Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

R.F. appealed a juvenile court order appointing a guardian for R.F.’s and S.V.’s children and restricting contact and visitation between the parents and children. C.B. filed petitions for guardianship of G.V. and S.V., R.F.’s and S.V.’s children. R.F. is the mother, and S.V. is the father. C.B. is the children’s maternal grandmother, and she lives in Fargo. Both parents were living in Florida at the time of the hearing. A judicial referee granted C.B. guardianship for three years and restricted the visitation rights of R.F. and S.V. On de novo review, the juvenile court then adopted the referee’s findings and order. At the time of the hearing, G.V. was eight and S.V. was four. C.B. had been taking care of the children since their births. R.F. would sometimes live with C.B., but she would come and go as she pleased, leaving the children with C.B. for extended periods. S.V. sometimes visited the children with R.F. Both parents wanted their children to reside in Florida, and R.F. wanted the children to live with her since she was not incarcerated. R.F. and S.V. provided the juvenile court a letter predating the guardianship petition stating their preference that in the event that they were unable to take care of the children, they wanted them to reside with their paternal grandmother in Florida. The juvenile court found that neither parent has acted as the primary caregiver or parental figure during the children’s lives. The juvenile court found that in Florida neither parent was the primary caregiver for the children; instead they lived for most of that time with their paternal grandmother. R.F. had warrants out for her arrest at the time of the hearing, she has absconded from probation, and she has not been a consistent presence in the children’s lives because of her criminal activity. S.V. also spent time in jail and has voluntarily left the children with C.B. since their births and has not cared for them as required by law. The North Dakota Supreme Court concluded the juvenile court did not err in its order appointing a guardian and for restricting contact between the parents and children. View "Interest of G.V." on Justia Law

Mark Rath appealed district court orders granting the State’s request for an extension of time to file pleadings, granting two protective orders to Heather Zins, denying two applications to file motions subject to a then existing but subsequently vacated pre-filing order, and a final judgment denying his motion to amend a child support judgment. Rath also argued the North Dakota Child Support Guidelines were unconstitutional. Rath and Zins shared one minor child, A.J.O., born in 2004. The North Dakota Department of Human Services’ Child Support Enforcement Division (“the State”) commenced support proceedings against Rath in 2005 and a judgment ordering child support payments was entered. The judgment was amended in 2008 to establish a parenting plan for A.J.O. Zins was awarded primary residential responsibility while Rath received scheduled parenting time. The judgment was modified three different times—in 2009, 2013, and 2016—with the last judgment requiring Rath to pay $366.00 per month. The district court issued an order detailing the applicable provisions of the North Dakota Child Support Guidelines, applying them to the evidence presented at the hearing, and addressing Rath’s constitutional claims. The court denied Rath’s motion to modify his child support judgment. The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s orders granting the State an extension, protection orders on behalf of Zins, and the final judgment denying Rath’s motion to amend his child support obligation. The Court reversed the district court’s orders denying Rath’s applications to file pleadings pursuant to a vacated pre-filing order and remanded to allow for further proceedings. View "Burleigh Cty. Social Service Bd. v. Rath" on Justia Law

Petitioner D.S. (Mother) was the adoptive mother of A.S. In 2021, San Bernardino County Children and Family Services (CFS) petitioned on behalf of A.S. in response to allegations of physical abuse. During the pendency of the proceedings, Mother petitioned to have A.S. placed back in her home. She appealed the summary denial of her petition. However, on appeal, Mother did not address any issue encompassed by her petition, nor did she seek reversal of the order denying her petition or reversal of any prior jurisdictional or dispositional orders. Instead, Mother’s opening brief was entirely devoted to seeking review of the adequacy of the juvenile court and CFS’s efforts to fulfill their obligations under the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA) seeking only to have the matter “remanded with instructions for the juvenile court to order full compliance with the inquiry provisions of the ICWA.” Consequently, the Court of Appeal construed Mother's appeal as a petition for extraordinary writ seeking an order directing the juvenile court and CFS to comply with their statutory duties under ICWA and the related California statutes. Upon consideration of the matter on the merits, the Court granted the requested relief. View "D.S. v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Appellant's complaint for a writ of prohibition to prevent Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court Judge Deena Calabrese from exercising jurisdiction in the underlying matter brought to enforce a divorce decree, holding that the court of appeals properly dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim.In 2016, the divorce decree at issue was entered dissolving the marriage of Neil and Erica Heyside. Erica later sued Neil in the general division of the common pleas court alleging that Neil owed her thousands of dollars in spousal support and seeking to enforce the property division under the decree. Neil filed a motion to dismiss, which the trial court denied. Neil then filed a complaint for a writ of prohibition seeking to have Judge Calabrese barred from continuing to exercise judicial power over Erica's lawsuit. The court of appeals dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that that the general division of the common pleas court did not patently or unambiguously lack jurisdiction over Erica's lawsuit. View "State ex rel. Heyside v. Calabrese" on Justia Law

Mother S.G. appealed after the juvenile court terminated her parental rights to her son. She raised two challenges. First, she faults the Los Angeles Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) for failing to exercise due diligence in locating her son’s father (Father). Mother argued this failure to locate Father, which included ignoring information she provided on how to locate him, invalidated the notice the court deemed proper for Father. Second, she contends DCFS did not comply with its initial duty of inquiry under Welfare and Institutions Code section 224.2,1 subdivision (b) when it failed to ask maternal and paternal extended family members about Indian ancestry within the meaning of Section 1903 of the federal Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA).   The Second Appellate District conditionally reversed the juvenile court’s order terminating parental rights and directed the juvenile court to order DCFS to complete its duty of due diligence to discover the whereabouts of Father and complete its initial inquiry of available maternal and paternal relatives into familial Indian ancestry. The court explained that this dependency proceeding lasted over two years. In that time, DCFS made two attempts to locate Father, and it did so using database search resources only. It made no attempt to inquire about Indian ancestry after obtaining Mother’s denial of such ancestry. The court found that DCFS did not exercise reasonable due diligence in its attempts to locate Father. The court also found that  DCFS erred in determining that ICWA did not apply without inquiring about available family members for whom it had contact information. View "In re Jayden G." on Justia Law

