective to a date before the marriage or, in the alternative, the statute allowing a minor to marry with the consent of only one parent should be declared unconstitutional. The Idaho Supreme Court rejected both arguments, affirming dismissal of Carver's petition because the magistrate court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Daughter's custody and jurisdiction would not have been restored by granting Carver's motion for nunc pro tunc relief. Furthermore, the Court declined to rule on the constitutionality of the statute, Idaho Code section 32-202. View "Carver v. Hornish" on Justia Law

Two tribes claimed to be a child’s tribe for purposes of the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA): The Native Village of Wales claimed the child was a tribal member; the Native Village of Chignik Lagoon claims that the child is “eligible for tribal membership.” After the superior court terminated the biological parents’ parental rights, Wales moved to transfer subsequent proceedings, including potential adoption, to its tribal court. Chignik Lagoon intervened in the child in need of aid (CINA) case, arguing that the child was not a member of Wales under Wales’s constitution and that transfer of further proceedings to the Wales tribal court was not authorized under ICWA. The superior court found that the child was a member of Wales and that Wales was the child’s tribe for ICWA purposes, and therefore granted the transfer of jurisdiction. Chignik Lagoon appealed. After review, the Alaska Supreme Court affirmed the superior court’s determination that the child was a member of Wales and that Wales was appropriately designated as the child’s tribe for ICWA purposes. The Supreme Court also concluded that, given that ruling, Chignik Lagoon lacked standing to challenge the transfer of proceedings to the Wales tribal court. View "Native Village of Chignik Lagoon v. Alaska Dept. of Health & Soc. Svcs." on Justia Law

John Bodie, as guardian ad litem for G.A., D.P., and M.P. ("the children"), has filed three separate petitions for the writ of certiorari, one on each child's behalf, regarding a decision of the Court of Civil Appeals reversing judgments of the Jefferson Juvenile Court ("the juvenile court") that terminated the parental rights of H.P. ("the mother") to the children. The Alabama Supreme Court granted the petitions, and, after review, concluded the Court of Civil Appeals erred in rejecting the possibility that the juvenile court could have reasonably determined lear and convincing evidence had been presented demonstrating that no viable alternative to termination of the mother's parental rights existed. Judgments were therefore reversed and the cases remanded for further proceedings. View "Ex parte John Bodie, as guardian ad litem for G.A., D.P. and M.P." on Justia Law

A woman filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of the father of her child because the child was conceived as a result of sexual abuse. After years of litigation, including a previous appeal, the superior court held a hearing on the petition and denied it. The woman appealed. "The court’s factual findings are supported by the record, and we do 'not re-weigh evidence when the record provides clear support for the trial court’s ruling.'" Accordingly, the Alaska Supreme Court affirmed the superior court’s denial of her petition. View "Angelica C. v. Jonathan C." on Justia Law

A couple separated after three years of marriage. They had a son who was later diagnosed with several mental disabilities. The father paid child support until the son turned 19; when the son was in his twenties the father filed for divorce. The superior court entered a divorce decree and ordered the father to pay post-majority child support, finding that the son was unable to support himself by reason of his disability. The father appealed, arguing that the superior court lacked jurisdiction and the statutory authority to order post-majority support and that the court abused its discretion by ordering him to pay the entirety of the son’s living expenses. The Alaska Supreme Court affirmed the superior court’s exercise of jurisdiction and authority to issue the support order. However, because of an inconsistency in the support order’s application, the case was remanded to the superior court for reconsideration of whether the father’s support obligation — 100% of the son’s living expenses — represented a fair percentage. View "Daum v. Daum" on Justia Law

Mother challenged the denial of her request that a child-support order be made retroactive and that she be awarded the arrearage. A magistrate judge found that mother assigned her right to any past-due support to the Office of Child Support (OCS) as a condition of receiving benefits on behalf of her child and that the State waived any arrearages. The family division affirmed. Mother argued on appeal that she did not assign OCS her right to past-due support. Finding no reversible error, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the family division. View "OCS/Dionne v. Anthony" on Justia Law

