Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the juvenile court denying the motion to intervene filed by Red Lack Tribe of Chippewa Indians in this termination of parental rights matter, holding that there was no error.After the juvenile court granted the State's motion to adjudicate Children as minors for purposes of Neb. Rev. Stat. 43-247(3)(a) the State sought certification. The Tribe sought intervention, but the State argued against intervention because Children were not Indian children for purposes of ICWA. The juvenile court granted intervention but then vacated its order granting the Tribe's motion to intervene. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Children were not currently Indian children for purposes of ICWA, and the juvenile court did not err in denying the Tribe's motion to intervene. View "In re Manuel C." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the judgment of the district court concluding that the parties' signed voluntary declaration of paternity (VDP) should be set aside because of the parties' fraud and a mutual mistake but that Taylor Scott should nevertheless be adjudicated the child's father, holding that there was no error.Sarah Benson and Taylor Scott, an unmarried couple, signed a VDP representing that Scott was the father of Benson's child when both parties know that Scott was not the child's biological father. When Benson later cut off contact between Scott and the child Scott filed a complaint seeking joint legal and physical custody. In response, Benson challenged the VDP. The district court set aside the VDP but concluded that, under the Utah Uniform Parentage Act, Scott should be adjudicated to be the child's father. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in looking to the factors set forth in Utah Code 78B-16-608 to disregard the genetic test results that would have excluded Scott as the child's father. View "Scott v. Benson" on Justia Law

M.C. (mother) appealed the termination of parental rights to two of her children (the children) under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. She contends that the juvenile court failed to determine whether it had jurisdiction over the children under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (the UCCJEA). The Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (the Department) responded that by failing to raise the issue, mother forfeited her right to raise it on appeal; alternatively, the Department argued that substantial evidence supports the court’s assertion of jurisdiction in this case. Mother also contended the juvenile court and the Department failed to comply with the inquiry requirements of the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA) and related California statutes.   The Second Appellate District concluded the forfeiture doctrine does not bar mother’s challenge to the juvenile court’s compliance with the UCCJEA, and the error requires conditional reversal of the parental rights termination orders with directions to the court to undertake the process that the UCCJEA requires. This disposition will permit mother to raise the unopposed ICWA arguments she makes on appeal. The court explained that here, the usual benefit from the application of the forfeiture doctrine—to encourage parties to bring issues to the trial court—would not be conferred under the facts of this case. Thus, although the Department or mother could have done more to urge the juvenile court to undertake the UCCJEA process, the objective facts supporting the need for such a process were readily apparent from the record. View "In re L.C." on Justia Law

Plaintiff alleged federal and wiretap violations and state common law claims against Defendant, her ex-husband, and co-Defendant, his attorney. She alleged that during a child custody proceeding in Nevada state court, Defendant had secretly recorded conversations between her and their child and that co-Defendant had filed selectively edited transcripts of the illegally recorded conversations on the state court’s public docket. The district court concluded that co-Defendant’s alleged conduct involved First Amendment petitioning activity, which is protected by the Noerr-Pennington doctrine. The district court entered default judgment against Defendant. The district court awarded Plaintiff $10,000 in statutory damages under the Federal Wiretap Act, but it did not award punitive damages or litigation costs, nor did it discuss or award other categories of damages ostensibly available on her Nevada common-law claims.   The Ninth Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment dismissing Plaintiff’s claims against co-Defendant as barred under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine and entering default judgment against Defendant. The panel held that co-Defendant violated the Federal Wiretap Act, and it agreed with the district court that the vicarious consent doctrine did not apply and that co-Defendant’s conduct was not protected under Bartnick v. Vopper, which carves out a narrow First Amendment exception to the Federal Wiretap Act for matters of public importance. The panel held that filing illegally obtained evidence on a public court docket is conduct not immunized under Noerr-Pennington, and the Federal Wiretap Act unambiguously applied to co-Defendant’s conduct. Further, the court held that the district court failed to adequately address other categories of damages to which Plaintiff might be entitled. View "LYUDMYLA PYANKOVSKA, ET AL V. SEAN ABID, ET AL" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed in part and vacated in part the judgment entered in the district court establishing parental rights and responsibilities concerning Father's child with Mother, holding that the court's judgment included a finding regarding domestic violence that was contrary to the evidence.Father filed a complaint for the determination of parental rights and responsibilities, and Mother filed an answer and counterclaim. After the district court entered its judgment Father appealed. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated in part the judgment below, holding (1) the court did not err in calculating Father's gross income for purposes of child support; and (2) the court clearly erred in finding that Father did not dispute Mother's testimony that he grabbed, pushed, and choked her, and the error was not harmless. View "Francoeur v. Berube" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of a single justice of the court dismissing as moot Father's petition pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211, 3, holding that there was no abuse of discretion.The Department of Children and Families filed a care and protection petition pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 119, 24 after the child in this case tested positive at birth for drugs. Thereafter, temporary custody was granted to Father. Father filed a motion to dismiss the petition for temporary custody on the grounds that there was no need for judicial intervention. The judge denied the order. Thereafter, Father brought his Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211, 3 petition. While the petition was pending, the juvenile court dismissed the care and protection case. On that basis, the single justice dismissed Father's as moot Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211, 3 petition. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that this Court declines to exercise its discretion to consider Father's appeal notwithstanding the fact that it was moot. View "In re Care & Protection of a Minor" on Justia Law

