Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

The Texas Department of Family and Protective Services filed a petition in September 2022 for temporary orders requiring the parents to participate in state-provided services for their child's safety. The trial court granted these temporary orders. In August 2023, the Department filed a petition to terminate the parents' rights and obtain conservatorship of the child. The parents responded with motions for sanctions, claiming the Department's actions were frivolous. The Department then moved to nonsuit its claims. The trial court expressed frustration but granted the nonsuit and planned a separate hearing for the sanctions motions.The trial court signed an order on August 21, 2023, dismissing the Department's claims and removing the case from the docket. However, the court later consolidated the cases and held a hearing on the sanctions motions, ultimately granting them and ordering the Department to pay the parents' attorney's fees. The Department appealed the sanctions order. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth District of Texas vacated the sanctions order, deeming it void because the trial court's dismissal order was considered final, thus ending the court's plenary power before the sanctions order was issued.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case and disagreed with the appellate court's conclusion. The Supreme Court held that the trial court's dismissal order was not a final judgment as it did not clearly and unequivocally dispose of all claims and parties. Therefore, the trial court retained its plenary power when it issued the sanctions order. The Supreme Court reversed the appellate court's judgment vacating the sanctions order, dismissed the appeal, and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings. View "In re C.K.M." on Justia Law

Elizabeth Corey Raber (Mother) and Michael Robert Raber (Father) married in 2019 in Texas and had one child. They moved to Coeur d’Alene, Idaho, in June 2020. Their relationship involved significant conflict, including a domestic dispute in June 2020 and a felony domestic battery charge against Father in December 2021, which was later dismissed. They separated, and Mother filed for divorce in January 2022, requesting joint legal and physical custody but primary physical custody and permission to relocate to Texas with the child. Father initially sought sole custody but later requested joint custody with equal time.The magistrate court ordered a Parenting Time Evaluation (PTE), which recommended joint legal custody with Mother having sole decision-making authority over schooling and routine medical care. The PTE also recommended that Mother have primary physical custody and be allowed to relocate to Houston. The magistrate court proposed two custody options: one where the child would stay in Idaho with a week-on/week-off schedule, and another where the child would fly between Idaho and Texas every two weeks. The court entered a judgment based on the second option after Mother relocated to Texas.The Supreme Court of Idaho reviewed the case and found that the magistrate court failed to consider all relevant factors, including the impact of the child traveling 2,000 miles every two weeks and the effect on the child’s education and stability. The court held that the magistrate court abused its discretion by not making a specific determination regarding the best interests of the child. The judgment was vacated, and the case was remanded for further proceedings to properly analyze the best interests of the child and consider all relevant factors. The court declined to award costs on appeal, as there was no prevailing party. View "Raber v. Raber" on Justia Law

Kenneth and Jill Swing were involved in a divorce action that included contested issues such as the pre-nuptial agreement, equitable division of property, child custody, visitation, support, and fees. The family court issued a final order on June 8, 2021. Jill filed a motion to alter or amend this order on June 16, 2021, which the family court partially granted on August 27, 2021, issuing an amended final order. Kenneth then filed his own motion to alter or amend on September 10, 2021.The family court denied Kenneth's motion on July 14, 2022, deeming it untimely as it did not address the amended final order but rather the original June 8 order. Jill received notice of this denial on July 21, 2022, and served her notice of appeal on August 22, 2022. Kenneth moved to dismiss Jill's appeal, arguing it was untimely because his own motion did not toll the appeal period. The court of appeals agreed with Kenneth and dismissed Jill's appeal, concluding that Kenneth's motion was untimely and did not stay the time for filing an appeal.The South Carolina Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that Kenneth's motion was timely as it was served within ten days of receiving notice of the amended final order. The Court clarified that a timely Rule 59(e) motion stays the time for appeal for all parties unless it falls into specific exceptions previously established in case law. The Court found that Kenneth's motion did not fit these exceptions and thus stayed the time for appeal. Consequently, the Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals' decision and remanded the case for consideration of Jill's appeal on its merits. View "Swing v. Swing" on Justia Law

