Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court granting the petition brought by the Wyoming Department of Family Services (DFS) to terminate the parental rights of Mother to her child, holding that Mother was not entitled to relief on her claims of error.After a hearing, the district court held that the Department of Family Services (DFS) had presented clear and convincing evidence that Mother's parental rights to her child should be terminated under Wyo. Stat. Ann. 14-2-309(a)(iii) and (a)(v). The court further held that termination would be in the child's best interest. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the record supported the district court's holding that DFS made reasonable but unsuccessful efforts to rehabilitate and reunify Mother and her child under Wyo. Stat. Ann. 14-2-309(a)(iii). View "Alcorn v. State ex rel. Dep't of Family Services" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated the order of the district court establishing paternity of twin children in Apurba Chatterjee and ordering joint legal and physical custody of the children, holding that Apurba lacked standing to seek a finding of paternity.Apurba brought this complaint seeking to establish paternity, custody, and support, alleging that Indraja Chatterjee, who was married to Indraneel Chatterjee, was pregnant with twins and that he was the biological father of the children. Apruba's motion for genetic testing of the children was granted, and results were returned indicating that there was a 99.9-percent statistical probability that Apurba was the children's biological father. The district court entered a decree finding that Apurba was the children's biological father and ordered joint legal and physical custody of the children. The Supreme Court vacated the order below, holding that Nebraska's paternity statutes do not allow for an alleged father to establish paternity over a child born to a married couple. View "Chatterjee v. Chatterjee" on Justia Law

CC (mother) and VC (father) were driving through eastern Washington when CC went into premature labor. CC gave birth to AC in a nearby hospital. AC’s umbilical cord tested positive for cannabis. Hospital staff noted that CC was disabled, that CC and VC were homeless, and that they had no baby supplies. The hospital reported its concerns to the State, and the State sent social worker Michelle Woodward to investigate. Woodward contacted CC’s family from whom she heard reports of the couple’s domestic violence, criminal history, and drug use. The State took custody of AC and temporarily placed him with a foster family. The court later found AC dependent at a contested shelter care hearing and ordered CC to participate in random drug testing and an evidence-based parenting program. The court also ordered the State to provide regular, supervised visitation. At about this time, a new social worker, Diana Barnes, was assigned to AC. The court held another dependency hearing where Woodward, Barnes, and parenting therapist Logan Wright testified in support of AC’s dependency. Woodward and Barnes relied extensively on hearsay based largely on secondhand reports and statements rather than their own personal interactions or investigations. None of these reports were submitted into evidence, no records custodian authenticated them, and none of the out-of-court witnesses whose statements were recorded in those reports were called to testify. Counsel for VC made two unsuccessful objections to the hearsay presented through the social workers. The court ultimately found that the parents’ past history with the criminal justice system and Child Protective Services supported dependency, a finding substantially based on hearsay. CC and VC appealed. The Washington Supreme Court held the trial court’s impermissible reliance on hearsay prejudiced the parents and materially affected the outcome of the trial. Accordingly, the Court reversed the trial court’s dependency finding for AC as to both parents. View "In re Dependency of A.C." on Justia Law

Karena and Keith Jensen (“Jensens”), as foster parents to A.P., appealed a juvenile court’s order denying their motion to modify and order approving a transition plan. Because the Jensens were not “aggrieved parties” under N.D.C.C. § 27-20.2-26(1), the North Dakota Supreme Court dismissed the appeal. View "Interest of A.P." on Justia Law

In these dependency proceedings, T.M. (Father) appealed from a juvenile court exit order awarding sole physical custody of minors N.M. and S.M. to E.S. (Mother), contending no substantial evidence supported the order.   The Second Appellate District agreed and therefore reversed the order insofar as it grants sole physical custody to Mother. The court explained that here, the juvenile court made no express finding that granting sole physical custody to Mother would be in the children’s best interests. Instead, the court stated, “It’s not appropriate to reward a parent who does nothing in this court, so I’m not going to make it joint legal.” The court thus granted Mother sole custody to avoid rewarding Father, who had refused to participate meaningfully in the case plan. This was an abuse of discretion because an exit order must serve the best interests of the children, not reward or punish one parent or another for failing to comply with the case plan.   The court explained that while it does not condone ignoring the court’s orders, there has been no express finding that these factors impacted the children’s interests, and no grounds appear for an implied finding. Father has never been deemed an offending parent, and no evidence suggested that his drug use, lack of a parenting class, or visitation practices impacted the children in any way. View "In re N.M." on Justia Law

