Justia Family Law Opinion Summaries

Margaret Chickansoky (Mother) appealed a family court order that modified her parent-child contact rights. The parties originally agreed to share parental rights and responsibilities as part of a December 2005 divorce order. In 2009, the family court granted, in part, father’s motion to modify the original divorce order by awarding him sole legal parental rights and responsibilities. In July 2010, the family court granted father's second motion to modify based on his planned move to Missouri. The court awarded him legal and physical parental rights and responsibilities, with mother having summertime and vacation parent-child contact. The parties then got into a dispute over mother's unplanned or short-notice visits to Missouri. Following a hearing in July 2011, the court entered a twenty-five page order which clarified and modified parent-child contact. The court found that mother placed her needs ahead of the best interests of daughter, engaged in selfish and unreasonable behavior, has been patently unreasonable, has had "no insight whatsoever" as to why her behavior has caused daughter stress, and has failed to gain insight "as to the devastating impact of her behavior." The court also found that father attempted to relieve daughter's stress and that his "good basic parenting" has allowed daughter to have a "consistent, stable routine." Turning to the best-interests analysis, the court found that daughter's emotional development would be harmed if she spent the whole summer with mother. Thus, the court set forth a specific contact schedule and limited mother’s summertime contact to approximately one month. Mother appealed, arguing that: (1) the court exceeded its jurisdiction and violated her right to due process by issuing an order limiting her summertime contact with daughter insofar as she was never notified that summertime contact would be at issue; (2) father failed to make an adequate showing that there was a real, substantial, and unanticipated change in material circumstances to modify the previous custody order; and (3) the court failed to consider the best-interests factors in further limiting her contact with daughter. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the evidence presented before the family court supported the court’s findings about mother’s unreasonableness and lack of insight, and father’s efforts to minimize daughter's stress, which in turn supported the conclusion that daughter's best interests would be served by limiting mother's summertime contact. View "Chickanosky v. Chickanosky" on Justia Law

The trial court dismissed Wife's post-divorce motion for relief from judgment based on Husband's alleged fraudulent concealment of assets without requiring completion of the discovery sought by wife, and without a hearing. Wife and Husband entered into a stipulated final divorce agreement, approved and incorporated into a final order by the family court. Several months after the parties' divorce became final, Wife filed a motion to set aside the final divorce decree on several grounds, including that husband had not disclosed a bank account. The family court denied the motion, noting that both parties had personal checking accounts opened post-separation from which they paid their bills and neither party had included those accounts in their financial disclosures. The court also concluded that the post-judgment questions raised by Wife's motion were relatively minor in the context of the overall case. Several years later Husband filed a motion to modify spousal maintenance due to an unanticipated decline in his income. In connection with that motion, he produced copies of his bank statements that included for the first time, an account that had his and his sister's names on it--an account he opened and used prior to the divorce stipulation. Wife subsequently filed a motion for contempt and enforcement, arguing that Husband indeed had hidden some accounts from her that were to be used in creating the stipulated divorce agreement. The trial court dismissed her motion. On appeal, Wife challenged the trial court's refusal to hold further hearings several outstanding issues pertaining to the accounts issue. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court did not err in declining to hear Wife's motion on the Husband's concealment of the last bank account. The Court found that the motion was time-barred. Therefore, if the motion was time barred, it was not an abuse of the trial court's discretion in refusing to hold another hearing on the issues raised in that motion. View "Olio v. Olio" on Justia Law

The issue in this case was whether the State may prosecute an adult defendant for crimes alleged to have occurred when he was a juvenile. The prosecution was late in bringing the charged because the alleged victims did not come forward until defendant was eighteen years of age and beyond the jurisdiction of the family division.  The State tried to file the information in the criminal division.  The criminal division transferred the case to the family division because it found there was no criminal jurisdiction to adjudicate even the most serious of the offenses without first filing the matter in the family division.  The family division, however, determined it was without jurisdiction to entertain the charges because defendant had reached eighteen years of age. Accordingly, it dismissed all of the charges against defendant. On appeal, the State argued that the family division erred by dismissing the more serious felony charges because: (1) a recent legislative enactment addressing what it called a "gap" in the jurisdictional provisions of the statutes was a mere clarification  demonstrating that the Legislature had always intended that adult defendants be subject to prosecution for serious crimes committed when they were juveniles; and (2) even if the new amendment did not clarify the statutes and fill the gap, there was jurisdiction in the criminal division because that division has always had jurisdiction over all serious felonies. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that: (1) the Legislature's recent enactment did not clarify existing law but rather established entirely new law that could not be applied retroactively to this case; therefore, to the extent that the Legislature has filled the "gap," it has done so only prospectively; and (2) the statutory scheme applicable at the time of the offenses  did not allow either the family or criminal division to exercise its jurisdiction over an adult defendant accused of offenses committed as a juvenile under the age of fourteen.  Accordingly, the Court affirmed the family division's order dismissing all charges in this case.