In this case, the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) became involved with a family after law enforcement discovered child pornography in the parents' home. Both parents admitted to possessing child pornography, and the mother admitted to posting inappropriate images of their daughter, M.V., online. M.V. was subsequently placed with her paternal grandparents, and the juvenile court sustained allegations of sexual exploitation against both parents, declaring M.V. a dependent child and removing her from her parents' custody. The parents received reunification services until November 2020, and in December 2021, the juvenile court terminated their parental rights. However, this order was vacated on appeal, and the case was remanded for a supplemental bonding study and a new permanency planning hearing.On remand, a new expert conducted a bonding study, and the permanency planning hearing took place in June 2024. The court reviewed extensive documentary evidence, including reports on M.V.'s well-being, her relationship with her parents and grandparents, and her expressed wishes to be adopted by her grandparents. The expert, Dr. Gonzalez, concluded that M.V. had a secure attachment to both parents and that terminating the parental relationship could be detrimental to her. However, the court found that the parents had not proven the beneficial parental relationship exception, noting that the expert's opinions were based more on general psychological principles than on the specific facts of the case.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, reviewed the case and affirmed the juvenile court's order terminating parental rights. The appellate court found that the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting the expert's opinions and that the evidence did not compel a finding in favor of the parents. The court also addressed and dismissed allegations of judicial bias and due process violations raised by the parents. View "In re M.V." on Justia Law

In 2021, Sharon Ceynar initiated a divorce action against William Ceynar. Following a bench trial, the District Court of McKenzie County, Northwest Judicial District, granted the divorce and divided the marital estate. Sharon received $1,218,903.90 in net assets, while William received $681,827.35. The court ordered the sale of the couple's real estate and mineral interests at public auction, with 55% of the proceeds going to William and 45% to Sharon.William appealed, arguing that the district court erred in its division of the marital estate, particularly given his large inheritance. The North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the case, noting that property distribution decisions are not reversed unless clearly erroneous. The court emphasized that the district court's findings are presumed correct and that it does not reweigh evidence or judge witness credibility on appeal.The Supreme Court found that the district court had properly considered the Ruff-Fischer guidelines, which include factors such as the duration of the marriage, the parties' ages, health, and financial circumstances. The district court had noted the long-term nature of the marriage and the need for both parties to have income-generating assets for retirement. Although William argued that his inheritance should result in a larger share of the marital estate, the court found that the district court had appropriately considered this factor and had not erred in its division.The Supreme Court also addressed William's contention that the district court erred in ordering the sale of the real property, noting that the court had the authority to do so to achieve an equitable distribution. The court affirmed the district court's judgment, concluding that the property division was equitable and not clearly erroneous. View "Ceynar v. Ceynar" on Justia Law

Decedent and Burnsed were married in 1997, and in 1998, Decedent named Burnsed as the primary beneficiary of his life insurance policy. They divorced in 2002, and the divorce decree did not address the life insurance policy. Decedent maintained the policy until his death in 2017 without changing the beneficiary designation. Decedent's son and brother filed a lawsuit claiming the policy proceeds, arguing that South Carolina Probate Code section 62-2-507(c) revoked Burnsed's beneficiary status upon divorce.The Circuit Court denied Respondents' motion for summary judgment, holding that the statute did not apply retroactively and granted Burnsed's motion for summary judgment, finding the legislature did not intend for the statute to apply to divorces before its effective date. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that section 62-2-507(c) revoked Burnsed's designation because Decedent died after the statute's effective date, and Burnsed had no vested interest in the policy until Decedent's death.The South Carolina Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision as modified. The Court held that section 62-2-507(c) applies to governing instruments executed before the statute's effective date if the decedent's death occurred after the effective date. The statute's presumption of revocation upon divorce applied to Decedent's life insurance policy, revoking Burnsed's status as the primary beneficiary. The Court concluded that the statute did not apply retroactively but prospectively from its effective date, effectuating Decedent's presumed intent. View "Estate of Meier v. Burnsed" on Justia Law

