Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

Jessica G. (Mother) appealed a juvenile court’s order terminating parental rights to her son, Robert F. Relying on subdivision (b) Welfare and Institutions Code section 224.2, Mother argued that the Riverside County Department of Public Social Services (DPSS) failed to discharge its duty of initial inquiry, because DPSS did not ask various extended family members whether Robert had any Indian ancestry. The Court of Appeal found DPSS took Robert into protective custody pursuant to a warrant, so DPSS did not take Robert into temporary custody under section 306. Accordingly, DPSS had no obligation to ask Robert’s extended family members about his potential Indian status under section 224.2(b). The Court therefore affirmed the order terminating parental rights. View "In re Robert F." on Justia Law

Appellant Madera County Department of Social Services (department) appealed from the juvenile court’s orders issued at a combined hearing for family reunification review and disposition from a Welfare and Institutions Code section 3871 petition on November 15, 2021. The department contends the juvenile court erred when it ordered the department to provide additional reunification services to L.V. (mother) for her dependent children Damian L. and Jesse A. (collectively “the children”).   The Fifth Appellate District reversed the juvenile court’s order continuing mother’s reunification services. The court remanded to the juvenile court with directions to vacate its order continuing mother’s family reunification services. The court explained that the juvenile court erred in failing to consider the entire time period since the children’s initial removal when it calculated the 18-month statutory limit on reunification services. By the time the juvenile court ordered mother’s reunification services to continue in November 2021, mother had received approximately 26 months of services, which was well over the 18-month limit. View "In re Damian L." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court accepted certification of a question from the district court regarding the authority of a court-appointed guardian and conservator of an incompetent adult ward to petition the district court for the ward's divorce and concluded that neither a guardian nor a conservator has the power under Wyoming law to pursue a divorce on behalf of a ward.Guardian/Conservator, who was appointed as guardian of Madonna Flory's person and conservator of her estate, filed a complaint for Ms. Flory's divorce from Rand Flory. The parties agreed that there was no controlling Wyoming precedent on the issue of whether a guardian or conservator could file for divorce on behalf of a ward, and the district court certified the question to the Supreme Court. In response the Supreme Court answered that Wyoming law does not permit a a guardian or conservator to move for and prosecute a divorce action on behalf of the ward. View "Flory v. Flory" on Justia Law

After determining that Father’s delusions and paranoia put A.G.(age 14) at risk of serious harm, the juvenile court assumed jurisdiction, ordered that A.G. be removed from Father’s custody, and ordered reunification services and a psychological evaluation. At the six-month hearing, the Agency reported that Father had received his case plan several months earlier but had not signed the plan nor engaged in recommended services. Father also resisted psychological evaluation. At the 12-month hearing, the Agency reported that Father had made moderate progress. The court granted an extension, finding that the Agency had provided reasonable services. At the 18-month hearing, the Agency reported that returning A.G. to Father’s custody still presented a substantial risk of detriment to her well-being and recommended a permanency planning hearing. The court found that the Agency had not provided reasonable services between the 12- and 18-month hearings but declined to exercise its discretion to continue the case, noting Father’s uneven progress.The California Supreme Court affirmed. Reasonable reunification services must be offered to qualifying parents for a minimum of six or 12 months, depending on the child’s age, and generally may be extended for up to 18 months. The court was not automatically required to grant a further extension based on its finding that reasonable services were not provided during the 12- to 18-month extension. Once a child has been out of the parent’s custody for 18 months, the law ordinarily requires the court to proceed to set a hearing to determine a permanent plan. View "Michael G. v. Superior Court of Orange County" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals determining that the trial court's findings of fact did not support its conclusion adjudicating Glenda a neglected juvenile, holding that the court of appeals erred by requiring findings of fact from the trial court to adjudicate a juvenile neglected that are not required by statute or Supreme Court precedent.After Glenda's sibling died, the Department of Social Services filed a petition alleging that Glenda was a neglected juvenile. After the trial court concluded as a matter of law that Glenda was a neglected juvenile within the meaning of N.C. Gen. Stat. 7B-101(15) Respondent appealed. The court of appeals vacated the adjudication and disposition order, concluding that the trial court's written findings of fact did not support its conclusion that Glenda was a neglected juvenile. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the findings of fact supported the trial court's adjudication and conclusion of law that Glenda was a neglected juvenile. View "In re G.C." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals reversing the trial court's adjudications of nine-year-old Margaret as an abused and neglected juvenile and her two younger siblings as neglected juveniles, holding that the trial court's order contained sufficient findings, supported by clear cogent, and convincing evidence, supporting the court's adjudications of Margaret and her siblings.In reversing the trial court's adjudications, the court of appeals held that the trial court improperly admitted some hearsay evidence and that the trial court's reasoning was so "reliant and intertwined with" the hearsay evidence that the proper remedy was to vacate the trial court's order. The Supreme Court reversed after reaffirming the proper role of an appellate court in reviewing a trial court's adjudication and disposition in a juvenile proceeding, holding that the court of appeals erred by vacating or reversing the trial court's adjudications because the court properly adjudicated Margaret as an abused and neglected juvenile and properly adjudicated her siblings as neglected juveniles. View "In re A.J.L.H." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court denied this petition for a writ of certiorari seeking to challenge the validity of a decision of the circuit court ordering attorney Helen Grinder to refund her client William Campbell $10,000 as a condition as her withdrawal, holding that Grinder had an adequate alternate remedy available.Grinder charged $10,000 to represent Campbell in an ex parte petition for a change in custody. Campbell prevailed and then fired Grinder. Grinder sought formally to withdraw as Campbell's counsel, but Campbell opposed the withdrawal on the grounds that Grinder retained unearned fees. The circuit court subsequently issued an order granting Grinder's motion to withdraw on the condition that she refund $10,000 of allegedly unearned fees to Campbell. Grinder filed a petition for a writ of certiorari and sought a stay. The Supreme Court denied the writ, holding that there was an adequate remedy other than a writ of certiorari for her to challenge the circuit court's fee adjudication. View "Grinder v. Campbell" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated the portion of the adjudicatory and dispositional orders culminating in the termination of Petitioners' parental rights to four of the seven children at issue in this case and affirmed the termination of Petitioners' parental rights as to the remaining children, holding that the circuit court erred in part.In the underlying proceedings the circuit court terminated the parental, custodial, and guardianship rights to seven children, three of whom resided in the home at the time the abuse and neglect petition was filed and the other four of whom were in legal guardianships with various relatives. The Supreme Court vacated the orders in part, holding (1) there was ample support for the termination of Petitioners' parental rights as to the children who resided in the home; and (2) the circuit court failed to make adequate findings to support its exercise of jurisdiction over the children in legal guardianships. View "In re B.V." on Justia Law

