Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Wisconsin Supreme Court
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This case involves the termination of parental rights of a father, B.W., to his son, Bob. The State of Wisconsin filed a petition to terminate B.W.'s parental rights on the grounds that Bob was a child in continuing need of protection or services and that B.W. failed to assume parental responsibility. B.W. entered a no-contest plea to the grounds for termination. At the dispositional hearing, the court terminated B.W.'s parental rights, finding it was in Bob's best interest.B.W. filed a post-disposition motion to withdraw his no-contest plea, arguing that the plea colloquy was defective because the court miscommunicated the burden of proof required at the dispositional phase. He also argued that the court improperly relied on the proposed adoptive parent's assurance that she would allow B.W. to continue to visit Bob. The circuit court denied the motion, and the court of appeals affirmed.The Supreme Court of Wisconsin affirmed the lower courts' decisions. The court found that B.W. failed to make a prima facie showing that the plea colloquy was defective. The court also concluded that the circuit court did not erroneously exercise its discretion by relying on the proposed adoptive parent's testimony. The court held that the circuit court properly exercised its discretion, considering the testimony and weighing the statutory dispositional factors. View "State v. B. W." on Justia Law

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This case involves the termination of parental rights of R.A.M., the mother of P.M., a child born in 2015. In 2017, R.A.M. was convicted of child abuse after a police officer found P.M. with scratches, bruising, and bleeding from the nose. P.M. was placed in foster care and later with his paternal uncle. In 2021, the State filed a petition for the termination of R.A.M.'s parental rights, citing a continuing need for protection and services (CHIPS) and R.A.M.'s failure to assume parental responsibility. R.A.M. contested both grounds.The case was heard in the Milwaukee County Circuit Court. During the proceedings, R.A.M. failed to appear for a hearing on July 5, 2022, despite a standing order requiring her to attend all court appearances. The court found her absence to be egregious and without justification, and granted the State's motion for default judgment. The court then immediately moved to the dispositional phase and concluded the hearing on the same day, finding that termination of R.A.M.'s parental rights would be in P.M.'s best interest.R.A.M. appealed the decision, and the Court of Appeals reversed the order, holding that the circuit court lost competency when it proceeded to the dispositional hearing on the same day that the grounds phase concluded. The Court of Appeals also held that R.A.M.'s due process rights were violated. The case was remanded to the circuit court with instructions to hold a new dispositional hearing.The Supreme Court of Wisconsin affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court held that under Wis. Stat. § 48.23(2)(b)3., the circuit court was required to wait at least two days after finding R.A.M.'s conduct in failing to appear as ordered was egregious and without clear and justifiable excuse before proceeding to the dispositional phase of proceedings. The court's failure to abide by this statutory mandate resulted in a loss of competency to proceed. Therefore, R.A.M. is entitled to a new dispositional hearing. View "State v. R.A.M." on Justia Law

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The case involves a non-marital couple, A.M.B. and T.G., who sought to adopt A.M.B.'s biological child, M.M.C. T.G. had been a father figure to M.M.C. for over a decade and had assumed various parental duties. The parental rights of M.M.C.'s biological father had been terminated. Despite a positive Home Study Report recommending the adoption, the Circuit Court for Ashland County denied the adoption petition. The court cited Wisconsin's adoption statutes, which only allow a non-marital partner to adopt their partner's child if they are married to the child's parent. A.M.B. and T.G. appealed, arguing that the statutes violated their equal protection rights.The Circuit Court for Ashland County denied the adoption petition, citing Wisconsin's adoption statutes. The statutes only allow a non-marital partner to adopt their partner's child if they are married to the child's parent. The court referenced a previous case, Georgina G. v. Terry M., which held that an adoption by a third party who is not the spouse of the parent is not permissible. A.M.B. and T.G. appealed the decision, arguing that the statutes violated their equal protection rights.The Supreme Court of Wisconsin affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that the adoption statutes did not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The court found that the statutes did not restrict a fundamental right or regulate a protected class. The court concluded that the state had a legitimate interest in promoting stability for adoptive children through marital families, which provided a rational basis for the legislative limits on eligibility to adopt a child. View "A. M. B. v. Circuit Court for Ashland County" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court denying Father's motion to withdraw his plea of no contest to one of two grounds alleged in the State's petition to terminate Father's parental rights to his daughter, holding that Father knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently pled no contest.In its termination petition under Wis. Stat. 48.415 the State claimed both that Father's daughter remained a child in continuing need of protection or services (CHIPS) and that Father failed to assume parental responsibility for his daughter. Father pled no contest to the continuing CHIPS ground. Thereafter, Father filed a motion for plea withdrawal. The circuit court denied the motion, but the court of appeals reversed on the grounds that the State lacked evidence establishing the validity of the plea. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Father knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently pled no contest to the continuing CHIPS ground for terminating his parental rights; and (2) therefore, the court of appeals erred in permitting Father to withdraw his plea. View "State v. A.G." on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals reversing the order of the circuit court concluding that it had the authority to order Paul Schwab to comply with a marital settlement agreement entered into in 1992 on the grounds that Wis. Stat. 893.40 barred Kathy Siech's action, holding that the statute posed no bar to Kathy's action.In the settlement agreement, Paul promised to pay Kathy half of his pension "when and if" that benefit became available to him. Twenty-one years later, Paul received his pension, but he refused to pay Kathy her share. Kathy sought to judicially enforce their agreement by seeking a contempt order. In response, Paul asserted that Kathy's action was barred by section 893.40's twenty-year statute of repose. The circuit court concluded that it had the authority to order Paul to comply with the settlement agreement under Johnson v. Masters, 830 N.W.2d 647. