Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

K.T. filed a request for a domestic violence restraining order (DVRO) against her ex-partner, E.S., with whom she shares three daughters. K.T. alleged that E.S. had subjected her to physical and sexual abuse over several years, including incidents where the children were present. She also claimed that E.S. had abducted the children from Texas to California without her consent. K.T. sought to include the children as protected parties in the DVRO, citing their exposure to E.S.'s abusive behavior.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County granted K.T. a temporary restraining order (TRO) against E.S. but did not include the children as protected parties, citing a lack of imminent risk of harm to them. During the hearing on K.T.'s DVRO request, the court reviewed her declaration and testimony, which detailed the abuse and the children's exposure to it. The court granted the DVRO protecting K.T. but did not include the children, stating there was no credible evidence of physical or sexual abuse of the children.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case and found that the trial court had used the wrong legal standard by requiring evidence of direct abuse of the children. The appellate court held that the correct standard was "good cause" based on the totality of the circumstances, which includes the children's exposure to domestic violence. The appellate court found that K.T. had provided sufficient evidence of good cause to include the children as protected parties in the DVRO.The appellate court reversed the trial court's decision in part, directing it to modify the DVRO to include the children as protected parties. The court otherwise affirmed the trial court's order and awarded costs to K.T. View "K.T. v. E.S." on Justia Law

C.T. filed a petition in 2019 in San Francisco Superior Court seeking a domestic violence restraining order against K.W. and sole custody of their son, born in November 2018. The court issued a temporary restraining order granting C.T. sole custody and determined California as the child's home state. In 2022, the court granted C.T. a five-year restraining order and continued temporary custody orders. In 2024, C.T. requested to relocate to Denmark with the child, which the court granted, maintaining C.T.'s sole custody and setting a future hearing for final custody determinations.The San Francisco Superior Court found in August 2024 that neither the child, C.T., nor K.W. resided in California but retained jurisdiction over the ongoing custody case. C.T. challenged this decision, arguing that the court lost jurisdiction under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA) because none of the parties resided in California.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed the case. The court concluded that the trial court retained jurisdiction to resolve the original custody and visitation issues despite the parties' relocation. The court emphasized that jurisdiction attaches at the commencement of the proceeding and is not lost due to subsequent relocations. The appellate court denied C.T.'s petition for a writ, affirming that the trial court had jurisdiction to make final custody and visitation determinations. View "C.T. v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

The case involves the dissolution of a marriage between Carol Sperry Smith and Dale Preston Smith. The key issue is the classification of a tract of land located at 4080 Racetrack Road in Grifton, North Carolina. Dale Preston Smith purchased this property before the marriage. The parties signed stipulations in January 2019, designating the property as marital property. However, Dale later filed a motion to set aside these stipulations, claiming the property was his separate property.In the District Court of Pitt County, the trial court approved a pretrial order that listed Racetrack Road as a disputed property, with Carol claiming it was a mixed asset and Dale asserting it was his separate property. The trial court classified the property as Dale's separate property and distributed it to him. Carol appealed, arguing that the stipulations were binding since the trial court never ruled on Dale's motion to set them aside.The Court of Appeals, in a divided decision, affirmed the trial court's order. The majority held that the pretrial order showed the parties did not agree that Racetrack Road was marital property. The dissenting judge argued that the trial court's failure to rule on the motion to set aside the stipulations meant the stipulations remained binding.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed the case. The court held that Carol invited any error by agreeing to proceed with the equitable distribution hearing without a direct ruling on the motion to set aside the stipulations. Therefore, she could not use this as a basis for a new hearing. The court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals, though it did not adopt its reasoning. The invited error doctrine barred Carol from obtaining a new equitable distribution hearing. View "Smith v. Smith" on Justia Law

Clint Seemann and Lisa Seemann, now known as Lisa Newell, married in 2005 and executed a premarital agreement listing their premarital assets, which included land and shares of stock, to be considered marital property. The agreement specified that these assets, along with any property resulting from their efforts during the marriage, should be divided equally in the event of death or divorce. In 2021, Clint filed for divorce.The District Court for Douglas County initially valued Lisa’s retirement accounts at $1,480,720 and included them in the marital estate. It determined that Clint’s membership interest in 75th and L Street, LLC, and its appreciation were nonmarital property. The court found the premarital agreement enforceable and divided the marital estate equally, ordering Lisa to make an equalization payment to Clint. Lisa appealed, and the Nebraska Supreme Court in Seemann v. Seemann (Seemann I) found errors in the district court’s valuation and inclusion of certain assets, remanding the case for redivision of the marital estate.On remand, the district court divided the marital property into two groups: assets listed in the agreement and the remainder of the marital estate. It equally divided the listed assets but awarded Clint all the assets added on remand without ordering an equalization payment, resulting in an unequal division of the total marital estate. Lisa received 45.25% of the total marital estate, while Clint received 54.75%.The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case de novo and held that the premarital agreement required an equal division of the entire marital estate. The court reversed the district court’s division and remanded with directions to divide the entire marital estate equally. View "Seemann v. Seemann" on Justia Law

