Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

This was an appeal by Petitioner from an order of the circuit court accepting the voluntary relinquishment of parental rights by Father to his two eldest children and dismissing his two youngest children from the case. Petitioner was the mother of the two youngest children, who lived in Maryland. The Supreme Court reversed the lower court's order, holding that the trial court abused its discretion by (1) accepting Father's voluntary relinquishment of parental rights to two of his children and dismissing two other children without holding a full evidentiary hearing to address the specific allegations of abuse and neglect; (2) failing to grant the motion for the appointment of a separate guardian ad litem for Father's children residing in Maryland; (3) refusing to conduct an in camera hearing with the two oldest children so the children could inform the court about the specific conduct of their father as well as their wishes regarding the termination of their father's parental rights; and (4) dismissing the two children residing in Maryland and failing to hold a hearing regarding the abuse and neglect issues involving those children. Remanded. View "In re T.W." on Justia Law

This was an appeal by Petitioner from an order of the circuit court placing Petitioner's grandson, Aaron H., a minor, in the home of his foster parents for the purpose of adoption. Petitioner contended he should have been considered as an adoptive placement for Aaron H. At issue on appeal was whether the circuit court erred in placing the child with his foster parents for adoption rather than with his grandfather in view of the statutory preference for grandparent placement. The Supreme Court affirmed the ruling of the circuit court and ordered that Aaron H. be placed for adoption in the home of the foster parents, holding that the circuit court did not err in approving the adoption of Aaron H. by his foster parents, as the grandparent placement failed to serve the best interests of the child. View "In re Aaron H." on Justia Law

Petitioner was the mother of six children, three of whom were minors. Respondents were Mother's ex-husbands and fathers to the minor children. Upon her divorces, Mother received primary custody of the minor children. Fathers later filed motions for modification of custody, which the family court denied. The circuit court reversed, finding the family court had abused its discretion, and placed the three children in the primary custody of their fathers. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the family court erred in concluding that a substantial change in circumstances was not present under the facts of the case, and the circuit court did not err by reversing the family court's order. View "T.H. v. D.K." on Justia Law

After an approximately twenty-one year marriage, Constance Mayle and Mark Mayle were divorced. The family court ordered Mark to pay Constance permanent spousal support in the amount of $5,500 per month, with an additional $1,500 per month for six months designated as rehabilitative support. After a period of ten years, the family court ordered that the monthly spousal support be reduced to $1,500 per month. The family court denied Constance's request for reimbursement spousal support and for attorney fees and costs. The circuit court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) there was no error in the award of rehabilitative spousal support for six months or in the amount of the permanent spousal support for the first ten years; but (2) the circuit court and family court erred in (a) reducing the amount of spousal support to $1,500 after ten years, and (b) denying Constance's request for attorney fees. Remanded. View "Mayle v. Mayle" on Justia Law

Karen Tanner appealed an order the circuit court that granted her parole with the condition that she not be in the presence or accompaniment of anyone convicted of a felony, including her husband. Tanner contended (1) the circuit court was without authority to grant parole insofar as parole is an executive function, and (2) the condition that she not associate with her husband was an unreasonable burden on her right of marriage. After discussing the reasons for imposing parole conditions, including the aim of reducing recidivism, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the West Virginia Home Incarceration Act imparts authority to circuit courts to grant parole under the conditions specified therein; and (2) the circuit court properly exercised its discretion and did not act in an unreasonable, capricious, or arbitrary manner when it imposed upon Tanner's parole the condition that she not associate with her husband. View "State v. Tanner" on Justia Law

Mother appealed from an order entered by the circuit court affirming a family court order, which modified primary residential custody of the parties' minor child from Mother to respondent Father. On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed, holding that based upon the parties' written submissions and oral arguments, the record designated for the Court's consideration, and the pertinent authorities, the circuit court's affirmation of the custodial decisions made by the family court should be reversed and the transfer of custody should be stayed. Remanded for an evidentiary hearing to consider what custodial arrangement would promote the best interests of the child. View "Brittany S. v. Amos F." on Justia Law

After finding that Mother was an abusive and neglectful parent, the circuit court terminated Mother's parental rights to Child, a sixteen-year-old minor, despite the recommendation of the Department of Health and Human Resources (DHHR) that only Mother's custodial rights be terminated. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court erred in terminating Mother's parental rights because it (1) failed to comply with the procedural requirements of Rule 34 of the rules of procedure for child abuse and neglect proceedings; and (2) failed to acquire and consider the wishes of Child as to the termination of Mother's parental rights, as required by W. Va. Code 49-6-5(a)(6).

Upon granting Husband and Wife a divorce, the family court directed Husband to pay $1,000 per month in spousal support. The court found that the award did not need to be paid out of Husband's veteran's disability benefits. The circuit court set aside the award of permanent spousal support and directed Husband to pay supposal support in the amount of $500 per month for eighteen months. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) in determining the amount of spousal support to be awarded, federal service-connected veterans disability benefits received by the payor spouse may be considered by the family court as a resource, along with the payor's other income, in assessing the ability of the payor to pay spousal support; and (2) because the circuit court, among other things, (i) failed to address with any specificity Husband's veterans benefits or the parties' Social Security awards, (ii) failed to address with specificity how those disability benefits were taken into account in setting aside the family court decision, and (iii) did not determine that any of the factual findings of the family court were clearly erroneous, the action was remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings.

Grandmother filed a petition for permanent guardianship of Child, who was over fourteen years old and had nominated his Grandmother to be his guardian. Child's Mother contested the guardianship. The family court denied Grandmother's petition. The circuit court affirmed, holding that appointing a third party as a guardian for a minor over the objection of a non-offending, biological parent would violate that parent's constitutional right to the custody of his or her own child. At issue on appeal was whether W. Va. Code 44-10-4 and the case law interpreting it required courts to appoint any guardian nominated by a minor above the age of fourteen, unless the guardian was "unfit." The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court properly concluded that it was not obligated under section 44-10-4 to appoint Grandmother as Child's guardian, despite Child's age and Grandmother's fitness; (2) the circuit court correctly concluded that Mother's constitutional rights as Child's biological mother would be violated by appointing a third party as Child's guardian; and (3) because Mother did not voluntarily transfer or relinquish her custody of Child, Grandmother was not Child's psychological parent.

Appellant Elizabeth Thornton was sentenced in circuit court to three to fifteen years in the state penitentiary for her conviction of child neglect resulting in death. Appellant appealed, arguing that (1) the state failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the appellant's delay in seeking medical treatment for her child caused his death, and (2) the circuit court erred in denying her motions for mistrial after the state allegedly violated the trial court's admonition to not reference child protective services proceedings or actions. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the jury verdict was supported by sufficient evidence, and (2) the circuit court did not abuse its discretion by not granting the appellant's motion for mistrial upon the mere mention of child protective services before the jury.