The Department of Children and Family Services detained infant boy S.S. at birth, based on exigency, alleging his parents abused drugs and S.S. was born testing positive for various drugs. The juvenile court detained S.S. from his parents and placed him with his maternal aunt and uncle. The mother and father both denied Indian ancestry. The maternal aunt, however, said that the mother might have Yaqui heritage. The Department, in turn, notified the Pascua Yaqui tribe, which replied S.S. was not eligible for membership: the tribe would not intervene. The Department never asked paternal extended family members about the possibility of Indian ancestry. The court terminated parental rights in favor of a permanent plan of adoption by the maternal aunt and uncle, who were the caretakers and prospective adoptive parents. The mother appealed. At issue is the federal Indian Child Welfare Act, sections 1901 and following title 25 of the United States Code (the Act, or ICWA) and its California counterpart.   The Second Appellate District conditionally reversed the juvenile court’s finding that ICWA does not apply and remanded the matter to the juvenile court with directions to order the Department to inquire of the three paternal extended family members previously identified whether S.S. may be an Indian child. The court explained that the Department’s failure prejudices tribes. The Department had contact information for three extended paternal family members but did nothing with it, thus denying tribes the benefit of the statutory promise. It would be a miscarriage of justice to deny tribes the benefit of this legislation. View "In re S.S." on Justia Law

When A.F. was 11 years old, she applied for a domestic violence restraining order (DVRO) against her father, Jeffrey F., who held joint legal custody with her mother, Andrea F. Mother was the original guardian ad litem (GAL), and she retained attorney Edward Castro to represent A.F. Father successfully moved to disqualify Mother as the GAL and Castro as A.F.’s counsel. A.F. appealed the order disqualifying Castro. A new GAL was not appointed. Although A.F. brought the petition on her own behalf, the family court in her parents’ dissolution matter, appointed a “minor’s counsel” to represent her best interests there, in anticipation of changes to the custody and visitation arrangement that could result from the outcome in the DV matter. A.F. retained attorney Aaron Smith, to represent her in the DV matter. The court disqualified Smith for numerous reasons, including that there was a potential conflict of interest from having her maternal grandfather serve as a third-party guarantor. The court also interviewed A.F. and determined she was not competent to retain counsel independently, and it found Smith did not meet the requirements detailed by the California Rules of Court to serve as a “minor’s counsel.” The court appointed counsel in the DV matter, and prohibited Smith from replacing the attorney the court appointed as a “minor’s counsel.” A.F. appealed, contending that the issue of selecting her attorney should have been stayed pending the appeal of the court’s order disqualifying Castro. She also contended it was error to appoint counsel in the DV matter and to disqualify the attorney she chose to represent her there. The Court of Appeal: (1) concluded the court had subject matter jurisdiction to act in the DV matter while the first appeal was pending because her original attorney substituted out of the case; (2) reversed the appointment of a “minor’s counsel,” which was improper in a DV matter where a minor seeks a restraining order under the Domestic Violence Prevention Act (DVPA); (3) affirmed the order voiding the agreement between A.F. and Smith and removing Smith as her attorney on the basis that A.F. lacked competency to select her attorney independently; (4) reversed the order prohibiting Smith from serving as A.F.’s attorney in the matter because it was an abuse of discretion to completely disqualify him on the basis that the court rejected the fee agreement or that he failed to meet the requirements of Rule 5.242. View "A.F. v. Jeffrey F." on Justia Law

Mother appealed a family division’s order denying her motion to permanently suspend father’s parent-child contact with the parties’ minor son. Mother argued the court erred in denying her motion to admit into evidence out-of-court statements made to her and other adults by son when he was four years old that allegedly demonstrated sexual abuse by father. The Vermont Supreme Court concluded the family court did not abuse its discretion in excluding son’s hearsay statements from the parent-child contact hearing, and therefore affirmed. View "Davis v. Davis" on Justia Law

Mark Rath appeals from a disorderly conduct restraining order directing him to have no contact with Kayla Jones for one year. In 2013, Rath and Jones divorced. Together they had two children. In July 2022, Jones filed a petition for a disorderly conduct restraining order after Rath sent numerous e-mails to Jones, her attorney, and her employer during a short period of time. A temporary restraining order was issued. In August 2022, a hearing was held and the district court granted a disorderly conduct restraining order against Rath. Rath argued the court abused its discretion by not holding a hearing within fourteen days of issuing the temporary restraining order. He argued the court abused its discretion by granting a restraining order even though Jones’s petition did not comply with N.D.C.C. § 12.1-31.2-01(3). He also argued the court abused its discretion by issuing the disorderly conduct restraining order without sufficient findings. Finding no reversible error, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed. View "Jones v. Rath" on Justia Law