Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part the decision of the court of appeals affirming several circuit court rulings in the underlying dissolution proceeding between Wife and Husband, holding that the circuit court erred in part.Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) the circuit court erred in its division of Husband's 401(k); (2) the circuit court did not err in its valuation of Husband's ownership in a corporation but did err in its distribution of that ownership interest; (3) the circuit court erred in its rulings regarding attorney's fees; and (4) given this Court's holdings, reconsideration of maintenance was required. View "Thielmeier v. Thielmeier" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the ruling of the circuit court that Ky. Rev. Stat. 411.137 and Ky. Rev. Stat. 391.033, collectively known as Mandy Jo's Law, prevented Lawrence Miller from being awarded any of the settlement proceeds from the wrongful death action against the hospital where his stillborn daughter, Autumn, was born, holding that Mandy Jo's Law is not applicable when the child in question is stillborn.After Autumn was born stillborn, her mother, Brittany Bunch, filed suit against the Hospital alleging wrongful death. Miller subsequently filed a motion to intervene. After DNA testing proved Miller's paternity, the trial court allowed Miller's motion to intervene. The Hospital, Bunch, and Miller reached a settlement, and Bunch argued that Miller should not be awarded any settlement proceeds in accordance with Mandy Jo's Law. The trial court agreed and granted judgment for Bunch. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the legislature did not contemplate the application of Mandy Jo's law to the facts in this case. View "Miller v. Brunch" on Justia Law

Mother appealed from the juvenile court order terminating her parental rights to her child Adrian L. pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26.1 She contends the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) did not comply with its duty under section 224.2, subdivision (b) to inquire of extended family members, including maternal grandmother, paternal grandmother, and paternal aunt, regarding Adrian’s potential status as an Indian child as defined in the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA).   The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court concluded additional inquiry would not have yielded information that was likely to bear meaningfully on the question of whether Adrian is an Indian child. The court explained that its review of the record as a whole does not disclose that unquestioned extended family members were likely to have had information that would have borne meaningfully on whether Adrian is an Indian child. Accordingly, any ICWA inquiry error under section 224.2, subdivision (b), was harmless. View "In re Adrian L." on Justia Law

This issue this appeal raised for the Idaho Supreme Court's review centered on the proper legal standards for assessing discovery sanctions against trial counsel, and for proving the character of property during divorce proceedings. Appellant Josh Erickson argued the magistrate court erred by applying the community property presumption to three retirement accounts he owned prior to marriage. Josh argued he failed to produce documents during discovery that could have established these accounts were his separate property because the Respondent Amy Erickson, did not give timely notice that she was seeking an interest in the retirement accounts. Josh argued the magistrate court then imposed inequitable sanctions at trial for his alleged discovery violations by preventing him from presenting evidence relevant to the claims Amy was permitted to make outside the discovery window. Josh appealed the magistrate court’s decision to the district court, which affirmed. After review, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s determination that Josh failed to establish that the retirement accounts were his separate property. The Court reversed the district court’s denial of Amy’s request for attorney fees and remanded for consideration on the merits. View "Erickson v. Erickson" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court relinquishing jurisdiction over a child custody dispute to Texas pursuant to Wyo. Stat. 20-5-306, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it found that Wyoming was an inconvenient forum and relinquished jurisdiction.Less than a week after Child's birth, Mother filed a petition to establish paternity, custody, and child support. Thereafter, Mother moved to Texas. The district court then entered an order establishing Father's paternity of Child and awarding Mother primary custody. Four years after Mother and Child moved, Mother petitioned a Texas district court to modify visitation and compel Father's participation in parenting facilitation. The Texas court contacted the Wyoming court to discuss the matter of jurisdiction. Ultimately, the Wyoming court determined Wyoming was an inconvenient forum and entered an order relinquishing jurisdiction to Texas. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court (1) did not abuse its discretion when it declined to exercise its exclusive, continuing jurisdiction to modify the child custody order after finding Wyoming was an inconvenient forum; and (2) did not violate Father's due process rights by not requiring the parties to file written pleadings in Wyoming. View "Ruiz v. Fribourg" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the district court dismissing with prejudice Plaintiff's protection from abuse (PFA) case, holding that the court did not err in determining that Plaintiff had agreed to a dismissal with prejudice.In 2018, Plaintiff filed a complaint for PFA against Defendant, whom she was divorcing. The PFA case was included in the divorce settlement negotiations. By the end of 2019, the parties had negotiated a future dismissal with prejudice of the PSA case as part of their final settlement. In 2021, on the eve of the expiration of the agreed-upon, self-terminating order, Plaintiff requested a final evidentiary hearing in the PFA case. The court dismissed the PFA order with prejudice, concluding that Plaintiff agreed that the PFA complaint would be dismissed with prejudice following two years without violation. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not commit clear error in (1) determining that Plaintiff intended to enter into a binding settlement agreement that would be incorporated into the court's order; and (2) finding that Defendant did not violate the terms of the PFA order. View "Doe v. Hewson" on Justia Law

