Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

Mother Jane Doe appealed a magistrate court's judgment granting a petition to terminate her parental rights to her two minor children, Jane Doe I and John Doe I (the children). The magistrate court determined that Mother had neglected the children as defined in Idaho Code section 16-2002(3)(b), and that termination was in the best interests of the children. On appeal, Mother argued the definition of “neglect” provided in section 16-2002(3)(b) violated the Idaho and the United States Constitutions, and she argues that the magistrate court’s finding that termination was in the children’s best interests was not supported by substantial and competent evidence. After its review of the magistrate court record, the Idaho Supreme Court found the magistrate court found, by clear and convincing evidence that Mother’s parental rights should be terminated. That decision was supported by substantial and competent evidence in the record. It was therefore affirmed. View "IDHW v. Jane Doe" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals reversing the judgments of the juvenile court granting permanent custody of three children to the Butler County Department of Job and Family Services - Children Services Division (the agency), holding that the current challenge to the juvenile court's jurisdiction was barred by res judicata.The dispositional hearing granting the agency temporary custody of the children in this case occurred more than ninety days after the filing of complaints for temporary custody. The juvenile court then granted permanent custody to the agency. The appellate court reversed, concluding that the juvenile court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to grant permanent custody to the agency because the temporary-custody judgment was void. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) even if no motion to dismiss has been filed, under the plain language of former Ohio Rev. Code 2151.35(B)(1), the juvenile court is required to dismiss the complaint after ninety days; (2) a juvenile court's failure to dismiss the complaint is an error in the exercise of the court's jurisdiction, not one that deprives the court of jurisdiction; and (3) the judgments granting temporary custody of the children to the agency were valid, and the parents' challenge to the juvenile court's jurisdiction was barred by res judicata. View "In re K.K." on Justia Law

Tuwanda Williams and John Williams, Jr., filed a “Joint Motion to Dismiss Fault Grounds and Consent to Divorce on Grounds of Irreconcilable Differences” and submitted for review a judgment of divorce based on irreconcilable differences and a divorce agreement. Shortly thereafter, Tuwanda changed her mind. She withdrew her consent to the divorce agreement and also withdrew her consent to the divorce based on irreconcilable differences. John moved to enforce the divorce agreement. The chancellor found that Tuwanda timely withdrew her consent to the irreconcilable-differences divorce but that the divorce agreement was an enforceable contract binding on both Tuwanda and John. The chancellor granted John’s motion to enforce the divorce agreement and entered what he called a “final judgment” incorporating the agreement. Tuwanda appealed. The Mississippi Supreme Court found that because the order entitled “final judgment” was not a final, appealable judgment, it lacked jurisdiction to review. Accordingly, the appeal was dismissed. View "Williams v. Williams" on Justia Law

Kimberlyn Seals and her counsels of record, Felecia Perkins, Jessica Ayers, and Derek D. Hopson, Sr., appealed a chancery court's: (1) Contempt Order entered on April 8, 2020; (2) the Temporary Order entered on April 28, 2020; (3) the Jurisdictional Final Judgment entered on June 16, 2020; (4) the Final Judgment on Motion for Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law entered on June 18, 2020; and (5) the Amended Final Judgment entered on June 18, 2020. Seals argued the chancellor lacked jurisdiction and erroneously found them to be in contempt of court. These orders arose out of a paternity suit filed by the father of Seals' child, born 2017. A hearing was set for April 7, 2020, but Seals sought a continuance. The motion was deemed untimely, and that the court expected Seals and her counsel to appear at the April 7 hearing. When Seals and her counsel failed to appear, the court entered the contempt orders at issue before the Mississippi Supreme Court. The Supreme Court: (1) affirmed the chancellor’s finding that Perkins and Ayers were in direct criminal contempt for their failure to appear at a scheduled April 7 hearing; (2) vacated the $3,000 sanction because it exceeded the penalties prescribed by statute; (3) affirmed the award of attorneys’ fees to opposing counsel; (4) found the chancellor erred in finding Hopson to be in direct criminal contempt for failing to appear - "Constructive criminal contempt charges require procedural safeguards of notice and a hearing;" and (5) found the chancellor erroneously found the attorneys to be in direct criminal contempt for violation of the September 2019 Temporary Order. "If proved, such acts are civil contempt." The matter was remanded for a determination of whether an indirect civil contempt proceeding should be commenced. View "Seals, et al. v. Stanton" on Justia Law