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that section 893.40 did not bar Kathy's action because it was impossible for Kathy to enforce Paul's promise until after the statutory period of repose had run. View "Schwab v. Schwab" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals agreeing with the circuit court that the amended version of Wis. Stat. 48.415(2)(a)3 applied during Mother's termination of parental rights (TPR) proceedings, holding that there was no error.In 2018, the legislature amended of Wis. Stat. 48.415(2)(a)3, a portion of the continuing child in need of protection of services (CHIPS) ground for the involuntary termination of parental rights. The amendment occurred during the pendency of Mother's court proceedings involving her child, who was adjudged CHIPS in 2016. During the TPR proceedings, the parties disputed whether the 2016 version of the 2018 amended version the statute should apply to Mother's case. The circuit court ruled that the amended version applied and then allowed Mother to appeal the non-final order. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the "15 out of 22 months" timeframe, as codified in the amended version of the statute, began to run when Mother received written notice accompanying the initial 2016 CHIPS order; and (2) starting the "15 out of 22 months" timeframe in 2016 did not violate Mother's due process rights. View "Eau Claire County Department of Human Services v. S. E." on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals reversing the circuit court's denial of Father's motion for reconsideration of the circuit court's ruling in favor of Mother in a custody dispute, holding that the "extreme" facts of this case rebutted the presumption of judicial impartiality and established a due process violation.The circuit court judge accepted Mother's Facebook "friend request" after a contested hearing but before rendering a decision. During the twenty-five days between the judge's acceptance of Mother's friend request and his issuance of a written decision entirely in her favor, Mother engaged with and reacted to at least twenty of the judge's Facebook posts. Mother further "shared" and "liked" several third-party posts related to an issue that was contested at the hearing. After discovering the Facebook friendship and communications, which the judge never disclosed, Father moved the circuit court for reconsideration, requesting judicial disqualification and a new hearing. The judge denied the motion. The court of appeals reversed and remanded the case with directions that the court proceed before a different circuit court judge. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circumstances and facts of this case rose to the level of a serious risk of actual bias, which rebutted the presumption of the judge's impartiality. View "Miller v. Carroll" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals applying a constructive trust to proceeds Lynnea Landsee-Pulkkila collected from a life insurance policy maintained by her late husband, James Pulkkila, holding that the court of appeals erred in imposing a constructive trust absent findings of fact that would support such an imposition.In 2009, James and Joan Pulkkila divorced. In their marital settlement agreement (MSA) that was incorporated into the judgment of divorce James and Joan were required to maintain life insurance with their children as beneficiaries. In 2013, James and Lynnea were married. The following year, James submitted a beneficiary name change asking that Lynnea be made the sole beneficiary of the life insurance policy. After Lynnea was paid the proceeds of the policy, Joan asserted that James breached the MSA agreement and that a constructive trust should be placed on the proceeds. The circuit court denied Joan's motion for a constructive trust. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that equity required the imposition of a constructive trust. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the court of appeals erroneously exercised its discretion because it determined that a constructive trust was appropriate in the absence of an evidentiary hearing and resulting relevant factual findings. View "Pulkkila v. Pulkkila" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court vacated the order of the circuit court granting a petition for grandparent visitation over the objection of two fit parents, holding that the Grandparent Visitation Statute, Wis. Stat. 767.43(3), as applied to the circuit court order, is unconstitutional because Grandmother did not overcome the presumption in favor of the Parents' visitation decision with clear and convincing evidence that their decision was not in the child's best interest.Despite finding that Parents were good and fit parents, the circuit court granted Grandmother's petition for visitation. The Supreme Court vacated the order, holding (1) The Grandparent Visitation Statute must withstand strict scrutiny; (2) the statute is facially constitutional and is narrowly tailored to further a compelling state interest; but (3) the statute is unconstitutional as applied, and the visitation order in this case violated the constitutional rights of Parents. View "Michels v. Lyons" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the termination of Father’s parental rights and remanded this case to the circuit court to conduct a new trial, holding that denying a defendant an opportunity to present his case-in-chief is a structural error, one that is so intrinsically harmful as to require automatic reversal.After the State petitioned the circuit court to terminate Father’s parental rights, the case went to trial. Immediately after the State rested and before giving Father an opportunity to present his case the circuit court decided that Father was an unfit parent. On appeal, the State admitted error but argued that the circuit court’s decision was subject to a harmless-error review. The court of appeals agreed with the State and concluded that the circuit court’s error was harmless. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the circuit court erred when it decided Father was an unfit parent before he had an opportunity to present his case; and (2) the error was structural, and the case must be remanded for a new trial. View "State v. C.L.K." on Justia Law