Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

David Paul Planchard was convicted by a jury of stalking Debra Doe and violating a protective order. Planchard and Doe had a relationship from 1997 to 2000 and had a son together in 2006. Despite a restraining order issued in 2020, Planchard continued to harass Doe through public Facebook posts from 2016 to 2023. These posts included threats, derogatory comments, and references to Doe's past trauma. Planchard also showed up at Doe's house in May 2023, violating the protective order.The Superior Court of Sacramento County found Planchard guilty of stalking and violating a protective order. The jury determined that Planchard's actions, including his Facebook posts and visit to Doe's house, constituted a credible threat and harassment. The court sentenced him to five years for stalking and a stayed term of six months for violating the protective order.The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case. Planchard argued that his Facebook posts did not constitute direct contact and thus could not be considered harassment under the stalking statute. The court disagreed, citing precedent that indirect threats and harassment through third parties or public posts can still meet the statutory requirements for stalking. The court found sufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict, noting that the posts were intended to harass and threaten Doe, and it was reasonably foreseeable that she would see them.The court also addressed Planchard's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, finding no merit in his arguments. The court concluded that the Facebook posts were relevant and admissible, and that any failure to object by his counsel did not constitute ineffective assistance. The judgment of the Superior Court was affirmed. View "P. v. Planchard" on Justia Law

In this case, the paternal grandmother, Natasha Ray, was appointed as the temporary guardian of a minor child shortly after the child's birth in 2015, with the father's consent. Over the next five years, the child's parents, Anthony Lowman and Kayla Morgan-Smart, contested the temporary guardianship. The magistrate court found no grounds to grant a permanent guardianship to the grandmother and aimed to reunify the child with the parents through a phased visitation plan. Despite this, the grandmother was held in contempt multiple times for failing to comply with court orders regarding visitation.The grandmother appealed the magistrate court's decisions to the district court. However, neither she nor her attorney, Wm. Breck Seiniger, filed the required opening briefs. The district court dismissed the appeal due to the failure to file timely briefs and found no good cause for the delay. The grandmother then filed a new notice of appeal from a subsequent contempt judgment, but again failed to file the necessary briefs on time, leading to the dismissal of the second appeal as well.The Supreme Court of Idaho reviewed the case and determined that Seiniger did not have the authority to represent the child, as he was never appointed by the magistrate court. The court also noted that the grandmother failed to challenge the district court's dismissal of her appeals in her briefing. Consequently, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decisions to dismiss the appeals and struck Seiniger's petition to intervene and notices of joinder. View "Ray v. Morgan-Smart" on Justia Law

Dan Lee Gearhart and Kristin A. Marlar divorced in September 2018, with Gearhart ordered to pay monthly child support. Gearhart applied for Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) benefits for himself and his children, which were approved after the divorce, with payments retroactive to August 2018. The children’s benefits were paid to Marlar as their representative payee. Gearhart stopped making child support payments, believing the SSDI payments covered his obligation. In May 2022, Gearhart petitioned the magistrate court to credit the SSDI payments against his child support arrearage, effectively reducing it to $0.00. Marlar opposed this, arguing it constituted a retroactive modification of child support.The magistrate court credited the SSDI payments against Gearhart’s arrearage, eliminating his outstanding balance. Marlar appealed to the district court, which reversed the magistrate court’s decision, concluding that Idaho Code section 32-709 prohibited retroactive modification of child support. The district court remanded the case with instructions to deny the application of SSDI payments as a credit against Gearhart’s arrearage.The Supreme Court of Idaho reviewed the case and reversed the district court’s decision. The Supreme Court held that Idaho Code section 32-709 did not apply to Gearhart’s petition because he was not seeking a modification of his child support obligation but rather a credit for SSDI payments already made. The court concluded that section 32-709(2) did not limit the magistrate court’s discretion to credit SSDI benefits against the child support arrearage. The case was remanded to the district court with instructions to reinstate the magistrate court’s judgment crediting the SSDI payments against Gearhart’s arrearage. Neither party was awarded attorney fees on appeal. View "Marlar v. Gearhart" on Justia Law