Plaintiff (Mother) appealed from the post-judgment order modifying the parenting plan between her and her former husband, Defendant (Father) with respect to their two minor children. Mother contends the family court abused its discretion in ordering the children to participate with Father in a therapy program operated by Family Bridges, which mandated no contact with Mother for a minimum of 90 days.   The Second Appellate District agreed and reversed the order. The court explained that nothing in the record supports the court’s finding that this significant disruption to the children’s established living arrangement with Mother was in their best interest. The order requires the children, for a minimum period of three months, to be moved out of their home and either moved across the country to Los Angeles if the Family Bridges program can be completed during a school break or moved into a new home in New York with Father until the program can be completed there during the school year. The children would not be allowed any contact with Mother during this disruptive period. Without evidence that it is in the best interest of the children to remove them from Mother’s custody for a period of at least 90 days in order to participate in the Family Bridges program, the court abused its discretion in issuing its order of December 22, 2021. View "Johnston-Rossi v. Rossi" on Justia Law

Jane Doe, a three-year-old child, was in the custody of the Idaho Department of Health and Welfare (the “Department”); she was six days shy of her first birthday when the State removed her from the custody of her mother and placed her with a foster family. Her mother’s attempts to stick to a permanency plan were inconsistent, and while for the majority of the life of this case, the magistrate court held fast to a permanency goal of reunification, it modified that goal in the summer of 2022 so that termination of parental rights and adoption became the primary goals for Jane and reunification became the concurrent goal. Mother appealed the district court’s change of the permanency goals. She also sought a permissive appeal from the magistrate court to appeal to the district court. The magistrate court granted the motion. The district court dismissed the case and remanded it back to the magistrate court sua sponte after determining it did not have jurisdiction to hear the appeal. Mother then appealed to the Idaho Supreme Court. The Supreme Court found no error in the district court’s judgment and affirmed. View "IDHW v. Jane Doe (2022-36)" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment of the district court adopting the final order of the family law magistrate ordering Mother's divorce from Father, awarding sole parental rights and responsibilities of the parties' child to Father, and distributing the parties' property, holding that the record lacked competent evidence to support the district court's findings.Mother, acting pro se, timely filed an objection to the final order of the magistrate, but the court denied the motion and adopted the magistrate's judgment. Mother then filed for relief from judgment, to set aside the default judgment, for a new trial, and for amended or additional factual findings. The motions were denied. The Supreme Judicial Court remanded the case, holding (1) when asserting that a magistrate's judgment lacks sufficient fact-finding, the objecting party should make her claim in a Mont. R. Civ. P. 118(a) objection, not a Mont. R. Civ. P. 52 motion after the district court has reviewed the Rule 118(a) objection; and (2) remand was necessary in this case because the existing record did not support the judgment. View "Daniel v. McCoy" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that Petitioner, who was ordered to show cause why she should not be further sanctioned and barred from filing any pro se pleadings in the Supreme Court, had abused the Court's limited judicial resources and directed the Clerk of Court to reject any future pleadings or other requests for relief submitted by Petitioner, unless such filings were signed by a member in good standing of The Florida Bar. The Court further denied any pending motions or requests for relief, holding that based on Petitioner's history of filing pro se petitions and requests for relief that were meritless or otherwise inappropriate for appellate review, Petitioner failed to show cause why she should not be sanctioned. View "A.C. v. Dep't of Children & Families" on Justia Law

Petitioner, the New Hampshire Division for Children, Youth and Families (DCYF), petitioned under the New Hampshire Supreme Court's original jurisdiction seeking review of a superior court order denying DCYF’s motion to dismiss a complaint brought against it. In 2019, Respondent filed a complaint as parent and next friend of his children, M.M. and J.M., asserting various claims against both DCYF and the Court Appointed Special Advocates of New Hampshire (CASA). DCYF and CASA moved to dismiss the complaint, with DCYF arguing, inter alia, that the claims were time-barred by RSA 541-B:14, IV. Respondent objected, asserting that RSA 508:8 (2010) tolled the period of limitations in RSA 541-B:14, IV. After a hearing on the motion, the trial court dismissed the claims against CASA as precluded by quasi-judicial immunity, but denied the motion to dismiss the claims against DCYF. In its order, the trial court reasoned that RSA 508:8 operated as a tolling provision and that failing to read the tolling provision into the statute of limitations in RSA 541-B:14, IV would lead to “an absurd, unfair, and unjust result.” In its petition to the Supreme Court, DCYF asked the Court to determine that RSA 508:8 did not apply to claims brought under RSA chapter 541-B. The Supreme Court concurred with Respondent, holding that RSA 508:8 had to be read into RSA 541-B:14, IV in order to comport with the equal protection guarantees afforded to the citizenry under Part I, Articles 2 and 12 of the New Hampshire Constitution. Accordingly, judgment was affirmed. View "Petition of New Hampshire Division for Children, Youth and Families" on Justia Law