Chanel Glover and Nicole Junior, a same-sex married couple, decided to conceive a child using assistive reproductive technology (ART) and a sperm donor. They entered into various contracts with a fertility clinic and a sperm bank, and both signed affidavits expressing their intent for Junior to adopt the child. However, their relationship deteriorated before the child was born, and Glover filed for divorce. Junior sought a court order to establish her parentage of the child, which the family court granted.The Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County confirmed Junior as the legal parent of the child, ordered Glover to inform Junior when she went into labor, and required Junior's name to appear on the child's birth certificate. Glover appealed, and the Superior Court affirmed the trial court's decision, holding that Junior established parentage through contract principles, equitable estoppel, and intent-based parentage.The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reviewed the case and held that none of the existing pathways to establish legal parentage—biology, adoption, equity, or contract—applied to the facts of this case. The court adopted the doctrine of intent-based parentage into Pennsylvania common law, recognizing that the parties' mutual intent to conceive and raise the child together, as evidenced by their actions and agreements, established Junior's parentage. The court affirmed the Superior Court's decision on the ground of intent-based parentage, emphasizing that this doctrine aligns with public policy and the evolving concept of family. View "Glover v. Junior" on Justia Law

A mother (TH) appeals a juvenile court's decision to change the permanency plan for her minor child (LH) from reunification to adoption. LH was taken into state custody shortly after birth due to both mother and child testing positive for opiates. The mother has another child, RH, who remained in her custody. The mother argues that the juvenile court did not consider LH's relationship with RH and that it abused its discretion by changing the plan to adoption despite her maintaining sobriety for six months.The District Court of Park County initially placed LH in the custody of the Department of Family Services (Department) and ordered the mother to abstain from controlled substances and undergo drug testing. Despite entering inpatient treatment and attending counseling, the mother continued to test positive for illegal substances, leading to suspended visitations with LH. The Department recommended changing the permanency plan to adoption after the mother failed to maintain sobriety and secure stable housing and employment.The Wyoming Supreme Court reviewed the case and found that the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion. The court noted that the juvenile court had ample evidence of LH's relationship with RH and the potential for sibling separation. The juvenile court's decision to change the permanency plan to adoption was based on the mother's failure to make sufficient progress on her case plan goals, particularly her sobriety and obtaining a stable living environment, within the statutory timeframe. The court emphasized that children have a right to stability and permanency, which outweighed the mother's progress in the months leading up to the permanency hearing.The Wyoming Supreme Court affirmed the juvenile court's decision to change the permanency plan from reunification to adoption, allowing the Department to cease reunification efforts. View "In re L.H. v. State" on Justia Law

Yolanda M. Currier and James M. Currier were married in 2000, and Yolanda filed for divorce in 2017. The divorce judgment, entered in 2019, awarded Yolanda sole parental rights and responsibilities for their three children, child support, spousal support, and half the value of James’s employee stock plan and 401(k) account. James was found to have committed economic misconduct by cashing in stocks and taking loans against his 401(k) during the divorce proceedings.The District Court (South Paris) found James in contempt multiple times for failing to comply with the divorce judgment. In 2023, Yolanda filed a fifth motion for contempt, asserting that James failed to provide an accounting of his stocks and did not file a proposed qualified domestic relations order (QDRO) for the division of his 401(k) account. The court found James not in contempt regarding the stock division, concluding that Yolanda did not prove James owned stocks. However, the court found James in contempt regarding the 401(k) account, valuing it at $7,000 and awarding Yolanda $3,500.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case and found that the District Court erred in its findings. The Supreme Judicial Court concluded that Yolanda met her burden of proving James’s noncompliance with the stock accounting and division order. The court also found that the District Court erred in valuing the 401(k) account at $7,000, as this figure excluded the value of loans taken against the account, contrary to the divorce judgment’s provisions.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court vacated the District Court’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion, noting James’s pattern of noncompliance and suggesting the consideration of punitive sanctions if his contumacious conduct continues. View "Currier v. Currier" on Justia Law