A child was born to Anthony Lowman and Kayla Morgan-Smart in 2015. The child's paternal grandmother, Natasha Ray, was appointed as her temporary guardian shortly after birth. Ray was later allowed to intervene in the parents' divorce action to determine custody once the guardianship ended in August 2021. Before the guardianship ended, attorney Wm. Breck Seiniger, Jr. was asked by Ray to represent the child, which he accepted without court appointment. Seiniger filed a notice of appearance in the divorce action, which the parents objected to. The magistrate court ruled that Seiniger could not represent the child as there was no motion to appoint counsel, it was unnecessary at that stage, and a neutral attorney would be appointed if needed.The parents reached a custody agreement and filed a stipulation for joint custody. Despite the magistrate court's ruling, Seiniger objected to the proposed judgment on behalf of the child. The magistrate court overruled the objections and entered a judgment consistent with the parents' stipulation. Ray appealed the custody judgment to the district court, joined by Seiniger. The district court concluded that Seiniger had no authority to represent the child and dismissed the appeal, characterizing Seiniger as an "officious interloper." Ray's appeal was later dismissed for failure to provide timely briefing.The Supreme Court of Idaho reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that the magistrate court acted within its discretion in rejecting Seiniger's representation of the child, as there was no motion to appoint counsel and it was unnecessary at that stage. The court also found that Seiniger's arguments were unpreserved and unsupported by sufficient authority. Consequently, the district court's order, including the decision to strike all pleadings filed by Seiniger, was affirmed. View "Lowman v. Morgan-Smart" on Justia Law

In 2015, the parental rights of H.M. and B.M.'s biological parents were terminated, and the children were adopted by their aunt, C.M. In 2019, the children were removed from C.M.'s home due to her substance abuse but were later returned after she completed an improvement period. In April 2022, new referrals indicated C.M. had relapsed, and the family was homeless. C.M. placed H.M. and B.M. in guardianships and entered a rehabilitation facility. DHS filed an abuse and neglect petition in May 2022. C.M. stipulated to substance abuse, and the court found the children to be abused and neglected. C.M. was granted an improvement period but failed to secure stable housing and employment and tested positive for drugs.The Circuit Court of Jefferson County held dispositional hearings and determined that C.M. did not substantially comply with her improvement period. The court placed H.M. in a legal guardianship with her foster mother, A.H., under West Virginia Code § 49-4-604(c)(5), and dismissed C.M. from the case, allowing only the GAL or DHS to seek modification of the disposition.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reviewed the case and found that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in determining that C.M. failed to make sufficient improvement to be reunified with H.M. However, the court found errors in the dispositional order, specifically the dismissal of C.M. from the case and the provision for post-termination visitation at A.H.'s discretion. The court affirmed the decision to place H.M. in a legal guardianship but vacated the order in part and remanded the case for further proceedings to correct these deficiencies. View "In re H.M." on Justia Law

Christopher J. Lamm and Amanda R. Kinney Anderson are the parents of F.L.F.L.K. Christopher lives in Williston, North Dakota, and Amanda lives in Bainville, Montana. They were not married, and after the birth of their child, Christopher filed a Petition for Parenting Plan in the District Court on March 1, 2023. The court held a hearing on May 23, 2023, where both parties, representing themselves, participated in an informal manner. The court established an interim parenting plan, allowing Christopher supervised visits with the goal of gradually increasing his parenting time.The District Court issued an order on January 22, 2024, setting a hearing for a final parenting plan under the new Informal Domestic Relations Trial (IDRT) process, which came into effect on October 1, 2023. The court held the hearing on February 5, 2024, where it questioned both parties about their lives and their ability to care for the child. The court issued its final parenting plan on February 7, 2024, designating Amanda as the primary custodian and gradually increasing Christopher's parenting time, with the goal of transitioning to overnight visits once the child turned two.Christopher appealed, arguing that the District Court failed to fully inform him of the IDRT process and did not consider the best interests of the child statutes. The Montana Supreme Court found that while the District Court did not fully explain the IDRT process, Christopher did not object and fully participated in the hearing. The court also found no substantial prejudice to Christopher from the IDRT process. The Supreme Court affirmed the District Court's decision, finding no abuse of discretion in the manner the IDRT was conducted or in the formulation of the final parenting plan. View "In re Parenting of F.L.F.L.K." on Justia Law

The petitioner, Maria Cristina Jarero Penichet (mother), appealed orders from the Circuit Court granting the motion of the respondent, Kenneth Corroon (father), to deny registration of a foreign child support order from Mexico under the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA). The Circuit Court concluded that the Mexico court did not have personal jurisdiction over the father and denied the mother’s request to reopen the record.The mother and father, who are unmarried, have one minor child born in New York in 2016. They executed a Stipulation of Paternity, Custody, and Access in New York, granting the mother sole custody and the right to relocate with the child, which she did, moving to Mexico in September 2016. The father, who lives in New Hampshire, began providing monthly child support. In 2022, the mother filed a petition in Mexico City for child support, resulting in a temporary support order. She then sought to register this order in New Hampshire, which the father contested, arguing that Mexico lacked personal jurisdiction over him.The Circuit Court found that the father did not have sufficient minimum contacts with Mexico to justify its exercise of personal jurisdiction. The court issued temporary orders to protect the child’s interests and denied the mother’s motion for reconsideration and to reopen the record, concluding that the additional facts presented did not establish jurisdiction.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the Circuit Court’s decision. The court held that the father did not purposefully avail himself of the benefits and protections of Mexico’s laws, as required by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The court also found no error in the Circuit Court’s refusal to reopen the record, as the mother did not provide reasons why the new information could not have been presented earlier. View "In the Matter of Penichet and Corroon" on Justia Law