Grant Phillip Poppinga filed a paternity petition seeking custody, visitation, and support for his daughter with Arrianna Monet Wallace. Unable to locate Wallace, Poppinga attempted service by publication. When Wallace did not appear, Poppinga moved for a default judgment, which the district court granted, establishing his paternity and awarding him sole custody. Wallace later sought to vacate the judgment, citing errors in the service by publication and the default judgment. The district court denied her motion, and she appealed.The Oklahoma Supreme Court reviewed the case, focusing on the sufficiency of the service by publication and the district court's denial of Wallace's motion to vacate. The court found multiple errors in the service by publication, including misspellings, incorrect nature of the suit, and untimely publication. These errors were deemed fatal to the court's jurisdiction over Wallace. Additionally, the court noted that the trial court failed to conduct a proper judicial inquiry into the due diligence of Poppinga's search for Wallace.The Oklahoma Supreme Court held that the district court abused its discretion in finding the service by publication sufficient and in denying Wallace's motion to vacate the default judgment. The court emphasized the importance of due process, particularly in cases involving fundamental parental rights. The court reversed the district court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings, instructing the trial court to reconsider Wallace's motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and insufficiency of service of process, and to conduct further proceedings consistent with the opinion. View "POPPINGA v. WALLACE" on Justia Law

Pat Doe filed a complaint for protection from harassment against John Costin on behalf of her two minor children, alleging aggressive behavior by Costin, including blocking their car at school. The District Court issued a temporary order for protection, which was later made permanent for the children but not for Doe. Doe did not request attorney fees within the required time frame.Doe later moved to modify the order, fearing that Costin might access the school after a no-trespass notice expired. The court modified the order to prohibit Costin from entering the school when the children were present and awarded Doe attorney fees. Costin opposed the modification and the attorney fees, arguing the motion was frivolous and untimely.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case. The court found the appeal regarding the modified order moot since it had expired. However, it reviewed the attorney fees award, determining that the lower court erred in awarding fees for services provided before the motion to modify. The court vacated the attorney fees award and remanded the case for reconsideration of fees related only to the motion to modify. View "Doe v. Costin" on Justia Law

Marvin T. Jose Mateo filed a petition in the Hall County Court seeking to establish a minor guardianship for his 18-year-old brother, Tomas J. The petition also requested immigration-related factual findings under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA). Tomas had been in Marvin's care since 2019, and they had been living in Grand Island, Nebraska, since January 2022. Tomas was attending high school and planned to join the U.S. Marines after graduation. Marvin testified that Tomas' parents were in Guatemala and did not provide financial support.The county court denied the guardianship petition, noting that Tomas was already 18 years old and that Marvin had a power of attorney from Tomas' parents, which allowed him to care for Tomas without a guardianship. The court did not make the requested factual findings under the UCCJEA. Marvin filed a motion to alter or amend the judgment, arguing that the court applied the wrong legal standard and failed to consider Tomas' best interests. The court overruled the motion, reiterating that Marvin had been able to care for Tomas without a guardianship and suggesting that the petition was filed primarily to obtain immigration findings.The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case and concluded that the UCCJEA did not apply because Tomas was no longer a "child" under the UCCJEA when the petition was filed. The court determined that other Nebraska statutes gave the county court jurisdiction over the minor guardianship proceeding. However, the court found that the appeal became moot once Tomas reached the age of majority, as the relief of appointing a minor guardian was no longer available. The court dismissed the appeal, concluding that none of the exceptions to the mootness doctrine applied. View "In re Guardianship of Tomas J." on Justia Law

Thomas Armenta and Tiffini Pateras began their relationship in 2012 and had a child, M.A., in 2014. They separated in 2017 and entered a child custody and support agreement. Armenta, a Chumash descendant, works at the Chumash tribal office and earns $114,000 annually, plus $5,000 monthly from the Chumash tribe’s general welfare program. Pateras filed a petition for child support and attorney fees in 2023. The trial court ordered Armenta to pay $448 monthly for temporary child support and $2,000 in attorney fees. Subsequent hearings led to a final order for Armenta to pay $1,053 monthly in child support and $5,000 in need-based attorney fees.The trial court ruled that the $5,000 monthly payments Armenta receives from the Chumash tribe’s general welfare program should be considered as income for calculating child support. Armenta argued that these payments should be excluded as they are not subject to federal income taxation and claimed they were need-based public assistance. However, the court found no evidence that the payments were need-based or restricted to low-income individuals.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, affirmed the trial court’s decision. The court held that the payments from the Chumash tribe’s general welfare program are income for child support purposes, regardless of their tax status under federal law. The court emphasized that California’s child support statutes aim to ensure parents support their children according to their financial ability, and income is broadly defined to include various sources. The court also rejected Armenta’s claims regarding the need for an evidentiary hearing and the enforcement of a notice to appear, finding no procedural errors. The orders were affirmed, and costs on appeal were awarded to the respondents. View "Pateras v. Armenta" on Justia Law