Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

This is an appeal from a family court’s self-described sua sponte sanctions order under Family Code section 271.1 The family court judge ordered Appellants (Mother) and her attorney, to each pay $10,000 to Respondent (Father) and partly justified the sanctions on its finding that Appellants unjustifiably accused the judge of being biased (or appearing to be biased).   The Second Appellate District considered whether the sanctions order represents an abuse of the family court’s discretion and reversed the family court’s order. The court explained that as to the attorney, the family court’s sanctions award is obviously wrong: Section 271 permits imposing sanctions only on a party, not a party’s attorney, and the sanctions award against the attorney is, therefore, improper. As against Mother, the sanctions award is an error, too, even if a marginally less obvious one. There is a question as to whether section 271 even authorizes a family court to issue sanctions on its own motion, but the court explained it need not decide that issue because the conduct relied on by the family court to impose sanctions here, even considered in the aggregate, does not rise to the level of meriting sanctions. The family court abused its discretion in concluding otherwise. View "Featherstone v. Martinez" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Georgia Supreme Court's review centered on whether a grandmother’s action for visitation rights to her biological granddaughter (the minor child of her deceased daughter) under OCGA § 19-7-3 was precluded by the adoption of the child by her stepmother, and whether certain subsections of the grandparent visitation statute were unconstitutional, among other issues. The Supreme Court concluded that: (1) the grandmother was authorized to pursue an action for visitation rights to her granddaughter despite the adoption; and (2) with respect to the constitutional challenges, the Court needed only to consider the constitutionality of one of the three subsections at issue—which it held to be constitutional. Accordingly, the trial court's rulings were affirmed. View "Barhhill, et al. v. Alford" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals determining that Karen Michael held an equitable lien on David Miller's Ram Sensors, Inc. stock shares securing David's current obligation to pay monthly spousal support to Karen, holding that an equitable lien did not exist on the stock to secure the current obligation.When Karen and David divorced, the separation agreement incorporated into their final judgment entry of divorce provided that David would pay Karen $15,000 per month in spousal support for twenty years. Karen agreed to relinquish all rights she may have had in Ram Sensors, and David agreed to secure his spousal support obligations. Later, Karen filed a postdecree pleading against David and Cody seeking a declaration that David's ownership of the Ram Sensors stock secured his obligations under the divorce decree and requesting that the court order Cody Miller, the parties' son, to transfer David's stock to her. The court granted partial summary judgment to Karen, concluding that she held a perfected lien in the Ram Sensors stock and an equitable lien on the stock. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the court of appeals misconstrued the separation agreement and erred when it recognized an equitable lien securing David's current support obligation. View "Michael v. Miller" on Justia Law