Over a five-year period, Robert Michael Tafoya stalked and harassed E.R. in various ways. He frequently appeared at her workplace, left flowers on her car, followed her while shopping, made numerous Facebook posts claiming to be involved with her and the father of her children, and fraudulently applied for custody and visitation orders. Despite restraining orders, his behavior continued unabated, including attempts to pick up her children from school.Following a jury trial in the Superior Court of Riverside County, Tafoya was convicted of stalking, perjury, attempted child abduction, and filing false documents. He was sentenced to 25 years and eight months in prison. Tafoya appealed the convictions, arguing that his Facebook posts were protected by the First Amendment, there was insufficient evidence for the attempted child abduction conviction, and the perjury and false document convictions lacked false statements. He also appealed the restitution order, claiming the court used the wrong standard and lacked proper verification.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the case. The court held that Tafoya’s Facebook posts were not protected activity as they were part of a pattern of conduct that constituted a credible threat. The court found substantial evidence supporting the attempted child abduction conviction, noting that the visitation order was obtained by fraud and thus void. The court affirmed the convictions for stalking, attempted child abduction, and filing false documents. However, the court reversed the perjury conviction related to the restraining order (count 10) due to the lack of a false statement under penalty of perjury and remanded for resentencing. The restitution order was upheld, as the need for relocation expenses was justified by the record. View "People v. Tafoya" on Justia Law

A father opposed the petition of his child's foster parent for guardianship. The child, a member of his mother's tribe, had been in the foster parent's care for about two years. The Office of Children's Services (OCS) took custody of the child in 2019 due to domestic violence and drug abuse in the mother's home. The father, living in Arizona at the time, was contacted by OCS after the child was taken into custody. OCS attempted to place the child with the father, but an Arizona home study recommended against it. The child was placed with the foster parent, a relative and tribal member.The superior court granted the foster parent's guardianship petition after an evidentiary hearing, finding it in the child's best interests and that returning the child to the father would likely result in serious emotional damage. The father appealed, arguing that the guardianship was a de facto termination of parental rights and required additional findings and procedural steps.The Alaska Supreme Court remanded the case to the superior court to address whether OCS had made active efforts to prevent the breakup of the family, as required by the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). On remand, the superior court made additional findings on the existing record and reaffirmed the guardianship order.The Alaska Supreme Court reviewed the case and concluded that the superior court did not clearly err or abuse its discretion. The court held that the superior court made the necessary findings under ICWA, including that OCS had made active efforts to prevent the breakup of the family and that guardianship was in the child's best interests. The court also clarified that guardianship proceedings do not require the termination of parental rights and can proceed independently of a Child in Need of Aid (CINA) proceeding. The order appointing the guardian was affirmed. View "In re Protective Proceedings of Macon J." on Justia Law

A husband and wife divorced after 19 years of marriage, with six children, including four adopted minors. The wife, a nurse practitioner, challenged the superior court's division of marital assets, particularly the valuation of the husband's law practice, which the court found lacked marketable goodwill. She also disputed the treatment of a $75,000 payout as a pre-distribution rather than interim support and the offsetting of adoption subsidies against the husband's child support obligation.The superior court, Third Judicial District, Anchorage, held a four-day custody trial and a five-day property trial. The court awarded 50/50 shared physical custody and divided the marital estate 60/40 in favor of the wife. The court valued the husband's law firm based on its net assets, excluding goodwill, and found the Wasilla office building was not a marital asset. The court also calculated the husband's child support obligation but reduced it to account for the adoption subsidies received by the wife.The Supreme Court of the State of Alaska reviewed the case. It affirmed the superior court's decision, holding that only marketable goodwill may be divided on divorce, and the evidence showed the law firm lacked such goodwill. The court found no error in the superior court's other decisions, including the pre-distribution in lieu of interim spousal support and the temporary adjustment of the child support obligation. The court also upheld the superior court's valuation of the law firm, the classification of the Wasilla office building, and the finding that the law firm had no excess cash. The Supreme Court concluded that the superior court did not abuse its discretion in declining to award interim spousal support, in its treatment of post-separation earnings, or in its decision not to award long-term spousal support, above-guidelines child support, or additional attorney's fees. The property division, including the award of the marital home to the husband, was found to be equitable. View "May v. Petersen" on Justia Law