A father was found to have neglected his child by the Calloway Circuit Court after a school resource officer (SRO) detected the odor of marijuana emanating from the father's vehicle during a school drop-off. The child, who was six years old, was also found to have behavioral issues at school and tested positive for marijuana exposure. The father tested positive for marijuana, methamphetamine, and oxycodone, although he had a prescription for the latter. The family court concluded that the father’s substance use created a risk of physical injury to the child.The father appealed the decision to the Kentucky Court of Appeals, which reversed the family court’s ruling. The Court of Appeals held that the family court’s decision was clearly erroneous, asserting that the Cabinet for Health and Family Services had not provided sufficient evidence that the father's actions resulted in a risk of physical or emotional injury to the child.The Supreme Court of Kentucky reviewed the case and reversed the Court of Appeals' decision, reinstating the family court's order. The Supreme Court held that the family court’s findings were supported by substantial evidence, including the SRO’s testimony, the Cabinet investigator’s observations, and the drug test results. The Supreme Court concluded that the father’s actions, including smoking marijuana in an enclosed vehicle with the child and driving under the influence, created a reasonable potential for harm, thus constituting neglect under Kentucky law. View "Commonwealth v. K.O." on Justia Law

Melzena Moore pled guilty to first-degree manslaughter of Raymond Jackson under extreme emotional disturbance (EED) as part of a plea agreement. The issue on appeal is whether the Laurel Circuit Court erred in denying Moore the domestic violence exemption to the mandatory minimum sentence for parole eligibility. This exemption would allow Moore to be considered for parole after serving 20% of her eighteen-year sentence and qualify her for counseling and rehabilitation programs.The Laurel Circuit Court found that Moore was a victim of domestic violence based on a single corroborated incident but concluded that her shooting of Jackson did not occur "with regard to" the domestic violence. The court denied Moore the exemption, citing a lack of corroborating evidence for her account of the events leading up to the shooting and questioning her credibility. The Court of Appeals reversed this decision, instructing the trial court to grant the exemption, arguing that the trial court failed to properly apply the "some connection" standard and did not adequately consider the expert testimony provided by Moore.The Supreme Court of Kentucky reviewed the case and determined that the trial court erred in its analysis by not making sufficient factual findings regarding the totality of the evidence of domestic violence. The court emphasized that the "some connection" standard does not require a direct causal link or contemporaneous act of domestic violence. The Supreme Court vacated the trial court's order and remanded the case for further factual findings and proper application of the legal standard to determine if Moore qualifies for the domestic violence exemption. View "Commonwealth v. Moore" on Justia Law

Robert Wills and Aniela Humphries, who share three children, divorced in January 2012. They initially shared physical custody on a 2/3-1/3 basis, switching to a 50-50 arrangement in January 2013. In November 2020, Wills refused to return their middle child to Humphries, prompting her to file a motion to enforce the custody agreement. The court found Wills had disobeyed the custody order and undermined the child's relationship with Humphries. It ordered a gradual transition back to 50-50 custody.Humphries sought attorney’s fees for enforcing the custody order, and the court awarded her $21,000, considering the parties' financial circumstances and the importance of the issues. Despite the court's order, Wills moved to South Carolina with the middle child and later sought to modify custody. The court granted him primary physical custody and modified child support, requiring Humphries to pay $1,070.89 monthly.Humphries requested an offset of the child support she owed against the attorney’s fees Wills owed her. The court granted the offset, finding that manifest injustice would result if Humphries had to pay child support while Wills owed her a substantial sum. The court determined that Wills still owed $15,641.09 in attorney’s fees and ordered Humphries to begin paying child support in March 2024.The Alaska Supreme Court affirmed the superior court’s order, holding that the superior court has discretion to order an offset against child support if good cause exists and the offset is in the children’s best interests. The court found that the superior court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that manifest injustice would result without the offset and that the offset was in the children’s best interests. View "Wills v. Humphries" on Justia Law