Jennie and Christopher Zinn appealed a circuit court's dismissal of their complaint against Ashley Till. In October 2017, the Zinns filed an adoption petition with the probate court concerning an unborn child. The child was born later that month, and the probate court subsequently entered an interlocutory adoption decree. In November 2017, the Zinns filed an amended adoption petition, listing the child's name and providing the consent of the child's mother and purported father to the child's adoption. On December 18, 2017, Till, an employee of the Alabama Department of Human Resources, submitted an acknowledgment letter to the probate court stating that there was no entry in the putative-father registry relating to the child. The next day, the probate court entered a final decree of adoption. On January 25, 2018, Till submitted a corrected acknowledgment letter to the probate court, identifying an individual who was, in fact, listed in the putative-father registry regarding the child and stating that incomplete information had previously been provided "due to oversight and neglect." The next day, the probate court vacated the final decree of adoption based on the corrected acknowledgment letter. In June 2019, the Zinns filed suit against Till alleging: (1) negligence; (2) wantonness; and (3) that the defendants had "acted willfully, maliciously, in bad faith, beyond their authority or under a mistaken interpretation of the law ...." The Zinns' complaint sought awards of compensatory and punitive damages. On appeal, the Zinns argue that the circuit court erred by dismissing their claims on immunity grounds. Till moved to dismiss count one of the Zinns' complaint based on State-agent immunity, and the circuit court cited State-agent immunity as an alternative ground for dismissing counts two and three of the complaint. Insofar as the circuit court's judgment dismissing each count of the complaint was based on the doctrine of State-agent immunity, the parties appeared to agree that the judgment should have been reversed regarding each count. The judgment was reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "Zinn v. Till" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court and confirmed the existence of a common-law marriage between Margaret Heidkamp and Edward Ritter, holding that the district court's findings were supported by substantial competent evidence and that the court properly applied the rules.After Ritter died at the age of sixty-seven, Heidkamp filed a petition to declare relationship as common-law spouse. After a hearing, the district court concluded that Ritter and Heidkamp "were in a valid common-law marriage under the statute and common law of Kansas as of September 8, 2003" and that the relationship continued until Ritter's death. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the evidence supported the conclusion that the components necessary to establish a common-law marriage existed in the relationship between Ritter and Heidkamp. View "In re Common-Law Marriage of Heidkamp & Ritter" on Justia Law