Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

D.S. and A.S. were married and have children, ages 14 and eight. A.S. filed a petition for legal separation and an ex parte request for temporary emergency orders related to child custody and visitation, property control, and “an order that all contact between Mother and Father be peaceful and neither party disparage the other, alienate the children nor discuss details of the custody case with the child.” She alleged that D.S. had a “trigger temper” and that the “children and I have had to flee the home multiple [times] when his anger has gotten out of control.” She stated that she did not have access to the family’s bank accounts. After the court denied her ex parte request, A.S. filed, and was granted, a peremptory challenge against the judge who issued the denial. A week later, A.S. sought a domestic violence restraining order (DVRO), which sought personal conduct orders and a stay-away order. A.S. identified two dates on which she and her children had suffered abuse. D.S. denied the allegations and appealed the DVRO. The court of appeal reversed. The family court abused its discretion in granting the DVRO without holding an evidentiary hearing compliant with Family Code section 217. View "Marriage of D.S. & A.S." on Justia Law

G.L.A. (“Mother”) brought L.S., who was one year old at the time, to the hospital for medical treatment. Hospital staff conducted a skeletal survey, which revealed that L.S. had a broken tibia; two additional fractures that were healing; severe bruising and swelling to his groin; and significant bruising on his back, face, and genitals. The hospital sent a referral to the Arapahoe County Department of Human Services, and the state filed a petition for dependent or neglected children in district court, alleging that Mother had physically abused L.S. The district court adjudicated L.S. dependent or neglected. About a month later, the court found that an appropriate treatment plan couldn’t be devised for Mother based on L.S.’s serious bodily injury(“SBI”), and Mother appealed. The issue this case presented for the Colorado Supreme Court's review centered on whether the State satisfies its burden of proving that an appropriate treatment plan can’t be devised for a respondent parent in a dependency and neglect case when the State establishes by a preponderance of evidence a single incident resulting in serious bodily injury to the child. To this, the Court concluded that it did: the district court erred by imposing a clear and convincing burden of proof on the State at the dispositional hearing. Because there was no dispute L.S. sustained a serious bodily injury, the district court’s order granting Mother’s motion for directed verdict was reversed and the case remanded to the district court for further proceedings. View "In Re Colorado in the interest of L.S." on Justia Law

Father appealed a circuit court order terminating his parental rights over his minor child, G.F., on the ground that he failed to correct, within twelve months, the conditions that led to the court’s finding under RSA chapter 169-C (2022) that G.F. was neglected by G.F.’s mother. In January 2020, father did not attend mother’s adjudicatory or dispositional hearings. Mother entered into a consent agreement acknowledging that neglect occurred due to her drug use. At the dispositional hearing, the circuit court adopted a case plan and dispositional orders, which also applied to father. Father was not served with these documents. At the three-month review hearing, father's counsel received the case plan, dispositional orders and related discovery. Two days after the six-month review hearing, father was arrested for felony second degree assault and other domestic violence charges involving his then girlfriend and her minor child. He pled guilty to at least two of the charges. In September 2020, a nine-month review hearing was held. In January 2021, the trial court held the first permanency hearing in the neglect case while father was incarcerated. The trial court found father was not in compliance with dispositional orders. The trial court changed the permanency plan from reunification to adoption and specified that “DCYF is no longer required to provide reasonable efforts to facilitate reunification between [G.F.] and mother [and] father, but shall make reasonable efforts to finalize the permanency plan.” In September 2021, the circuit court held a second permanency hearing; again the court found father was not in compliance with the dispositional orders and concluded G.F. could not be safely returned to his care. DCYF filed a new petition to terminate the father’s parental rights in October 2021. In December 2021, the father was released from incarceration. In February 2022, the circuit court granted DCYF’s petition to terminate the father’s parental rights. Assuming without deciding that, during the nine months in which DCYF was ordered by the court to make reasonable efforts to reunify G.F. with his father, those efforts were reasonable, the New Hampshire Supreme Court concluded that DCYF failed to meet its burden because the court did not order DCYF to make such efforts for the remaining three months. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s order terminating the father’s parental rights over G.F. View "In re G.F." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court finding that a material change in circumstances had occurred sufficient to warrant modification of Appellee's alimony obligation, holding that there was no error.When the parties divorced, Appellee was earning $162,000 per year. Appellee was earning $200,000 per year when he was terminated. After the loss of his employment and the subsequent starting of his consulting firm, Appellee filed a motion for modification of his alimony obligation, also citing Appellant's increased income. The district court found a material change in circumstances and entered a new alimony schedule. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion. View "Mackiewicz v. Mackiewicz" on Justia Law