Respondent-appellant Wife appealed the property division incorporated into a divorce decree. The parties initially agreed to a settlement after mediation, but Wife later changed her mind. Petitioner-appellee Husband moved to enforce the settlement agreement, and the trial court held a hearing on the request. The trial court's divorce decree divided property between the parties based on information provided at the settlement conference and the hearing. Wife contended that the court's property division was unfair, and she appealed. The Oklahoma Supreme Court questioned the timeliness of Wife's appeal but allowed the appeal to proceed, reserving consideration of the timeliness issue until the decisional stage. After review, the Court determined Wife's appeal of the trial court's judgment was timely, and that the property division reached by the trial court was fair, just, and reasonable. Therefore judgment was affirmed. View "Owens v. Owens" on Justia Law

In this case, the superior court granted visitation to grandparents after finding that the children enjoyed a positive relationship “typical of a grandparent-child relationship” and that the parents’ motive for cutting off contact with the grandparents was spiteful. To this, the Alaska Supreme Court reversed the court’s ruling, finding the parents’ motive for ending visitation did not show that the lack of visitation was detrimental to the children. "And the mere fact that children enjoy a positive or typical relationship with their grandparents does not amount to clear and convincing evidence that ending visitation is detrimental to the children. Absent such evidence, it is error to order visitation that a fit parent does not wish to allow." View "Christy v. Conrad" on Justia Law

Blythe and Danny were the parents of three-year-old Gene. Blythe had two other children, Gene’s half siblings, with a man named Timothy. Timothy has custody of those other children; they lived with him and his parents, Robert and Vivian. In January 2021, the Office of Children’s Services (OCS) filed a non-emergency petition to adjudicate Gene a child in need of aid due to concerns about Blythe’s and Danny’s mental health and substance abuse. Later that month OCS removed Gene from his parents and placed him with Robert and Vivian. Robert and Vivian considered themselves Gene’s grandparents, though they were not related to him by blood or marriage. When OCS decides to transfer a child in its custody from one out-of-home placement to another, a party may seek judicial review of that decision. According to statute, the superior court shall deny the proposed transfer if the party “prove[s] by clear and convincing evidence that the transfer would be contrary to the best interests of the child.” OCS argued that in some circumstances the party challenging a proposed transfer must also show it was an abuse of discretion, such as when OCS seeks to transfer the child to a statutorily preferred placement or due to licensing concerns with the existing placement. Because there was no basis in statutory text or legislative history to supplant the standard of review chosen by the legislature with a standard more deferential to OCS, the Alaska Supreme Court declined to do so. And because the Court mistakenly applied abuse of discretion review in State, Department of Health & Social Services, Office of Children’s Services v. Zander B., 474 P.3d 1153 (Alaska 2020), it overruled that decision to the extent it was inconsistent with the opinion here. View "Blythe P. v. Alaska, DHSS, OCS" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the county court finding that it was not in the best interest of the minor child at issue in this case to grant a petition to adopt the child (Child), whose parents died as the result of a murder-suicide, holding that there was no error.Child was five years old when her father killed her mother and then committed suicide. Thereafter, the Department of Health an Human Services (DHHS) took temporary protective custody of Child, who was adjudicated under Neb. Rev. Stat. 43-247(3)(a). The deceased couple's wills nominated Kelly, Child's biological maternal grandmother, as guardian for Child. Kelly filed a petition for guardianship of Child, after which Petitioners filed a petition for adoption. The county court denied the petition for adoption on the basis that it was not in Child's best interests to grant the petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in its best interests analysis. View "In re Adoption of Faith F." on Justia Law

At issue is whether the Commonwealth of Virginia would recognize a divorce granted by a foreign nation to its own citizens when neither spouse was domiciled in that nation at the time of the divorce. The question arises from Petitioner’s marriage to a woman after the woman and another man — both Ghanaian citizens — divorced pursuant to Ghanaian customary law. At the time of the divorce, the woman and man were lawful permanent residents of the United States, and neither was present or domiciled in Ghana. Based on his marriage to the woman, Petitioner became a lawful permanent resident of the United States. But when Petitioner applied to become a naturalized citizen, United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) determined that he and the woman were not validly married. USCIS reasoned that under controlling Virginia law, the Commonwealth would not recognize a divorce granted by a nation where neither spouse was domiciled at the time of the divorce. Petitioner sought a review of the decision in the district court, which granted summary judgment to USCIS. Petitioner then brought this appeal.   The Fourth Circuit reversed and remanded with instructions to grant Petitioner’s naturalization application. The court concluded as a matter of comity, Virginia would recognize this otherwise valid divorce granted by a foreign nation to its own citizens, regardless of the citizens’ domicile at the time. The court explained it rejected only USCIS’s argument that pursuant to present Virginia law, the Commonwealth would refuse to recognize a divorce granted by a foreign nation to its own citizens simply because neither was domiciled in the foreign nation at the time of the divorce. View "Michael Adjei v. Alejandro Mayorkas" on Justia Law