Mother appeals from an order terminating her parental rights to her daughter under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. Mother contends the juvenile court erred when it determined the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) satisfied its inquiry obligations under the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) and related California law as to daughter’s possible Indian heritage. No interested party filed a respondent’s brief; instead, the mother, DCFS, and daughter filed a joint application and stipulation for conditional affirmance and remand to the juvenile court to order DCFS to inquire of a non-relative extended family member (NREFM) caring for the child, and available maternal and paternal extended family members in compliance with ICWA and related California law.   The Second Appellate District conditionally reversed. The court explained that the juvenile court shall order DCFS to make reasonable efforts to interview the NREFM (I.C.) and available maternal and paternal family members about the daughter’s Indian ancestry. The court wrote that this case involves reversible error because the parties agree, and we concur, there was noncompliance with the inquiry requirements of ICWA and related California provisions. Here, DCFS only inquired of the parents regarding Native American ancestry. DCFS did not ask the NREFM I.C. (daughter’s caregiver and prospective adoptive parent), or the extended known maternal and paternal family members about Indian heritage. Pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 224.2, subdivision (b), DCFS had a duty to ask daughter’s “extended family members” and “others who have an interest in the child” whether daughter is an Indian child. View "In re A.C." on Justia Law

In a dependency and neglect case, the Colorado Supreme Court addressed whether respondent R.B.’s (“Father’s”) due process rights were violated when a juvenile court denied his request for a continuance of a parental-rights termination hearing. Although his counsel was present, technical difficulties prevented Father’s virtual attendance at the hearing. Because Father failed to show actual prejudice, the Supreme Court concluded his claim fails. Therefore, the Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals, vacated its opinion, and remanded for further proceedings. View "People in interest of Minor Child E.B." on Justia Law

The decedent Willie Clyde Burns married Silver Ruth Cooper in 1959. The couple lived in Claiborne Parish, Louisiana and had three children. A divorce petition was filed in 1966 in Arkansas, captioned “Sybia Ruth Burns vs. W. C. Burns.” A final judgment of divorce was rendered on August 26, 1966 by the Arkansas court. Willie filed a divorce petition in Claiborne Parish in 1967, and the petition was served on Silver, captioned “W.C. Burns (Col.) vs. Sylvia Ruth Burns.” There was no judgment of final divorce rendered in this case. Silver went on to marry Welcome Boyd in 1968. Willie went on to marry Annie Bradley in 1970. Annie testified at trial that at the start of their marriage she and Willie had no assets and that anything Willie owned at the time of his death was acquired during their marriage. The couple was married for 45 years and had two children. Willie died intestate in 2015. Annie petitioned to open Willie’s succession and appoint an administratrix. Silver filed a Petition in Intervention in which she sought to be named Willie’s surviving spouse as she was never lawfully divorced from him. In support of her position, Silver provided a report by a forensic document examiner who concluded that the signatures on the documents of both divorce proceedings did not belong to Silver. She also testified that she never went by the names Sybia or Sylvia. The trial court granted the petition to intervene, declared the Arkansas divorce invalid, and recognized Silver as the legal wife of Willie at the time of his death. In addition, the trial court found that Annie was a good faith putative spouse based on Annie’s testimony that Willie told her he was divorced. The trial court then said that the estate would be divided according to the formula in Prince v. Hopson, 89 So.2d 128 (La. 1956), allocating one-fourth of the community to the legal spouse, one-fourth to the putative spouse, and the decedent’s one half to his heirs. The Lousiana Supreme Court reversed the trial court's division of the community, finding that as a good faith putative spouse, Annie had an undivided one-half interest in the community. Willie’s five children were to divide equally his undivided one-half interest in the community, subject to Annie’s usufruct. View "Succession of Willie Clyde Burns" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court granting Alice and Vernon Cook a divorce on the grounds of irreconcilable differences, holding that the circuit court's property award and alimony award were an abuse of discretion.The court below equitably divided the parties' marital property and ordered Vernon to pay Alice a cash payment that included $140,000 for marital assets that the court found Vernon had dissipated. The court further ordered Vernon to pay Alice permanent alimony in the monthly amount of $1,500. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the circuit court abused its discretion in classifying Vernon's monthly military retirement pay as marital property; (2) the circuit court erred in failing properly to apply federal law to the military disability pay Vernon received during the separation; and (3) because the circuit court's property division is reversed, vacatur of the alimony award and remand were required. View "Cook v. Cook" on Justia Law