Mother Jacqueline Parker appealed a superior court judgment that transferred physical parental rights and responsibilities to Father Brian Parker.  She contended that the court erred in concluding that her desire to relocate to Buffalo, New York satisfied the threshold requirement of changed circumstances and supported its decision to transfer physical parental rights and responsibilities to Father. The court's rationale noted that the parties' ability to communicate effectively with each other was "completely dysfunctional," although they were able to exercise legal parental rights and responsibilities in most areas.  After noting that the children's "relationship to Father has been constant and multi-day on a weekly basis," the court concluded that a permanent move to Buffalo "[was] not in the children's best interest, and is so far in derogation of the obligation to promote and provide maximum parent-child contact under 15 V.S.A. § 655(b)(5), that it trumps [Mother's] primary caretaker role, as well as other statutory factors that might otherwise trend in [Mother's] favor." On appeal, Mother emphasized that she was not challenging the court's denial of her motion to modify or her request to move to Buffalo with the children, but rather only the court's transfer of physical parental rights and responsibilities to Father.  She argued that the court erred by arriving at its threshold finding of changed circumstances and its best-interests determination based solely on Mother's conditional intent to relocate. Upon review, the Supreme Court remanded the case for more findings, taking no position on the family court's decision: "our examination of the transcript of the custody hearing reveals abundant testimony by both Mother and Father on issues surrounding the breakdown of the parties' relationship, their inability to communicate, and the children's best interests generally.  Thus, on remand, the trial court may in its discretion conclude that additional evidence is not required in order to make supplemental findings and may instead clarify its rationale, or even alter its decision if duly supported, on the basis of the existing transcript and case file." 

Husband Robert Molleur appealed the property and maintenance components of a divorce order issued by the family division of the superior court.  Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court granted the parties a divorce and awarded Wife Susan Molleur: (1) as her share of the marital property, 75% of the marital component of husband's pension (which generated approximately 41.67% of husband's total monthly pension payment; (2) maintenance in the amount of $1900 to $2100 per month for years 2011 to 2013 and $500 per month permanently thereafter, subject to an inflation adjustment; and (3) $2500 in attorney's fees.  Husband appealed, arguing that the court abused its discretion by awarding wife 75% of the marital component of the pension and permanent maintenance.  Husband also argued that the court erred by ordering an automatic adjustment of maintenance for inflation based upon an arbitrary formula that did not take into account his income. Upon review of the record, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court's findings on this point have support in the record. The Court affirmed in all respects, except that the case was remanded for the trial court to amend the maintenance award's automatic inflation-adjustment provision.

Craig Wilson appealed a family division order that dismissed his motion to modify part of his 2005 final divorce decree. The court concluded that the provision at issue pertained to property division and he did not demonstrate a sufficient reason to modify its terms. On appeal, Mr. Wilson argued that the court abused its discretion in dismissing the motion as a matter of law and not considering the merits of his request for relief from judgment. The order explained that when the parties' youngest child turned eighteen or graduated from high school (in 2014) the house would be sold and the parties would share in the proceeds. The order specifically delineated that neither party was entitled to maintenance. In August 2010, husband filed a motion to modify the divorce decree, claiming that after being laid off in January 2009, he remained unemployed and did not have the financial means to continue sharing the costs of taxes, insurance and maintenance on the house. He asked to be relieved of his obligation of paying for one-half of the taxes and future maintenance. He also asked that the house be placed on the market immediately instead of in 2014. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the family division did not abuse its discretion in determining that Mr. Wilson's claims of financial hardship were insufficient to warrant relief. Furthermore, the Court found that the provisions of the decree relating to the house were "aspects of property division and not maintenance." Accordingly, the Court affirmed the family divisions' decision to dismiss Mr. Wilson's requests.