The parties obtained a divorce in 2016. In 2020, Jennifer Bryant filed a motion in which she asked the chancellor, pursuant to Section 17 of the property settlement agreement (which was incorporated into the divorce decree), to determine which school the three minor children should attend: Hernando or Lake Cormorant. The father, Kenneth Bryant, wanted the children to go to school at Lake Cormorant because his wife, Alicia Bryant, was a teacher there. The chancellor decided that it was in the children’s best interest to go to school in the Hernando public school district. Kenneth appealed, but the Court of Appeals affirmed the chancellor's decision. The Court of Appeals determined that the language of the property settlement agreement authorized the chancellor to reevaluate the matter and that “[a] property settlement agreement cannot deprive the court of its authority to modify support and educational needs of a child.” The Mississippi Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Appeals. Therefore, it affirmed. View "Bryant v. Bryant" on Justia Law

A mother appeals an order terminating parental rights over her son, based on a deficient initial inquiry about Indian ancestry. The only source of information about ancestry was the mother. The Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services could have satisfied its inquiry obligations by asking for contact information and making a few phone calls.   The Second Appellate District conditionally reversed and remanded to allow the Department and juvenile court fully to comply with the Indian Child Welfare Act (25 U.S.C. Section 1901 et seq.) (the Act) and related California law. The court reasoned that because the Department does not argue the issue and because the effect tribal involvement may have had on this case is unknown, the son’s adoptive placement does not establish harmlessness. The court held that, after completing the initial inquiry, there is no reason to believe the son is an Indian child, the court shall reinstate its order terminating parental rights. View "In re Oscar H." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the circuit court granting a divorce to Husband and Wife on the grounds of irreconcilable differences, holding that the circuit court erred in part.On appeal, Husband raised challenges regarding issues involving child custody and support, the valuation and division of marital assets, and attorney fees. Wife appealed the circuit court's rulings regarding the grounds for divorce, property division and valuation, and attorney fees. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) the circuit court's findings were insufficient to support its conclusion that certain buy-out funds should be excluded from the marital estate and in setting the property aside as non-marital; and (2) the trial court erred by sua sponte ordering the production of the parties' tax returns post-divorce without seeking in put from the parties on the relevant considerations for a protective order. View "Dunham v. Sabers" on Justia Law

Appellee Andrea Milne dated Appellant Howard Hudson. During an argument, Hudson became violent with Milne. Milne sought a civil protection order from the McIntosh County district court, as the couple dated in in Eufaula, Oklahoma. She stated in her application, and testified at a hearing, that Hudson first attacked her in a car, slamming her head into the dashboard. When they got to her house, he hit her and threw her across her yard. Finally, he pushed his way into her house, grabbed some of his belongings, and struck her in front of her children. When the children came to her aid, he absconded, but returned later and threatened to burn the house down. Milne testified that after the afternoon of violent acts, he stalked her at home, around town, and at her workplace. This application and testimony, though not tested by investigation or cross-examination, "were certainly enough to justify an order of protection." Hudson objected, claiming that the district court had no jurisdiction to enter the eventual order. Hudson argued that because McIntosh County was within the boundaries of the Muscogee Reservation, Milne was a member of the Muscogee Nation, and Hudson was a member of the Cherokee Nation, the McIntosh District Court had no jurisdiction to enter a civil protective order against him. The trial court denied the objection and entered the civil protection order. The Oklahoma Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision. View "Milne v. Hudson" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment of the district court granting Wife's complaint for divorce, holding that the trial court's factual findings were not supported by competent record evidence.On appeal, Husband argued that the trial court erred in determining that a 1968 Ford Mustang was a gift to Wife and setting it aside for her as her nonmarital property and in awarding a 2013 Honda Rancher to Wife. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment below, holding (1) because the parties did not present evidence of under what circumstances the 1968 Ford Mustang was acquired the trial court lacked an adequate evidentiary basis from which it could award the vehicle to set it aside for one of the parties; and (2) because there was no evidence that the parties owned a 2013 Honda Rancher at the time of the final hearing the trial court erroneously awarded one to Wife. View "Mitchell v. Mitchell" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals held that the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children (ICPC) does not apply to out-of-state, noncustodial parents seeking custody of their children who are not in custody of New York social services agencies.ICPC is an interstate agreement to follow certain procedures in connection with sending children across state borders "for placement in foster care or as a preliminary to a possible adoption." In 2012, Suffolk County Department of Social Services (DSS) removed Child from the custody of Mother, a New York resident, and placed Child in foster care. In 2013, an application was made under the ICPC to North Carolina, where Father was a resident, for the approval of Father's home as a suitable placement for Child. The North Carolina authority denied the request. In 2017, Father commenced these custody proceedings arguing that it was in Child's best interests to award him sole custody. Family Court dismissed the petitions without a hearing, concluding that the ICPC's requirements did not apply to placement of Child with Father because Child was in the custody of DSS in New York. The appellate division affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the ICPC does not apply to out-of-state noncustodial parents seeking custody of their children. View "Matter of D.L. v S.B." on Justia Law