Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

Mother and Father had one child together. Mother and Father later divorced pursuant to an order in which Mother was granted primary custody of the child. Mother and her husband (Stepfather) subsequently filed a verified petition for adoption in which Stepfather sought to adopt the child. After an adoption hearing, the circuit court denied the adoption petition on the grounds that Father was current on his child support payments and had made minimum contact with the child such that the court could not find abandonment. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the circuit court abused its discretion in finding that Respondent had not abandoned the child; and (2) it was in the best interest of the child to be adopted by Stepfather. Remanded for entry of an order granting the petition for adoption. View "Joshua D.R. v. David A.M." on Justia Law

Decedent died intestate as a result of a motor vehicle accident. Petitioner, the former spouse of Decedent, sought a share in the settlement proceeds from a wrongful death action based on her monthly receipt of payments from Decedent for a child support arrearage. The circuit court ruled that Petitioner was not entitled to a portion of the subject settlement funds because Petitioner could not demonstrate she was financially dependent on Decedent at the time of trial. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err in ruling that Petitioner was not entitled to a share of the wrongful death settlement proceeds, as Petitioner's receipt of monthly arrearage payments was not sufficient to demonstrate the statutory requirement of financial dependence. View "Ellis v. Swisher" on Justia Law

Wife and Husband were divorced by order of the family court. Adopted into the final divorce order was an agreed parenting plan under which Mother was the primary custodial parent. After Father relocated to Pennsylvania, the parties were unable to reach an agreed-upon modification of the parenting plan. The primary dispute involved the transportation of the child for the purposes of Father's visitation. The circuit court found the parties had a "de facto" parenting plan under which Father was to provide all transportation for the child for purposes of visitation. In so finding, the circuit court reversed the final order of the family court, which provided that the parties share responsibility in the transportation of the child to facilitate Father's parenting time. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court committed error in finding that Mother was to be given deference to all parenting plan decisions. Remanded. View "Todd M.S. v. Julie M.G." on Justia Law

The family court granted Husband and Wife a divorce. The court awarded wife spousal support of $500 a month for thirty-six months; ruled that Husband must pay wife $80,390 in equitable distribution; provided an "in-kind" debt payment plan wherein Wife was to reimburse Husband one-half of any debt payments made to Husband's mother in connection with a loan; and awarded Wife attorney fees. The circuit court reversed, concluding (1) Wife was not entitled to spousal support and the amount in child support already paid by Husband should be deducted from the equitable distribution payment; (2) the family court erred in awarding attorney fees to Wife; and (3) Wife's repayment of her half of the loan should be deducted from Husband's payment of $80,390 to Wife. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded with directions that the order of the family court be reinstated, holding (1) the family court arrived at a fair and equitable grant of spousal support; (2) the family court was within its discretion in ordering the in-kind repayment of the loan and in ordering Husband to pay $80,390 to Petitioner in equitable distribution; and (3) the family court did not err in awarding attorney fees to Wife. View "Cochran v. Cochran" on Justia Law

The circuit court found Frieda, Cordelia's elderly mother, to be a protected person. After determining that Cordelia was exploiting Frieda, neglecting her needs, and mishandling her finances, the court directed Cordelia to turn over to Frieda's conservator a full accounting of what she had done with Frieda's assets. Cordelia failed to comply with the order. The mental hygiene commissioner subsequently found Cordelia to be in contempt for failing to account for the disposition of assets belonging to her mother. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the circuit court's finding that Cordelia was in contempt; (2) affirmed that portion of the $50 per diem contempt sanction that applied prospectively from the actual date of the entry of the order of contempt; but (3) reversed that portion of the sanction that was retroactive, and reversed the sanction insofar as it purported to be for "compensation or damages." View "In re Frieda Q." on Justia Law

This case involved Hunter, who was seventeen months old at the time an abuse and neglect petition was filed. Both of Hunter's biological parents had their parental rights terminated. Hunter was placed with foster parents, and Hunter's grandmother (Grandmother) was allowed to have visits with Hunter twice a month. Grandmother later petitioned the circuit court for additional contact with Hunter. The circuit court granted the petition in an order that was entered in the middle of the foster parents' six-month adoption waiting period. After entry of the order, the issue arose as to whether a grandmother can continue to receive visitation after a child has been adopted by a non-relative. The circuit court submitted the certified question to the Supreme Court, which answered the question in the negative, holding that the Grandparent Visitation Act does not provide for continued grandparent visitation after a child is adopted by a non-relative. The Court then vacated the circuit court's order granting visitation to Grandmother. View "In re Hunter H." on Justia Law

In the underlying abuse and neglect petition, the circuit court adjudicated that respondent parents had neglected their four infant children. The parents then moved for a post-adjudication improvement period. The Department of Health and Human Services (DHHR) and the Guardian ad Litem (GAL) objected. After a hearing, the circuit court granted the parents a six month post-adjudication improvement period. A written order was entered on June 19, 2012. On September 25, 2012, the DHHR and GAL filed a joint petition seeking a writ of prohibition to bar enforcement of the circuit court's order, arguing that the circuit court erred by not allowing evidence of the parents' pre-adjudication neglect and that the parents failed to meet the requisite legal standards for granting a post-adjudication improvement period. The Supreme Court denied the petition for a writ of prohibition, holding that DHHR and GAL failed to demonstrate that the circuit court (1) lacked jurisdiction to grant the parents a six month post-adjudication improvement period, or (2) exceeded its legitimate powers in granting the post-adjudication improvement period. View "State ex rel. Dep't of Health & Human Servs. v. Circuit Court" on Justia Law

Petitioner claimed to be Child's psychological parent. Child's biological mother had virtually no contact with Child. When Child's biological, custodial father (Respondent) pleaded guilty to several crimes, Petitioner filed a motion to intervene in an existing family court action and sought either shared parenting with Respondent or guardianship of Child if Father was sentenced to prison. Father petitioned the circuit court for a writ of prohibition, claiming that the family court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to consider a motion for shared parenting or guardianship. The circuit court granted the writ, thus halting the family court's consideration of Petitioner's motion. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the family court clearly had subject matter jurisdiction to consider Petitioner's motion, and therefore, the circuit court erred in issuing its order granting a writ of prohibition. View "Brooke B. v. Ray C." on Justia Law

The Department of Health and Human Resources appealed a circuit court's order dismissing a petition alleging a father had abused and neglected his daughter. After vesting legal custody of the child with the child's grandmother - a disposition the Department supported - the circuit court determined that further hearings on the petition would not be in the best interests of the child. The Department asserted on appeal that the circuit court was still required to formally determine whether abuse or neglect occurred before the petition could be dismissed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in its finding that full adjudication of the petition was not in the best interests of the child. View "In re D.P." on Justia Law

Petitioner appealed the circuit court's order granting permanent guardianship of her two children to Respondent, their paternal grandmother. Petitioner asserted that the circuit court erred in exercising jurisdiction under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA) and by transferring custody from a biological mother without a finding of unfitness. The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court's order awarding guardianship to Respondent, restored Petitioner's custodial rights, and remanded the matter, holding (1) it was error for the circuit court to exercise jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to the UCCJEA; and (2) the circuit court erred in refusing to consider the evidence of abuse and neglect underlying this guardianship proceeding and in transferring custody of the minor children from a natural parent without a finding of unfitness. View "In re K.R." on Justia Law