This case presented an issue of first impression for the Washington Supreme Court relating to the business records exception to the rule against hearsay: the admissibility of a drug rehabilitation and testing center incident report under RCW 5.45.020. The child in this case, M.R., was removed from her parents’ custody shortly after birth because of her mother’s history of involvement with Child Protective Services for her two older children and the mother’s suspected ongoing substance abuse and mental health problems. In 2017, the Department of Children, Youth, and Families (Department) petitioned to terminate the parental rights of M.R.’s father, D.R. Throughout the course of M.R.’s dependency, the juvenile court ordered D.R. to engage in various remedial services designed to correct his perceived parenting deficiencies. One such requirement asked D.R. to provide a urinalysis (UA) sample. D.R. went for the UA test but left without providing a sample. The clinic staff member who monitored the test submitted an incident report, which stated D.R. had been seen attempting to open a UA “device” during the test. The State moved to terminate D.R.’s parental rights, and at the time of the trial, despite several follow-up requests to comply with a UA test, D.R. failed to produce a UA sample. At trial, the incident report was admitted as a business record to show D.R. was caught attempting to use a UA device. In November 2020, D.R.’s parental rights were terminated. He appealed, arguing the judge committed prejudicial error by admitting the incident report as a business record because the observation of the UA device involved a degree of “skill of observation” akin to expert testimony and in excess of the scope of the business records exception. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court determined the judge's decision to admit the incident report met applicable legal standards, and was not manifestly unreasonable or based on untenable grounds. Therefore, the Court found no abuse of discretion and therefore affirmed. View "In re Welfare of M.R." on Justia Law

Pro Se respondent-appellant Anthony Hammer (Father) was a member of the Cherokee Nation. His parental rights to his children were terminated, and he sought to collaterally attack the termination order using: McGirt v. Oklahoma, 140 S. Ct. 2452 (2020); the United States' 1866 treaty with the Cherokee, Treaty with the Cherokee, U.S.-Cherokee Nation, July 19, 1866, 14 Stat. 799; and the federal Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). Father argued the district court never acquired jurisdiction because the children were domiciled or resided within the Muscogee (Creek) Nation's reservation. The district court implicitly found Children were not residents or domiciliaries of a reservation. At no point in the original proceedings did Father or the tribe allege otherwise. No direct appeal was filed from the original order. Instead, Father brought a claim to vacate more than a year after the judgment terminating his parental rights became final. "A motion to vacate is not a substitute for a timely appeal. A judgment will only be vacated as void if the lack of jurisdiction affirmatively appears on the face of the judgment roll." Because Father failed to demonstrate the judgment was void, the Oklahoma Supreme Court affirmed the order denying Father's motion to vacate. View "Hammer v. Oklahoma" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the circuit court terminating Mother's parental rights to her five children, holding that there was no error in the proceedings below.Following a disposition hearing, the circuit court determined that Mother had not successfully completed her improvement period and terminated her parental rights. Mother appealed, arguing that the circuit court erred by terminating her parental rights based on the findings that she had continued to have a relationship with a certain person during her improvement period and that there was no reasonable likelihood of correcting the conditions of abuse and neglect in the near future. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that there was sufficient evidence to support the circuit court's determination. View "In re F.N." on Justia Law

A.H. (Mother) and J.H. (Father) appealed a juvenile court’s order terminating their parental rights to their two-year-old son, G.H., at the permanent plan selection and implementation hearing held under California Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. G.H. was detained from his parents’ custody two days after he was born when both he and Mother tested positive for methamphetamine. Mother and Father were homeless at the time, and had been struggling with methamphetamine abuse for approximately eight years. Father admitted he did not discourage Mother’s drug use during pregnancy. The day before G.H. was detained, Mother, G.H.’s maternal great aunt, and his maternal grandmother denied Native American ancestry. Father claimed he was a “small percent” Cherokee, but he acknowledged he was not registered as a member of the tribe. On appeal, Mother and Father contend the juvenile court erred in finding that a statutory exception to terminating the parental rights of an adoptable child did not apply. They also contended the Orange County Social Services Agency (SSA) and the court did not meet their obligations under the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA) and related state law to investigate G.H.’s Native American background. The Court of Appeal found nothing in the record suggested SSA or the court made any effort to use social media as a means of contacting the paternal grandmother for the purposes of determining ancestry, so it conditionally reversed the termination and remanded for the agency to conduct further inquiry. View "In re G.H." on Justia Law