In 2015, appellant Destiny C. (Mother) petitioned for dissolution of her marriage to her husband Justin C. (Father). Six years later, following a six-day trial on custody and visitation issues, the family court made final custody orders, directing both parents to share joint legal and physical custody of the couple’s then-seven-year-old daughter. Mother disputed that order, relying primarily on the Family Code section 3044 presumption against the award of joint legal or physical custody to a party who is found to have committed domestic violence “within the previous five years.” She contended the five-year period provided for in section 3044 ran backwards from the filing of the dissolution petition, not from the date of the family court’s custody ruling. The trial court rejected this "impractical construction." The Court of Appeal also rejected appellant's construction and affirmed the custody order. View "Marriage of Destiny C. & Justin C." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeal dismissing Father's appeal of the determination of the juvenile court that it had jurisdiction over D.P. under former Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code 300(b)(1), holding that the court of appeals erred in dismissing the appeal.The Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services filed a dependency petition claiming that D.P. and his sister were at risk of neglect. The juvenile court dismissed all but one of the counts and found that it had jurisdiction over D.P. under former Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code 300(b)(1). Parents challenged this jurisdictional finding on appeal. While Parents' appeal of the jurisdictional finding was pending, the juvenile court terminated its jurisdiction, finding that D.P. was no longer at risk. The court of appeals then dismissed Parents' case as moot. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Father's appeal was moot; and (2) the court of appeals had discretion to review Father's case even though it was moot. View "In re D.P." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the trial justice awarding attorneys' fees to Plaintiff in this divorce action, holding that there was no error.Plaintiff filed a complaint for divorce, and Defendant filed a counterclaim for divorce. As to attorneys' fees, the trial justice found that Plaintiff was entitled to reasonable attorneys' fees pursuant to the parties' postnuptial agreement's fee-shifting provision, as well as R.I. Gen. Laws 15-5-16. Defendant appealed, challenging the award of attorneys' fees. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial justice had both a statutory and contractual basis to award Plaintiff attorneys' fees and costs and did not abuse his discretion in making the award. View "McCollum v. McCollum" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court granting Father's petition to modify a child custody order granting Mother primary custody of the parties' daughter (Child), holding that there was no abuse of discretion during the proceedings below.The original child custody order granted Mother primary custody of Child. Father later petitioned the court to modify the order, claiming that the original order had proved unworkable due to ambiguity in its terms. After a trial, the district court concluded that a material change of circumstances had occurred since the original order and that it was in Child's best interests for the parties to have shared custody. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that there was no abuse of discretion in the district court's conclusion that there had been a material change of circumstances affecting Child's welfare since the original custody and visitation order and that Child's best interests would be served by granting the parties shared custody. View "Gardels v. Bowling" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated a portion of the judgment and decree of divorce entered by the circuit court in this case, holding that the circuit court abused its discretion in determining Daniel Parker's military "monthly pay base" to be $1,500.94.Daniel filed for divorce from Camille Parker, citing irreconcilable differences. In dispute during the underlying proceedings was the correct amount of Daniel's "monthly basic pay" for the purpose of determining the equitable division of his retirement benefits. The Supreme Court vacated the portion of the court's decree dividing Daniel's military retirement but otherwise affirmed, holding that the record revealed a legal error in the application of federal law to determine Daniel's monthly pay base. View "Parker v. Parker" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was whether a superior court erred in it affirmed a Court of Common Please Criminal Division's decision overturning a Montgomery County District Attorney (DA) decision. The DA had disapproved the private criminal complaint of Luay Ajaj (Father) against Saja Ibrahim Abdulkareem Al Rabeeah (Mother) for violations of 18 Pa. C.S. § 2904(a) (interference with custody of children), and 18 Pa. C.S. § 2909(a) (concealment of whereabouts of a child). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court determined the proper standard of review courts should apply when reviewing a disapproval decision under Rule of Criminal Procedure 506(B)(2) was: if the private complainant demonstrated that the disapproval decision amounted to bad faith, occurred due to fraud, or was unconstitutional. Applying that standard of review here, the Court concluded Father failed to demonstrate that the DA’s decision to disapprove the Complaint amounted to bad faith, occurred due to fraud, or was unconstitutional, and, consequently, the Supreme Court reversed the superior court’s order. View "In Re: Private Comp. Filed by L. Ajaj" on Justia Law