"This is a case of avoidable error and its consequences." The Vermont League of Cities and Towns (VLCT), the workers' compensation insurance carrier for the Town of Randolph, settled a compensation claim of Claimant Stacey Colson and paid the settlement amount to the Office of Child Support pursuant to an earlier order that OCS issued to collect Claimant's back child support payments. VLCT failed to deduct the amount of an attorney's fee lien granted by the Commissioner of the Department of Labor (DOL) to claimant’s lawyer. VLCT acted with the understanding that the lawyer would not seek the fee if, as occurred, claimant was awarded a lump-sum compensation amount. The lawyer sought her fee, but VLCT resisted double paying that amount, and the dispute has ended up before the Supreme Court after two decisions from the Commissioner and one from Superior Court. Claimant appealed the Commissioner’s grant of summary judgment to VLCT, in which the Commissioner concluded that VLCT acted appropriately in paying over the entire proceeds of claimant’s workers’ compensation award to OCS. Claimant argued that his attorney's lien had priority over OCS's claim for child support arrearages. He claimed that the Commissioner's findings were incomplete and contradictory, that the Commissioner erred when she determined his attorney’s lien did not have priority, and that DOL should be compelled to enforce his attorney’s lien for fees. Upon review of the applicable legal authority and the trial court record, the Supreme Court found that the OCS lien was first in time and therefore took priority, and affirmed the Commissioner's holding that VLCT could not be required to pay the attorney's fee amount to Claimant's attorney.

Mother Karen Cegalis appealed a family court's order that awarded primary custody of her five-year-old son to Father Raymond Knutsen. On appeal, Mother argued the family court made numerous errors in its decision, that the evidence could have only lead to the conclusion that she should have been awarded primary custody. Even if this was a close case, and even if inclined to reach a different result on the same facts, "[the Supreme Court] repeatedly stated . . . that [its] review of custody matters is limited, and that [the Court] must defer to the judgment of the trial court applying its own common sense and experience." Accordingly, the Court found that the evidence presented to the family court was sufficient to support the court's judgment awarding custody to the Father.

In this termination of parental rights case, the Supreme Court considered two separate appeals pertaining to a mother’s and father’s respective rights to their two daughters, seventeen-year-old R.W. and thirteen-year-old N.W. The case presented novel jurisdictional questions because the parents and children are citizens of Sri Lanka and, although mother and the children have been residents of Vermont for a number of years, father resided in Sri Lanka and has never been to Vermont. The Department for Children and Families (DCF) petitioned to terminate both mother’s and father’s residual parental rights. The family division granted the request as to mother, but concluded it lacked personal jurisdiction over father. Mother appealed termination of her parental rights, arguing that the superior court applied the incorrect standard of proof with respect to changed circumstances and engaged in a faulty best-interests analysis. DCF filed a separate appeal as to father, arguing that even though father lacked minimum contacts with Vermont, the court had jurisdiction to adjudicate the status of his children, who were within the court’s jurisdiction. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the termination of parental rights was a determination of status and could be adjudicated when the forum state has a sufficient connection to the children, even absent minimum contact jurisdiction over a parent. Further, in this case, the Court held that exercise of jurisdiction was authorized by the UCCJA and was reasonable given the strong interests of the state and the children in resolution of father’s rights as well as the lack of any conflicting jurisdictional claims by another state or country. The Court affirmed the termination of the mother's parental rights.

Husband-Petitioner John Towslee appealed a post-divorce ruling by the family court. The parties were divorced in 1997. By stipulation, which was incorporated into the final divorce order, Wife-Respondent Cathleen Callanan was awarded the marital home until the parties' youngest child turned eighteen. Wife was responsible for all costs and expenses associated with the home, including "the current mortgage," of which there were two, totaling $87,500, a value near the property's purchase price. The stipulation provided that the proceeds from the sale of the property would be divided equally after deducting the usual and customary expenses associated with the sale of the property, the remaining balance of the current mortgage, the cost of the appraisal, and "the cost of all capital improvements and capital contributions (mortgage)." At issue was the "capital contributions": when Wife tried to sell the property in 2008, the bank required Petitioner to sign off on the sale. He refused, claiming that his Wife owed him money under the terms of the divorce decree. The dispute turned on whether she was entitled to deduct not only the principal component of the mortgage payments she made, but also the interest component of those payments. Following a hearing, the court found the phrase "capital contributions (mortgage)" ambiguous, and it examined extrinsic evidence to discern the parties' intent. After hearing testimony from husband's attorney, who drafted the language in question, as well as from wife, the court concluded that the more reasonable interpretation, given the use of the word "mortgage," was that Wife could deduct the entirety of the payments made on the debt secured by the original two mortgages. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the family court's construction of the decree "was not unfair or unreasonable." As such, the Court affirmed the family court's decision.