Petitioners W.M. (minor), and Amber G. (her prospective adoptive parent/de facto parent) sought an extraordinary writ from the juvenile court’s order removing W.M. from Amber’s care and placing her with out-of-state relatives she has never met. The California Legislature enacted a "complex scheme of placement preferences," and Orange County Social Services Agency (SSA) conflated the considerations involved in the placement of a child with those involved in removing a child posttermination from a prospective adoptive parent’s home. "While placement with relatives is generally favored when the need arises, removal from any stable, permanent, loving home (with non-relatives or relatives), particularly after a child has been freed for adoption, is not. By failing to recognize its burden in recommending W.M.’s removal, SSA obscured the critical decision the juvenile court needed to make: Was removing W.M. from her current placement in her best interest?" After carefully reviewing the entire record, the Court of Appeal found SSA was obligated to do much more pursuant to the prospective adoptive parent (PAP) preference. The statute also required the court to hold a hearing and review all material evidence relating to SSA’s removal decision before approving or rejecting it. In this case, it appears the court focused on the reasons for the delay in placing W.M. with her relatives, and neglected to sufficiently consider Welfare & Institutions Code section 366.26(n)’s directive. Petitioners argued there was insufficient evidence that it would be in W.M.'s best interest to remove her from the only family she has ever known, and eliminate any chance she has of connecting with her siblings, for the opportunity to live with out-of-state blood relatives who are strangers to her. The Court of Appeal granted the petitions and vacated the juvenile court’s removal order. View "Amber G. v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed portions of the court of appeals' opinion that found error in certain portions of the trial court's order eliminating reunification as a permanent plan and ceasing further review hearings in a neglect and dependency case concerning Mother's child, holding the trial court did not err.The trial court entered the order eliminating reunification as a permanent plan only after it found that an alternate permanent plan of custody with a court-approved caretaker had been achieved and after the court had received evidence showing that the court-approved caretakers understood the legal significance of the child's placement in their home. The court of appeals vacated the order and remanded the case. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that the court of appeals erred in determining that the trial court erred in ceasing reunification efforts and in failing to fulfill its statutory obligations concerning verification. View "In re K.P." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the trial court permitting Father's court-appointed counsel to withdraw from representing Father in the case proceedings and the trial court's order ceasing efforts to reunify Father with his son (Child), holding that remand was required for additional proceedings.The Chowan County Department of Social Services (DSS) petitioned to terminate Father's parental rights to Child on multiple grounds. Father was granted the same attorney for the termination of parental rights matter as had been allowed to withdraw at an earlier hearing. Thereafter, trial court terminated Father's parental rights, concluding that all four of the alleged grounds of the termination existed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court erred in allowing Father's counsel to withdraw from representation without proper notice evidence in the record of the attorney's intent to withdraw and without making further inquiry into the circumstances regarding the motion. View "In re L.Z.S." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Industrial Commission dismissing Shannon Stocks's claim for death benefits, holding that Stocks - the decedent's alleged, cohabitating fiancee - lacked a legally-recognized relationship and thus could not file a claim for death benefits.The decedent in this case died from injuries sustained in an industrial accident at Defendant. Plaintiffs - the decedent's daughter, son, estranged wife, and Stocks - all filed claims for death benefits under the North Carolina Workers' Compensation Act. The Commission dismissed Stocks's claim for benefits, and a consent order was entered dividing the decedent's death benefits equally among the remaining plaintiffs. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Plaintiff could not file a claim for death benefits because she lacked a legal relationship with the decedent sufficient to qualify as a dependent under N.C. Gen. Stat. 97-39. View "West v. Hoyle's Tire & Axle, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court conditionally granted mandamus relief in this case concerning a premarital agreement to resolve disputes by binding arbitration under religious law, holding that the trial court was statutorily required to hear and determine Wife's challenges to the agreement's validity and enforceability before referring the parties' disputes to arbitration.When the parties in this case married they signed an "Islamic Pre-Nuptial Agreement" providing that "[a]ny conflict which may arise between the husband and the wife will be resolved according to the Qur'an, Sunnah, and Islamic Law in a Muslim court, or in [its] absence by a Fiqh Panel." When Wife sued for divorce, Husband moved to enforce the agreement. After a hearing on whether the reference to Islamic law was sufficiently ambiguous to render the agreement unenforceable the trial court ordered the parties to arbitrate under the agreement. Wife moved for mandamus relief. The Supreme Court conditionally granted relief, holding that the trial court erred in compelling the parties to arbitrate. View "In re Mariam Ayad" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that a spouse’s permanent disability suffered during the parties’ marriage may be considered when determining a traditional spousal support award, even if the length of the parties’ marriage does not quite meet the typical durational threshold.Jason and Erinn Mills married in 2006. Later that year, Erinn was injured while giving birth to the parties' only child, leading to her becoming permanently disabled. Jason filed for divorce in 2019. At issue on appeal was whether the fact that one spouse acquires a permanent disability during the marriage can support an award of spousal support when the length of the marriage would not otherwise support a traditional support award. The Supreme Court held (1) a court may appropriately consider a spouse's permanent disability acquired during the parties' marriage as a factor when determining a child support award; and (2) Erinn should be awarded traditional spousal support of $400 per month, but the amount should not increase upon the termination of Jason's child support obligation. View "In re the Marriage of Mills" on Justia Law

In 2014, wife filed for dissolution of her marriage to husband. At the trial to divide the parties’ assets and establish support awards for both wife and a child, wife requested, in relevant part, $750 per month in transitional spousal support for 60 months and $750 per month in maintenance spousal support for an indeterminate period. The trial court entered a general judgment (the “original 2014 judgment”) awarding wife $750 per month in transitional spousal support for 60 months, to begin on the date of the 2014 judgment (May 1, 2014), and $500 per month in maintenance spousal support for an indefinite period to begin immediately after the transitional support ended (June 1,2019). Wife appealed, challenging both the monthly amount and the delayed commencement of the maintenance support. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded, finding the trial court misapplied ORS 107.105(1)(d)(C) and thus incorrectly calculated wife’s maintenance support and postponed the maintenance support payments until after the transition support ended. On remand, the trial court increased the maintenance support award to $1,000 per month for 60 months, after which time the maintenance award would decrease to $750 per month. The issue this case presented for the Oregon Supreme Court’s review centered on whether interest accrued on the support payments that were increased retroactively following the husband’s appeal. The Court of Appeals held that the award of interest was improper. The Supreme Court concluded wife was entitled to statutory interest at nine percent per annum on the additional amount that the trial court added to the monthly support award in the original judgment, calculated from the dates that those payments would have been due. Accordingly, the Court reversed the Court of Appeals, affirmed in part and reversed in part the circuit court, and remanded this case to the circuit court for further proceedings. View "Skinner & Skinner" on Justia Law